



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

AUDIT REPORT

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
IN THE NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE

No. 91-021

December 14, 1990

*Office of the
Inspector General*





INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
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December 14, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT)

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Manpower and Personnel Management in
the Naval Selected Reserve (Report No. 91-021)

This is our final report on the Audit of Manpower and Personnel Management in the Naval Selected Reserve. We made the audit from October 1989 through May 1990. This audit is a segment of the ongoing Audit of Capabilities of Early Deploying Guard and Reserve Units. The objectives of this segment of the audit were to evaluate the Navy's management of Selected Reservists in In-Assignment Processing, a temporary holding status for Reservists awaiting assignment to an authorized billet, and to evaluate the Navy's management of Selected Reserve billets that are difficult to fill or that require extended periods of formal training. We also evaluated internal controls applicable to the audit objectives. About 154,000 personnel were members of the Naval Selected Reserve. Approximately \$3.5 billion was appropriated for Naval Reserve operation and maintenance and personnel accounts for fiscal year 1990.

The audit showed opportunities for the Navy to economize and to streamline the Selected Reserve billet structure. We believe the Navy should reduce the number of personnel carried in In-Assignment Processing, stop providing drill pay to personnel without mobilization assignments, and eliminate the Selected Reserve billets that require unattainable skills and knowledge. The results of the audit are summarized in the following paragraphs, and the details and audit recommendations are in Part II of this report.

About 31,000 Naval Selected Reservists were carried in In-Assignment Processing status. We estimate that one-half of those personnel had been in that status for 90 days or more. Personnel in In-Assignment Processing do not have mobilization assignments, are not included in readiness status reporting, and should not receive drill pay. We found that the Navy incurred costs of about \$3.9 million per month in pay and allowances for personnel in In-Assignment Processing. Also, personnel in In-Assignment Processing were not being trained to fill specific mobilization billets, and at least one-half of the personnel in that status were excess to requirements (page 5).

The Navy nonconcurred in Recommendation A.1.a., which proposed a moratorium on billet structure changes until all Selected Reservists were assigned to mobilization billets or removed from the Selected Reserve, because the backlog of changes created during such a freeze would exacerbate the situation once the freeze was removed.

The Navy concurred in Recommendation A.1.b., which proposed establishing procedures to limit the number and frequency of Selected Reserve billet changes.

The Navy nonconcurred in Recommendation A.2.a., which proposed terminating drill pay for Selected Reservists not assigned to mobilization billets, because there would be, in most cases, a mobilization requirement for the individual, and those personnel were receiving mobilization readiness training, albeit not billet specific.

The Navy nonconcurred in Recommendation A.2.b., which proposed that procedures be established to preclude commencement of or continuation of drill pay for Selected Reservists not permanently assigned to valid mobilization billets, because that action would degrade force readiness, and because time is needed to reassign a member to an appropriate billet without disrupting Selected Reserve participation.

The Navy nonconcurred in Recommendation A.2.c., which proposed procedures be established to permit recruiting only to fill local billet vacancies or vacancies that exist within a reasonable commuting distance, because the Naval Reserve must continue to recruit nationwide in order to meet established mobilization requirements with the best qualified personnel.

The Navy nonconcurred in Recommendation A.3.a., which proposed that FY 1991 funds budgeted for inactive duty training pay and allowances be reduced by \$47 million, because the In-Assignment Processing management issue has primacy over the funding issue, and because funding reductions should not be effected before managers have had the opportunity to resolve issues through management actions that may result in little or no savings.

Likewise, the Navy nonconcurred in Recommendation A.3.b., which proposed reducing appropriate program elements by an

aggregate amount of \$235 million from FY 1991 through FY 1995, because management actions must be allowed to "run their course" before any final savings amount can be derived.

Since it is now unlikely that the recommended pay policy changes could be fully implemented until well into FY 1991, we have modified Recommendation A.3.a. to assume potential monetary benefits of \$11.7 million in FY 1991. Likewise, we adjusted Recommendation A.3.b. to propose that the Navy recognize potential monetary benefits of \$235 million in FY 1992 through FY 1996.

We believe that, with the adjustments mentioned above, each of the Recommendations is still warranted for the reasons cited in Part II of the report. DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all audit recommendations be resolved promptly. Accordingly, the Navy should provide final comments on Recommendations A.1.a., A.2.a., A.2.b., A.2.c., A.3.a., and A.3.b. within 60 days of the date of this memorandum. Management's comments should state concurrence or nonconcurrence in each recommendation cited above, describe corrective actions taken or planned, and provide completion dates for actions taken or planned.

About 8,000 Naval Selected Reserve billets were vacant because qualified prior service personnel could not be recruited, and new accessions could not be trained to qualify for those billets. Retaining those billets in the Selected Reserve virtually assured personnel shortages in those skills in the event of a mobilization (page 13). The Navy concurred in Recommendations B.1. and B.2., which proposed disestablishing vacant Selected Reserve billets requiring skills that are unattainable by Reservists in inactive status and not establishing such billets in the future. The Navy reply was responsive and further comments on items B.1. and B.2. are not necessary.

The audit identified internal control weaknesses as defined by Public Law 97-255, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, and DoD Directive 5010.38. Controls were not effective to limit the frequency and number of Manpower Authorization Change Requests or to preclude payment of drill pay to personnel who do not have mobilization assignments. Controls were not established

to prevent the establishment of Selected Reserve billets requiring skills and knowledge that could not be attained by Reservists in an inactive duty status. Recommendations A.1.a., A.1.b., A.2.a., A.2.b., and B.2. in this report, if implemented, will correct the weaknesses. Therefore, a copy of this final report will be provided to the senior official responsible for internal controls within the Navy.

The courtesies extended to the audit staff are appreciated. If you have any questions on this audit, please contact Ms. Mary Lu Ugone on 703-693-0317 (AUTOVON 223-0317) or Mr. Harrell Spoons on 703-693-0077 (AUTOVON 223-0077). A list of the audit team members is in Appendix F. Copies of this report are being provided to the activities listed in Appendix G.



Robert J. Lieberman
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for Auditing

cc:
Secretary of the Navy
Comptroller of the Department of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
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MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN
THE NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE

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Prepared by:
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MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN
THE NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE

PART I - INTRODUCTION

Background

The mission of the Naval Reserve is to provide trained units and qualified personnel for active duty in the Naval forces in time of war or national emergency or when otherwise authorized by law. Navy total force policies mandate that manpower requirements must be minimized because of high manpower costs and because of the increasing difficulty in providing skilled manpower to meet requirements. Only those manpower requirements that can be fulfilled by qualified personnel on a long-term basis are authorized.

The Naval Reserve is comprised of the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve is made up of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve consists of members of the Ready Reserve who are essential to initial wartime tasks, require priority training, and receive pay for active and inactive training duty performed. The Selected Reserve may be called to active duty either as units or as individuals by order of the Secretary of the Navy. Although subject to a call to active duty in a manner similar to the Selected Reserve, members of the Individual Ready Reserve either do not drill, or drill without pay. The members of the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve remain affiliated with the Navy, but do not drill or receive drill pay and are eligible for active duty only in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress. As of March 31, 1990, the Naval Reserve had about 424,000 members and was comprised of:

- Ready Reserve - 236,000 members.
 - Selected Reserve - 154,000 (20,000 full-time support and 134,000 inactive duty personnel) members.
 - Individual Ready Reserve - 82,000 members.
- Standby Reserve - 11,000 members.
- Retired Reserve - 177,000 members.

The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for the organization, administration, training, and equipping of the Selected Reserve and for mobilization planning to reinforce and augment the active Naval forces. Responsibility for the administration and management of the Naval Reserve program is

delegated to the Director of Naval Reserve who also serves as the Commander, Naval Reserve Force. Units and individuals of the Selected Reserve are assigned to either the Naval Surface Reserve Force or the Naval Air Reserve Force as appropriate.

The Naval Selected Reserve has commissioned, reinforcing, and sustaining units. Commissioned units are similar to units in the active Naval forces. They possess ships, aircraft, or other appropriate equipment and are staffed to operate those resources in operational missions. When mobilized, Selected Reserve commissioned ships, squadrons, and other units would retain their unit identity and become functional components of the active Naval forces. Reinforcing and sustaining units augment Naval or Marine Corps units and shore activities upon mobilization. The members of reinforcing and sustaining units may deploy as a unit, or the members may be deployed individually.

Fiscal year 1990 funds totaling \$2.471 billion were appropriated for the operation and maintenance (\$895 million) and personnel (\$1.576 billion) accounts of the Naval Reserve.

Objectives and Scope

This audit is a segment of the ongoing Audit of Capabilities of Early Deploying Guard and Reserve Units. The objectives of this segment of the audit were to evaluate the Navy's management of Selected Reservists in In-Assignment Processing, a temporary holding status for Reservists awaiting assignment to an authorized billet, and to evaluate the Navy's management of Selected Reserve billets that require Navy Enlisted Classifications that cannot be attained through inactive duty training. We also evaluated internal controls applicable to those audit objectives. The overall audit that is in progress will address the remaining announced audit objectives: to verify the data reported through the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS); to evaluate the status of early deploying Reserve Component units that are excluded from SORTS reporting; to evaluate actions to ensure that early deploying units are staffed, equipped, and trained to perform the missions for which they were designed; and to evaluate the compatibility of equipment between Reserve Component units and Active Component units.

The audit focused on the Naval Selected Reserve units because they are required to be prepared for early deployment in the event of a mobilization. The audit evaluated policies governing the administration of the Selected Reserve including personnel assignment procedures, reserve billet structure, and staffing priorities. We also reviewed training criteria, training programs, and policies on inactive duty training capabilities.

The audit included Naval Reserve recruiting policies and goals and identified actions and initiatives taken by Navy officials to alleviate personnel administration problems.

We reviewed records and reports from January 1986 through May 1990. Information was extracted from the Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management Information System and the Reserve Training Support System. Accordingly, we reviewed management's assessments of the adequacy of the management information systems that support the administration of the Naval Reserve. However, we did not perform audit steps to validate the reliability of the extracted data because the results of such steps would have been inconclusive. System interfacing was difficult because the two systems used different data architectures and programming languages. Errors in computer programs and incorrect edit and validation checks also hampered database management. During our audit, the Navy was already conducting a functional analysis of the management information systems to document discrepancies and to recommend corrective actions. In order to minimize the effect on our reported results, we used data generated by those systems used by the Navy to develop and report budgetary data to the Congress.

The potential monetary benefits described in Part II of this report were based on the ratio of personnel in In-Assignment Processing status, by pay grade, to the total number of personnel in drill pay status, by pay grade, during the 3-month period of December 1989 through February 1990. The monetary benefits represent the estimated average monthly cost to the Government including basic pay, Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes, retirement pay account contributions, and some incentive pay.

The audit was done from October 1989 through May 1990 at the activities listed in Appendix E. This program audit was made in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD, and accordingly included such tests of internal controls as were considered necessary.

Internal Controls

We evaluated internal controls over the management of personnel in In-Assignment Processing status and internal controls over the assignment of Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes to Selected Reserve billets. Internal controls were assessed by comparing results achieved by the procedures and policies in effect on the requirements and objectives promulgated in governing regulations. We concluded that controls over billet structure changes and drill pay were ineffective. We also concluded that procedures to control the assignment of

unattainable NEC's to the Selected Reserve were ineffective. Implementation of Recommendations A.1.a., A.1.b, A.2.a., A.2.b., and B.2. will correct the internal control weaknesses identified in this report. Details on the weaknesses are provided in Part II of the report.

Prior Audit Coverage

There have been no prior audits within the last 5 years that deal with the specific issues addressed in this report.

During our audit, the Naval Audit Service, Southeast Region, was in the audit phase of a project that included In-Assignment Processing in the Selected Reserve. We were advised that In-Assignment Processing may be addressed in the Navy's audit report.

PART II - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. In-Assignment Processing

FINDING

About 31,000, or 23 percent, of the inactive duty members of the Naval Selected Reserve were not assigned to mobilization billets. This condition occurred because the Navy's controls and procedures for managing the Selected Reserve billet structure were ineffective and because recruiting was focused on meeting end-strength goals rather than on filling billet vacancies. As a result, Naval Selected Reservists were retained in drill pay status at an estimated cost of \$3.9 million per month although they had no mobilization billets, were not considered in determining unit readiness status, and would not deploy with their Reserve units upon mobilization. Furthermore, at least 50 percent of the personnel in In-Assignment Processing status may be excess to valid mobilization requirements.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

Background. Personnel in In-Assignment Processing are awaiting assignment to mobilization billets either locally or on a cross-assigned basis (assigned to a billet in a unit located more than 100 miles or 3 hours travel time away). In effect, personnel in In-Assignment Processing status are "transients" who are associated with units for training and personnel administration only. Because Reservists in In-Assignment Processing are not assigned to mobilization billets, Naval Reserve management does not consider them to be excess to the authorized personnel allowances of the units with whom they attend drills. In July 1984, about 13 percent of the Naval Selected Reservists were categorized as in In-Assignment Processing. As of February 1990, personnel in In-Assignment Processing had increased to approximately 26 percent.

Guidance. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16F, "Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures," dated August 12, 1986, provides information, policies, taskings, and procedures for acquiring and managing all Navy personnel. Navy personnel managers are directed to minimize manpower requirements, to identify nonessential authorized billets for deletion, and to minimize Manpower Authorization Change Requests. Furthermore, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, and Training) is required to "Authorize only those manpower requirements which can be fulfilled by qualified personnel on a long-term basis."

Commander, Naval Reserve Force Instruction (COMNAVRESFORINST) 1001.5, "Administrative Procedures for the Selected Reserve and Drilling Members of the Individual Ready Reserve," dated December 15, 1989, requires Reservists in drill pay status to have mobilization assignments.

COMNAVRESFORINST 3501.1G, "Readiness Reporting and Monitoring for Naval Reserve Commissioned and Reinforcing/Sustaining Units," dated December 21, 1989, states that the Naval Reserve is called on to support the active Navy with a trained and fully qualified force.

Mobilization Billets. Selected Reservists in In-Assignment Processing status were not assigned to mobilization billets; however, they received full pay for attending drills. Paying drill pay to Reservists who do not occupy mobilization billets contravenes Naval Reserve Force policy. Before December 1989, Naval Reserve Force Instruction 5400.42, "Administrative Procedures for Naval Reservists on Inactive Duty," required Selected Reservists to be dropped from drill pay status after being in In-Assignment Processing for 90 days. We found that as of December 1, 1989, 15,620 Selected Reservists had been in In-Assignment Processing for more than 90 days (see Appendix A). That number equaled about one-half of the personnel in In-Assignment Processing.

COMNAVRESFORINST 1001.5, which took effect on December 15, 1989, eliminated the language that required terminating drill pay for personnel in In-Assignment Processing after 90 days. However, the Instruction mandates that Reservists in drill pay status be assigned to mobilization billets. Personnel in In-Assignment Processing are not assigned to mobilization billets. As a result, they are excluded from personnel readiness status reporting because they are not counted against any unit's authorized personnel allowance. Accordingly, personnel in In-Assignment Processing should not receive drill pay.

Specific data on the costs of drill pay for personnel in In-Assignment Processing were not routinely available because those costs were not required by Naval Reserve Force management. At our request, the Navy prepared an estimate of those costs. Based on the average drill pay costs for the months of December 1989 through February 1990 and on the ratio of In-Assignment Processing personnel to total personnel receiving drill pay, the Navy estimated the costs to be about \$3.9 million per month or about \$47 million per year (see Appendix B). The Navy could avoid the improper expenditure of \$47 million annually, or \$235 million over the FY 1991 through FY 1995 Five-Year Defense Program, by complying with its own policy that requires Selected Reservists who receive drill pay to have mobilization assignments.

Training. The mission of the Naval Reserve is to provide fully trained personnel to meet mobilization requirements. Mobilization training is defined as that military and occupational training necessary to ensure that incumbents of mobilization billets are able to meet the standards of and to perform competently in assigned billets upon mobilization. Personnel in In-Assignment Processing are not trained to meet specific mobilization requirements, and these personnel do not have training plans. They receive only training that is generic to all Naval ratings, e.g., fire fighting and first aid, rather than receive training in the specific skills required for a particular mobilization billet.

The Navy estimated that 80 percent of all training for Selected Reservists was generic, and only 20 percent was billet-specific. The Navy depended on the benefits that can be derived from generic training to maintain or to develop military skills for personnel in In-Assignment Processing. However, the Navy excluded personnel in In-Assignment Processing status from all training readiness status reports. Although generic training is important, without specific skill training, Selected Reservists would not be fully qualified to perform competently in mobilization billets.

Billet Structure. Navy managers identified billet structure changes as a major cause of personnel being placed in In-Assignment Processing. Navy guidance mandates that frequent and numerous manpower authorization changes ". . . shall not be requested because approval of such requests results in personnel turbulence, excessive administrative efforts in the management of Navy manpower, and unnecessary expenditure of severely constrained financial resources." Despite that guidance, a study done by the Naval Reserve Forces Manpower and Personnel Division in February 1990 concluded that billet changes in the Selected Reserve occurred at the rate of 2.25 changes per unit per hour. The annual changes included 200,000 billet structure changes, other controllable administrative changes, and personnel turnover changes.

The major causes of billet structure changes are billet modifications, problems in management information system interfaces, processing errors, and fluctuating Navy requirements. The Navy's actions to correct these problems were focused on developing an automated data processing capability to cope with the administrative burden created by excessive changes in the Selected Reserve billet structure. Although necessary, improvements in the management information systems alone would not stem the flow of billet structure changes. We believe that the frequency and number of Selected Reserve billet modifications must be better controlled to provide a stable training environment and to promote administrative efficiency.

The Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force, proposed a 1-year moratorium on billet structure changes in his command. Such a moratorium would permit a stable training program, a reduction of the administrative backlog, and the identification of mobilization billets to which personnel in In-Assignment Processing could be assigned. The proposed moratorium would have been in consonance with Navy policies to reduce the volume of billet changes and to make required billet changes in conjunction with an annual billet review. However, billet changes and billet requirements of the active Naval forces are controlled by the Active Navy, not by the Naval Reserve. The differences between the Active Navy's mobilization requirements and its peacetime authorizations are generally translated into Selected Reserve billet requirements. Billet structure turbulence in the Naval Reserve will not be eliminated unless both the Active and Reserve Components comply with Navy policy restricting the volume of Manpower Authorization Change Requests.

Recruiting. The Naval Reserve recruiting policy in effect at the time of the audit exacerbates the In-Assignment Processing problem. In general, the recruiting policy allows the Navy to recruit to fill vacancies in local commissioned units and to recruit to meet Naval Reserve end-strength goals without regard to the location of billet vacancies in noncommissioned units. Naval Reserve activities are directed to accept all accessions delivered by the recruiters. If vacant billets in the appropriate ratings do not exist in the local commuting area (within 100 miles or 3 hours travel time), the newly recruited Reservists are placed in In-Assignment Processing until they can be cross-assigned to a unit located outside the local commuting area that has suitable vacant billets. However, members who are cross-assigned to a distant unit will be mandatorily returned to In-Assignment Processing status if qualified individuals are recruited within the distant unit's local commuting area. Accepting new accessions without suitable vacant local billets creates a transient, In-Assignment Processing population.

The recruiting policy has helped to create a pool of personnel who are excess to requirements. As shown in Appendix A, about 50 percent of the personnel in In-Assignment Processing had been in that status for 90 days or more. We believe that personnel who cannot be assigned to a billet within 90 days are clearly excess to the requirements of the Selected Reserve. Furthermore, some of the personnel who had been in In-Assignment Processing status from 30 to 89 days may also be excess to valid requirements.

Navy Reserve Recruiting management advised us that it did not favor limiting recruiting to valid and projected vacant billets. A prior effort to recruit to fill specific billet

vacancies caused a drop in accessions resulting in a reduction in recruiting funds. As a result, Reservists are recruited to meet end-strength goals without regard to the geographic location of vacant billets in order to maintain a higher level of accessions and to reduce the probability of future recruiting budget reductions. Continued recruiting to meet end-strength goals will perpetuate the need to place personnel in In-Assignment Processing. If demographics support the location of Selected Reserve units, it should be possible to staff units with personnel who reside within a reasonable commuting distance (100 miles or 3 hours travel time). By limiting recruiting to only those accessions needed to fill local billet vacancies, the time spent in In-Assignment Processing could be sharply reduced or eliminated. An added benefit would be elimination of the administrative burden of cross-assignments.

Management Issue. The Navy Inspector General identified In-Assignment Processing as a Naval Reserve management issue in 1983. The problem has remained unresolved since that time. During Exercise Proud Eagle 1989, a mobilization exercise held during November 1989, about one-third of the Naval Selected Reservists were in In-Assignment Processing status, and they were not considered to be ready mobilization assets.

In the event of mobilization, personnel in In-Assignment Processing would be processed as Individual Ready Reservists. In-Assignment Processing personnel would mobilize with the unit they were affiliated with for training, but would not deploy with that unit. Instead, they would remain at the Reserve Center to await assignment or other needed action. The Naval Reserve Personnel Center would then determine the disposition of those personnel. Because In-Assignment Processing personnel would have participated only in generic training, we believe that they would require additional training to meet standards and to perform competently. Thus, they would not have satisfied the mission of the Naval Selected Reserve.

We believe that by enforcing and complying with existing regulations, and by changing Selected Reserve recruiting policy, the Navy can reduce costs, provide the billet stability that is requisite for enhanced training and personnel management, and reduce the need for placing personnel in In-Assignment Processing.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations:

a. Direct a moratorium on Selected Reserve billet structure changes, except billet deletions, until all Selected Reservists are assigned to a mobilization billet or are removed from the Selected Reserve.

b. Establish procedures to limit the number and frequency of Selected Reserve billet structure changes in accordance with the policy stated in chapters 4 and 9 of Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16F, "Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures."

2. We recommend that the Commander, Naval Reserve Force:

a. Terminate drill pay for all Selected Reserve personnel not assigned to mobilization billets.

b. Establish procedures to preclude commencement of or continuation of drill pay for Selected Reserve personnel not permanently assigned to valid mobilization billets.

c. Establish procedures to permit recruiting for the Selected Reserve to fill only local billet vacancies or vacancies that exist within a reasonable commuting distance (100 miles or 3 hours travel time).

3. Assuming implementation of Recommendations A.1.a. through A.2.c., we recommend that the Comptroller of the Navy:

a. Reduce or realign FY 1991 funds for inactive duty training pay and allowances which would have been required before those corrective actions were implemented. For FY 1991, we estimate potential monetary benefits of \$11.7 million.

b. Reduce or realign funds in the 050----N series of program elements in FY 1992 through FY 1996 to reflect monetary benefits related to the corrective actions. We estimate that potential fiscal impact as \$235 million in FY 1992 through FY 1996.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

The Navy stated that the 35,000 inactive duty Selected Reserves not assigned to mobilization billets in January 1990 reflected a temporary problem. In July 1990 the Navy Inspector General reported that the number of personnel in In-Assignment Processing status had dropped to 23,537, or about 17 percent of the force.

That reduction resulted primarily from automatic data processing (ADP) enhancements. The Navy stated that the In-Assignment Processing would be further reduced by management actions and further ADP enhancements. The Navy provided a schedule of actions completed and planned to better manage the In-Assignment Processing situation. However, the Navy nonconcurred with Recommendations A.1.a., A.2.a., A.2.b., A.2.c., A.3.a, and A.3.b. Furthermore, the Navy nonconcurred with the estimated potential monetary benefits. The complete text of the Navy response is at Appendix C.

AUDIT RESPONSE TO MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

We consider the Navy's comments with respect to Recommendations A.1.a., A.2.a., A.2.b., A.2.c, A.3.a., and A.3.b. to be nonresponsive. We believe that those recommendations, as modified in the final audit report, should be implemented based on the information provided in the Discussion of Details section of the Finding and the additional reasons stated below.

We believe Recommendation A.1.a. remains valid because freezing billet changes would allow management the time needed to assign personnel currently carried in In-Assignment Processing status to valid billets if such billets exist. The predicted backlog of billet changes that could build during such a freeze should not occur because the Chief of Naval Operations has directed that the billet file be established using end of the year projected billet requirements. Thus, after the freeze is lifted only those billet changes needed to conform to projected end of the year billet requirements would be necessary. That same work load will be required each succeeding year under the new procedures. The recommended freeze on billet changes should provide an orderly basis for conversion to the procedures directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

We believe that Recommendation A.2.a. remains valid because Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16F states that the Selected Reserve consists of those members of the Ready Reserve so essential to initial wartime tasks that they require priority training and receive pay for active and inactive training duty performed. Further, only those mobilization requirements for which there is a demonstrable need may be authorized. Commander, Naval Reserve Force Instruction 1001.5 states that Reservists in drill pay status are required to have mobilization assignments. Personnel in In-Assignment Processing status do not have mobilization assignments. An individual who has no mobilization assignment is not essential to initial wartime tasks, and is not entitled to drill pay.

We believe that Recommendation A.2.c. remains valid because recruiting nationwide without regard to the location of vacant billets when the Navy is powerless to direct the relocation of Reservists results in members being cross-assigned to units or activities where billet vacancies exist. Such cross-assignments create an additional administrative burden, they are a major cause of members being placed in In-Assignment Processing status, and they adversely impact the management of training for members who are cross-assigned. Those problems could be eliminated if the Navy restricted recruiting of Selected Reservists to personnel who reside in the local commuting area and who are qualified for, or can be trained to fill vacant mobilization billets.

We believe that the thrust of Recommendation A.3.a. remains valid because management's actions over the years have neither resolved the In-Assignment Processing problem nor yielded lasting improvement. In the present instance, management proposes to implement a 90 day grace period, during which suitable vacant mobilization billets for personnel in In-Assignment Processing status may be located, but also proposes a waiver to permit continuation of drill pay if no billet is found. Furthermore, management did not define what level of In-Assignment Processing personnel strength would be considered unacceptable. While we agree that a grace period may be appropriate, we believe that aggressive action is needed. Savings can and should be realized in FY 1991 by applying Navy policy that defines the criteria for establishing Selected Reserve billets (a demonstrable need), and entitlement to drill pay (occupies a mobilization billet). For example, terminating drill pay for the 6,583 personnel acknowledged in the Navy's response to be in In-Assignment Processing status because they were excess to valid billet requirements could result in a cost avoidance conservatively estimated at \$21.4 million per year. Continued full funding for management policies that have failed to resolve the long-standing In-Assignment Processing problem provides no incentive for corrective action.

Recognizing that a grace period may be employed and that FY 1991 is now well under way, we have modified Recommendation A.3.a. to reflect potential savings of \$11.7 million, which assumes full implementation of our other recommendations by the last quarter of FY 1991.

We believe that Recommendation A.3.b. remains valid for the reasons stated above, although we have modified it to address the period from FY 1992 through FY 1996. Recommendations A.3.a. and A.3.b. both allow Navy the flexibility to determine what types of financial plan adjustments would be appropriate.

B. Unattainable Navy Enlisted Classifications

FINDING

The Navy assigned mobilization billets that required specific skill levels to the Selected Reserve even though the requisite skills were considered to be unattainable by Reservists in an inactive duty status. This condition occurred because procedures governing the assignment of mobilization billets to the Selected Reserve were ineffective. As a result, about 8,000 Selected Reserve billets that require highly skilled personnel were vacant. Furthermore, retention of those billets in the Selected Reserve only guarantees a shortfall in those skills when mobilization occurs.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

Background. The Navy enlisted rating is the primary occupational designator for enlisted personnel. Occupational standards define the tasks required of each rating by pay grade. Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes reflect special knowledge and skills not included in the enlisted rating structure. Requirements for personnel possessing special qualifications are indicated by coding billets in manpower authorizations with the appropriate NEC.

The Reserve Unit Assignment Document (the Document) is the official staffing authorization for the Selected Reserve. The Document identifies the specific ratings authorized and, when appropriate, NEC codes. Whenever possible, an exact match of rating, pay grade, and NEC should be achieved in staffing units.

Guidance. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1000.16F, "Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures," dated August 12, 1986, provides that "Only those mobilization requirements for which there is a demonstrable need and capability for peacetime training [emphasis added] may be authorized as Selected Reserve billets." Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Manual P-111-1-86, "Navy Training Plan Manual," dated July 21, 1986, states that when determining whether an NEC can be attained and maintained through Reserve training, only those NEC training courses lasting 45 days or fewer should be considered for personnel with nonaviation ratings. Similarly, only courses lasting 60 days or fewer should be considered for personnel with aviation ratings. Furthermore, if an NEC can be earned through on-the-job training or segmented instruction, that training must be accomplished within a 3-year cycle consisting of three 12-day active duty training periods and 50 percent of the weekend drill time, or a total of 72 days.

Management Issue. In 1982 and again in 1989, the National Naval Reserve Policy Board (the Board) advised senior Navy management of the issue of unattainable NEC's being assigned to the Selected Reserve. On November 14, 1989, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training) sent a memorandum to members of the Navy staff stating:

Assignment of unexecutable NEC's to the Selected Reserve doesn't make any sense and is an issue which we all concur should be corrected. The matter of how to correct this long standing problem is where we lack consensus and has proven to be the 'stumbling block.'

More than 8 years has passed since the Board first recognized the problem, and senior Navy leaders still have not reached a consensus on a practicable solution to resolve the assignment of NEC's to the Selected Reserve.

Unattainable Navy Enlisted Classifications. As of January 1990, the Navy had established 1,337 NEC's. The Director of Naval Reserve has determined that 151 NEC's require knowledge or skills that are unattainable in an inactive duty status. About 30,000 Selected Reserve billets are coded to require NEC's. Of those 30,000 billets, about 8,000 billets, or 26 percent, require one of the 151 NEC's already determined to require knowledge or skills unattainable by personnel serving in an inactive duty status. The 8,000 billets remain vacant because the Selected Reserve has been unable to recruit qualified prior service personnel and because the Selected Reserve cannot train new accessions in the requisite knowledge and skills. But more important, those billets would be vacant in the event of a mobilization, and the active Navy forces would be required to operate without the skills those billets represent.

Management Action. The Director of Naval Reserve has tried to alleviate the problem of unattainable NEC's by using alternative methods to accomplish lengthy training requirements. By the end of 1989, the Director of Naval Reserve had reduced the number of NEC's considered unattainable because of training requirements from 173 to 151 by identifying functional substitutions and by establishing alternatives to qualify Reservists. The training required to qualify for the remaining 151 NEC's cannot be accomplished in the Selected Reserve.

During the audit, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training) was studying a system to identify each NEC proposed for assignment to Selected Reserve billets as attainable, unattainable, or restricted.

Attainable and unattainable would be acceptable and unacceptable, respectively, for assignment to the Selected Reserve. The restricted category would denote an NEC for which pretrained personnel might be available, but availability was not assured. Selected Reserve billets that require restricted NEC's would include a caveat that qualified personnel may not be available and, therefore, operational readiness could be degraded. However, Navy management still had not resolved the issue of unattainable NEC's at the time of our audit.

Current Situation. The Navy managers responsible for approving personnel requirements and for authorizing the establishment of billets have not eliminated the Selected Reserve billets that require knowledge and skills that cannot be attained in an inactive duty status. Although the number of unattainable NEC's had been reduced, billets requiring those NEC's were still levied on the Selected Reserve. As a result, little has changed since 1982 when the problem became a management issue.

We agree with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training) that it makes no sense to assign unattainable NEC's to Selected Reserve billets. To maintain the status quo serves only to mask virtually assured shortfalls in skilled personnel if mobilization occurs. We believe that the disestablishment of Selected Reserve billets that require unattainable NEC's would offer two advantages. First, it would recognize that the Selected Reserve cannot satisfy those requirements. Second, it would force the active Naval forces to consider alternative means to fill those requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations:

1. Disestablish all vacant Selected Reserve billets requiring Navy Enlisted Classifications that have been determined to be unattainable by Reservists.
2. Issue procedures to preclude the establishment of Selected Reserve billets requiring Navy Enlisted Classifications that have been determined to be unattainable by Reservists.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

The Navy has acted to identify billets that can be filled by qualified Selected Reservists or that can be supported by existing training programs. Of the 8,000 vacant billets previously identified as unattainable, 1,600 vacant billets were determined to be supported by the current Selected Reserve inventory and should not be changed, and 3,400 billets were

either valid requirements that must be reprogrammed with an alternative manpower source or invalid requirements that must be deleted. Required actions were to be completed by November 2, 1990. The remaining 3,000 billets require medical specialties. Some of those billet requirements can be met through Reserve Allied Medical Program (RAMP) vocational-technical training. A review to determine which of those requirements can be met by qualified Selected Reservists and RAMP accessions is to be completed by January 1, 1991. Any requirements that cannot be satisfied will be reprogrammed with an alternative manpower source. Concurrently, the Navy will categorize NEC's as "assignable," "not assignable," or "restricted" to prevent unattainable billet requirements from being assigned to the Selected Reserve. The Navy also expects to continue to improve its ability to train Reservists and to find qualified personnel to meet mission objectives. The revised procedures will be published in the January 1991 issue of the Navy Enlisted Classification Manual.

AUDIT RESPONSE TO MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

We consider the Navy's comments to be responsive to the recommendations.

TIME SPENT IN IN-ASSIGNMENT PROCESSING

Number of Days Spent in In-Assignment Processing Status
as of December 1, 1989

<u>Command</u>	<u>Number of Personnel</u>				<u>Totals</u>
	<u>Fewer Than 30 Days</u>	<u>30 to 59 Days</u>	<u>60 to 89 Days</u>	<u>90 Days or More</u>	
Naval Air Reserves	1,227	1,069	566	2,625	5,487
Naval Surface Reserves	5,249	4,608	2,992	12,995	25,844
Totals	<u>6,476</u>	<u>5,677</u>	<u>3,558</u>	<u>15,620</u>	<u>31,331</u>
Percentage of Totals	21	18	11	50	100

DRILL PAY COSTS FOR IN-ASSIGNMENT PROCESSING PERSONNEL*

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Estimated Number of Paid Drills Performed</u>				<u>Average Cost Per Drill</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
	<u>Dec. 1989</u>	<u>Jan. 1990</u>	<u>Feb. 1990</u>	<u>Total</u>		
E-1	2,727	3,361	3,189	9,277	\$ 28.77	\$ 266,899
E-2	5,166	6,077	5,485	16,728	32.65	546,169
E-3	17,028	20,815	18,660	56,503	36.77	2,077,615
E-4	16,990	21,039	18,200	56,229	43.29	2,434,153
E-5	13,797	17,339	15,189	46,325	51.49	2,385,274
E-6	7,927	9,556	8,743	26,226	62.47	1,638,338
E-7	2,952	3,428	3,079	9,459	76.90	727,397
E-8	775	867	809	2,451	90.82	222,600
E-9	218	316	281	815	107.72	87,792
W-2/3/4	16	22	0	38	97.86	3,719
O-1	39	84	50	173	60.14	10,404
O-2	209	183	138	530	92.10	48,813
O-3	1,567	1,648	1,317	4,532	113.79	515,696
O-4	988	733	803	2,524	131.70	332,411
O-5	442	455	373	1,270	156.48	198,730
O-6	173	187	138	498	193.29	96,258
Total Cost for 3 Months						<u>\$11,592,268</u>

Average Cost per Month is \$3,864,089
Rounded to \$3.9 Million

Average Cost per Year is \$46.8 Million (rounded to \$47 million)

*Data on drill pay costs were provided by the Navy.

Methodology

In-Assignment Processing strength onboard in each pay grade divided by total strength onboard in each pay grade equals the percentage of onboard personnel in In-Assignment Processing in each pay grade.

Total drills performed by personnel in each pay grade multiplied by the percentage of onboard personnel in In-Assignment Processing in each pay grade equals the estimated In-Assignment Processing drills performed.

Average cost per drill includes basic pay, Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes, retirement pay account contributions, and some incentive payments.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

25 SEP 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR AUDITING

Subj: AIG(A) DRAFT REPORT: MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
IN THE NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE (PROJECT NO. ORB-0012.01) -
ACTION MEMORANDUM

I am responding to your memorandum of 29 June 1990 (TAB A) on the subject audit of manpower and personnel management in the Selected Reserve.

The Department of the Navy Comments are provided in TAB B.

A DODIG audit of Naval Reserve personnel management reported that 35,000 (26%) of the Selected Reserves (SELRES) were placed in an In Assignment Processing (IAP) status rather than being assigned to a valid mobilization billet. This problem is exacerbated by ADP system procedures which cause an average of 200,000 billet changes annually. The Director of Naval Reserve is taking positive steps to correct systemic and management problems to ensure assignment of SELRES personnel to valid mobilization billets without degrading SELRES end-strength as recommended in the DODIG Audit Report. The number of SELRES assigned IAP has been reduced by 11,500 since the DODIG conducted his audit. Additionally, a Plan of Action and Milestones has been developed to further reduce and control the number of SELRES personnel placed in an IAP status.

The DODIG audit also reported that the Naval Reserve had approximately 8,000 billets that require special knowledge or skills that are unattainable by SELRES personnel during a normal three year training cycle. This problem has been the focus of a Navy working group which already eliminated or filled with a qualified SELRES, 4,000 of the 8,000 billets. The remaining billets will be resolved by 31 January 1991. In addition to addressing the original 8,000 billets, the working group has developed management controls to preclude future allocation of unattainable NEC coded billets to the Selected Reserve component of a ship, squadron, or shore-manning document. Those controls include ADP changes and a standing committee to annually review established procedures and screen the billet file for any incorrectly coded billets.

Robert S. Silberman
ROBERT S. SILBERMAN

Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Acting

TAB A - DOD AIG(A) memo of 29 Jun 90
TAB B - Department of the Navy Comments

Department of the Navy Comments
on
OAIG(A) Draft Report of June 29, 1990
on
Manpower and Personnel Management
in the Naval Selected Reserve
Project No. ORB-0012.01

Finding A: In Assignment Processing (IAP). About 35 thousand, or 26 percent, of the inactive duty members of the Naval Selected Reserve (SELRES) were not assigned to mobilization billets. This condition occurred because the Navy's controls and procedures for managing the Selected Reserve billet structure were ineffective or ignored and because recruiting was focused on meeting end-strength goals rather than on filling billet vacancies. As a result, Naval Selected Reservists who had no mobilization billets, who were not considered in determining unit readiness status, and who would not deploy with their Reserve units upon mobilization were retained in drill pay status at an estimated cost of \$3.9 million per month. Furthermore, at least 50 percent of the personnel in In Assignment Processing status may be excess to valid mobilization billet requirements.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur in Part.

Although the report is correct that there were 35,000 inactive duty Selected Reserves not assigned to mobilization billets in January 1990, this reflected a temporary problem. Prior to and during the audit, the number of people in an IAP status had increased by 5,000 as a result of the installation and testing of ADP software updates. These software updates are designed to provide automated mobilization billet assignments to personnel in an IAP status and presently the situation is greatly improved. In July 1990, the Navy Inspector General reported IAPs to be 17% of the force or 23,527. This reduction in IAP is primarily the result of the initial ADP enhancements and has not been subject to significant management actions. SELRES not assigned to mobilization billets will be further reduced by corrective management actions and ADP enhancements initiated by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commander, Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR).

The schedule for corrective action taken by COMNAVRESFOR is as follows:

<u>ADP Enhancements (completed)</u>	<u>Date</u>
Query demographics information available through the Computer Assisted Juxtaposition of Units (CAJUN) data base within Reserve Training Support	January 1990

System (RTSS) computer software data fields (Beta Test).

Establish a direct computer software interface between Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management Information System (IMAPMIS), and Reservè Standard Training, Administration and Readiness Support (RSTARS) to update current and future manpower changes and assignment changes.

January 1990

Create an IMAPMIS/RTSS interface enhancement which reduces the data rejection rate during data transfer between systems.

March 1990

Overlay billet structuring data in RTSS to IMAPMIS to ensure accurate, identical data in both systems.

June 1990

Conduct an analysis of the billet structure to determine if an automated vertical rating substitution should be incorporated in automated cross-assignment program.

June 1990

Management Actions (pending)

Date

Begin imposing a 90 day limit for SELRES placed in an IAP status.

October 1990

Establish an aggregate 120 day limit per fiscal year that a SELRES can be held in an IAP status.

October 1990

Establish provisions for IAP waiver authority by COMNAVRESFOR (Code O2) to allow for systemic problems beyond management control.

October 1990

Establish a percentage limit on the number of SELRES that can be placed in an IAP status. (X% of total SELRES).

October 1990

Establish an annual review of the percentage limit set on IAP.

October 1990

Establish the SELRES billet file based on forecast billet information from Navy Manpower Data Accounting System (NMDAS) reports.

December 1990

Conduct a demographics study to determine the best locations to establish SELRES billets and reserve units within fiscal management and facilities constraints.	January 1991
Align billets and Reserve Units to better match demographics within fiscal management and facilities constraints of COMNAVRESFOR. (Place the billets where the SELRES live).	March 1991
Assign recruiting goals and add recruiting incentives which prioritize recruiting to local billets before recruiting to the national requirement.	June 1991
Establish controls which maintain IAP below the set limits.	September 1991
Add IAP monitoring/management as an internal control item.	September 1991
Add IAP monitoring/management as a special interest item for command inspections.	September 1991

Many administrative details remain to be accomplished which include billet title or organizational changes (such as Billet Sequence Code changes) by gaining commands which cause automatic computerized displacement to IAP of the billet incumbent. While this displacement may last several months, the incumbent, and the reserve unit/activity understands the change in process and continues training to specific Reserve Billet Training Plan requirements knowing that reassignment to the corrected billet is forthcoming. The actions listed above are designed to correct this problem.

Notwithstanding current policy restrictions on cross assignments, a review of both the Officer and Enlisted Mobilization Allowance Totals Versus On Board SELRES End-Strength Reports shows that ninety five percent of all SELRES can immediately be assigned to valid mobilization billets. This is further substantiated through a review of Defense Manpower Requirements Review (DMRR) statistics. On Board versus allowance analysis and DMRR statistical reviews are attached as Appendixes A and B respectively.

As indicated above, ADP action has been initiated which reduces the number of SELRES who are in an IAP status.

While it has been correctly reported that personnel not assigned to mobilization billets would not immediately deploy with their reserve unit, mobilization procedures provide that IAP personnel

be used as the resource for filling vacant billets as identified to Naval Reserve Personnel Center (NRPC). NRPC will assign personnel to mobilization billets that best utilize their skills.

Additionally, it should be noted that personnel in an IAP status are in fact assigned to a Reserve activity (center, ship, squadron, etc.) as well as to a local Reserve unit. Such assignment does provide for military skill and rating/designator training which meets approximately 80% of the mobilization requirements for many billets and a significant portion of the required training for most of the remaining billets. The lack of a mobilization billet assignment does not render the member without value in the event of mobilization.

However, there will be a segment of the SELRES who will be placed in an IAP status as a result of personnel actions. Primarily, this would involve SELRES who move and must reestablish affiliation with a Reserve Activity near their new residence. This equates to the Regular Navy's Individuals Account (Transits, Prisoners, Patients and Holders). This is the account to which the Regular Navy assigns their transitory personnel. Such an account for the Naval Reserve should not be as large as that of the Regular Navy since the Reserve account would only have those personnel who are transferring (moving) or are displaced because of a billet deletion.

The draft report incorrectly states that Commander, Naval Reserve Recruiting Command (COMNAVRESCUITCOM) recruits only to an end-strength requirement. In actuality, each new accession is recruited against a specific, existing SELRES officer designator requirement or enlisted rating requirement. An initiative to target recruiting to local requirements will be instituted once the demographics study and billet realignment review have been completed. This will enhance COMNAVRESCUITCOM's ability to recruit to local billets. However, COMNAVRESCUITCOM will remain accountable for meeting accession goals which will require the flexibility to recruit to national requirements.

Recommendation A.1.a: That the Chief of Naval Operations direct a moratorium on Selected Reserve billet structure changes, except billet deletions, until all Selected Reservists are assigned to a mobilization billet or are removed from the Selected Reserve.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

Because the billet file is now structured using only those billets which are currently in effect, a freeze of the billet file would only serve to further exacerbate the problem. During such a freeze, a backlog of billet requirements would be building which would cause a large upheaval in the billet file when the

freeze is removed. CNO has directed that the billet file be established using information which projects end of the year billet requirements. Once the billet file is created with this data, freezing the billet file will be unnecessary because the intermittent changes which occur during the year will not affect the file as they currently do.

Recommendation A.1.b: That the Chief of Naval Operations establish procedures to limit the number and frequency of Selected Reserve billet structure changes in accordance with the policy stated in chapters 4 and 9 of Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16F, "Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures."

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

CNO is now providing COMNAVRESFOR with future billet requirements from the NMDAS report and has tasked COMNAVRESFOR with establishing the billet structure file using this data. By structuring to future (end of the year) requirements rather than structuring based on existing billets, the need to react to the constant changes which occur in the billet file during the year will be greatly reduced.

Recommendation A.2.a: That the Commander, Naval Reserve Force terminate drill pay for all Selected Reserve personnel not assigned to mobilization billets.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

Although an individual may not be currently assigned to a mobilization billet, there remains, in most cases, a mobilization requirement for the individual and those individuals are receiving mobilization readiness training, albeit not billet specific. A period of time must be provided to determine if a person who has been removed from a billet can be reassigned to another mobilization billet. Also, time must be allowed for those people who are relocating to establish unit affiliation at a Reserve activity near their new residence.

However, when the 90 day time limit is reached or it can be determined that there is no mobilization billet for a SELRES, whichever occurs first, that SELRES will be removed from drill pay status unless waived.

Recommendation A.2.b: That the Commander, Naval Reserve Force establish procedures to preclude commencement of or continuation of drill pay for Selected Reserve personnel not permanently assigned to valid mobilization billets.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

Immediately removing a SELRES from drill pay when a billet is deleted without considering other mobilization billet assignments or the reestablishment of a deleted billet would degrade force readiness. The individual in an IAP status can still be mobilized, possesses mobilization skills, and continues to receive general mobilization training. The establishment of a 90 day limit on IAP allows time to reassign the SELRES to an appropriate mobilization billet without disrupting SELRES participation. As soon as it is determined that no mobilization billet is available, or the 90 day limit is reached, the Reservist will be transferred from the SELRES to a non-pay status unless waived.

Recommendation A.2.c: That the Commander, Naval Reserve Force establish procedures to permit recruiting for the Selected Reserve to fill only local billet vacancies or vacancies that exist within a reasonable commuting distance (100 miles or 3 hours travel time).

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

The Naval Reserve must continue to recruit to national requirements. Unlike the active components, the Naval Reserve can not transfer inactive duty personnel to a duty station. In order to meet established mobilization requirements with the best qualified personnel, the Naval Reserve must be able to recruit where former military personnel relocate and the population will support non-prior service accessions. COMNAVRESFOR has been tasked with conducting a demographics study and aligning billets and Reserve units to correspond to this study within fiscal management and facilities constraints. COMNAVRESCUITCOM will be assigned goals which give priority to recruiting to local billets, but does allow for recruiting to national requirements.

Recommendation A.3.a: That the Comptroller of the Navy reduce FY 1991 funds budgeted for inactive duty training pay and allowances by \$47 million.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

Reviewing management actions which have occurred since the DOD IG audit reflects COMNAVRESFOR has reduced the number of people placed in an IAP status from 35,000 in January 1990 to 23,500 in July 1990. The Plan of Actions and Milestones developed by CNO (OP-095 and OP-01R) sets specific requirements for COMNAVRESFOR to meet in reducing and managing IAP personnel. Savings, if any, are dependent upon the success or failure of the management actions being instituted to deal with the IAP management issue raised in the audit. That IAP management issue has primacy over the funding issue that is associated with the IAP program. Those

management actions must be allowed to 'run their course' before any final savings amount can be derived. Funding reductions cannot and should not be effected before Reserve managers have had the opportunity to resolve issues through management actions that could, eventually, result in little or no savings. NAVCOMPT will monitor the progress of COMNAVRESFOR and determine if funds should be reduced should COMNAVRESFOR fail to meet the required milestones, and the number of IAP personnel remains at or reaches an unacceptable level.

Recommendation A.3.b: That the Comptroller of the Navy reduce the appropriate specific Program Element in the 050----N series of elements in the FY 1991 through FY 1995 Five Year Defense Program by an aggregate amount of \$235 million.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

The management action taken by COMNAVRESFOR to date and the Plan of Actions and Milestones developed by CNO (OP-095 and OP-01R) set specific goals to reduce and control the IAP population within acceptable established limits. Reviewing management actions which have occurred since the DOD IG audit reflects COMNAVRESFOR has reduced the number of people placed in an IAP status from 35,000 in January 1990 to 23,500 in July 1990. The Plan of Action and Milestones developed by CNO (OP-095 and OP-01R) sets specific requirements for COMNAVRESFOR to meet in reducing and managing IAP personnel. Savings, if any, are dependent upon the success or failure of the management actions being instituted to deal with the IAP management issue raised in the audit. That IAP management issue has primacy over the funding issue that is associated with the IAP program. Those management actions must be allowed to 'run their course' before any final savings amount can be derived. Funding reductions cannot and should not be effected before Reserve managers have had the opportunity to resolve issues through management actions that could, eventually, result in little or no savings. NAVCOMPT will monitor the progress of COMNAVRESFOR to determine if the appropriate program element should be reduced if COMNAVRESFOR fails to meet the established goals.

Finding B: Unattainable Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) Codes. The Navy assigned Mobilization billets that require specific skill levels to the Selected Reserve even though the requisite skills were considered to be unattainable by Reservists in an inactive duty status. This condition occurred because procedures governing the assignment of mobilization billets to the Selective Reserve were ineffective. As a result, about 8,000 Selected Reserve billets that require highly skilled personnel were vacant. Furthermore, retention of those billets in the Selected Reserve only guarantees a shortfall in those skills when mobilization occurs.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur in Part.

The Navy establishes mobilization requirements to satisfy capabilities for a specific operating environment. The most cost effective manpower resource (i.e. active, reserve, civilian) is assigned to these requirements by sponsors and claimants. Those requirements that are time-urgent and military essential are assigned to active military or SELRES.

CNO (OP-095) is responsible for satisfying the manpower demand for SELRES; and, if unable, must inform the responsible CNO sponsors/claimants that it cannot support the requirement in quantity or quality.

Because of a reserve training (TRC A) issue, COMNAVRESFOR determined there are 151 'unattainable' NECs in the SELRES program. This initial review addressed only those NECs which had known training requirements that were unattainable by SELRES. The majority of Navy's 1337 NECs were not addressed by COMNAVRESFOR during the initial review. However, the full spectrum of resourcing qualified manpower which was not considered in the initial review will be considered in the final list of 'unattainable' NECs which will be completed by 1 September 1990.

CNO approached the problem by reviewing the affected requirements and available manpower resources. CNO sponsors, claimants, and COMNAVRESFOR determined in February 1990 that many of the requirements were valid and many of the billets were either being filled with qualified SELRES or were supportable by existing training programs. In summary:

- 3000 billets can be supported by the vocational-technical school 'Reserve Allied Medical Program' (RAMP) and should not be changed.
- 1600 billets were supported by current SELRES inventory and should not be changed.
- 3400 billets were either:
 - Valid requirements and must be reprogrammed with an alternative manpower source.
 - Invalid and must be deleted from NMDAS.

Concurrent with the above, CNO categorized the NECs for SELRES as either 'Assignable', 'Restricted' or 'Not Assignable'.

In February 1990, CNO implemented action to remove invalid billets from NMDAS and required that COMNAVRESFOR specify which NECs and how many related billets it can or cannot support. As of 1 August 1990, approximately 860 of the 3400 billets which required OP-12 action remain to be corrected in NMDAS. OP-12 action on the remaining 860 billets will be complete by 2 November 1990.

During a meeting held on 18 July 1990, OP-095 stated that the 3000 medical NEC billets previously identified as supportable through the RAMP program can not be supported solely by RAMP accessions because of the limited number of students completing the course of study. OP-093 and BUMED are evaluating the SELRES billet requirements based on SELRES inventory holding the required NECs and RAMP accessions against the recently revised requirements resulting from a reduction in medical programs. This review will be completed by 1 January 1991. Any requirements which are in excess of available SELRES and RAMP assets will be reprogrammed with an alternative manpower source.

The SELRES NEC issue is an ongoing action item. CNO expects that COMNAVRESFOR will continue to improve its ability to train SELRES and to find qualified personnel in order to meet the mission objectives of the Navy.

Recommendation B.1: That the Chief of Naval Operations disestablish all currently vacant Selected Reserve billets requiring Navy Enlisted Classifications that have been determined to be unattainable by Reservists.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

CNO will remove SELRES mobilization billets with 'unattainable' NECs and re-code all valid manpower mobilization requirements for another manpower resource. COMNAVRESFOR will annually review its ability to support SELRES billets.

Recommendation B.2: That the Chief of Naval Operations issue procedures to preclude the establishment of Selected Reserve billets requiring Navy Enlisted Classifications that have been determined to be unattainable by Reservists.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

CNO has completed a software change in NMDAS to prevent mobilization billets with 'Not Assignable' NECs from being assigned to SELRES.

CNO will categorize all SELRES NECs as either 'Assignable', 'Not Assignable' or 'Restricted' no later than 1 October 1990. This change will be contained in the January 1991 edition of the NEC Manual for resource sponsor and claimant use.

CNO will establish procedures by 2 November 1990 to manually control the number of mobilization billets with 'Restricted' NECs that can be assigned to SELRES.

Methodology and Summary

Methodology

Data on following pages represent "allowance" for ratings/designators which have excess personnel "onboard" from NRPC 4080-1020-7 and 4080-1050-7 as of 6/30/90.

Only those overmanned ratings/designators are listed because only they contribute to IAP as defined by having more people of that rating/designator than existing structured billets. That number of people is the "excess" number. The "SN" line is not a rating, but instead is a vehicle to capture occupational field paygrade E-3 and below. These "excesses" can actually be spread into the rating groups, which will happen over time as GENDET personnel strike for ratings. No projection of ratings to which these SN's may strike is assumed here. The same potential structure exists for the AN, CN and FN communities, however, all three of the groups are undermanned, thus contribute no excess personnel to the overall posture.

The page on "Warfare Billet Tracking" summarizes those "Requirements Designators" versus manning in the "Inventory Designators", an analysis made necessary by the existence of numerous billets written in which personnel with a variety of designators fit (ie-the billets for designator 1000, 1050, etc). Note that the allowance of 12574 is not fully satisfied by the onboard of 12303, so no "excess" people result.

The term "Combined Health Care" is similar, taking into account the 2000 designator, which no people hold, offset by the designated people and the billets from designators 2105, 2205, 2305, 2905 and 7545.

Summary:

Group	Allow	Onbd	"Excess"	"IAP"
Officer	26535	27623	1718	6.2%
Enlisted	105050	96107	4865	5.1%
Total	131585	123730	6583	5.32%

The resultant "IAP" computation expressed as a % of people, as is done in the report, produces the 5.32% IAP rate.

**Officer Designator Personnel Excesses
Allowance vs Onboard, per NRPC Report 4080-1020-7, as of 6/30/9**

Desig	Allow	Onbd	Percent	Excess
Health Care				
Combined	5097	6176	121%	1079
1500/1510	229	269	117%	40
1525	189	232	123%	43
1615	405	409	101%	4
1625	0	4	-	4
1635	2189	2315	106%	126
1655	252	267	106%	15
1675	0	4	-	4
1805	97	122	126%	25
1925	0	2	-	2
1945	0	7	-	7
1955	0	1	-	1
1975	0	7	-	7
2505	431	487	113%	56
3165	0	84	-	84
4105	436	504	116%	68
5105	818	914	112%	96
6125	17	20	118%	3
6135	60	67	112%	7
6185	17	23	135%	6
6195	7	9	129%	2
6315	1	3	300%	2
6325	2	3	150%	1
6395	1	2	200%	1
6415	16	25	156%	9
6425	3	7	233%	4
6445	12	18	150%	6
6495	5	12	240%	7
7125	4	8	200%	4
7185	14	17	121%	3
7235	2	3	150%	1
7495	1	2	200%	1
Officer Total Excess				1718

**Enlisted Rating Personnel Excesses
Allowance vs onboard, per NRPC Report 4080-1050-7 as of 6/30/90**

Rating	Allow	Onbd	Percent	Excess
ABE	107	163	152%	56
ABF	184	209	114%	25
ABH	271	353	130%	82
AD	1408	1461	104%	53
AK	1001	1100	110%	99
AME	165	253	153%	88
AMH	538	626	116%	88
AQ	179	239	134%	60
ASE	13	33	254%	20
AT	1502	1520	101%	18
AV	31	33	106%	2
AZ	458	635	139%	177
BT	791	1124	142%	333
CE	1376	1402	102%	26
DK	282	344	122%	62
DP	1007	1030	102%	23
DS	237	288	122%	51
DT	998	1070	107%	72
EA	458	464	101%	6
EM	1299	1743	134%	444
ET	1823	2140	117%	317
FC	845	898	106%	53
FT	14	15	107%	1
FTB	7	34	486%	27
GMG	1155	1159	100%	4
GMM	363	380	105%	17
GSM	107	129	121%	22
IC	504	799	159%	295
IM	162	188	116%	26
JO	177	211	119%	34
LI	82	123	150%	41
MA	312	356	114%	44
MM	1593	2169	136%	576
MT	9	40	444%	31
OTA	132	171	130%	39
PC	156	237	152%	81
PH	366	384	105%	18
PM	45	48	107%	3
PN	793	937	118%	144
RP	224	243	108%	19
SH	559	632	113%	73
SK	5517	5883	107%	366
SN	6352	7011	110%	659
STS	90	157	174%	67
TM	718	817	114%	99
WT	115	139	121%	24

Enl Total Excess

4865

Warfare Billet Tracking

Summary of Inventory vs Requirements
 Requirements from OPA; Inventory from NRPC Report 4080-1020-7

"Requirements Designators"

Desig	FY-89 (as of 9/30/89)					OPA/ Onbd +/-	FY-90 (as of 6/30/90)					OPA/ Onbd +/-
	OPA	Allow	Onbd	%All	%OPA		OPA	Allow	Onbd	%All	%OPA	
1000	4811	4561	0	0%	0%	-4811	4532	4487	0	0%	0%	-4532
1050	283	362	0	0%	0%	-283	283	325	0	0%	0%	-283
1160	244	261	47	18%	19%	-197	252	332	48	14%	19%	-204
1170	189	0	4	-	2%	-185	189	0	2	-	1%	-187
1190	18	13	1	8%	6%	-17	20	17	3	18%	15%	-17
1300	627	855	399	47%	64%	-228	627	854	367	43%	59%	-260
1370	0	0	2	-	-	2	0	0	7	-	-	7
1390	0	0	1	-	-	1	0	0	3	-	-	3

"Inventory Designators"

1105	0	478	3001	628%	-	3001	0	295	2861	970%	-	2861
1115	1728	2083	3115	150%	180%	1387	1720	2239	3322	148%	193%	1602
1125	594	542	1125	208%	189%	531	594	560	1231	220%	207%	637
1135	173	176	72	41%	42%	-101	173	174	77	44%	45%	-96
1145	258	224	123	55%	48%	-135	256	195	123	63%	48%	-133
1315	2424	2170	3062	141%	126%	638	2424	2264	3088	136%	127%	664
1325	1054	785	1118	142%	106%	64	1054	832	1171	141%	111%	117
Total	12403	12510	12070	96%	97%	-332	12124	12574	12303	98%	101%	179
Tot #211972	12110	11875	98%	99%	-97	11695	12205	12103	99%	103%	408	
w/out 1135/1145												

Methodology and Summary

Methodology

Data on the following two pages was derived in the same manner as data supplied to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Navy's annual submission to the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR).

1. The DMRR reports Actual Inventory versus Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI) to identify the variances between them. DMRR methodology defines occupation manning as follows:

Category	Occupation Size	Short	Balance	Overage
Small	< 100 people	< 85%	≥ 85% and ≤ 115%	> 115%
Medium	100-499 people	< 90%	≥ 90% and ≤ 110%	> 110%
Large	500+ people	< 95%	≥ 95% and ≤ 105%	> 105%

2. One of the Navy's unique personnel management methods is the use of designators and ratings which can be filled by more than one occupation group:

- 1000 Unrestricted Line Officer billet which may be filled by any officer with a designator of 110X, 111X, 112X, 113X, 114X, 116X, 117X, 118X, 119X, 130X, 131X, or 132X.
- 1050 Unrestricted Line Officer billet requiring an officer qualified in any one of the warfare specialties (111X, 112X, 113X, 114X, 131X, or 132X) (O3 and above)
- 1300 Unrestricted Line Officer billet (Other than Operational Flying) requiring Air Warfare specialty of, or previous designation as a Naval Aviator (pilot) (131X) or Naval Flight Officer (132X) (O3 and above)
- 1500 Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer billet requiring Aerospace Engineering (151X) or Aerospace Maintenance (152X) specialties (O6 and above)
- 2000 Medical Department (Medical Admin) Officer billet which may be filled by any Medical Department officer (210X, 220X, 230X, and 290X) with appropriate skill and experience (O4 and above)

Similar enlisted groups exist; however, they are at the E3 level and while very general in nature, can be filled by E4s in more specialized fields.

On the basis of the OSD DMRR criteria and the Navy system of billets described above, the below manning existed in the Inactive Selected Reserve on 30 June 1990:

OFFICERS:	OVER	BALANCED	SHORT	TOTAL
# of Skills	29	14	45	88
Authorized	11,858	7,796	7,080	26,734
Onboard	13,771	7,800	5,646	27,217
Over/Short	1,913	4	-1,434	483

ENLISTED:

# of Skills	30	28	44	102
Authorized	30,075	12,634	61,104	103,813
Onboard	34,029	12,541	49,435	96,005
Over/Short	3,954	-93	-11,669	-7,808

NOTE: The overwhelming number of shortages are in CWO, O1-O2 and E3/E4 billets.

The resultant true number of individuals who do not match any authorization in the force is 5,955, or 4.6%.

DMRR TABLE IV-6 INACTIVE SELRES OFFICER INPUT

		OVER	BALANCED	SHORT	TOTAL
CWO	# OF SKILLS	6	3	23	32
	OPA	9	58	533	600
	ONBOARD	18	31	150	199
	OVER/SHORT	9	-27	-383	-401
O1-03	# OF SKILLS	19	8	28	55
	OPA	2681	2060	9765	14506
	ONBOARD	3151	2107	5314	10572
	OVER/SHORT	470	47	-4451	-3934
O4-06	# OF SKILLS	19	9	22	50
	OPA	6931	3548	1149	11628
	ONBOARD	12112	3587	747	16446
	OVER/SHORT	5181	39	-402	4818
O1-06	# OF SKILLS	23	11	22	56
	OPA	11849	7738	6547	26134
	ONBOARD	13753	7769	5496	27018
	OVER/SHORT	1904	31	-1051	884
ALL	# OF SKILLS	29	14	45	88
OFFICERS	OPA	11858	7796	7080	26734
	ONBOARD	13771	7800	5646	27217
	OVER/SHORT	1913	4	-1434	483

DMRR TABLE IV-6 INACTIVE SELECTED RESERVE ENLISTED INPUT

		OVER	BALANCED	SHORT	TOTAL
E1-E4	# OF SKILL	22	12	52	86
	EPA	12734	3898	37476	54108
	ONBOARD	14791	3896	25878	44565
	OVER/SHORT	2057	-2	-11598	-9543
E5-E9	# OF SKILL	46	32	21	99
	EPA	24695	13987	11023	49705
	ONBOARD	28405	14022	9013	51440
	OVER/SHORT	3710	35	-2010	1735
E1-E9	# OF SKILL	30	28	44	102
	EPA	30075	12634	61104	103813
	ONBOARD	34029	12541	49435	96005
	OVER/SHORT	3954	-93	-11669	-7808

**SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL MONETARY AND OTHER
BENEFITS RESULTING FROM AUDIT**

<u>Recommendation Reference</u>	<u>Description of Benefit</u>	<u>Amount and Type of Benefit</u>
A.1.a.	Internal Controls. Enhance readiness by assigning Reservists to valid mobilization billets for training. Also, would reduce administrative burden by stabilizing billet structure.	Nonmonetary
A.1.b.	Internal controls. Improve training opportunity and reduce administrative burden by reducing billet structure changes.	Nonmonetary
A.2.a.	Internal controls. Cost avoidance from terminating drill pay for Reservists not assigned to mobilization billets.	Benefits are recorded under A.3.a. and b. below.
A.2.b.	Internal controls. Enhance readiness by ensuring all personnel are assigned to valid mobilization billets for training, and by reassigning excess personnel.	Nonmonetary
A.2.c.	Economy and efficiency. Improve training opportunity by reducing billet structure changes, and reduce administrative burden associated with cross-assignment of personnel.	Nonmonetary
A.3.a.	Economy and efficiency. Savings from terminating drill pay for Reservists not assigned to mobilization billets.	Monetary. Savings of \$11.7 million in the FY 1991 Reserve Personnel, Navy appropriation.

**SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL MONETARY AND OTHER
BENEFITS RESULTING FROM AUDIT (Continued)**

<u>Recommendation Reference</u>	<u>Description of Benefit</u>	<u>Amount and Type of Benefit</u>
A.3.b.	Economy and efficiency. Program reduction to realize savings from terminating drill pay for Reservists not assigned to mobilization billets.	Monetary. Program reduction of \$235 million from Program 05, Guard and Reserve, during the period FY 1992 through FY 1996.
B.1.	Economy and efficiency. Improve manpower management by eliminating unattainable billet requirements.	Nonmonetary
B.2.	Internal controls. Improve manpower management by determining capability of Naval Reserve Force to meet manpower requirements.	Nonmonetary

SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL MONETARY AND OTHER
BENEFITS RESULTING FROM AUDIT (Continued)

Six-Year Defense Program (SYDP) Budgetary Impact

Recurring Savings (millions)

<u>Appropriation</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u>	<u>FY 1996</u>	<u>Total SYDP</u>
Reserve Personnel, Navy (17-1405-0-1-051)	\$12	\$47	\$47	\$47	\$47	\$47	\$247
<u>Program</u>							
05-Guard and Reserve (Program Element 050----N) <u>1/</u>	\$12	\$47	\$47	\$47	\$47	\$47	\$247

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1/ The Navy must determine which program elements are affected. The funds could either be withdrawn from the program elements or redistributed within them or among them.

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Department of the Navy

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve
Affairs, Washington, DC
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations/Chief of Naval Personnel,
Washington, DC
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and
Operations, Washington, DC
Commander, Naval Reserve Forces/Director of Naval Reserve,
Washington, DC
Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Forces, New Orleans, LA
Commander, Naval Air Reserve Forces, New Orleans, LA
Commander, Naval Reserve Recruiting Command, New Orleans, LA
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