

Audit



Report

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

**STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM
REPORTING BY NATIONAL GUARD
AND RESERVE UNITS**

Report No. 93-083

April 22, 1993

Department of Defense

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The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in this report.

AFB.....	Air Force Base
AFR.....	Air Force Regulation
AFSC.....	Air Force Specialty Code
AGS.....	Aircraft Generation Squadron
ALO.....	Authorized Level of Organization
AR.....	Army Regulation
ASI.....	Additional Skill Identifier
CJCS MOP 11.....	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy 11
CONUS.....	Continental United States
CRS.....	Component Repair Squadron
EMS.....	Equipment Maintenance Squadron
GAO.....	General Accounting Office
I-I.....	Inspector-Instructor
IAP.....	International Airport
LIN.....	Line Item Number
MOS.....	Military Occupational Specialty
MTOE.....	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NAS.....	Naval Audit Service
NWP.....	Naval Warfare Publication
SORTS.....	Status of Resources and Training System
SQI.....	Special Qualification Identifier
TAR.....	Training and Administration of Reserves
TDA.....	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TOE.....	Table of Organization and Equipment



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April 22, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Status of Resources and Training
System Reporting By National Guard and Reserve
Units (Report No. 93-083)

This final report is provided for your review and comments. The report identifies significant problems related to the reporting of personnel and equipment status by National Guard and Reserve units mobilized for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

A draft of this report was issued to the addressees for comment on September 18, 1992. Replies were received from the Department of the Army on December 29, 1992; from the Department of the Navy on December 12, 1992; from the Department of the Air Force on November 16, 1992; and from the Joint Staff on November 18, 1992. The final report contains 23 recommendations to improve the reporting of personnel and equipment status by the Military Departments. The Military Departments and the Director, Joint Staff, concurred, partially concurred, or nonconcurred with the recommendations in the draft report. We revised three recommendations and added two recommendations in response to comments on the draft report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all audit recommendations be resolved promptly. Recommendations are subject to resolution in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3 in the event of nonconcurrence or failure to comment. The response requirements section at the end of each finding identifies the unresolved issues and the specific requirements for your comments. Comments on the unresolved recommendations must be provided by the addressees by June 22, 1993.

The courtesies extended to the audit staff are appreciated. If you have any questions on this audit, please contact Mr. John Gannon at (703) 692-2906 (DSN 222-2906) or Mr. John Mundell at (703) 692-2869 (DSN 222-2869). The distribution of this report is listed in Appendix F.



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Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

cc:

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Secretary of the Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
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Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau

Audit Report No. 93-083
(Project No. 1RA-0025)

April 22, 1993

Status of Resources and Training System
Reporting By National Guard and Reserve Units

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction. The Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) was established by Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy 11, March 16, 1990, to provide the Joint Staff with reports on resources (personnel and equipment) and training of Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve units. SORTS is the primary method used to report the status of those areas. The data in SORTS reports indicate the status of a unit's personnel, equipment, and level of training at a given time compared to the personnel, equipment, and training required to undertake the mission for which the unit was organized or designed.

Objectives. The principal objective of the audit was to evaluate whether SORTS reports adequately portrayed the status of personnel and equipment and supplies on hand in National Guard and Reserve units mobilized for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Also, we reviewed policies and procedures relating to personnel transfers among units during Operation Desert Shield. However, we discontinued our work on personnel transfers because of concurrent audit coverage by the General Accounting Office.

Audit Results. Procedures for calculating the status of personnel (**Finding A**) and equipment and supplies on hand (**Finding B**) for SORTS reports did not ensure that the actual status was reported for units mobilized for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Of the 51 units we audited, SORTS reports for 41 (80 percent) mobilized National Guard and Reserve units were based on inaccurate data. As a result, either the status of personnel or equipment and supplies was overstated in SORTS reports submitted by 23 units. In addition, the status of equipment was understated in the SORTS report submitted by one unit. Sufficient time was available during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to remedy problems identified during the mobilization process. If SORTS reporting procedures are not corrected and if a high number of SORTS reports continue to be based on faulty data as identified by this audit, future deployment decisions could be adversely affected and harmful delays in mobilization and deployment may result.

Internal Controls. An evaluation of internal controls was not performed because it was not part of our audit objectives.

Potential Benefits of Audit. Implementation of the recommendations in this report will improve the SORTS reports by helping to ensure the status of personnel and equipment and supplies on hand is more accurately reported. There are no monetary benefits associated with this audit. A list of potential benefits resulting from the audit is in Appendix D.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommended that the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and the Director, Joint Staff, revise the criteria governing SORTS reports. Also, we recommended that reports be prepared in compliance with the Services' instructions and that essential equipment needed by the Services be determined.

Management Comments. The draft report contained 21 recommendations. The Military Departments and the Director, Joint Staff, concurred with 11 recommendations, partially concurred with 2 recommendations, and nonconcurred with 8 recommendations. The discussion of management comments is in Part II of the report, and the complete texts of management comments are in Part IV of the report. We added two recommendations in the final report. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller), Inspector General, Department of the Army, and the Director, Joint Staff are requested to provide comments on unresolved issues and the two new recommendations by June 22, 1993.

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This report was prepared by the Readiness and Operational Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD. Copies of the report can be obtained from the Secondary Reports Distribution Unit, Audit Planning and Technical Support Directorate (703) 614-6303 (DSN 224-6303).

PART I - INTRODUCTION

Background

Reporting of unit status. The primary method to report the status of Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve units to the Joint Staff is the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). SORTS is an internal management tool used by the Joint Staff and the Services¹ to support contingency planning and to manage resources. SORTS provides information on unit identity, location, and resources. SORTS indicates, at a specific point in time, the status of unit resources (personnel and equipment) and training required to undertake the mission for which the unit was organized or designed.

SORTS policies and procedures. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy 11 (CJCS MOP 11), "Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)," March 16, 1990, establishes the requirements for SORTS reporting and defines the criteria to measure the status of resources and training. CJCS MOP 11 requires Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve combat units, combat support units, and Service-designated combat service support units to report in SORTS. The category levels (C-levels) used to report the status of a resource area are based on criteria in CJCS MOP 11 and the Services' implementing instructions.

Commanders use C-levels to report the status of four areas: personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and training. C-levels represent the status of unit resources or training a unit has compared to its wartime requirements. Appendix A describes the C-levels and how the C-levels are calculated for personnel and equipment and supplies on hand. C-levels are also used to report the Commander's subjective overall assessment of a unit's resources and training. Once the C-level is computed for an individual resource area, it cannot be changed. As a baseline, the overall unit rating may be no higher than the lowest C-level assigned to a measured area. However, unit commanders are authorized to subjectively upgrade or downgrade a unit's overall C-level based on an assessment of the unit's mission and capabilities and all factors affecting the unit's capabilities. In assessing a unit's overall status, the commander evaluates the unit's resources and training and other factors, such as morale and the quality of leadership, which cannot be objectively measured.

In addition to the assigned C-levels, the units include comments in the SORTS reports to clarify information or to provide additional data required by the Services. CJCS MOP 11 requires unit commanders to include comments in SORTS reports justifying subjective changes to an overall C-level.

¹ For the purposes of this report, the Services include the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

CJCS MOP 11 also requires that reports be submitted to the Joint Staff within 24 hours when changes occur in a resource C-level due to a change in resources and when changes occur in an overall C-level. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps also require their units to submit periodic reports. Before Operation Desert Shield, Army National Guard units reported quarterly, and Army Reserve units reported semiannually. Effective July 15, 1991, the Army changed the reporting requirement for Army Reserve units to quarterly. The Marine Corps requires quarterly reports from Reserve units, and the Air Force requires monthly reports from Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units. The Navy requires reports to be submitted within 4 hours of a change in status.

Use of SORTS in mobilizing for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Except for the Marine Corps, the Services used SORTS reports to assist in identifying the most combat-ready units to mobilize for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Marine Corps officials stated that SORTS reports did not play a major role in its assessment of Marine Corps units because the same data were obtained from other Marine Corps reporting systems. To select the units to be mobilized, the Services used SORTS reports and other data to identify the units that were the best staffed, equipped, and trained to perform their missions.

Objectives

Audit objectives. The audit objectives were to determine whether SORTS reports adequately portrayed the status of personnel and equipment and supplies on hand for units mobilized for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and to evaluate the policies and procedures relating to personnel transfers among units during Operation Desert Shield. We announced those objectives on July 22, 1991, after completing an initial review of the mobilization and deployment processes in each Service. We decided to focus on SORTS reporting and personnel transfers because of their potential effect on the mobilization process.

Discontinued objectives. During the audit, we discontinued the evaluation of policies and procedures relating to personnel transfers during Operation Desert Shield because of concurrent audit coverage by the General Accounting Office (GAO). United States Code, title 10, section 673b, restricts mobilization during a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up, like Operation Desert Shield, to members of the Selected Reserve². Because the law precluded the call-up of Individual Ready Reservists during Operation Desert Shield, the Army transferred members from

² The Selected Reserve is one of the three components of the Ready Reserve. The Ready Reserve also includes Individual Ready Reservists and the Inactive National Guard. The Selected Reserve consists of Reserve units, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and personnel who are awaiting or have not completed initial Active Duty training.

nonmobilizing units to mobilizing units to fill shortages. Army officials told us that if mobilization had continued, additional combat-ready units may not have been available because of the personnel transfers. Conversely, according to officials in the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, transfers of personnel did not reduce the combat effectiveness of their units. GAO, Report No. NSIAD-92-67 (OSD Case No. 8919), "Army Had Difficulties Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces," March 10, 1992, states that the limitations of the law restricted the flexibility of the Army during mobilization. Army officials told us that the mobilization process was being studied and that the Army may recommend changes to the law. The GAO report states that Congress may wish to examine the intent behind the use of the current call-up legislation.

Scope

Elements affecting scope. The audit was limited to SORTS reporting for personnel and equipment and supplies on hand. Equipment condition and training were excluded from review because during the first stage of the audit, no significant problems were found in those resource areas. In addition, the status and quality of training were considered to be too subjective to be included in the audit. The audit was limited to Continental United States (CONUS) based National Guard and Reserve units that had 20 or more members mobilized either for Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm and that report in SORTS. Army Roundout Brigades were excluded because of the extensive audit coverage and congressional oversight those units received during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Active Duty units were also excluded because the audit focused on the status of units selected for mobilization. The reliability of computerized personnel rosters and equipment lists was not established and internal controls were not reviewed because the primary audit objective was to evaluate the policies for SORTS reporting.

Statistical sampling plan. Of 1,065 units mobilized through March 1991 that met our audit criteria, 51 units (see Appendix B) were statistically selected for review. We statistically selected the units using geographic cluster sampling. This efficient and economical method allowed us to achieve a reasonable coverage of many types of units. The clusters were selected from geographical regions developed by dividing the four CONUS time zones into north and south. We randomly selected four of the eight regions, then two zones from each of the four regions. From the universe of 1,065 (717 Army, 23 Navy, 261 Air Force, and 64 Marine Corps) units, a random sample of 51 (26 Army, 2 Navy, 20 Air Force, and 3 Marine Corps) units was drawn from the clusters. The sample plan would have provided a basis for statistical projections had the audit uncovered systemic problems among the Services' National Guard and Reserve units. Since systemic problems were not detected, the sample was used only to ensure adequate coverage of the universe.

Policies for SORTS reporting are the same in each Service's Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve units. Although the audit results are not statistically projectable to the Active Duty units, many of the problems observed in the National Guard and Reserve units may also exist in Army, Navy, and Air Force Active Duty units. However, problems observed in Marine Corps Reserve units would not be found in Marine Corps Active Duty units because those units use other procedures for determining the status of personnel and equipment and supplies on hand.

Reports reviewed. We reviewed SORTS reports prepared before and at mobilization by Army, Navy (one of two units), and Marine Corps units. Air Force SORTS reports were not available for that time period, because the Air Force does not require units to retain reports. Therefore, Air Force units' most current (September, October, November, or December 1991) reports were reviewed. One Navy unit did not have supporting documentation for the SORTS report prepared before or at mobilization; therefore, we reviewed its September 1991 report. We recalculated unit status levels based on data supporting the reports. SORTS policies and reports were discussed with Joint Staff and Service headquarters personnel, full-time staff at the units, and some unit commanders.

Auditing standards. This program audit was made from February 1991 to April 1992 in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD. Activities visited or contacted during the audit are listed in Appendix E.

Prior Audit Coverage

Since the publication of CJCS MOP 11 in March 1990, the Inspector General, DoD, has issued three audit reports relating to SORTS reporting. Two audit reports state that SORTS reports did not contain accurate data because criteria for determining the status of units were not adequate. The Joint Staff nonconcurred with the audit reports, stating that evidence was not presented to demonstrate that SORTS reports were inaccurate. The third Inspector General, DoD, audit report stated that there was not an adequate system to provide oversight and tracking of chemical and biological defense equipment. The report recommended that CJCS MOP 11 be modified to include the equipment status level for chemical and biological defense in SORTS reports. The Joint Staff partially concurred, stating that SORTS policy would be modified to require reporting the status of chemical and biological defense, but all items of chemical and biological defense would not have to be included in SORTS reports. Additionally, both the GAO and the Naval Audit Service have issued audit reports that pertain to the accuracy of SORTS reports. Appendix C contains summaries of the prior coverage. Problems regarding the accuracy and reliability of SORTS reports data for personnel and equipment and supplies on hand were found during our current audit. We continue to believe that changes to SORTS criteria are necessary to ensure that Joint Staff

and Service decision makers receive reliable data. Although sufficient time was available during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to remedy problems identified during the mobilization process, future mobilizations may not allow time for extensive consultations and delays caused by inaccurate reporting.

Other Matters of Interest

While conducting audit work at the Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalion 3 (the Battalion), we were told that the Commander of Beach Group One in the Persian Gulf prevented female cargo handlers from deploying with the Battalion during Operation Desert Shield. The SORTS report submitted before mobilization included the 18 female cargo handlers as available and qualified. After being replaced by male cargo handlers, the female cargo handlers were sent to Al Jubail, Saudi Arabia, by the Battalion's higher headquarters, the Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Staff (the Staff), to assist in unloading ships in the port. The male cargo handlers were sent with the Battalion off-shore in the Persian Gulf to unload ships. The Battalion commander was not given an official reason for preventing the females from being deployed off-shore. Staff officials advised us that they were informally told that the ships in the Persian Gulf were severely overcrowded and that living accommodations aboard ship were not adequate to accommodate females. Although the Battalion commander believed that the unit's mission was accomplished, the unit's integrity and cohesion were disrupted by replacing the females as the unit was preparing to go to war. The Navy's mission statement (Required Operational Capability/Potential Operational Environment) for cargo handling units requires the units to operate in hostile environments. We believe that unit integrity and cohesion are important elements in meeting mission requirements, and should be maintained.

PART II - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. STATUS OF PERSONNEL IN SORTS REPORTS

The Joint Staff's SORTS reporting instructions and the Services' implementing procedures did not ensure that the actual status of personnel mobilized for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was reported. The Services reported unqualified personnel as qualified and did not separately assess personnel most critical to the accomplishment of a unit's mission. In addition, Service personnel did not prepare SORTS reports in compliance with Service regulations, guidance on processing SORTS data was inadequate, oversight reviews were not made, and personnel processing SORTS data were untrained. The reported category level for the status of personnel resource area in SORTS reports was based on inaccurate data for 10 (20 percent) of 51 units audited. The inaccurate data caused the status of personnel to be overstated in SORTS reports submitted by seven (14 percent) units audited. The status of personnel reported by two units was not effected by the inaccurate data, and the effect on the status of personnel in one unit could not be determined because data were not available. Sufficient time was available to remedy the resulting delays in properly identifying and mobilizing the appropriate units for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. However, future decisions by the Joint Staff and Service headquarters could be based on inaccurate information and harmful delays in mobilization and deployment could occur if the SORTS reporting process is not revised.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

Background

Implementation of SORTS. Each Service has issued instructions implementing SORTS. In implementing the policies and criteria in CJCS MOP 11, the Services' instructions have been tailored to fit their respective needs. For example, the Air Force SORTS regulation specifies the personnel considered to be critical for determining personnel status. At the audited Air Force units, critical personnel varied from 46 percent to 100 percent of the number of required³ or authorized⁴ personnel. The Army and Marine Corps consider all personnel to be critical. The Navy considers all officers to be mission-essential and periodically publishes a list of mission-essential enlisted personnel ratings and codes.

³ Personnel requirements are identified as required personnel in Air Force mobility units. A mobility unit is required to deploy to perform its mission.

⁴ Personnel requirements are identified as authorized personnel in Air Force generation units. A generation unit performs its mission at its present location.

Personnel Status Reporting in the Army National Guard and Reserve

Guidance implementing SORTS. Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, "Unit Status Reporting," August 30, 1988, implements SORTS reporting in the Army.⁵ AR 220-1 states that personnel status is to be determined by comparing available personnel strength, military occupational specialty (MOS) qualified strength, and senior grade (E-5's and above) strength to the wartime requirements for personnel listed in Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) or Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDAs). MTOEs and TDAs are Army authorization documents that specify the personnel and equipment units need to perform their missions during wartime and peacetime. A special qualification identifier (SQI) is a one-character code that identifies special qualifications of the position, such as first sergeant (M), parachutist (P), or drill sergeant (X). An SQI is used with a three-character MOS identifier and the skill level digit to form a five-character MOS code (e.g., 13B4X). An additional skill identifier (ASI) is a two-digit code that identifies a specialized skill, qualification, or requirement that is needed in addition to the MOS. ASIs primarily identify skills that require formal training or civilian certification but that are too narrow in scope to comprise an MOS. ASIs have been established to identify such skills as patrol dog handler (A9), postal operations (F5), and petroleum vehicle operator (H7). The ASI code is added to the five-character MOS code (e.g., 71L20F5). If a commander considers an SQI or ASI to be essential to completion of a unit's assigned wartime mission, AR 220-1 requires the commander to consider the skill of personnel requiring the SQI or ASI in determining the unit's training and overall status.

Calculation of personnel status. The status of personnel was overstated in SORTS reports submitted by 2 of the 26 Army units examined because personnel reported as qualified did not possess all skills and training required of their assigned positions. Assigned personnel were not qualified because they were not trained for the SQI or ASI specified on the unit's authorization document. AR 220-1 requires that in calculating the MOS qualified strength, units consider only the first three characters of the MOS code, thereby excluding SQIs and ASIs from the calculation of a unit's personnel status. However, for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, personnel in one unit who had been reported in the SORTS reports as qualified were not mobilized because they did not possess the SQI for drill sergeant. In another unit, personnel who had been reported as qualified but did not possess the ASI for postal operations were given training at the mobilization station in an effort to qualify them in their assigned positions before being deployed to Saudi Arabia.

SQIs. The C-level for personnel in a training unit was inaccurate in SORTS because personnel who were not fully trained as

⁵ In the Army, SORTS reports are called Unit Status Reports.

drill sergeants were reported as qualified. The unit's stated mission is to train recruits in field artillery. The unit's TDA required 136 personnel, including 72 personnel with MOS 13B (field artillery) and SQI X (drill sergeant). In calculating the status of MOS qualified personnel, the unit used AR 220-1 criteria and determined that 62 (86 percent) of 72 drill sergeant positions were filled by qualified personnel. However, only 25 of the 72 positions were filled by fully trained drill sergeants. If AR 220-1 required the SQIs to be included in the personnel status calculations, the unit's reported C-level for personnel would have been C-4 instead of C-3. The commander submitted the following remarks on the lack of qualified personnel:

Shortage of qualified drill sergeants limits the unit's ability to fully conduct the mobilization mission. Although the drill sergeant positions are filled with good potential candidates, the time in grade and schooling requirements will take about 3 years for the younger soldiers to become drill sergeants.

However, in other remarks submitted with the SORTS reports, the commander justified upgrading the overall status of the unit as follows:

Upgrade to C-2 because unit has sufficient equipment and assigned MOS qualified junior personnel to accomplish the 13B [field artillery] training mission.

The unit was mobilized in January 1991 to provide field artillery training to Individual Ready Reservists at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The training unit's higher headquarters decided individuals without the SQI for drill sergeant could not be mobilized. To fill the shortage of qualified drill sergeants, the unit's higher headquarters transferred 47 fully qualified drill sergeants from another training unit to the mobilized unit.

By not considering SQIs in determining the status of personnel, the Army's SORTS reporting procedures permitted the status of personnel to be distorted. If personnel will not be deployed with their unit because of a lack of job qualification, they should not be considered qualified in the calculation of personnel status for SORTS reports. Replacing the unqualified personnel as the unit mobilized disrupted the cohesion of the unit.

ASIs. A postal unit's personnel status was inaccurately reported because personnel who were not qualified for the required ASI were considered MOS qualified in determining the personnel C-level. The unit's MTOE specified a total of 120 personnel, including 111 personnel who were required to be qualified in MOS 71L (administrative specialist) and ASI F5 (postal operations). In its October 1990 SORTS report, the unit reported a C-3 personnel

status. In calculating the status of qualified personnel, the unit considered as fully qualified 32 personnel who possessed the administrative specialist MOS but not the ASI for postal operations. Therefore, the postal unit's personnel status should have been C-4, not C-3. The commander made no comments in the SORTS report regarding the shortage of personnel with ASI F5.

After the unit was mobilized in December 1990, training classes in the ASI for postal operations were held at the mobilization station in an attempt to qualify personnel. Twenty-one personnel who were already MOS qualified for administrative specialist completed training for the ASI in postal operations before the unit was deployed. By not considering ASIs in SORTS reporting, the status of personnel was allowed to be overstated. Unit personnel considered the training at the mobilization station essential to provide unit cohesion and to ensure all postal services could be provided.

Factors affecting personnel status. Although the C-levels were calculated in accordance with AR 220-1, the SORTS reports for the training and postal units did not portray actual unit personnel status. The Army policy of basing personnel qualifications only on the first three digits of the MOS code excludes consideration of specialized skills (SQIs and ASIs) needed in the full performance of a unit's assigned mission. A similar condition was identified in IG, DoD, Audit Report No. 92-029, "Capability of Reserve Component Intelligence Units to Satisfy Wartime Requirements," December 23, 1991. That report stated that the status of intelligence personnel may not be accurately reported because specific language requirements are not considered in SORTS reporting. The report states that a unit could report that personnel were qualified even though personnel were proficient in one or more languages, whether or not they were proficient in the one required by the unit.

RECOMMENDATION, MANAGEMENT COMMENTS, AND AUDIT RESPONSE

1. We recommend that the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations revise Army Regulation 220-1, "Unit Status Reporting," to require that special qualification identifiers and additional skill identifiers that denote critical skills required during wartime be included in the calculation of personnel status for Status of Resources and Training System reports.

Management comments. The Department of the Army nonconcurrent with the recommendation, stating that the Army considers all MOSs critical and does not intend to increase attention on specific ones. The response also stated that commanders can determine whether skills are essential and whether unit personnel have the required skills. Further, the commanders consider the soldiers' skills in determining the training and overall C-levels.

Audit response. SORTS reports should accurately state the status of unit resources. The MTOE for the unit specifies the number of personnel with specific skills to accomplish the unit's wartime mission. We acknowledge that the commander should assess the qualifications of the unit personnel in determining the overall status of the unit. However, in one of the units discussed in the report, the commander upgraded the status of the unit after acknowledging the shortage of trained personnel. When the unit was mobilized, the unqualified personnel were not allowed to mobilize with the unit and were replaced by personnel from another unit. For the other unit discussed in the report, the commander made no remarks and did not change the overall C-level to reflect the shortage of fully qualified personnel. When that unit mobilized, training had to be provided at the mobilization station to provide personnel the skills required of their duty position. We maintain that soldiers who do not possess skills specified by the MTOE should not be counted as MOS qualified and available in the calculation of the personnel resource area. Permitting this unnecessary degree of subjectivity in reporting reduces the commander's incentive to provide the needed training. We request that the Army reconsider its position in commenting on the final report.

Personnel Status Reporting in the Naval Reserve

Guidance implementing SORTS. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 10-1-11, "Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)," September 1987, provides instructions on preparing SORTS reports and assigns oversight responsibilities in the Navy. NWP 10-1-11 requires that Navy units determine a personnel status rating for each primary mission area. Primary mission areas are functions a unit must be fully capable of performing during wartime. The Navy's mission statements specify 16 primary mission areas, such as anti-air warfare, construction, and logistics. The personnel status reported in the SORTS report is based on the lowest C-level computed for personnel in each assigned primary mission area. Units determine personnel C-levels by comparing available personnel strength, available mission-essential personnel strength, and available mission-essential senior grade (E-5's and above) personnel strength to wartime requirements for those three areas. The Chief of Naval Operations identifies the mission-essential enlisted personnel for all primary mission areas for SORTS reporting. NWP 10-1-11 requires that all officers be considered mission-essential. Additionally, NWP 10-1-11 requires a unit's Immediate Superior in Command to review SORTS data to ensure that units comply with reporting requirements in processing SORTS data.

Calculation of personnel status. The personnel C-levels reported for the two Naval Reserve units audited were based on inaccurate data. The effect on the status of personnel reported by the units could not be determined. Because unit personnel preparing SORTS reports were not adequately trained, the personnel status was not calculated in accordance with NWP 10-1-11. A

separate C-level for each primary mission area was not calculated, and all mission-essential personnel were not identified. Additionally, unit personnel were not aware that the Chief of Naval Operations had identified mission-essential enlisted personnel for SORTS reporting.

Identification of mission-essential personnel. The Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalion 3 (the Battalion) did not calculate a C-level for each primary mission area in determining the unit's overall personnel status. The commander subjectively determined that the overall personnel status was C-1 based on how he believed the unit, at that time, would perform its wartime mission. Neither the unit commander nor the unit's wartime higher headquarters, the Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Staff (the Staff), implemented the list of mission-essential personnel for each primary mission area. Neither the Commander nor the Staff were aware that the Chief of Naval Operations had identified mission-essential enlisted personnel for SORTS reporting. Additionally, the Commander, Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California, the Battalion's Immediate Superior in Command, had not performed required reviews of the SORTS reports in compliance with NWP 10-1-11. He was not aware of his responsibility to review SORTS reports. Had reviews been done, the personnel needed for each primary mission area may have been identified before SORTS reports were submitted to decision makers.

Based on the experiences of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Staff recognized that additional guidance was needed in determining the status of personnel. In April 1991, the Staff identified the quantity and mission-essential personnel needed for each primary mission area in a memorandum, "Reserve Cargo Handling SORTS Guidance," to the Navy's 12 Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions. The guidance in the memorandum assigned a weighted value to each personnel position based on the criticality of the position. The guidance will enable the overall personnel C-level to be based on the lowest personnel C-level for each primary mission area. We believe the Staff's guidance is commendable and exceeds the requirements of NWP 10-1-11.

Computing personnel status. Personnel preparing SORTS reports for Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 55 (Squadron 55) did not include officers in computing the personnel C-level. Squadron 55 has a wartime requirement for 40 officers and 196 enlisted personnel. By excluding the 40 officers, approximately 17 percent of the unit was not included in the computation of the personnel C-level. Unit officials stated that the staffing level for officers in the unit exceeded 100 percent and that the status of officers was subjectively considered. Although inclusion of the officers would not have changed the C-level on the September 1991 SORTS report, future reports could be inaccurate if all personnel are not included in the C-level computations.

Determining mission-essential personnel for primary mission areas. Squadron 55 SORTS reports were not prepared in accordance with NWP 10-1-11 because neither the unit commander nor Squadron 55's Immediate Superior in Command, the Fleet Logistics Support Wing (the Wing), specified the type and number of personnel required for each primary mission area. Instead of calculating C-levels for personnel in each primary mission area, unit personnel applied the same C-level to each primary mission area. The unit requires both air crews and maintenance personnel to perform its mission. However, not all personnel are needed for each of the unit's four primary mission areas (command, control, and communications; fleet support operations; logistics; and mobility), and some personnel are more critical than others. Squadron 55 is a three C-9B aircraft squadron with a mission to provide worldwide fleet logistics support by transporting personnel and material. The Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, issued guidance in September 1989 to Active Duty aviation units in the Pacific, specifying the number of air crews and the enlisted personnel needed for each primary mission area. To ensure that the critical personnel requirements for each primary mission area are considered, the Wing should issue similar guidance to its subordinate units.

Reviewing SORTS reports. The Wing conducted a review of Squadron 55's SORTS reporting process in September 1991; however, the review was inadequate. The Wing's review did not identify the deficiencies that the auditors found in Squadron 55's September 1991 SORTS report regarding either personnel or equipment (deficiencies regarding the reporting of equipment are discussed in Finding B). Additionally, the Wing review did not provide useful feedback on reporting procedures to the personnel preparing the SORTS reports and did not identify that the personnel preparing the report needed training. We learned that the individual primarily responsible for preparing Squadron 55's SORTS report was not trained in preparing the report. Both the SORTS reporting process and instructions in NWP 10-1-11 are complex, and personnel responsible for preparing SORTS reports should receive comprehensive training to ensure accurate reporting.

RECOMMENDATIONS, MANAGEMENT COMMENTS, AND AUDIT RESPONSE

2. We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations establish procedures to provide Naval Reserve units the current list of the mission-essential personnel required for the calculation of the personnel status for Status of Resources and Training System reports.

Management comments. The Department of the Navy concurred, stating that the Naval Reserve would ensure all applicable Reserve commands and headquarters staffs receive updates of mission-essential personnel listings.

Audit response. The Navy's comments on the recommendation are considered responsive, and no further response is required.

3. We recommend that the Commander, Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California, review Status of Resources and Training System reports in compliance with Naval Warfare Publication 10-1-11, "Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)."

Management comments. The Navy concurred and stated that commanding officers of Reserve centers with cargo handling battalions will be directed to review SORTS reports.

Audit response. The Navy's comments on the recommendation are considered responsive, and no further response is required.

4. We recommend that the Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing:

a. Issue guidance requiring unit personnel preparing Status of Resources and Training System reports to use the personnel designated in the list of mission-essential personnel published by the Chief of Naval Operations in the calculation of the unit's personnel status.

Management comments. The Navy concurred, stating that the Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing, will issue specific instructions no later than February 1, 1993, to use the list of mission-essential ratings that the Chief of Naval operations would publish no later than January 1, 1993.

Audit response. The Navy's comments are considered responsive, and no further response is required.

b. Train personnel responsible for preparing Status of Resources and Training System reports to calculate category levels in accordance with guidelines in Naval Warfare Publication 10-1-11, "Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)."

Management comments. The Navy concurred, but did not specify when the Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing, would conduct necessary training and how training would be provided on a recurring basis.

Audit response. We request that comments be provided in response to the final report on what training will be provided by the Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing, and when the training will be provided.

Personnel Status Reporting in the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve

Guidance implementing SORTS. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 55-15, "Unit Reporting of Resources and Training Status (Category Levels) (Status of Resources and Training System [SORTS])," November 21, 1986, implements SORTS reporting in the Air Force. For Air Force wing organizations, SORTS reports are submitted by the flying units and by ground support units, such as security police, medical, and civil engineering units. Maintenance personnel are included with the flying squadron they support. AFR 55-15 requires the personnel C-level to be based on total personnel and critical personnel. Critical personnel are officers or enlisted personnel who are qualified in a specialty denoted by an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) listed in AFR 55-15. The Regulation requires commanders to examine reported C-levels for the possible masking of a lack of capability in the measured area and suggests that the overall C-level be adjusted if a critical shortage of personnel exists. Additionally, AFR 55-15 requires commanders to submit remarks identifying shortages and to support the rationale for adjusting an overall C-level.

Calculation of personnel status. The actual status of personnel in the flying and maintenance squadrons for two associate wings and in two medical units was overstated in SORTS reports. If the status of personnel had been reported separately, the C-levels for personnel in the flying squadrons would have been higher than the C-levels for personnel in the maintenance squadrons. When the flying and maintenance squadrons were combined for SORTS reporting, the personnel shortages in the maintenance squadrons and the number of qualified personnel in the flying squadrons were not evident. In the medical units, shortages of doctors and surgical personnel were masked in the calculation of the C-level by the number of personnel on hand in less critical positions. The C-level is based on a mathematical calculation, and all critical personnel were considered equal in the calculation of the C-level, regardless of their relative importance to the accomplishment of the unit's mission.

Personnel status in Air Force wings. Reliable and accurate information on the status of flying and maintenance squadrons was not provided to decision makers because SORTS data for the flying and maintenance squadrons were combined. Data on these squadrons was combined because, in the past, the flying and maintenance squadrons were expected to be activated together.

One of the two wings audited had four flying squadrons and four maintenance squadrons. Two flying squadrons had C-5 aircraft; the other two had C-141 aircraft. The four maintenance squadrons consisted of two Aircraft Generation Squadrons (AGS) (one for each type of aircraft), one Equipment Maintenance Squadron (EMS), and one Component Repair Squadron (CRS). The wing submits a SORTS report for each aircraft type. The wing combined the flying

squadrons (two C-5 aircraft squadrons or two C-141 aircraft squadrons), a specific AGS, and the maintenance personnel from the EMS and CRS for each type of aircraft. The personnel status in the SORTS report for the two C-5 flying squadrons and associated maintenance personnel was C-1; however, reported separately, the personnel status for the C-5 aircraft EMS and CRS personnel would have been only a C-2 level. In addition, the personnel status in the SORTS report for the two C-141 flying squadrons and the associated maintenance personnel was C-1; however, the status for both the C-141 AGS personnel and the EMS maintenance personnel should have been a C-2 level. Had each flying squadron and each maintenance squadron for both types of aircraft been reported separately, shortages of maintenance personnel would have been revealed.

The personnel status in the other wing we audited also was distorted by combined data on the flying and maintenance squadrons. The wing had three C-141 flying squadrons and three maintenance squadrons. The personnel status in the SORTS report for the flying and maintenance squadrons was C-1. Had they not been combined with the flying squadrons, two of the three maintenance squadrons would have been at a C-2 level; the third would have been at a C-3 level.

Because of the combined data in the wings' SORTS reports, needed information on which units to mobilize for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was not available. During the mobilization, portions of units were not mobilized until a specific need for their capabilities was identified. At one of the wings audited, segments of three flying squadrons and four maintenance squadrons were called up in five increments over a 7-month period. In selecting squadrons to mobilize, the wing's higher headquarters had to contact the wing by telephone and discuss each squadron's actual status. Although coordination can be expected in deciding which wing to send to war, SORTS reports should contain sufficient and accurate information for higher headquarters or the Air Force to determine the combat-ready status of individual units and, ultimately, which units to mobilize and deploy. Because wings probably will not be mobilized as an entire unit in the future, SORTS reports should show separately the status of individual flying squadrons and the status of maintenance personnel supporting each type of aircraft.

Critical personnel. The personnel status in two Air Force medical units was inaccurately reported because shortages of critical personnel were masked in the calculation of the C-level by the availability of less critical personnel. In the hospital unit audited, 368 personnel were required. Of that total, 255 personnel (69 percent) were in a specialty designated as critical by AFR 55-15. The unit reported a C-2 level in SORTS, even though the hospital had shortages in two critical areas: 13 (50 percent) of 26 doctors and 29 (60 percent) of 48 surgical personnel. In a clinic unit, 122 personnel were authorized, and 65 positions were designated as critical. That unit reported a C-1 level in SORTS,

even though the unit had only 3 (60 percent) of 5 general physicians and 6 (60 percent) of 10 flight surgeons. Although the medical units had a shortage of critical personnel, those shortages were masked by personnel with other skills because all personnel required to be included in the SORTS report were considered the same in the calculation of the C-level, regardless of their criticality.

In reviewing the SORTS reports for the two units, we found that the overall C-levels were not adjusted for the shortages and that remarks were not submitted identifying shortages of critical personnel. One unit's SORTS report contained remarks identifying shortages of medical service specialists (AFSC 90250). At the other unit, the commander told us she believed the shortages would not affect the ability of the unit to perform its mission because enlisted aeromedical specialists or technicians (AFSC 901XX) can perform portions of physicals for flying squadrons. However, without 40 percent of required physicians, it is doubtful that the unit could perform its full wartime mission. Unless unit commanders make needed adjustments to the overall C-levels or provide appropriate remarks in SORTS reports to alert decision makers, personnel shortfalls will not be evident. To ensure that shortages in a personnel specialty are considered, commanders should be required to include comments in SORTS when the status of personnel identified as critical is C-3 or C-4.

Pacing personnel. AFR 55-15 defines pacing items as resources for which shortages would have the greatest effect on a unit's ability to perform its wartime mission. AFR 55-15 also states that shortages in pacing items can lower a unit's C-level, and that, when the C-level is lowered, remarks must be included to indicate the effect the shortage has or may have on the mission. Although the concept of pacing items is usually applied to equipment, AFR 55-15 does not limit the application to equipment. We believe pacing personnel should be used to designate personnel qualified in specialties so integral to a unit that shortages would significantly affect its ability to perform its mission. The status of pacing personnel should be calculated separately as part of the determination of the personnel C-level. Requiring a separate calculation on pacing personnel would ensure that the status of critical personnel is accurately reflected in SORTS reports. Although we did not identify similar examples in the other Services, the concept of pacing personnel appears to be equally applicable. CJCS MOP 11 should require the Services to identify pacing personnel and include pacing personnel in the calculation of the personnel C-level in all SORTS reports.

RECOMMENDATIONS, MANAGEMENT COMMENTS, AND AUDIT RESPONSE

5. We recommend that the Commander, Air Mobility Command, and the Commander, Air Combat Command, require a Status of Resources and Training System report for each flying squadron.

Management comments. The Department of the Air Force nonconcurred with the recommendation in the draft report stating that in some cases, a SORTS report combining several units, such as strategic aircraft units, makes more sense than a SORTS report for each squadron. The Air Force also stated that since the audit, the flight line maintenance personnel have been included in the flying squadron. Consequently, the flying squadron commander includes the status of the flight line maintenance personnel in the C-level calculation for the flying squadron.

Audit response. We recognize that combined reports may be useful for some purposes. However, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, all flying squadrons in a wing were not mobilized at the same time. Future contingencies also may require forces to be tailored to the specific threat. We continue to believe that SORTS reports should provide accurate information that enable decision makers to identify units for mobilization. We believe that combining the flight line maintenance personnel with the flying personnel is appropriate to give the commander of the flying squadron control of the personnel resources needed to perform the flying mission. We revised Recommendation A.5. in the final report in response to comments that flight line maintenance personnel have been included in the flying squadrons. We request comments on the revised recommendation in response to the final report.

6. We recommend that the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations revise Air Force Regulation 55-15, "Unit Reporting of Resources and Training Status (Category Levels) (Status of Resources and Training System [SORTS])":

a. To require commanders to include comments in Status of Resources and Training System reports on the effects shortages have or may have on a unit's mission when the status of personnel identified as critical or pacing is C-3 or C-4.

Management comments. The Air Force concurred with the recommendation and stated that the next revision of AFR 55-15 requires more remarks on problems, causes of problems, and assistance required to fix the problem. The revision of AFR 55-15 is at the printers.

Audit response. The Air Force response meets the intent of the recommendation. In response to the final report, we ask that the Air Force provide the publication date for revised AFR 55-15.

b. To designate as pacing personnel those personnel who are qualified in specialties that are integral to a unit's ability to perform its wartime missions.

Management comments. The Air Force nonconcurred with the recommendation. The comments are summarized below with the response to Recommendation A.6.c.

c. To require a separate calculation for pacing personnel based on the available compared to the required pacing personnel in mobility units and the available compared to the authorized pacing personnel in generation units in determining personnel status.

Management comments. The Air Force nonconcurred with Recommendations A.6.b. and A.6.c. to require another calculation for the personnel resource area. The comments stated that the Air Force defines critical specialties and that pacing and critical personnel would be the same.

Audit response. Regarding Recommendations A.6.b. and A.6.c., we recognize that in some units, pacing and critical personnel could be the same. However, in the examples in the report, some specialties were more important than others. We doubt that a medical unit could perform its mission effectively without the required number of doctors. In addition, we believe that a unit must have an appropriate mix of specialties to accomplish its mission. A shortage of doctors or other essential personnel could be masked by counting doctors or other essential personnel the same as other critical specialties. We request that the Air Force reconsider its position in commenting on the final report.

7. We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, revise Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy 11, "Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)," to require the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to identify personnel positions expected to have the greatest effect on a unit's ability to perform its wartime mission as pacing personnel and to include the pacing personnel in the calculation of the C-level for personnel.

Management comments. The Joint Staff nonconcurred with the recommendation. The response stated that although data masking has been a well-known problem, establishment of a new category for pacing personnel is not warranted. The CJCS MOP 11 was to be changed in December 1992 to expand the definitions of the C-levels and to require commanders to examine whether the calculated C-level is in consonance with the expanded definition. The response stated that the new C-level definitions should eliminate the masking problem.

Audit response. Based on discussions with Joint Staff personnel, we acknowledge that the revised C-level definitions are an improvement over the existing definitions. The new definitions may encourage commanders to consider the accuracy of the calculated personnel C-level in making an overall assessment of the unit's resources. However, the status of personnel is only one of many factors that the commander must subjectively consider in making an overall assessment, and it may or may not be fully considered. Also, the new definitions will not change how the personnel C-level is calculated. To assist the commander in making an overall assessment and to ensure accurate information is provided to decision makers, the calculation of the C-level for each resource

area must indicate the actual status of that resource area. We continue to believe that without separately considering the status of the personnel most integral to the accomplishment of the unit's wartime mission, the unit's actual personnel status may be masked. We request that the Joint Staff reconsider its position in responding to the final report.

Personnel Status Reporting in the Marine Corps Reserve

Guidance implementing SORTS. Marine Corps Order P3000.13, "Marine Corps Status of Resources and Training (SORTS) Standing Operating Procedures (Marine Corps SORTS SOP)," October 2, 1989, implements SORTS reporting in the Marine Corps. The 4th Marine Division (the Division) is the headquarters for Marine Reserve ground units, and the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (the 4th Wing) is the headquarters for Marine Reserve aviation units. The Division computed the SORTS personnel status for all Division units by using data extracted from the Reserve Manpower Management and Pay System. Each Marine Reserve wing unit computed its own SORTS personnel status based on data in that system.

Calculation of personnel status. The C-level for personnel status was overstated in one of two audited Marine Division units because Division personnel inappropriately included Marine Corps inspector-instructor (I-I) and Navy Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) personnel in the C-level calculation for all Division units. The I-I and TAR staffs consist of Active Duty personnel who provide oversight and support to Division units. The I-I and TAR staffs work closely with the units, but are not included in the units' Tables of Organization. Marine Corps Active Duty personnel assigned to 4th Wing units are called Active Duty support and are included in the units' Tables of Organization. By including the I-I and TAR personnel in the calculation of personnel status, the personnel C-level in SORTS reports was overstated for 19 (39 percent) of 49 Division units.

For its Headquarters Battalion, the Division incorrectly included 431 I-I and 15 TAR staff members in the calculation for personnel status. The SORTS report showed a C-2 for the Headquarters Battalion. The C-level was based on 1,502 (109 percent) personnel assigned and on 1,113 (81 percent) personnel who were MOS qualified of 1,373 personnel required in the Table of Organization. The C-level calculation included 95 I-I and 6 TAR personnel assigned to support the Battalion's companies and 336 I-I and 9 TAR personnel to staff the Division Headquarters. The I-I and TAR staffs were counted as MOS qualified, regardless of their skill qualifications and the requirements on the Headquarters Battalion's Table of Organization. Excluding the I-I and TAR staffs from the C-level calculation would reduce the number of personnel assigned to 1,056 and the number of MOS qualified personnel to 667. Accordingly, the personnel C-level should have been C-4 instead of C-2, informing Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Joint Staff that the unit required additional resources to accomplish its wartime mission.

Marine Corps guidance. Marine Corps guidance for preparing SORTS reports was unclear. Marine Corps Order P3000.13 states that personnel to be counted in the C-level calculations are the Marine Reservists assigned to the unit in the Reserve Manpower Management and Pay System and the Active Duty personnel designated to mobilize with the unit. The I-I and TAR staffs are not included in the wartime requirements in Tables of Organization for Division units. However, Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan, Volume I, October 25, 1988, states that I-I staff will automatically deploy with the Division and 4th Wing units to the station of initial assignment, unless otherwise directed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Stations of initial assignment process Marine Reserve units to move onward to their Active Duty gaining commands. Headquarters, Marine Corps, and Division officials stated that the Marine Corps Management Plan implies that the I-I staff is designated to deploy with the unit and may be used in calculating the units' personnel C-levels.

During our audit, we were told that for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, most of the I-I staff members were not sent to stations of initial assignment. I-I staff stayed behind to act as family assistance officers and to maintain the Marine Reserve Centers. Conversely, because Active Duty support staff are on the Tables of Organization of 4th Wing units, we were told that 4th Wing Active Duty support staff usually deployed with the unit to which they were assigned during peacetime. Headquarters, Marine Corps, officials stated that the Marine Corps Management Plan does not address the deployment of TARs because the TARs are managed by the Navy. Because the TARs are Navy resources, the Marine Corps should not count the TARs in the personnel C-level.

Because of concerns over how the I-I staff is reported and because the Marine Corps is being reduced in size, officials at Headquarters, Marine Corps, told us they are considering including the I-I staff in the Tables of Organization for Division units. The I-I staff would replace positions on the Tables of Organization that are presently filled by Marine Reservists. Until the I-I staff is included in Tables of Organization for Division units, the I-I staff members should not be included in the SORTS reports because they are not part of the Division units' wartime requirements.

RECOMMENDATION, MANAGEMENT COMMENTS, AND AUDIT RESPONSE

8. We recommend that the Commandant of the Marine Corps revise Marine Corps Order P3000.13, "Marine Corps Status of Resources and Training (SORTS) Standing Operating Procedures (Marine Corps SORTS SOP)," to require that personnel status be based on available personnel assigned to positions on the unit's Table of Organization compared to wartime requirements stated on the unit's Table of Organization.

Management comments. The Department of the Navy concurred and stated that the change would be incorporated in the Marine Corps Order after CJCS MOP 11 is revised. The response estimated that the change would be completed by September 30, 1993.

Audit response. The Department of the Navy comments are considered responsive and no further comments are required.

RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS PER RECOMMENDATION

Responses to the final report are required from the addressees shown for the items indicated with an "X" in the chart below.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Addressee</u>	<u>Response to Final Report Should Include</u>		
		<u>Concur or Nonconcur</u>	<u>Proposed Action</u>	<u>Implementation Date</u>
A.1.	Army	X	X	X
A.2.	Navy	NR ¹	NR	NR
A.3.	Navy	NR	NR	NR
A.4.a.	Navy	NR	NR	NR
A.4.b.	Navy	NR	X	X
A.5.	Air Force	X ²	X	X
A.6.a.	Air Force	NR	NR	X
A.6.b.	Air Force	X	X	X
A.6.c.	Air Force	X	X	X
A.7.	Joint Staff	X	X	X
A.8.	Navy	NR	NR	NR

¹ NR - Not required.

² Recommendation was revised in final report.

B. STATUS OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND IN SORTS REPORTS

The Joint Staff's SORTS reporting instructions and the Services' implementing procedures for calculating the status of equipment and supplies on hand for SORTS reports did not ensure that the actual status was reported for units mobilized for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Services had not identified essential equipment; some essential equipment was excluded from SORTS reporting; C-levels for Naval units were inaccurately reported; and, although equipment was recorded as redistributed among Marine Corps units, it had not been physically redistributed. In addition, SORTS reports were not prepared in accordance with Service regulations, guidance on procedures was inadequate, and personnel responsible for reporting had not been trained in preparing SORTS reports. Also, computer-generated documents used to determine the status of equipment and supplies on hand in the Marine Corps contained errors. As a result, the reported C-levels in SORTS reports for equipment and supplies on hand were based on inaccurate data for 39 (76 percent) of 51 units we audited. The inaccurate data caused the status of equipment and supplies on hand to be overstated in SORTS reports submitted by 17 units and understated in the SORTS report submitted by one unit. The status of equipment and supplies on hand reported by four units was not changed by the inaccurate data. The effects of the inaccurate data on the status of equipment and supplies in 17 units could not be determined. Sufficient time was available to remedy delays in identifying and mobilizing units for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. However, future decisions by the Joint Staff and the Services could be based on information that does not depict the actual status of equipment and supplies on hand, and harmful delays in mobilization and deployment could result if the SORTS reporting process is not revised.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

Background

In accordance with CJCS MOP 11, the status for equipment and supplies on hand is calculated by comparing the required quantities of combat-essential equipment, end-items, support equipment, and supplies for a unit to perform its wartime mission with those actually possessed by the unit. In implementing CJCS MOP 11, each Service established procedures for identifying mission-essential equipment and for determining the status of equipment and supplies on hand. The Army and Air Force require certain data that are not used in calculating the C-level to be included as comments in SORTS reports.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve Reporting of Equipment Status

Guidance implementing SORTS. AR 220-1 provides criteria for calculating the status of equipment on hand. The status of equipment is calculated by comparing the on hand quantities of

selected equipment to wartime requirements. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command assigns equipment readiness codes on the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs). The codes specified on the TOEs are listed on the MTOEs by the major commands. Equipment to be reported by units organized by an MTOE is identified by Codes A and P. Code A denotes primary weapons and equipment essential to the accomplishment of assigned operational missions. Code P equipment is Code A equipment further designated as pacing equipment. Pacing equipment is considered key to a unit's ability to perform its mission. Code B denotes equipment that supplements or takes the place of Code A equipment if it becomes inoperative. Code C denotes administrative support equipment. The status of Code B and Code C equipment is not required to be reported in SORTS reports. TDAs do not include equipment readiness codes; however, the Army plans to include codes on TDAs in the future. Until TDAs are coded, equipment to be reported by units organized by TDAs is listed in AR 700-138, "Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability," March 30, 1990, or AR 18-25, "Army Tactical Management Information Systems Readiness Criteria," January 15, 1984. The Army excludes supplies from the determination of the C-level for the equipment and supplies on hand category.

Calculation of equipment on hand status. Although SORTS reports were prepared in compliance with AR 220-1, the reported C-levels for 20 of 26 units audited were based on inaccurate data on the status of equipment on hand. As a result, the status for equipment on hand was overstated in SORTS reports submitted by 13 units and was understated in the SORTS report submitted by 1 unit. The inaccurate data did not alter the status of equipment in four units. The effects of the inaccurate data on the status of equipment in two units could not be determined. The C-levels for the 20 units were based on inaccurate data because mission-essential equipment either was excluded from the C-level calculation or was not coded as pacing equipment. The reported C-level for one unit also was inaccurate because partially complete medical sets were counted as on hand in the C-level calculation.

Exempt and nonreportable equipment. The equipment on hand status in 11 of 26 Army units audited was overstated because mission-essential equipment designated as reportable was excluded from the C-level calculation. AR 220-1 lists certain mission-essential equipment as exempt from SORTS reporting, until the unit has sufficient quantities on hand for the equipment to reach a C-3 level. In addition, AR 220-1 allows the major commands to designate certain mission-essential equipment as nonreportable line item numbers (LINs), when MTOEs or TDAs are changed to authorize new or additional equipment and the equipment will not be available in inventory for several months or years. Units exclude nonreportable LINs from the C-level calculation for the period of time established by the major command, or until the unit receives sufficient quantities of the new equipment to reach at least a

C-3 level or the same level as the unit's authorized level of organization.⁶ Some equipment was designated as exempt or nonreportable LINS in 16 of the 26 Army units audited.

The purpose of SORTS reporting is defeated by excluding mission-essential equipment from the calculation of the C-level for equipment on hand. SORTS reports are designed to inform decision makers of the level of resources that a unit has available to accomplish its wartime mission. AR 220-1 states that: "Its [SORTS report] full purpose can only be realized when the status of each unit is accurately determined and reported."

Because the Army policy permits mission-essential equipment to be excluded from the C-level calculation, the equipment on hand C-level was overstated for four units that had only exempt equipment, one unit that had nonreportable LINS, and six units that had both. For example, the equipment on hand C-level in one unit was overstated by three levels because exempt equipment was excluded from the C-level calculation. If mission-essential equipment had not been exempted, the equipment on hand status would have been calculated on 26 Code A line items of equipment listed on the unit's MTOE. However, nine equipment line items were listed in AR 220-1 as exempt. The unit properly included four of the nine exempt line items in its C-level calculation because the line items were at a C-3 or greater level. However, because the other five line items were excluded from the calculation, the unit reported a C-1 status. If all of the equipment had been included in the calculation, the C-level would have been C-4.

In another unit, excluding exempt equipment and nonreportable LINS caused the equipment on hand status to be overstated by one level. The MTOE listed 164 Code A line items. AR 220-1 listed two of the line items as exempt, and the major command designated eight as nonreportable LINS. The unit included two of the eight nonreportable LINS in its equipment on hand calculation because the nonreportable LINS were at a C-3 level. By excluding the eight exempt and nonreportable line items from the calculation, the unit reported a C-1 status. If all the equipment had been included in the calculation, the C-level would have been C-2.

Based on difficulties experienced in selecting units for mobilization for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Army recognized the nonreportable LIN policy could cause the status of equipment on hand to be inaccurately portrayed. The Army issued a September 10, 1991, message, which states that new nonreportable LINS could not be authorized by the major commands. Currently, approved nonreportable LINS can be excluded from reporting until a

⁶ An authorized level of organization (ALO) establishes the authorized strength and equipment level for MTOE units during peacetime. For example, ALO 1 is 100 percent; ALO 2, approximately 90 percent; ALO 3, approximately 80 percent; and ALO 4, approximately 70 percent.

C-3 level for the LIN is reached, or until October 15, 1993. The Army is incorporating the policy change into AR 220-1. The Army's action is a positive step toward ensuring accurate reporting. However, to increase the reliability of the data on the status of equipment on hand, all nonreportable LINs should be included in SORTS reports effective immediately. In addition, the Army should include exempt line items in its policy change. In order to provide decision makers accurate and complete information, all equipment identified as mission-essential should be included in the calculation of the unit's equipment on hand C-level.

Mission-essential equipment. At eight Army MTOE units, personnel told us that certain equipment on the MTOEs was mission-essential and should be designated as reportable, Code A. In addition, at two Army TDA units, personnel told us that certain equipment on the TDAs was mission-essential and should be required by AR 700-138 or AR 18-25 to be reported by TDA units. Unit personnel believed the equipment should be reportable for SORTS based on their experience during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The number of mission-essential line items that were not designated as reportable at each of the 10 units ranged from 1 to 43, and averaged 13. Because mission-essential equipment was excluded from the equipment on-hand calculation, the equipment on-hand status was overstated for two units and understated for one. Specifically, personnel at a medical evacuation unit identified eight equipment line items not coded as reportable on the MTOE that were essential to perform the unit's wartime mission of command and control of medical units. The items included various vehicles, generators, and protective masks. Those items were essential for moving personnel and equipment, for generating power for communications equipment and lights, and during chemical warfare conditions. If the eight items had been included in the C-level calculation, the C-level would have been C-4 instead of C-3.

At another medical unit, personnel identified 10 items on the MTOE that were not reportable, but were needed to perform the unit's mission of preventive medicine services. Preventive medicine services include such functions as checks of sanitation at dining and water purification facilities, noise levels at equipment sites, and personal hygiene of soldiers. The 10 items included vehicles and vehicle maintenance vans essential for operating over vast geographic areas and protective masks essential during chemical warfare conditions. If those items had been designated mission-essential and included in the C-level calculation, the C-level would have been C-2 instead of C-1. At a TDA training unit, personnel identified 16 mission-essential items that were not required to be reported by AR 700-138 or AR 18-25. Those items included a field artillery trainer, machine guns, and tool sets considered critical to maintaining proficiency in training tasks. If those items had been designated mission-essential and included in the C-level calculation, the C-level would have been C-2 instead of C-4 because the unit had that equipment on hand.

Personnel at three units identified equipment designated either Code A or Code B that they considered key to the unit's ability to perform its mission and believed should be designated Code P, pacing item. AR 220-1 requires units to make a C-level calculation for each pacing item. The C-level for equipment on hand is based on the lowest C-level calculated for all of a unit's reportable equipment and for each pacing line item of equipment. Thus, each pacing item can directly affect the C-level. Because key equipment was not designated as pacing, SORTS reports for equipment on hand were overstated in two units. Specifically, in a combat support engineer unit, the line item number for a maintenance van was designated Code A and did not receive the special emphasis accorded to pacing items. If the maintenance van had been designated pacing, the unit's C-level for equipment on hand would have been C-4, instead of C-1. The C-level would have changed because the unit had none of the four required vans on hand. In a transportation unit, truck tractors were Code P, but truck trailers were Code A. Unit personnel believed that the trailers were needed to operate in conjunction with the tractors to haul cargo and should have been designated Code P. The unit reported a C-3 for equipment on hand, but if the trailers had been designated pacing equipment, the C-level would have been C-4. In two helicopter ambulance units, the helicopters were Code P, but the aviation tool set was Code B. At one of the units, personnel considered the tool set to be key to the unit's mission because it is needed to maintain the helicopters. Designating the tool set as a pacing item would not have changed the unit equipment C-level because the tool set was on hand. Although personnel in the other ambulance unit did not consider the tool set to be pacing equipment, maintenance of the helicopters is essential to the unit's capability to fly; therefore, the tool set should be Code P.

Equipment was not properly coded on the MTOEs as reportable or pacing or was not required to be reported by TDA units because units had not submitted recommended changes to the equipment readiness codes on MTOEs or to AR 700-138 or AR 18-25 for TDA equipment. AR 220-1 describes the process for establishing equipment readiness codes and authorizes units to submit recommended changes to equipment readiness codes through command channels to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In describing the process, AR 220-1 specifies the roles of the Training and Doctrine Command and of the major commands, but does not identify the important role and responsibility that units have in helping to ensure that equipment is properly coded. Also, AR 220-1 does not describe the procedures for TDA units to recommend changes in the equipment to be reported in SORTS reports. Unit commanders have the best knowledge of the equipment needed to perform their units' mission and should be actively involved in identifying reportable and pacing equipment.

Medical equipment sets. The equipment on hand status reported for one unit was overstated because incomplete medical

equipment sets were counted as on hand in the computation of the C-level. AR 220-1 provides that equipment consisting of several components, such as medical equipment sets, will be reported as on hand if "sufficiently complete to be used for its intended purpose." AR 220-1 also states that medical sets "will be evaluated by the readiness inventory required by AR 40-61 ['Medical Logistics Policies and Procedures,' April 30, 1986]." AR 40-61 requires an annual inventory of medical sets, but it does not provide quantitative criteria for determining whether the medical equipment sets are sufficiently complete. Because the guidance was inadequate, the unit counted four required medical equipment sets as on hand in the C-level calculation. However, two medical sets should not have been counted as complete. A set used for blood and culture examinations was missing 11 (31 percent) of 36 components. The set was missing such items as the oven to grow cultures and microscopes to examine blood samples and cultures. Another set used to measure carbon dioxide levels and wind speed and direction around equipment sites was missing 8 (40 percent) of 20 components. This set was missing such items as carbon dioxide monitoring kits and anemometers.

Because the sets were considered complete, the unit did not submit remarks in the SORTS report to inform decision makers of the shortages in the medical sets. AR 220-1 requires that units include remarks on medical sets that have been issued but are not on hand, the number of sets that have a C-4 status, and the projected date all sets are expected to be C-3 or better. Medical sets that are only 60 to 69 percent complete are not fully mission capable. By including the incomplete medical sets in the C-level calculation, the unit reported a C-1 instead of C-2 for the equipment on hand status.

The Army recognized that quantitative criteria were needed to measure the status of medical equipment sets. In April 1991, the Surgeon General issued a change to AR 40-61 requiring commanders to assess the status of each national stock number in reportable medical equipment sets. However, the change to AR 40-61 was rescinded in July 1991 because the procedures were deemed too burdensome on unit commanders. We were told by Army Surgeon General personnel that revised, practical policies and procedures for determining the status of medical equipment sets were being developed.

RECOMMENDATIONS, MANAGEMENT COMMENTS, AND AUDIT RESPONSE

1. We recommend that in the revision being made to Army Regulation 220-1, "Unit Status Reporting," the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations:

a. Require all mission-essential equipment, including items designated as exempt or as nonreportable line item numbers, to be

included in the calculation of the status of equipment on hand for Status of Resources and Training System reporting, effective immediately.

Management comments. The Department of the Army nonconcurrent, stating that action already has been taken to eliminate the use of nonreportable line item numbers by October 15, 1993. The reply also stated that AR 220-1 identifies some items of equipment that are exempt from reporting until they reach a C-3 level. Because those items are unique, the majority of Army units are not affected by the exemption.

Audit response. We believe that the Army's action to eliminate the use of nonreportable line item numbers is an important step in improving the accuracy of SORTS reports. However, the Army's action does not meet the intent of the recommendation because some equipment will still be excluded from SORTS reporting. Equipment that is combat-essential for any unit to perform its wartime mission should be included in its SORTS reports. As shown by our audit of 26 Army units that participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, exempting items from reporting causes SORTS reports to be incomplete and, consequently, inaccurate. SORTS reports should reflect the actual status of unit resources in order to provide decision makers accurate information. We request that the Army reconsider its position in responding to the final report.

b. Require unit commanders to review the essentiality of all required equipment and to recommend changes to equipment readiness codes when they determine that the equipment should be designated as reportable or as pacing equipment on Modified Tables of Organization for Status of Resources and Training System reports. In addition, until Tables of Distribution and Allowances are coded with equipment readiness codes, require commanders of Table of Distribution and Allowance units to review the essentiality of all required equipment and to recommend changes to equipment designated as reportable by Army Regulation 700-138, "Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability," or Army Regulation 18-25, "Army Tactical Management Information Systems Readiness Criteria."

Management comments. The Army nonconcurrent and stated that AR 220-1 already provides a means for commanders to identify equipment items that should be combat-essential.

Audit response. We agree that AR 220-1 provides guidance on submitting changes to equipment readiness codes, but it is limited. AR 220-1 does not require unit commanders to review equipment readiness codes and to forward recommended changes. The units discussed in the report had not forwarded recommendations regarding the essentiality of equipment deemed combat-essential. Commanders can objectively evaluate whether equipment is combat-essential or not based on their unit's training and field experience. AR 220-1 should require unit commanders to submit recommended changes when

equipment is deemed combat essential and is not required to be included in the calculation of the status of equipment on hand. We recognize that final decisions regarding Army policy must be retained at the Department of the Army or major command level, but commanders must be actively involved in the process to identify equipment for SORTS reporting purposes. We request that the Army reconsider its position in response to the final report.

2. We recommend that the Army Surgeon General revise Army Regulation 40-61, "Medical Logistics Policies and Procedures," to include quantitative criteria for determining complete medical equipment sets to be reported as on hand for Status Of Resources and Training System reports.

Management comments. The Army concurred and stated that a field evaluation of new readiness criteria for medical sets, kits, and outfits would be made in the second quarter of FY 1993. The revised policy should be implemented in the third and fourth quarters of FY 1993.

Audit response. The Army's comments are fully responsive. The new criteria should correct serious deficiencies noted in reporting the status of medical equipment. No further comments are required.

Naval Reserve Reporting of Equipment and Supplies On Hand Status

Guidance implementing SORTS. NWP 10-1-11 provides instructions on determining the C-level for equipment and supplies on hand. To determine the C-level, units are required to compare combat-essential equipment, end-items, support equipment, and supplies on hand for each primary mission area to the wartime requirements.

Reporting of equipment in centralized storage. CJCS MOP 11 requires the C-level for equipment and supplies on hand to be based on the equipment actually possessed by a unit. The October 14, 1990, SORTS report for the Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalion 3 (the Battalion) overstated the status of equipment and supplies on hand, because the C-level was not based on equipment the unit possessed. The Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Staff (the Staff) stores and controls the equipment needed by the 12 Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions during wartime. Consequently, the staff told the 12 Battalions what C-level to report for equipment and supplies on hand. But, the Staff was not trained in requirements for the processing of SORTS reports, and as a result, the C-level the Battalions reported was improper.

The Staff acquires equipment based on the anticipated mix of missions the 12 Battalions will be mobilized to perform. However, the Navy does not procure enough equipment for the 12 Battalions to

accomplish all missions at the same time. Upon mobilization, the Staff will issue needed equipment to the deployed Battalions to perform the specific missions the Staff assigns.

SORTS reports should inform decision makers of the actual status of equipment and supplies on hand. The 12 Battalions should report C-4 for equipment and supplies on hand because the Staff possesses the Battalions' wartime equipment and has not earmarked the equipment for specific Battalions. Reporting a C-4 status would inform decision makers that a particular unit requires additional resources to undertake its wartime mission.

Calculation of equipment and supplies on hand status. The C-level the Staff told the Battalion to report was not based on equipment and supplies on hand or stored by the Staff. Instead, because Staff personnel lacked training in the preparation of SORTS reports, Staff excluded all equipment from the C-level calculation and based the C-level only on supplies that were expected to be obtained at the deployment site. Staff personnel assumed all supplies would be provided; consequently, they determined the rating to be C-1. Under that assumption, the status of equipment and supplies on hand would always be C-1. The Staff also told the other Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions to use C-1 in their SORTS reports. Additionally, in April 1991, the Staff issued a memorandum to the 12 Battalions stating that they should report a C-1 for the equipment and supplies on hand category in future SORTS reports. Reported C-levels should be based on the actual status of the equipment and supplies on hand.

Reporting of support equipment. Squadron 55 did not include all required equipment in determining the status of equipment and supplies on hand. Although NWP 10-1-11 requires aviation units to include both aircraft and support equipment in the C-level calculation, Squadron 55 reported only its aircraft. The support equipment needed by Squadron 55 is listed in the unit's individual material readiness list (material list). Unit officials told us they saw no reason to report the status of support equipment that could be obtained within a short time from a contractor. A contractor is located on site with Squadron 55 and is required, by contract, to obtain any equipment item needed by the unit within 24 hours. Also, unit officials believed that the unit's support equipment was not significant enough to report because most of the equipment belonged to the Naval Air Station, Alameda, California, or to the contractor. Our review showed that Squadron 55 did not have control of 81 percent of its required support equipment. Of the 90 lines of equipment on the material list, Squadron 55 controlled 17 (19 percent); while the Naval Air Station, Alameda, controlled 60 (67 percent) and the contractor controlled 13 (14 percent). According to CJCS MOP 11, SORTS reports are intended to show the status of equipment and supplies needed to perform a unit's wartime mission. CJCS MOP 11 also requires that the C-level for equipment and supplies be based on the equipment and supplies under the operational control of the unit. Support

equipment is vital to the performance of an aircraft and should be included in the calculation of the equipment and supplies on hand status, as required by NWP 10-1-11. Support equipment that is not controlled by the unit may not deploy with the unit when it is mobilized and should not be included on the material list for reporting in SORTS. The reporting procedure used by Squadron 55 did not disclose the status of reportable equipment and supplies on hand to higher level decision makers.

RECOMMENDATIONS, MANAGEMENT COMMENTS, AND AUDIT RESPONSE

3. We recommend that the Commander, Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Staff:

a. Require Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions to report C-4 for the equipment and supplies on hand resource area for Status of Resources and Training System reports.

Management comments. The Department of the Navy comments on the recommendation are summarized below with Recommendation B.3.b.

b. Train personnel responsible for the preparation of Status of Resources and Training System reports how to calculate the status of equipment and supplies on hand, and require the personnel to provide guidance to the Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions that complies with policies in NWP 10-1-11, "Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)."

Management comments. The Navy agreed in principle with the intent of Recommendation B.3.a., but stated that reporting C-4 for all units when equipment is stored for the Cargo Handling Force would convey an inaccurate degraded status. The response stated that the organization of the Cargo Handling Force does not lend itself to the SORTS reporting methodology. A quality management board will be convened to make recommendations on meaningful SORTS reporting for the Cargo Handling Force. The comments did not specify when the board would be convened or when the board would submit recommendations regarding SORTS reporting or the organization of the Cargo Handling Force. Regarding Recommendation B.3.b., the Navy concurred and stated that the Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Staff has been tasked to conduct training by February 28, 1993. The response did not specify what action would be taken to provide the Cargo Handling Force guidance that complies with NWP 10-1-11.

Audit response. The C-level assigned to a resource category should be an accurate statement of the status of the resource at the time of the report. Unless equipment is specifically assigned to a unit and the unit commander knows the status of the equipment, the unit commander cannot determine the unit's capability to perform its wartime mission. According to the comments from the Joint Staff regarding Recommendation B.7., the next revision of CJCS MOP 11 will require units to base the C-level for equipment

only on the organic equipment that is either assigned or allocated to a particular unit. We recognize that the Department of Navy needs to examine the structure of the Cargo Handling Force and the equipment required by and available to the Cargo Handling Force in determining a reasonable method to implement SORTS policies. We request that in commenting on the final report, the Department of the Navy provide us the date that the quality management board will convene and the date that the SORTS reporting procedures to be used by the Cargo Handling Force will be approved by the Department of the Navy. We request a copy of the approved procedures.

4. We recommend that the Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 55:

a. Exclude from the individual material readiness list equipment items that are not controlled by the squadron.

b. After the individual material readiness list has been changed, include in the calculation of the equipment and supplies on hand status for Status of Resources and Training System reports the support equipment listed on the squadron's individual material readiness list in compliance with Naval Warfare Publication 10-1-11.

Management comments. The Navy concurred in principle with Recommendation B.4. in the draft report, stating that support equipment should be included in SORTS calculations. The response noted that tenant commands and contractors possess and maintain much of a squadron's support equipment. Consequently, it is not feasible to require a squadron to report in SORTS the status of equipment that it does not control. Last, the Navy stated that the support equipment required for mobilization would be reviewed and its reportability determined and incorporated into the reporting system by March 1, 1993.

Audit response. We recognize that not all support equipment is controlled by the fleet logistics squadrons. NWP 10-1-11 requires that all items on the individual material readiness list be included in SORTS reports. Equipment that is not possessed and controlled by a unit should not be included in SORTS reports. We have revised the recommendation in the final report to change the individual material readiness list to include only the equipment that is controlled by the squadron. Because the Navy's comments are not clear on whether the individual material readiness list would be changed to include only equipment and supplies controlled by the unit, we request clarification in response to the final report.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Reporting of Equipment and Supplies On Hand Status

SORTS implementing guidance. AFR 55-15 establishes two reporting categories in the equipment and supplies on hand area: combat-essential equipment, and support equipment and supplies. Combat-essential equipment is mission-essential equipment under the operational control of the reporting unit or its parent unit. Combat-essential equipment includes items such as aircraft, materiel handling equipment, and communications equipment. Support equipment and supplies are other items of equipment needed to perform a unit's wartime mission. Support equipment and supplies includes items such as spare engines, individual tool kits, and mobility bags. Mobility bags provide basic survival and protective material for individuals in mobility units. Some equipment, such as vehicles, could be classified under either reporting category, depending on the unit's mission.

Equipment to be evaluated in determining the status of equipment and supplies on hand is identified in a unit's Designed Operational Capabilities statement prepared by the unit's major command. Major commands vary the equipment to be measured based on a unit's assigned wartime mission and whether the unit is a mobility unit or a generation unit. Generation units augment Active Duty units and do not possess equipment.

Calculation of equipment and supplies on hand status. For 14 of the 20 Air Force units audited, not all support equipment was required to be included in the computation of the C-level for equipment and supplies on hand. The SORTS reports for the 14 units requiring mobility bags did not adequately reflect the status of unit equipment because AFR 55-15 excludes mobility bags from the equipment and supplies on hand C-level computation. In addition, SORTS reports for two units did not include all required maintenance equipment because AFR 55-15 permits Air Force major commands to exclude essential support equipment from SORTS reporting. The effects of the inaccurate data on the status of equipment and supplies on hand could not be determined.

Mobility bags. Mobility bags can be essential to the capability of a unit to perform its wartime mission, but AFR 55-15 requires the status of mobility bags to be reported only in the remarks section of the SORTS report. The absence of mobility bags containing chemical and biological defense gear could have prevented flying crews from performing their airlift mission if chemical or biological weapons had been used during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Since a lack of mobility bags would degrade the capability of units to perform some missions, mobility bags should be included in SORTS reports when possessed by or designated in base storage to a specific unit. In response to IG, DoD, Audit Report No. 92-123, "Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Reporting," June 30, 1992, the Air Force plans to include remarks on the status of six items of chemical and biological

defense gear contained in the mobility bags. Although the mobility bags will not be included in the calculation of the equipment C-level, remarks on the status of specific items in mobility bags will increase the knowledge of decision makers on the capabilities of the flying squadrons.

Support equipment for flying units. For two of the three audited flying units that possessed equipment, the Designed Operational Capability statements excluded needed support equipment from SORTS reporting. The statements identified some items, such as spare engines and kits, as reportable support equipment in SORTS. However, we were told by officials at two units that their statements did not identify all the support equipment needed for the units to accomplish their wartime missions. For example, maintenance personnel in one unit identified support equipment, such as refueling trucks, generators, compressors, test equipment, and tractors, as equipment that should be reportable under SORTS. That support equipment was considered essential to accomplishing the unit's mission when it was deployed to Cairo, Egypt, during Operation Desert Shield and should have been included in SORTS reports, but was not.

In contrast to the Air Force, aviation units in the Navy are required by NWP 10-1-11 to include all support equipment possessed by a unit in the computation of the C-level for equipment and supplies on hand. The Navy's approach of considering all support equipment possessed by a unit as essential to the accomplishment of the unit's flying mission gives a complete picture of the status of unit resources. Based on our audit work at three Air Force flying units possessing equipment, we concluded that the Air Force was not including all mission-essential support equipment and supplies in the C-level computation for the equipment and supplies on hand.

RECOMMENDATION, MANAGEMENT COMMENTS, AND AUDIT RESPONSE

5. We recommend that the Commander, Air Mobility Command, and the Commander, Air Combat Command:

a. Review Designed Operational Capability statements for assigned units to determine which equipment and supplies are essential and should be included in the calculation of the equipment and supplies on hand status for Status of Resources and Training reports.

b. Revise the Designed Operational Capability statements to require that Status of Resources and Training reports include support equipment that is determined to be essential upon implementation of Recommendation B.5.a.

Management comments. The Department of the Air Force nonconcurred with the recommendation in the draft report to measure every item of support equipment for SORTS reporting. The comments stated that reporting all equipment would levy an undue reporting

burden on units deployed at austere locations. Also, the comments stated SORTS was not intended as a detailed management information system counting all variables. Finally, the response stated that the Air Force would review the items measured to ensure that the sample of items being measured is reflective of the equipment status.

Audit response. To be of value to decision makers, SORTS reports must identify the status of resources possessed by the unit required to accomplish its wartime mission wherever the unit is located. We acknowledge that some equipment may not be critical to accomplishing the unit's mission. Therefore, we have revised Recommendation B.5. in the final report. However, based on our analysis and discussions with unit personnel, we continue to believe that not all essential support equipment is being included in SORTS reports. We request that the Air Force comment on the revised recommendation in response to the final report.

Marine Corps Reserve Equipment and Supplies On Hand Status

Guidance implementing SORTS. Marine Corps Order P3000.13, "Marine Corps Status of Resources and Training (SORTS) Standing Operating Procedures (Marine Corps SORTS SOP)," October 2, 1989, implements SORTS reporting in the Marine Corps. The 4th Marine Division (the Division) and the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (the 4th Wing) computed the status of equipment using data provided by Marine Corps Reserve units and by the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia. The units provided data on equipment on hand through the Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System LM2, and the Logistics Base provided reports on equipment held in storage.

Special allowances and stored equipment. Marine Reserve units are authorized special allowances of equipment when additional equipment is needed for training because the units' components are geographically dispersed. Special allowance equipment normally is issued to the units from equipment held in storage by the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps stores equipment that the units require in wartime but cannot use or maintain during peacetime. Special allowance equipment and equipment held in storage is not earmarked for use by specific units during wartime.

Calculating equipment and supplies on hand status. SORTS reports were submitted for 83 U.S. Marine Corps Reserve units. The Division and the Wing used a computer program to determine the equipment available to Reserve units and to prepare reports on the status of the equipment for SORTS reporting. The computer program compared the units' wartime requirements to their equipment on hand, and to fill shortages, allocated on paper special allowance equipment held by units and stored equipment. The computer programs allocated the special allowance equipment to avoid showing an excess in one unit and a shortage in another. The Marine Corps allocates stored equipment because it is owned by the Marine Corps

and would be issued to mobilizing units during a contingency. The allocations were based on the priorities of the units' missions and planned deployments. The equipment on hand in the units and the allocated special allowances and stored equipment were totaled and reported on readiness reports. Based on the quantities in the readiness reports, the Division and the 4th Wing calculated the C-levels for equipment and supplies on hand for each unit.

Naval Audit Service (NAS), Report No. 010-C-92, "Marine Corps Reserve Equipment Readiness Reporting and Mobilization Plans and Preparations," December 9, 1991, states that the Division and Wing SORTS reports for the quarter ended September 30, 1989, were inaccurate. The audit report states that SORTS reports were inaccurate because equipment was artificially distributed on paper to maximize the number of Marine Corps Reserve units with an acceptable percentage of equipment and because computer-generated documents contained errors. The report also states that artificially redistributing equipment among units caused the equipment C-levels to be overstated for 21 of 83 SORTS reporting units. NAS reported that readiness reports contained equipment that was not SORTS reportable in accordance with Marine Corps Bulletin 3000, "Table of Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System Logistics Reportable Items for SORTS." Further, some equipment that was SORTS reportable was not included either in the readiness reports or in the calculation of the equipment status. The data errors caused the equipment status to be overstated for 8 of 83 SORTS reporting units and to be understated for 14 of 83 units. We found these same problems in SORTS reporting in the Marine Corps Reserve units we audited.

Redistribution of equipment. Redistributing equipment on paper caused SORTS reports for all three audited Marine Corps Reserve units to be overstated. In one unit, the C-level for equipment status was C-2 instead of C-4 because the SORTS calculation included 13 items of special allowance equipment and 353 items of stored equipment that did not belong to the unit. By including those equipment items, the unit had 683 of 785 required items of equipment, instead of 317 of 785 items of equipment. In another unit, 15 items of special allowance equipment and 117 items of stored equipment were included in the calculation of equipment status. By including the additional equipment items, the unit was reported as having 512 of 544 required items of equipment, instead of the 380 of 544 items of equipment it actually had. By including the special allowances and stored equipment, the C-level was reported as C-1, instead of C-3.

According to CJCS MOP 11, SORTS reports should show the status of equipment and supplies under the operational control of a unit compared to its wartime requirements. As an exception, CJCS MOP 11 authorizes the Marine Corps to base the status of equipment and supplies on hand on the equipment the unit has on hand for training plus equipment held in storage. However, equipment held in storage is not earmarked for a particular unit. Also, CJCS MOP 11 does not

authorize the Marine Corps to allocate on paper special allowance equipment in one unit to fill shortages in another unit. We believe that redistributing special allowances and stored equipment among units on paper for SORTS reporting is fallacious because, upon mobilization, the units may not actually receive the allocated equipment.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated that the Marine Corps methodology for redistributing equipment on paper was not reliable during wartime. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, portions of units were mobilized and were issued equipment from training allowances and storage to fill shortages. Because of the fast pace of the equipment issue and because the Marine Corps had not planned for an incremental mobilization, the data bases used to redistribute equipment could not be readily updated. Consequently, even though the shortages in the mobilized units had already been filled, the computer program algorithms continued to allocate special allowances and stored equipment to the parent units based on their total wartime requirements. We were told by Marine Corps officials that the Marine Corps recognized that the faulty data made the equipment status reports useless, and during the war, stopped relying on the computer-generated information. We also were told by Marine Corps officials that the Marine Corps is considering excluding stored equipment from the C-level calculation. To ensure that the status of equipment on hand would be based on the equipment that is actually under the operational control of the units, the Marine Corps also should stop including special allowance equipment in the C-level calculation. To be of value to decision makers, SORTS data must be accurate.

We were told by Marine Corps officials that in changing its methodology, the Marine Corps was considering comparing the equipment on hand for training to the quantity of equipment the unit is authorized to have on hand for training. We do not agree with this proposal. The SORTS reports should reflect the status of resources to perform a unit's mission, not to train during peacetime.

Equipment data bases. Calculations of equipment status were inaccurate in two Marine units because incorrect data were included in the readiness reports. In one unit, the SORTS calculation did not include 244 of 584 required items of equipment, because data from the Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System LM2 and from the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, were not accurate in the computer-generated readiness report. In the other unit, the SORTS calculations included four items of equipment that were not reportable. Because the Marine Corps is considering a change in the methodology used to determine the status of equipment, the Division and the Wing are not correcting the errors in the computer programs until the Marine Corps decides on whether the methodology will be changed. To inform decision makers that

there could be a problem with resource information, the Division and the Wing should include comments in SORTS reports that the data for equipment and supplies on hand may be incomplete.

RECOMMENDATIONS, MANAGEMENT COMMENTS, AND AUDIT RESPONSE

6. We recommend that the Commander, 4th Marine Division, and the Commander, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing:

a. Comment in Status of Resources and Training System reports that data on equipment and supplies on hand may be incomplete because of problems with the computer programs used to determine the on hand status for this measurement area.

b. After the computer programs are corrected, compute the status of equipment and supplies on hand for Status of Resources and Training System reports based on the equipment physically on hand or stored at another location and specifically identified for a unit compared to the unit's wartime equipment requirement.

Management comments. The Department of the Navy stated that corrective actions had been taken, but did not specify what they were and when they would be completed.

Audit response. We request that the Department of the Navy provide a description of the actions taken to ensure accurate reporting of the status of equipment and supplies as well as the dates actions will be completed.

7. We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, revise Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy 11, "Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)," to require the Marine Corps to measure the status of equipment and supplies on hand for Status of Resources and Training System reports based on the equipment physically on hand or stored at another location and specifically identified for the unit compared to the unit's wartime equipment requirement.

Management comments. The Joint Staff concurred and stated that the next revision of CJCS MOP 11 would require all units to base the status of equipment on hand only on the organic equipment that is either assigned or allocated to a particular unit. The next revision of CJCS MOP 11 was to be published in December 1992.

Audit response. The comments from the Joint Staff are fully responsive, and no further comments are required.

RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS PER RECOMMENDATION

Responses to the final report are required from the addressees shown for the items indicated with an "X" in the chart below.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Addressee</u>	<u>Response to Final Report Should Include</u>		
		<u>Concur or Nonconcur</u>	<u>Proposed Action</u>	<u>Implementation Date</u>
B.1.a.	Army	X	X	X
B.1.b.	Army	X	X	X
B.2.	Army	NR ¹	NR	NR
B.3.a.	Navy	X	X	X
B.3.b.	Navy	NR	X	X
B.4.a.	Navy	X ²	X	X
B.4.b.	Navy	X ²	X	X
B.5.a.	Air Force	X ²	X	X
B.5.b.	Air Force	X ²	X	X
B.6.a.	Navy	NR	X	X
B.6.b.	Navy	NR	X	X
B.7.	Joint Staff	NR	NR	NR

¹ NR - Not required.

² Recommendation was revised in final report.

PART III - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

APPENDIX A - Assigning Category Levels for Personnel and Equipment
and Supplies On Hand for SORTS Reporting

APPENDIX B - Units Included in Audit

APPENDIX C - Prior Audit Coverage

APPENDIX D - Summary of Potential Benefits Resulting
from Audit

APPENDIX E - Activities Visited or Contacted

APPENDIX F - Report Distribution

APPENDIX A: ASSIGNING CATEGORY LEVELS FOR PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND FOR SORTS REPORTING

Assignment of category levels. CJCS MOP 11 defines the criteria used to assign the category levels (C-levels) for reporting the status of a unit's resources and training. C-levels (C-1 through C-6) indicate the degree to which a unit has achieved the prescribed level of resources and training required to perform the mission for which it is organized or designed.

Assignment of levels C-1 through C-4 is based on the percentage of resources on hand or level of training achieved compared to the quantity or level required to undertake the unit's wartime mission. Levels C-1 through C-3 indicate that the unit possesses the resources and is trained to undertake the full, bulk of, or major portions of its wartime mission. Level C-4 indicates that the unit requires additional resources, or training, or both to undertake its wartime mission. However, a unit reporting C-4 may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission with the resources on hand.

CJCS MOP 11 provides that a unit will assign a C-5 to a resource area if the unit is undergoing a Service-directed resource action and is not prepared to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. For example, units with ships in overhaul, or units undergoing conversion or transition to new models of equipment report C-5 for equipment and supplies on hand.

C-6 is assigned as directed by the Service when an individual resource area is not measured. CJCS MOP 11 requires the Services to specify in implementing instructions the type of units authorized to use C-6. For example, the Air Force authorizes Reserve associate units whose trained personnel augment an Active Duty unit to use C-6 to report the status of the equipment and supplies on hand resource area, because Reserve associate units do not possess equipment and supplies.

Calculations for personnel status reporting. CJCS MOP 11 requires two calculations to determine the C-level for the status of personnel for SORTS reporting. To determine the C-level, the Services are required to consider the status of total available personnel and the available critical, military specialty qualified personnel compared to wartime requirements. In addition, CJCS MOP 11 establishes a third calculation to be used at the Service's option. The optional calculation compares the status of available critical military speciality qualified senior grade (E-5's and above) personnel to wartime requirements. The assigned C-level for the personnel resource area is the lowest of the two or three (if the optional calculation is used) C-levels calculated. The three calculations and the percentages used to determine the C-level for the personnel resource area are shown below.

APPENDIX A: ASSIGNING CATEGORY LEVELS FOR PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND FOR SORTS REPORTING (Cont'd)

<u>Calculation</u>	<u>Category Level</u> (Percentage)			
	<u>C-1</u>	<u>C-2</u>	<u>C-3</u>	<u>C-4</u>
1. Total available strength divided by authorized or required strength.	90+	80-89	70-79	less than 70
2. Service-selected available critical, military specialty qualified strength divided by the authorized or required strength in those specialties.	85+	75-84	65-74	less than 65
3. (Optional Calculation) Available Service-selected critical personnel in grades E-5 and above divided by the authorized or required strength in those grades.*	85+	75-84	65-74	less than 65

*The Services may include promotable personnel in grade E-4 who are serving in authorized positions requiring grade E-5 and above.

To implement the calculations for personnel status reporting, each Service has established procedures for identifying critical personnel and for determining the C-level for the status of personnel for SORTS reports. For example, only the Air Force specifies in its SORTS regulation the personnel specialties considered to be critical. The Navy considers all officers to be critical and periodically publishes a list of critical enlisted ratings and codes. In contrast, the Army and Marine Corps consider all personnel to be critical. Only the Army and the Navy use the optional calculation for senior grade (E-5's and above) personnel for determining the C-level for reporting the status of personnel. In addition, only the Navy determines a personnel C-level for each of a unit's primary mission areas.

The calculations made by an audited Air Force hospital unit illustrate how calculations determine the status of personnel. The unit required a total of 368 personnel. Of that total, 255 personnel were designated as critical by AFR 55-15. The unit

APPENDIX A: ASSIGNING CATEGORY LEVELS FOR PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND FOR SORTS REPORTING (Cont'd)

had 390 personnel on hand and 209 available critical, military specialty qualified personnel. In determining the C-level to be assigned to the personnel resource area, the unit calculated C-levels for total available personnel and for available critical, military specialty qualified personnel. To determine the C-level for total available personnel, the unit properly reported that it had 100 percent¹ of the total personnel required by dividing the 390 available personnel by the 368 required personnel. Based on CJCS MOP 11 criteria, the unit assigned a C-1 for total available personnel. To determine the C-level for available critical, military specialty qualified personnel, the unit divided the 209 available critical, military specialty qualified personnel by the 255 required available critical, military specialty qualified personnel. The unit assigned a C-2 for available critical, military specialty qualified personnel because it determined it had 82 percent on hand. Since the available critical, military specialty qualified personnel C-level was lower than the total available personnel C-level, the unit properly reported a C-2 for its personnel resource area.

Calculations for equipment and supplies on hand status reporting. CJCS MOP 11 requires two calculations to determine the C-level to be assigned for the equipment and supplies on hand resource area. To determine the C-level, the Services are required to consider the status of selected combat-essential equipment, end-items, support equipment, and supplies compared to wartime requirements. The assigned C-level for the equipment and supplies on hand resource area is the lowest of the two C-levels calculated. The two calculations and the percentages used to determine the C-level for reporting the status of equipment and supplies on hand are shown below.

¹ The unit calculated 106 percent; however, only 100 percent was recorded in accordance with AFR 55-15 criteria.

APPENDIX A: ASSIGNING CATEGORY LEVELS FOR PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND FOR SORTS REPORTING (Cont'd)

<u>Calculation</u>	<u>Category Level</u> (Percentage)			
	<u>C-1</u>	<u>C-2</u>	<u>C-3</u>	<u>C-4</u>
1. Total Service-selected combat-essential equipment possessed, divided by the prescribed wartime requirement* (aircraft shown within brackets).	90+ [90+]	80-89 [80-89]	65-79 [60-79]	less than 65 [less than 60]
2. Total Service-selected end-items, support equipment, and supplies possessed divided by the prescribed wartime requirement.	90+	80-89	65-79	less than 65

* Certain major items of equipment with unique capabilities, notably, Air Force mobile and transportable communications electronic equipment and navigation aids, do not lend themselves to a percentage measurement. The Services prescribe supplemental instructions to measure those items.

To implement the calculations for equipment and supplies on hand status reporting, each Service has established procedures for determining the C-level to report the status of equipment and supplies on hand. For example, the Army determines a C-level for each reportable line item of equipment. If the number of items required for a Code A or Code P line item number is 21 or more, the Army calculates a percentage by comparing the on hand quantity to the required quantity. If the number of items is 20 or fewer, units use a table in AR 220-1 to determine the C-level. The C-level to be assigned for all the reportable equipment is determined by using an algorithm that considers the C-levels identified for each line item of equipment. In addition, the Army determines a C-level for each pacing line item of equipment either by calculating a percentage or by using the table in AR 220-1. The Army bases the C-level to be reported for equipment on hand on the lowest C-level determined for all reportable equipment and for each line item of pacing equipment. In contrast, the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps calculate a percentage of required equipment and supplies on hand based on individual items of equipment and base the C-level to be reported on the calculated percentage.

APPENDIX A: ASSIGNING CATEGORY LEVELS FOR PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND FOR SORTS REPORTING (Cont'd)

The calculations made by an audited Army air ambulance unit illustrate how the calculations determine equipment on hand status. Twenty-two line items of equipment were required to be reported in SORTS. Of the 22 line items, 1 was also designated a pacing item. To determine the C-level for all reportable line items of equipment, the unit calculated a C-level for each of the 22 reportable line items. The unit divided on hand quantities for each line item by the required quantities or, when 20 or fewer items were required, the unit used the table in AR 220-1. The unit determined that 16 line items were C-1, 1 line item was C-3, and 5 line items were C-4. Using the algorithm in AR 220-1, the unit determined a C-4 for all reportable line items of equipment. To determine the status of the one pacing item, the unit used the table in AR 220-1. The pacing line item number required a total of six items. Of that total, four were on hand. Based on the criteria in the table, the unit assigned a C-3 to the pacing item. Since the C-level for all reportable equipment was lower than the C-level for the pacing item, the unit properly reported a C-4 for equipment on hand.

Conclusion. SORTS reports are used by each of the Services to report to the Joint Staff the status of resources and training in Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve units. As evidenced by Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the data in the reports play a large part in determining which units will be deployed during a contingency operation. To be of value to national-level decision makers, SORTS data on reporting units must be accurate and complete.

APPENDIX B: UNITS INCLUDED IN AUDIT

Army National Guard and Army Reserve

Location

348th Military Police Detachment	Edison, NJ
970th Military Police Company	San Mateo, CA
Headquarters, 185th Military Police Battalion	Pittsburg, CA
870th Military Police Company	Pittsburg, CA
44th Medical Hospital (General 1000 Bed)	Madison, WI
467th Medical Detachment (Psychiatric)	Madison, WI
12th Medical Detachment (Preventive Medicine Service)	Beloit, WI
145th Medical Detachment (Maintenance Support)	Texarkana, TX
343d Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance)	Novato, CA
872d Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance)	Lafayette, LA
4005th Dental Service Detachment	Houston, TX
Headquarters, 328th Medical Battalion	Austin, TX
149th Personnel Services Company	Austin, TX
221st Replacement Company	Lake Charles, LA
755th Postal Detachment	Texarkana, TX
253d Transportation Company (Light Medium Truck)	Cape May, NJ
644th Transportation Company (Heavy Truck)	Beaumont, TX
Headquarters, 185th Transportation Battalion	Fresno, CA
Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 84th Division (Training)	Milwaukee, WI
3d Battalion, 334th Regiment, 3d Brigade, 84th Division (Training)	Milwaukee, WI
78th Division Training Support Brigade	Edison, NJ
229th Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment)	Prairie Du Chene, WI
808th Engineer Company (Pipe Laying) (Combat Support)	Houston, TX
107th Maintenance Company (Non-Divisional Direct Support)	Sparta, WI
1192d Transportation Terminal Unit	New Orleans, LA
432d Civil Affairs Company	Green Bay, WI

Naval Reserve

Cargo Handling Battalion 3	Alameda, CA
Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 55	Alameda, CA

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve

349th Military Airlift Wing (Associate)	Travis Air Force Base (AFB), CA
12th U.S. Air Force Contingency Hospital	Travis AFB, CA
349th Security Police Flight	Travis AFB, CA
349th U.S. Air Force Clinic	Travis AFB, CA

APPENDIX B: UNITS INCLUDED IN AUDIT (Cont'd)

<u>Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve</u> (Cont'd)	<u>Location</u>
514th Military Airlift Wing (Associate)	McGuire AFB, NJ
35th Aerial Port Squadron	McGuire AFB, NJ
33d Aeromedical Patient Staging Squadron	McGuire AFB, NJ
69th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron	McGuire AFB, NJ
72d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron	McGuire AFB, NJ
514th Security Police Flight	McGuire AFB, NJ
150th Air Refueling Squadron (Heavy)	McGuire AFB, NJ
170th Security Police Flight	McGuire AFB, NJ
181st Tactical Airlift Squadron	Dallas, TX
301st Medical Squadron	Fort Worth, TX
126th Air Refueling Squadron (Heavy)	General Mitchell International Airport (IAP), WI
128th Security Police Flight	General Mitchell IAP, WI
406th Combat Logistics Support Squadron	McClellan AFB, CA
940th Civil Engineering Squadron	Mather AFB, CA
177th U.S. Air Force Clinic	Atlantic City, NJ
924th Security Police Flight	Bergstrom AFB, TX
 <u>Marine Corps Reserve</u>	
4th Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion, 4th Aircraft Wing	Fresno, CA
1st Battalion, 23d Marines, 4th Marine Division	Houston, TX
Headquarters Battalion, 4th Marine Division	New Orleans, LA

APPENDIX C: PRIOR AUDIT COVERAGE

Inspector General, DoD, Audit Report No. 91-108, "Capabilities of Early Deploying Guard and Reserve Units," July 3, 1991. The report identified deficiencies in SORTS reporting. The report states that SORTS report data are inaccurate and unreliable for determining whether a unit is equipped or trained to perform its mission. Recommendations were made to change the measuring criteria in CJCS MOP 11 for determining the status of resources and training. The Joint Staff nonconcurred, stating that sufficient evidence was not provided to show that the SORTS data base did not accurately reflect the status of units.

Inspector General, DoD, Audit Report No. 92-029, "Capability of Reserve Component Intelligence Units to Satisfy Wartime Requirements," December 23, 1991. The report states that the status of National Guard and Reserve intelligence units was not accurately reflected in SORTS. SORTS reports did not provide decision makers with reliable information on the number of personnel in National Guard and Reserve intelligence units that were eligible to deploy, or on whether deployable intelligence personnel were qualified and properly cleared for the billets they occupied. A recommendation was made to the Joint Staff to revise CJCS MOP 11 to establish uniform measuring criteria for the Services in reporting the status of National Guard and Reserve intelligence units. The Joint Staff nonconcurred in the recommendation, stating that the report provided no evidence that status of intelligence units was inaccurately reported.

Inspector General, DoD, Audit Report No. 92-123, "Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Reporting," June 30, 1992. The report states that DoD decision makers did not have adequate data on chemical and biological defense resources when making deployment and procurement decisions for Operation Desert Shield. SORTS does not require that the status of low-cost chemical and biological defense equipment be reported and tracked. As a result, redistribution of equipment and employment of forces were delayed, the need to accelerate or increase production could not be identified, and high-cost emergency procurements were made. The report recommended that the Joint Staff modify SORTS reports to include status levels for chemical and biological defense equipment. The Joint Staff partially concurred, stating that CJCS MOP 11 would be revised to require mandatory reporting of chemical and biological defense equipment in SORTS reports, but all items would not have to be reported. The report also recommended that the Services identify critical items of chemical and biological equipment for inclusion in equipment status reporting. The Army, Navy, and Air Force concurred and stated that critical items of chemical and biological equipment would be identified. The Marine

APPENDIX C: PRIOR AUDIT COVERAGE (Cont'd)

Corps nonconcurrent, stating that including numerous quantities of chemical and biological defense equipment in SORTS reports would distort the data.

Naval Audit Service, Report No. 010-C-92, "Marine Corps Reserve Equipment Readiness Reporting and Mobilization Plans and Preparations," December 9, 1991. The report states that Marine Corps SORTS reports for Reserve units contained inaccurate data regarding equipment on hand. The Naval Audit Service recommended that reports be prepared in compliance with Marine Corps guidance on SORTS reporting. The Marine Corps concurred with the recommendation. We found similar problems during our audit regarding the reporting of equipment in Marine Corps Reserve units (see Finding B).

GAO Report No. NSIAD-92-67 (OSD Case No. 8919), "Army Had Difficulties Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces," March 10, 1992. GAO reported that the Army had to engage in extensive consultations to select the units for mobilization and that the limited call-up under Operation Desert Shield did not provide the Army the flexibility it needed. The report also states that a major weakness of the SORTS report was that, under certain circumstances, the status of all essential equipment was not reported. In addition, Army commanders could use substitute items of equipment for required equipment. Those actions can cause the status of unit equipment to be misrepresented. GAO recommended that DoD include in proposed legislative changes the information regarding obstacles encountered in selecting and mobilizing units. DoD was not required to and did not provide a formal response to the report.

APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS RESULTING FROM AUDIT

<u>Recommendation Reference</u>	<u>Description of Benefit</u>	<u>Type of Benefit</u>
A.1., A.2., A.5., A.6.a., A.6.b., A.6.c., A.7., and A.8.	Program results. Improves the accuracy of and reliability on management information on the status of unit personnel.	Nonmonetary.
A.3.	Compliance with Service regulation. Emphasizes the necessity for SORTS reviews as required by the regulation.	Nonmonetary.
A.4.a.	Compliance with Service regulation. Emphasizes the necessity to consider mission-essential personnel in determining the status of personnel.	Nonmonetary.
A.4.b. and B.3.b.	Compliance with Service regulation. Emphasizes the necessity for SORTS training as required by the regulation.	Nonmonetary.
B.1.a., B.1.b., B.2., B.3.a., B.4.a., B.5.a., B.5.b., B.6.a., B.6.b., and B.7.	Program results. Improves the accuracy of and reliability on management information on the status of unit equipment.	Nonmonetary.
B.4.b.	Compliance with Service regulation. Emphasizes the necessity to consider support equipment in determining the status of equipment.	Nonmonetary.

APPENDIX E: ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel),
Washington, DC
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), Washington, DC
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC

Joint Staff

Director J-4 (Logistics), Washington, DC
Director J-7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability),
Washington, DC

Department of the Army

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC
U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA
1st U.S. Army, Fort Meade, MD
5th U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, TX
U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
(Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC
Headquarters, Fort Carson and 4th Infantry Division
(Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO
Headquarters, 43d Support Group, Fort Carson, CO
1st Mobilization Battalion, Fort Carson, CO
U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, GA
78th Division (Training), Edison, NJ
30th Hospital Center, Fort Sheridan, IL
420th Engineering Brigade, Bryan, TX
990th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance), Lafayette, LA
826th Ordnance Company, Conventional Ammunition Group Support,
Madison, WI
Military Traffic Management Command, Falls Church, VA

Department of the Navy

Naval Civilian Personnel Center, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC
Director of Naval Reserve, Washington, DC
Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Washington, DC
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, and
Training), Chief of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), Washington, DC
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations),
Washington, DC

APPENDIX E: ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED (Cont'd)

Department of the Navy (Cont'd)

Commander Naval Reserve Forces, New Orleans, LA
Personnel Support Activity, New Orleans, LA
Personnel Support Detachment, Gulfport, MS
Reserve Naval Construction Force, Gulfport, MS
Fleet Logistics Support Wing, Dallas, TX
Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Washington, DC
Naval Reserve Center, Gulfport, MS
Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, CA
Naval Construction Battalion Center, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, Gulfport, MS
Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, CA
Naval Cargo Handling and Port Group, Logistics Group 2, Naval
Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Williamsburg, VA
Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Force Staff, Williamsburg, VA
Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Training Battalion, Williamsburg,
VA
Personnel Support Detachment, Personnel Support Activity,
Helicopter Wings Atlantic, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet, Camp Lejeune, NC
Naval Dental Center, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, NC
Naval Hospital Branch Clinic, Naval Hospital, Naval Education and
Training, Chief of Naval Operations, Gulfport, MS
Naval Regional Dental Center Branch Clinic, Dental Center, Naval
Education and Training, Chief of Naval Operations, Gulfport, MS

Department of the Air Force

Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC
Office of the Air Force Reserve, Washington, DC
Headquarters, Air Force Reserve, Robins AFB, GA
302d Tactical Air Wing, Peterson AFB, CO
459th Military Air Wing, Andrews AFB, MD

Marine Corps

Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, DC
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA
Marine Expeditionary Force II, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Camp
Lejeune, NC
2d Tank Battalion, 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC
Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, NC
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA
Headquarters, 4th Marine Division, New Orleans, LA
Headquarters, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, New Orleans, LA
Marine Corps Reserve Support Center, Overland Park, KS
Marine Corps Mobilization Station, Quantico, VA

APPENDIX E: ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED (Cont'd)

National Guard Bureau

National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC
Director, Army National Guard, Washington, DC
Director, Air National Guard, Washington, DC
The Adjutant General, Colorado National Guard, Denver, CO
140th Tactical Fighter Wing, Colorado Air National Guard,
Buckley Air National Guard Base, CO
Commanding General, District of Columbia National Guard,
Washington, DC
U.S. Property and Fiscal Office, New Jersey National Guard,
Trenton, NJ
State of New Jersey, Department of Military and Veterans
Affairs, Trenton, NJ
49th Military Police Brigade, California Army National Guard,
Alameda, CA

APPENDIX F: REPORT DISTRIBUTION

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

Department of the Army

Secretary of the Army
Inspector General, Department of the Army
Auditor General, U.S. Army Audit Agency

Department of the Navy

Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management)
Auditor General, Naval Audit Service

Department of the Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Auditor General, Air Force Audit Agency

Other Defense Activities

Director, Joint Staff
Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency
Inspector General, National Security Agency
Defense Logistics Information Exchange

Non-DoD Activities

Office of Management and Budget, National Security Division,
Special Projects Branch
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International
Affairs Division, Technical Information Center

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of Each of the Following
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees:

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services

APPENDIX F: REPORT DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Non-DoD Activities (Cont'd)

Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Committee on
Armed Services
Senate Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and
Support, Committee on Armed Services
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation,
Committee on Armed Services
House Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Operations
House Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security,
Committee on Government Operations
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence

PART IV - MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Joint Staff

Department of the Army Comments

Final Report
Reference

	DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0400	
REPLY TO ATTENTION OF		
DAMO-ODR		
MEMORANDUM THRU	DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY STAFF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (M&PA)	
FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL (AUDITING)		
SUBJECT: Draft DOD IG Audit Report on Support for Enroute Military Forces During Contingency Deployments (U) (Project No. 1RA-0025)-INFORMATION MEMORANDUM		
1. Purpose. To provide the Army response to IG, DOD request for comments on subject report (TAB A).		
2. Comments on subject report:		
a. Recommendation A.1. (page 20): Nonconcur. The Army position is that all MOSs are critical and does not intend to increase attention on specific ones. This is in consonance with the intent of the revised JCS MOP 11. AR 220-1 already provides the necessary mechanism for commanders to consider special qualification identifiers (SQI) and additional skill identifiers (ASI) in determining the unit's ability to complete assigned wartime missions. If the commander determines that the skills are essential, and the soldiers do not have the required skills (SQI/ASI), he will consider that fact in determining the training and overall category levels. We do not believe that requiring SQI and ASI in calculation of personnel status is warranted.		
b. Recommendation B.1.a. (page 48): Nonconcur. While conceptually the Army position is in accord with the DODIG recommendation, the timing of "immediately" is not acceptable. Action has already been taken to eliminate the use of Non- reportable Line Item Numbers (NRLINs) in readiness reporting. All NRLINs will be phased out by 15 October 1993. AR 220-1 does identify some items of equipment that are exempt from reporting until they reach a C-3 level (essentially the minimum level for operations) of fill in units. These pieces of equipment, such as selected Communications Security Equipment (COMSEC), and other specialized electronics and developmental items, are so unique that the majority of the Army's units are not impacted by exemption.		
c. Recommendation B.1.b. (page 48): Nonconcur. AR 220-1 already provides a means for commanders to alter ERC codes to		

10

28

29

Department of the Army Comments

Final Report Reference

DAMO-ODR

SUBJECT: Draft DOD IG Audit Report on Support for Enroute Military Forces During Contingency Deployments (Project No. 1RA-0025)--INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

identify items of equipment that should be combat essential. Any commander can submit recommendations for changes to the essential coding of the equipment, but there must be standards so the system can identify these "critical" items of equipment in the unit's authorization documents. The desire of one individual to increase or decrease the coding of a piece of equipment is not sufficient justification to alter the ERC of that item. One of the examples given in the report (page 45) was of two helicopter ambulance units with differing approaches to this question. One unit felt that the helicopter tool kit should be ERC-P and the other did not. The unit commander is the best person to evaluate the mission and requirements of a unit, but in this case even similar commanders could not agree. For this reason, an honest broker must be found that clarifies the true mission essentiality of unit equipment.

d. Recommendation B.2. (page 49): Concur. Readiness criteria for medical Sets, Kits and Outfits (SKO) were disseminated to the field by DA message in July 1992 for coordination with the field. A field evaluation is planned in the 2d QTR FY93. Finalization and full implementation of the policy are anticipated in the 3d or 4th quarter of FY 93.

3. The Army has provided a separate response to items of a joint perspective in support of a JCS response to DODIG subject report.

4. HQDA (DAMO-ODR) POC is MAJ Stapleton, DSN 227-3205.

Encl

COORDINATION:
ODCSPER
ODCSLOG
US Army Health Professional
Support Agency


JOHN C. HELDSTAB
Major General, GS
Director of Operations,
Readiness and Mobilization

26 Nov 92 - Noted DAS


AUSTIN D. BELL
LTC, GS
ADAS

Department of the Navy Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON D C. 20380-1000

09 December 1992

SECRET--Unclassified upon removal of TAB A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSISTANT INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR AUDITING

Subj: DRAFT REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR ENROUTE MILITARY FORCES DURING
CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENTS (PROJECT NO. 1RA-0025) - ACTION
MEMORANDUM (U)

I am responding to the draft audit report forwarded by TAB A
concerning support for enroute military forces.

The Department of the Navy response is provided at TAB B. We
agree with the audit findings, with exceptions noted for
Recommendations B.3.a and B.4.

As outlined in the enclosed comments, the Department of the
Navy has taken, or is planning to take, specific actions to
address concerns identified in the audit.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Morency", written over a horizontal line.

DONALD C. MORENCY
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Reserve Affairs)

TAB A - DODIG memo of 18 Sep 92 (S)
TAB B - Department of the Navy response to Draft Audit Report (U)

Copy to: (w/o TAB A)
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Department of the Navy Comments

Department of the Navy Comments
on
DOD IG Draft Report of September 18, 1992
on
Support for Enroute Military Forces
During Contingency Deployments
PROJECT NO. 1RA-0025

A. Finding A: Status of Personnel in SORTS Reports

Recommendation A.2: That the Chief of Naval Operations establish procedures to provide Naval Reserve units the list of mission-essential personnel required for the calculation of personnel status.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

The Chief of Naval Operations periodically updates the list of mission-essential personnel required for each assigned mission area. The Naval Reserve will ensure all applicable reserve commands and headquarters staffs receive updates of the mission-essential personnel listing. The next update will be published no later than 1 January 1993.

Recommendation A.3: Require that the Commander, Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California, review Status of Resources and Training System reports in compliance with Naval Warfare Publication 10-1-11.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force has drafted revised guidance that directs all Commanding Officers of Reserve Centers with Cargo Handling Battalions assigned to review all Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) messages prepared by the battalions. The updated instruction will be published no later than 1 February 1993.

Recommendation A.4.a: That Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing issue guidance requiring unit personnel preparing Status of Resources and Training System reports to use the personnel designated in the list of mission-essential ratings in the calculation of the unit's personnel status.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

The Chief of Naval Operations has recently revised and updated the list of mission-essential ratings. The next update will be promulgated no later than 1 January 1993. Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing will issue specific instructions no later than 1 February 1993 to use this updated list.

Recommendation A.4.b: That Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing train personnel responsible for preparing Status of Resources and Training System reports to calculate category levels in accordance with Naval Warfare Publication 10-1-11, "Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)."

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

Recommendation A.8: That the Commandant of the Marine Corps revise Marine Corps Order P3000.13, Marine Corps Status of Resources and Training (SORTS), Standard Operating Procedures, to require that personnel status be based on available personnel assigned to positions on the unit's Table of Organization compared to wartime requirements stated on the unit's Table of Organization.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

This change will be incorporated into the Marine Corps Order following completion of the new revision to MOP 11, which is currently in staffing. Estimated completion date is 30 September 1993.

B. Finding B: Status of Equipment and Supplies on Hand in SORTS Reports.

Recommendation B.3.a: Require Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions to report C-4 for the equipment and supplies on hand resource area.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur with modification.

The Department of the Navy agrees in principle with the intent of this recommendation. However, reporting all units C-4 for requisite equipment and supplies on hand, when that required gear is stored and ready for Cargo Handling Force use, conveys a degraded status that is not accurate.

The Cargo Handling Force is organized such that the equipment needed to support wartime requirements does not lend itself to the SORTS reporting methodology. In order to reflect true readiness, the SORTS reporting system must be further refined, or the Force must restructure itself to accommodate the SORTS system, which in turn would degrade its readiness.

Commander, Navy Cargo Handling Force has been directed to establish a QMB and to make recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations to reconcile the discrepancy between accurate, meaningful SORTS reporting and the assignment of equipment and supplies.

Recommendation B.3.b: That Commander, Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Staff train personnel responsible for the preparation of

Department of the Navy Comments

Status of Resources and Training System reports how to calculate the status of equipment and supplies on hand and require the personnel to provide guidance to the Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions that complies with policies in NWP 10-1-11, "Status of Resources and Training System."

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

Commander, Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Staff has been tasked to conduct such training by 28 February 1993.

Recommendation B.4: That Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 55 include in the calculations of the equipment and supplies on hand, status of the support equipment listed on the individual material readiness list that the squadron possesses, in compliance with NWP 10-1-11.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur with modification.

Concur in principle that the status of the support equipment should be included in squadron readiness rating calculations. However, tenant commands and the contractors that support squadrons are required to possess and maintain much of the support equipment. Therefore, it is not feasible to require squadrons to be accountable in SORTS for the status of equipment that they do not have operational control over or that they are not required to possess for wartime.

Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing has been tasked to review the list of support equipment required for mobilization (in addition to the seventeen equipment items possessed by the squadron), determine their reportability, and incorporate them into the reporting system. Estimated completion date is 1 March 1993.

Recommendation B.6.a and B.6.b: That Commander, 4th Marine Division and Commander, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing comment in Status of Resources and Training System reports that data on equipment and supplies may be incomplete because of problems with the computer programs used to determine the on hand status for this measurement area, and, after the computer programs are corrected, compute the status of equipment and supplies on hand for Status of Resources and Training System report based on the equipment physically on hand or stored at another location and specifically identified for a unit compared to the unit's wartime equipment requirement.

Department of the Navy Response: Concur.

Corrective actions have been implemented.

Administrative note: Two corrections to the draft report are recommended for accuracy.

a. Page 35, par. 1, line 8. Change to read:

"However, Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan, Volume I...."

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b. Page 35, par. 1, line 14. Change to read:

"The Marine Corps SORTS SOP states that...."

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Department of the Air Force Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

NOV 12 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Support for Enroute Military Forces During Contingency Deployments,
IRA-0025, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

This is in reply to your memorandum requesting the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) provide Air Force comments on subject report. We nonconcur with a number of the recommendations and our attached comments provide specific reasons and alternative proposals.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John G. Lorber".

JOHN G. LORBER
Maj Gen, USAF
Director of Plans, DCS/P&O

Atch
Air Force Comments

Final Report
Reference

Air Force Comments
on
Support for Enroute Military Forces During Contingency Deployments
Project 1RA-0025

4 **AF-01. Page 9, lines 16-20:**

a. **Report Statement:** "Air Force SORTS reports were not available for that time period, because the Air Force requires units to maintain reports for only 90 days from the date of the report issuance."

b. **Management Response:** We do not require units to maintain outdated reports for 90 days. Individual commands may require the retention of outdated reports. However, we reviewed ANGR 55-15 and AFRES Sup 1 to AFR 55-15 and did not find such requirements.

15 **AF-02. Page 27, lines 9-11:**

a. **Report Statement:** "The C-level is based on a mathematical calculation, and all critical personnel were considered equal in the calculation of the C-level, regardless of their relative importance to the accomplishment of the unit's mission."

b. **Management Response:** AFR 55-15 defines critical AFSCs and consequently critical personnel as those personnel identified as essential to the launch, recovery, or turn around of a unit's weapon system, or the direct accomplishment of a unit's mission. Therefore, all of the personnel should have the same relative importance to the accomplishment of the unit mission. As part of the Air Force SORTS Quality Improvement Program, we will be reviewing the AFSCs identified as critical to ensure that they are valid and are indeed essential to the unit mission.

15 **AF-03. Page 27, lines 15-18:**

a. **Report Statement:** "Data on the flying squadrons and their direct support maintenance squadrons are combined because, in the past, the flying and maintenance squadrons were expected to be activated together."

b. **Management Response:** The situation has changed since data was collected for the report. Under the objective wing concept, flight line maintenance is now actually part of the flying squadron.

17 **AF-04. Page 31, lines 9-11:**

a. **Report Statement:** "We believe pacing personnel should be used to designate personnel qualified in specialties so integral to a unit that shortages would significantly affect its ability to perform its mission."

b. Management Response: We nonconcur with adding another layer to the personnel measured area calculations. By definition, critical personnel are those who are essential to the launch, recovery, or turn around of a unit's weapon system, or the direct accomplishment of a unit's mission. Consequently, critical personnel and pacing personnel would be the same.

AF-05. Page 31, line 22:

a. Recommendation 5: "We recommend that the Commander, Air Mobility Command, and the Commander Air Combat Command, require a Status of Resources and Training System report for each flying squadron and a separate Status of Resources and Training System report for the maintenance squadron personnel supporting each type of aircraft."

b. Management Response: AFR 55-15 prescribes the types and levels of units required to report C-level data. Although our objective report for flying units is a squadron-level report, we nonconcur with making it a blanket policy since in some cases it makes more sense to report at the level of actual employment (e.g. fleet reporting of strategic airlift) since it gives a better indicator of the readiness of the resource. We also nonconcur with a separate report for maintenance personnel for each type of aircraft. Under the objective wing concept, front-line maintenance personnel are now actually part of the flying squadron and should be included in the resource measurements of those units. However, we do not currently have visibility over the shop and intermediate level maintenance in the maintenance squadron in the objective wing structure. As part of the Air Force SORTS Quality Improvement Program, we have identified these maintenance squadrons as potential measured units (i.e., required to report C-level data). Initial review has been favorable and we are continuing with this initiative.

AF-06. Page 32, line 9:

a. Recommendation A-6a: "We recommend that the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations revise Air Force Regulation 55-15, "Unit Reporting of Resources and Training Status (Category Levels) (Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)) to require commanders to include comments in Status of Resources and Training System reports on the effects shortages have or may have on a unit's mission when the status of personnel identified as critical or pacing is C-3 or C-4.

b. Management Response: We concur with the recommendation. The current AFR 55-15 states that "remarks must include problem AFSCs with authorized, assigned, available levels, and estimated get well date." A rewrite of AFR 55-15, now at the printers, requires even more information to include: list of resource types with problems; numbers required, assigned, and available; problem causes if known; assistance already requested; and further actions required. These remarks along with the expanded C-level descriptions in the new CJCS MOP 11, now in final coordination, will give decision makers a clear indication on the effects shortages have or may have on a unit's mission.

AF-07. Page 32, line 13:

a. **Recommendation A-6b:** "We recommend that the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations revise Air Force Regulation 55-15, "Unit Reporting of Resources and Training Status (Category Levels) (Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)) to designate as pacing personnel those personnel who are qualified in specialties that are integral to a unit's ability to perform its wartime missions.

b. **Management Response:** We nonconcur with adding another layer to the personnel measured area calculations. By our definition, critical personnel are those who are essential to the launch, recovery, or turn around of a unit's weapon system, or the direct accomplishment of a unit's mission. Consequently, critical personnel and pacing personnel would be the same. However, as part of the Air Force SORTS Quality Improvement Program, we will be reviewing the AFSCs currently identified as critical to ensure that they are valid and are indeed essential to the unit mission.

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AF-08. Page 32, line 16:

a. **Recommendation A-6c:** "We recommend that the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations revise Air Force Regulation 55-15, "Unit Reporting of Resources and Training Status (Category Levels) (Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)) to require a separate calculation for pacing personnel based on the available compared to the required pacing personnel in mobility units and the available compared to the authorized pacing personnel in generation units in determining personnel status.

b. **Management Response:** We nonconcur with adding another layer to the personnel measured area calculations. By our definition, critical personnel are those who are essential to the launch, recovery, or turn around of a unit's weapon system, or the direct accomplishment of a unit's mission. Consequently, critical personnel and pacing personnel would be the same. However, as part of the Air Force SORTS Quality Improvement Program, we will be reviewing the AFSCs currently identified as critical to ensure that they are valid and are indeed essential to the unit mission.

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AF-09. Page 55, lines 4-8:

a. **Report Statement:** "Since a lack of mobility bags would degrade the capability of units to perform some missions, mobility bags should be included in the C-level computation for equipment and supplies on hand when possessed by or designated in base storage to a specific unit."

b. **Management Response:** We nonconcur with including mobility bags in the C-level computation. As we stated in our response to DOD(IG) Report Number 92-123, Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Reporting, we will comply with the guidance in the new CJCS MOP 11, currently in final coordination. The MOP will require separate C-level reporting for chemical warfare equipment and chemical warfare training. For the chemical warfare equipment area, we propose measuring filter sets/canisters, chemical protective masks, overgarment, glove sets, personal decontamination kits, and hoods. Initially, these C-levels would be reported in a

remark but the intent is to use standard SORTS data elements after the software is changed to support it.

AF-10. Page 55, lines 15-23 and page 56, lines 1-2:

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a. **Report Statement:** "Maintenance personnel identified support equipment, such as refueling trucks, generators, compressors, test equipment, and tractors, as equipment that should be reportable under SORTS. That support equipment was considered essential to accomplishing the unit's mission when it was deployed to Cairo, Egypt, during Operation Desert Shield and should have been included in SORTS reports, but was not. In contrast to the Air Force, aviation units in the Navy are required by NWP 10-1-11 to include all support equipment possessed by a unit in the computation of the C-level for equipment and supplies on hand."

b. **Management Response:** We nonconcur with measuring every item of support equipment. It would levy an undue reporting burden on units, particularly those deployed at austere locations without the normal infrastructure available at a base or on board a ship, without a commensurate benefit. SORTS was not intended as a detailed management information system objectively counting all conceivable variables regarding personnel, training, and logistics. Instead, it provides broad bands of information on selected unit status indicators and includes a commander's subjective assessment. We believe that measuring a sample of the various types of support equipment, provided it is a valid sample (i.e., draws the best picture about the overall resource status of the unit), best fulfills the role of SORTS. As part of the Air Force SORTS Quality Improvement Program, we will be reviewing the equipment items currently measured to ensure that they constitute a valid sample and are reflective of the overall resource status of the unit.

AF-11, Page 56, lines 9-15:

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a. **Recommendation B-5:** "We recommend that the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations revise Air Force Regulation 55-15, "Unit Reporting of Resources and Training Status (Category Levels) (Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS))," to require that all support equipment and supplies assigned to reporting units be included in the calculation of the equipment and supplies on hand status for the Status of Resources and Training System reports.

b. **Management Response:** We nonconcur with measuring every item of support equipment. It would levy an undue reporting burden on units, particularly those deployed at austere locations without the normal infrastructure available at a base or on board a ship, with a commensurate benefit. SORTS was not intended as a detailed management information system objectively counting all conceivable variables regarding personnel, training, and logistics. Instead, it provides broad bands of information on selected unit status indicators and includes a commander's subjective assessment. We believe that measuring a sample of the various types of support equipment, provided it is a valid sample (i.e., draws the best picture about the overall resource status of the unit), best fulfills the role of SORTS. As part of the Air Force SORTS Quality Improvement Program, we will be reviewing the equipment items currently measured to

ensure that they constitute a valid sample and are reflective of the overall resource status of the unit.

The Joint Staff Comments



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

DJSM-1342-92
16 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Audit Report on Support for En Route Military
Forces During Contingency Deployments (Project No.
IRA-0025)

1. As requested,* the Joint Staff has reviewed the subject draft report. We continue to be concerned about how the focus of this audit was changed from support for en route military forces during contingency deployments to just another in a series of audits that focus exclusively on the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). As a minimum, the title of the audit should be changed to reflect the real subject matter.
2. Our position regarding the two recommendations addressed to us is enclosed. However, on a more general note, we are concerned about the widespread use of the term "inaccurate" to describe SORTS reporting. Unfortunately, the vast majority of the purported inaccuracies were based on what you would like to see in SORTS as opposed to what was required by current policy and procedures. We strongly suggest you eliminate the use of the term "inaccurate" throughout the report except in those few cases where units did not adhere to current policy or procedures.
3. As requested, we have also reviewed the document for security classification. We believe that based on the limited sample size and the age of the SORTS data, publication as an unclassified report would not cause any damage to the national security of the United States.

The Joint Staff Comments

4. The Joint Staff point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Williams, J-7/EAD, (703) 695-4604.


HENRY VICCELLIO, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

Reference:

* DOD Inspector General Draft Audit Report, 18 September 1992,
"Draft Audit Report on Support for En Route Military Forces
During Contingency Deployments (Project No. IRA-0025)"

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ENCLOSURE

JOINT STAFF COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE DRAFT
AUDIT REPORT
ON
SUPPORT FOR EN ROUTE MILITARY FORCES DURING CONTINGENCY
DEPLOYMENTS
(Project No. IRA-0025)

1. Comments on recommendations for the Director, Joint Staff

a. Page 32, Recommendation 7. Nonconcur. Although data masking has been a well known problem, we do not believe establishment of a mandatory new personnel category of pacing personnel is warranted. CJCS MOP 11 already requires measurement of critical personnel separately from total available personnel. Furthermore, the upcoming revision to CJCS MOP 11 has expanded the category level definitions and requires commanders to specifically examine whether the calculated category level is in consonance with the expanded definition. This new feature should eliminate the masking problem encountered in the Air Force medical units used as a basis for the recommendation. The revised MOP is scheduled for publication in December 1992 with full-scale implementation in conjunction the switch to SORTS 6.0 software on 1 May 1993.

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b. Page 62, Recommendation 7. Concur. The upcoming revision to CJCS MOP 11 requires all units to base equipment on hand only on the organic equipment that is either assigned or allocated to a particular unit. The revised MOP is scheduled for publication in December 1992 with full scale implementation in conjunction the switch to SORTS 6.0 software on 1 May 1993.

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2. Joint Staff recommended changes to the draft report.

a. General Comments.

(1) Throughout the report, references to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM should be portrayed in all caps to conform to the DOD standard for referring to operations or exercises.

(2) References to "inaccurate" SORTS data should be based solely on reports that do not adhere to current SORTS policy and procedures. As currently structured, it appears that the vast majority of units are not following current policy and procedures, which is not the case. Based on the narrative, it appears that a maximum of 3 of the 51 units reported inaccurate personnel category levels (2 Navy, 1 USMC) based on

The Joint Staff Comments

Final Report Reference

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current policy and procedures. A similar situation exists for equipment reporting.

b. Page 13, paragraph A, 1st through 3d lines. Change as follows: "~~Some of the Services'~~ SORTS reporting procedures did not ensure the actual status of personnel mobilized for Operations ~~Desert Shield~~ DESERT SHIELD and ~~Desert Storm~~ DESERT STORM was reported. The"

REASON: Accuracy. Because Air Force and some Navy data was based on post-DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM SORTS reports, the premobilization personnel status cannot be attributed *ex post facto*.

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c. Page 19, 17th through 25th lines. Change as follows: ". . . assigned mission. ~~A similar condition was identified in . . . language other than the one required by the unit.~~"

REASON: Accuracy. The reference to DOD Inspector General Audit Report 92-029 is misleading because the auditors could not produce any evidence that any unit actually reported personnel as being qualified when they were not proficient in the language required by the unit manning document.