

May 06, 2005



## **Infrastructure and Environment**

**Defense Security Service's Data Call  
Submissions and Internal Control  
Processes for Base Realignment and  
Closure 2005  
(D-2005-060)**

Department of Defense  
Office of Inspector General

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### **Acronyms**

BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
COBRA	Cost of Base Realignment Actions
DoD OIG	DoD Office of Inspector General
DSS	Defense Security Service
ICP	Internal Control Plan
JCSG	Joint Cross-Service Group
JPAT 7	Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense



**INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704**

May 06, 2005

**MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE**

**SUBJECT: Report on Defense Security Service's Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 (Report No. D-2005-060)**

We are providing this report for your information and use. No written response to this report was required, and none was received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Mr. Bruce A. Burton at (703) 604-9071 (DSN 664-9071) or Mr. Thomas J. Hilliard at (703) 604-9062 (DSN 664-9062). See Appendix B for the report distribution. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

By direction of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing:

Mary L. Ugone  
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## Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. D-2005-060

May 06, 2005

(Project No. D2004-D000AB-0088.000)

### Defense Security Service's Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005

#### Executive Summary

**Who Should Read This Report and Why?** Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel responsible for deciding the realignment or closure of military installations based on the Base Realignment and Closure data calls and Defense Security Service management personnel should read this report. The report discusses the adequacy, completeness, and integrity of the data provided by the Defense Security Service to assist the Secretary of Defense in Base Realignment and Closure 2005 recommendations.

**Background.** Base Realignment and Closure 2005 is the formal process outlined in Public Law 101-510, "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990," as amended, under which the Secretary of Defense may realign or close military installations inside the United States and its territories. As part of Base Realignment and Closure 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued, "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures," April 16, 2003, which provided for the DoD Office of Inspector General review of the accuracy of Base Realignment and Closure data and the certification process.

The Base Realignment and Closure 2005 process was mandated for the United States and its territories and was divided into the following data calls – capacity analysis, supplemental capacity, military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions, Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7, and scenario specific. The supplemental capacity, military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions, and Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7 data calls are collectively known as the second data call. We issued two site memorandums for the capacity analysis data call and three site memorandums for the second data call. This report summarizes issues related to the Defense Security Service's Base Realignment and Closure process as of March 18, 2005.

The Defense Security Service contributes to the national security community by conducting personnel security investigations and providing industrial security products and services, as well as offering comprehensive security education and training to DoD and other Government entities.

**Results.** After corrections were made, the Defense Security Service Base Realignment and Closure 2005 data were generally supported, complete, and accurate, and the data collection processes generally complied with applicable internal control plans. In addition, the Defense Security Service internal control plan properly incorporated and

supplemented the Office of the Secretary of Defense internal control plan. However, for the scenario specific data calls, supporting documentation used in calculating the weight of equipment that would need to be moved was insufficient. For all three data calls, some supporting documentation was not marked as deliberative or not releasable under the Freedom of Information Act, or both, as required by the internal control plan. Also, the position of the individual who certified the BRAC scenario specific data did not match the position listed in the Defense Security Service internal control plan. The correct person signed the certifications, but the job title changed. The internal control plan was not revised to note the job title change. Despite these areas of noncompliance, we determined that the data, responses, and sources were generally reasonable for the Base Realignment and Closure 2005 process.

**Management Comments.** We provided a draft of this report on April 18, 2005. No written response to this report was required, and none was received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

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## Background

**Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005.** Public Law 101-510, “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,” as amended, establishes the procedures under which the Secretary of Defense may realign or close military installations inside the United States and its territories. The law authorizes the establishment of an independent Commission to review the Secretary of Defense recommendations for realigning and closing military installations. The Secretary of Defense established and chartered the Infrastructure Executive Council and the Infrastructure Steering Group as the BRAC 2005 deliberative bodies responsible for leadership, direction, and guidance. The Secretary of Defense must submit recommendations to the independent Commission by May 16, 2005.

**Joint Cross-Service Groups.** A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to realigning base structure, is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established seven Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) – Education and Training, Headquarters and Support Activities, Industrial, Intelligence, Medical, Supply and Storage, and Technical. The JCSGs address issues that affect common business-oriented support functions, examine functions in the context of facilities, and develop closure and realignment recommendations based on force structure plans of the Armed Forces and on selection criteria. To analyze the issues, each JCSG developed data call questions to obtain information about the functions that they reviewed.

**BRAC Data Calls.** The BRAC 2005 data collection process, mandated for the United States and its territories, was divided into the following data calls – capacity analysis, supplemental capacity, military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA), and Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7 (JPAT 7), and scenario specific. The supplemental capacity, military value, COBRA, and JPAT 7 data calls are collectively known as the second data call. The Services, Defense agencies, and Defense-wide Organizations used either automated data collection tools or a manual process to collect data call responses. Each data call had a specific purpose as follows.

- The capacity analysis data call gathered data on infrastructure, current workload, surge requirements, and maximum capacity.
- The supplemental capacity data call clarified inconsistent data gathered with the initial capacity analysis data call.
- The military value data call gathered data on mission requirements, land and facilities, mobilization and contingency, and cost and manpower.

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- The COBRA data call gathered data to develop costs, savings, and payback (formerly known as return on investments) of proposed realignment and closure actions.
  - The JPAT 7 questions gathered data to assess the community's ability to support additional forces, missions, and personnel associated with individual scenarios.<sup>1</sup>
  - The scenario specific data call gathered data related to specific scenario conditions for realignment or closure.

**Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)**

**Responsibility.** Pursuant to "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures," April 16, 2003, the DoD OIG provided advice and recommendations on internal control plan (ICP) development and implementation, reviewed the accuracy of BRAC data, and evaluated the data certification processes. In addition, DoD OIG personnel assisted the JCSGs and DoD Components as needed. This report summarizes issues related to the Defense Security Service (DSS) BRAC 2005 process.

**Internal Control Plans.** The ICPs outlined management controls designed to provide accountability for information used in the BRAC 2005 process. Before the BRAC data calls were released to the Services and Defense agencies, OSD required the Services, Defense agencies, and Defense-Wide Organizations to prepare ICPs that incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP. The OSD ICP was issued in the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics' memorandum, "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures," April 16, 2003. To align with the OSD ICP, DSS prepared, "Defense Security Service (DSS) Internal Control Plan (ICP) for 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Process." The DSS ICP was updated on January 28, 2004, with procedures to store and control BRAC data more efficiently. DSS used a manual process to collect data call responses.

**Defense Security Service.** The DSS contributes to the national security community by conducting personnel security investigations and providing industrial security products and services. DSS also offers comprehensive security education and training to DoD and other Government entities. The DSS was formerly known as the Defense Investigative Service. DSS is transitioning from approximately 2,500 employees to 582 employees during the transfer of part of its mission to the Office of Personnel Management. DSS Headquarters' responses to BRAC questions were based on projections of the DSS organizational structure after the transition is completed, rather than providing responses that were based

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<sup>1</sup> A scenario is a description of one or more potential closure or realignment actions identified for formal analysis by either a JCSG or a Military Department.

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on the specific time frames given for each question. As of January 2005, DSS had 22 offices remaining open. We visited the Headquarters and the Academy offices during our review. We reviewed the responses for the three DSS locations that answered BRAC questions: DSS Headquarters; the Columbus, Ohio, regional office; and the DSS Academy. The rest of the offices were deemed by DSS to be too small to need to answer BRAC questions. Those offices are all less than 1,500 square feet in size and have 10 or fewer personnel assigned. See Appendix A for a list of sites visited and question numbers reviewed for each data call.

## **Objectives**

The overall objective of the audit was to evaluate the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of data that DSS collected and submitted for the BRAC 2005 process. In addition, we evaluated whether DSS complied with the OSD and DSS ICPs. This report is one in a series on data call submissions and internal control processes for BRAC 2005. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology, the review of management controls, and prior audit coverage related to the objectives.

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## **Defense Security Service BRAC 2005 Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes**

DSS reported BRAC 2005 data for sites visited or reviewed that was generally supported, accurate, and complete after corrections were made. The site data collection processes for the capacity data call, second data call, and scenario specific data call generally complied with applicable ICPs, and the DSS ICP properly incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP. However, we noted the following conditions:

- For the three scenario data calls, supporting documentation for the computation of the weight of equipment to be moved was not adequate,
- The job title of the signature authority on the certifications of BRAC scenario specific data changed but the DSS ICP was not revised to note the change. The signature authority on the scenario specific data call certifications did not agree with the title of the signature authority specified in the DSS ICP, and
- Some of the supporting documentation was not marked as deliberative or not releasable under the Freedom of Information Act, or both, as required by the ICP.

The inadequate supporting documentation, the inconsistent titles of the certification signature authority, and the lack of proper document marking are considered immaterial and should not affect the reliability or integrity of the DSS data in the BRAC 2005 analysis.

## **Defense Security Service BRAC 2005 Data Call Submissions**

The BRAC 2005 data that DSS reported was generally supported, accurate, and complete after corrections were made. At each site, DSS answered specific questions, and we evaluated the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of the targeted questions. DSS estimated information in its response to the data calls because of the ongoing change in the organization. Specifically, we compared responses to supporting documentation and reviewed “Not Applicable” question responses to determine whether the responses were reasonable.

**Capacity Analysis Data Call.** The DSS sites that we visited for the capacity analysis data call provided accurate, reasonable responses and adequate supporting documentation after corrections were made. DSS Headquarters

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reviewed 753 capacity analysis questions to determine which were applicable to DSS. DSS Headquarters retained some of the targeted questions at DSS Headquarters, and forwarded the remainder to one training facility in the United States. We evaluated the responses and supporting documentation at both sites in the United States (see Appendix A for a list of sites visited and questions reviewed). At the sites, we identified responses with inadequate support or that were inaccurate and, as a result, DSS provided additional documentation that we considered to be adequate. Also, DSS corrected one response and provided documentation to support the correction. We verified and concurred with the change. We did not verify whether the change was made in the OSD database.

**Second Data Call.** The DSS data reviewed for the second data call provided accurate, reasonable responses and adequate supporting documentation after corrections were made, except for JPAT 7 questions 1405, 1406, and 1407 and Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG military value questions 1907 and 1908. DSS Headquarters was unable to obtain data from the local school district to answer JPAT 7 questions 1405, 1406, and 1407,<sup>2</sup> therefore we could not make any determination on those answers. For Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG military value questions 1907<sup>3</sup> and 1908,<sup>4</sup> we were unable to validate the steps taken to generate the data and did not make a determination on whether the supporting documentation was reasonable or accurate. For the second data call, DSS received targeted questions and DSS Headquarters answered the questions and forwarded questions to one regional office and one training facility in the United States. We evaluated the responses and supporting documentation for all three offices at DSS Headquarters and identified responses with inadequate support and inaccurate responses. As a result, the DSS sites revised their responses and provided documentation to support the changes. We verified and concurred with the changes. We did not verify whether those changes were made in the OSD database.

**Scenario Specific Data Call.** DSS responded to three Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG scenarios on November 24, 2004. We reviewed the three scenario data call responses at DSS Headquarters and determined that DSS provided reasonable responses with adequate supporting documentation with one exception. In each of the three responses, DSS was asked to provide the weight, in tons, of the mission equipment and support equipment that would have to be moved as part of the scenarios. DSS estimated the quantity and weight of equipment and provided us with a memorandum for the record that discusses the methodology used. As of March 18, 2005, we determined that their approach and the resultant figures were reasonable, but that the supporting documentation for

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<sup>2</sup> Questions 1405, 1406, and 1407 are all related to the educational system in the local community.

<sup>3</sup> The question asks for the number of meetings between an organization's senior officials, including flag officers, and senior officials from another organization located in the Washington, D.C., area.

<sup>4</sup> The question asks for the number of meetings between an organization's senior officials, including flag officers, and Members of Congress or their staffs.

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the calculations was inadequate. We considered the effect of the lack of documentation to be immaterial.

## **Internal Control Processes**

The DSS site data collection processes for the capacity analysis, second, and scenario specific data calls generally complied with applicable ICPs. The DSS ICP properly incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP; however, we had concerns with the title of the person responsible for certification and the marking of BRAC data.

We evaluated ICP compliance for the capacity analysis data call at two sites, the second data call responses for three sites, and the scenario specific data call at one site. During the data calls, we visited DSS Headquarters and the DSS Academy where we evaluated DSS BRAC 2005 data collection processes to determine whether they complied with OSD and DSS ICPs. (See Appendix A for a list of sites visited.) We reviewed whether the DSS ICP incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP and whether sites completed nondisclosure agreements, marked, safeguarded, and maintained BRAC data. Specifically, we reviewed nondisclosure agreements, documents marked as deliberative and not releasable under the Freedom of Information Act, and safeguards for the BRAC documentation to ensure that the DSS complied with the ICPs.

**Completeness of ICPs.** The DSS BRAC 2005 ICP is meant to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integration of all information and analytical processes upon which the DSS submits information to the various BRAC groups. The DSS BRAC 2005 ICP also has a goal of limiting the possibility of premature disclosure of BRAC 2005 information. The ICPs outlined the need for an unbroken chain of accountability for BRAC information and included direction on responsibilities and the process to be followed.

The DSS ICP states that the Chief of Staff is responsible for the certification and release of all data calls, and delegates the Chief of Staff with the final authority for all matters associated with the DSS 2005 BRAC process. However, DSS does not have a Chief of Staff; it has a Chief Operating Officer to certify the BRAC data. The Chief Operating Officer has similar duties to those of a Chief of Staff. The correct person signed the certifications, but the job title changed and the ICP was not revised to note the change. We consider the ICP issue to be immaterial in its effect on the usefulness of the BRAC data, but the ICP should be revised to correctly assign BRAC authority and responsibility to the Chief Operating Officer.

**Compliance with ICPs.** DSS sites were generally compliant with the ICP procedures. The site data collection processes for the capacity analysis, second, and scenario specific data calls generally complied with applicable ICPs.

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Nondisclosure agreements were signed and documents were properly safeguarded. However, as of March 18, 2005, some of the BRAC documentation for all three rounds was not marked as deliberative or not releasable under the Freedom of Information Act, or both, as required by the ICP. We consider the noncompliance with the ICP procedures to be immaterial because it should not affect the reliability or integrity of the DSS data in the BRAC 2005 analysis.

## **Conclusion**

The DSS responses to the BRAC 2005 data calls were generally supported, complete, and reasonable, once corrected. However, because DSS was unable to obtain data from the local community to answer three JPAT 7 questions for the second data call, we could not make a determination on those questions or answers. We were unable to validate the steps taken to generate the data for two other second data call questions and did not make a determination whether the support was reasonable or accurate. Supporting documentation for some calculations was inadequate for the scenario specific data calls. DSS generally complied with the ICPs and properly incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP. However, for all three data calls, some of the supporting documentation was not properly marked as deliberative or not releasable under the Freedom of Information Act, or both, as required by the ICP, but the documentation was properly safeguarded. Also, the title of the signature authority on the certifications of BRAC scenario data did not agree with the title of the signature authority specified in the DSS ICP. We determined that all of the issues were immaterial and will not affect the reliability or integrity of the DSS BRAC 2005 data.

We discussed the results of the data call submissions and the ICP review with DSS management. DSS management concurred with the findings and stated they will mark the documentation as specified in the ICP.

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## Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We evaluated the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of DSS BRAC 2005 data. The evaluation included comparing responses to supporting documentation and reviewing Not Applicable (N/A) responses to determine whether the responses were reasonable. Questions had either an answer or an N/A response; the N/A response was for questions that did not apply to a site. We determined that the DSS ICP incorporated and supplemented the requirements of the OSD ICP. We evaluated site data collection procedures, such as use of nondisclosure agreements, proper storage of BRAC data, and marking of documentation to determine whether they were in compliance with ICP procedures. In addition, we interviewed the personnel responsible for preparing and certifying the responses to the data calls. We did not verify that the DSS responses were in the OSD database for the capacity analysis or second data calls.

DSS was downsizing from approximately 2,500 people to 582 employees as part of transferring a segment of its mission to the Office of Personnel Management. DSS Headquarters' responses to BRAC questions were based on projections of the DSS organizational structure after the transition is completed, rather than providing responses based on the specific time frames given for each question. As of January 2005, DSS had closed 50 offices, and 22 offices remained open. We reviewed the responses for the three DSS locations that answered BRAC questions. We visited the DSS Headquarters and Academy offices during the review. We reviewed the data for the Columbus, Ohio regional office at DSS Headquarters. The rest of the DSS offices had only a few personnel each and DSS deemed them too small to need to answer BRAC questions.

**Capacity Analysis Data Call.** DSS Headquarters received 753 capacity analysis data call questions, reviewed the data call questions, and forwarded specific questions to each DSS site. Specifically, DSS Headquarters targeted 70 questions to DSS Headquarters, and 19 to one training facility. We did not validate DSS Headquarters' selection process.

We evaluated the DSS data call responses at each DSS site that we visited. We issued two memorandums to summarize the results of these site visits. Table 1 identifies the questions reviewed at each site.

**Table 1. Capacity Analysis Data Call Questions Reviewed**

Defense Security Service Site	Question Number	
	Answered	Not Applicable
DSS Headquarters, Alexandria, Virginia	311, 386, 393, 446, 448, 460, 462, 466, 468, 471, 472, 480, 482, and 582	23, 40, 216, 301, 302, 313-329, 335, 347, 348, 352-356, 358, 360, 362- 366, 369, 371-373, 375, 376, 378, 379, 381-385, 387, 388, 465, 467, 479, and 627
DSS Academy, Linthicum, Maryland	107 and 749	97-106, 108-112, 750 and 751

**Second Data Call.** DSS Headquarters received targeted questions from the JCSGs. Specifically, DSS received Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG military value question numbers 1904-1927,<sup>5</sup> 1947-1957; Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG supplemental capacity question numbers 4072-4074, 4079-4081, 4096, and 4099-4103; Education and Training JCSG supplemental capacity question numbers 4000-4001; Medical JCSG supplemental capacity question numbers 4242-4246; COBRA question numbers 1500-1507; and JPAT 7 question numbers 1400-1417, and 1420-1421.<sup>6</sup> DSS Headquarters reviewed the data call questions and decided to send all of the questions to three sites. We did not validate the DSS Headquarters' selection process. DSS complied with the requirement for all stand-alone facilities and host installations, which included leased facilities, to answer JPAT 7 and COBRA data call questions. DSS stand-alone facilities included DSS Headquarters, one regional office in Columbus, Ohio, and the DSS Academy. The regional office and the Academy sent their responses and supporting documentation back to DSS Headquarters where we conducted our audit.

DSS Headquarters, the regional office, and the DSS Academy received the same 82 questions. The DSS Academy also answered 20 initial capacity analysis questions during the second data call that the other sites did not. In addition to reviewing the second data call responses, we followed up on outstanding issues

<sup>5</sup> Questions 1907 and 1908 ask for the number of meetings between an organization's senior officials, including flag officers, and senior officials from another organization located in the Washington, D.C., area, and Members of Congress or their staffs, respectively.

<sup>6</sup> The JPAT 7 group decided to replace JPAT 7 questions 1418 and 1419 with JPAT 7 questions 1420 and 1421.

from the capacity analysis data call. We evaluated initial capacity analysis question number 107 for the DSS Academy.

We issued three site memorandums to summarize the results of the sites' responses. Table 2 identifies the questions reviewed for the three DSS sites.

**Table 2. Second Data Call Questions Reviewed**

Defense Security Service Site	Question Number	
	Answered	Not Applicable
DSS Headquarters, Alexandria, Virginia	1400-1417, 1420, 1421, 1501, 1505, 1907, 1908, 1911, 1914, 1916, 4096, and 4099-4103	1500, 1502-1504, 1506, 1507, 1904-1906, 1909, 1910, 1912, 1913, 1915, 1917-1927, 1947-1957, 4000, 4001, 4072-4074, 4079-4081, and 4242- 4246
DSS Academy, Linthicum, Maryland	97, 98, 104, 106, 107, 112, 749, 1400-1417, 1420, 1421, 1501, 1505, 1911, 4096, and 4099- 4103	18, 94-96, 99, 100, 105, 108-111, 750, 751, 1500, 1502-1504, 1506, 1507, 1904-1910, 1912-1927, 1947-1957, 4000, 4001, 4072-4074, 4079-4081, and 4242-4246
DSS Columbus, Columbus, Ohio	1400-1417, 1420-1421, 1501, 1505, and 4096	1500, 1502-1504, 1506, 1507, 1904-1927, 1947- 1957, 4000, 4001, 4072- 4074, 4079-4081, 4099- 4103, and 4242-4246

**Scenario Specific Data Call.** As of March 18, 2005, DSS received three scenario specific data calls from OSD and submitted responses. The three scenarios were Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG Scenarios HSA-0072, HSA-0095, and HSA-0100. All three scenarios were answered at DSS Headquarters. We evaluated the responses and supporting documentation. Scenario specific data calls that may have been received and responded to by DSS after the audit were not reviewed.

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We performed this audit from January 2004 through April 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

**Use of Computer-Processed Data.** We did not test the accuracy of the computer-processed data used to support an answer to a data call question because of time constraints. Potential inaccuracies in the data could affect the results. However, the BRAC data were certified as accurate and complete to the best of the certifier's knowledge and belief.

**Government Accountability Office High-Risk Areas.** The Government Accountability Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides coverage of the Management of Federal Real Property and DoD Support Infrastructure Management high-risk areas.

## **Management Control Program Review**

We evaluated the DSS management controls for preparing, submitting, documenting, and safeguarding information associated with the BRAC 2005 data calls, as directed by the applicable ICPs. Specifically, we reviewed the relevant ICPs, checked nondisclosure agreements and data certifications, and verified that documentation was properly marked and stored; however, two issues required disclosure. The title of the signature authority on the certifications of BRAC scenario data did not agree with the title of the signature authority specified in the DSS ICP, and some of the supporting documentation was not marked as deliberative or not releasable under the Freedom of Information Act, or both, as required by the ICP. We determined that those issues are immaterial. Overall, management controls were adequate as they applied to the audit objective (see finding discussion for details). We did not review the DSS management control program because its provisions did not apply to the one-time data collection process.

## **Prior Coverage**

During the last five years, the DoD OIG has issued five memorandums on DSS BRAC 2005.

## **DoD OIG**

### **Site Memorandums**

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DoD OIG Memorandum, "Audit on the Second Data Call Submission From Defense Security Service Headquarters for Base Realignment and Closure 2005," February 14, 2005

DoD OIG Memorandum, "Audit on the Second Data Call Submission From Defense Security Service Academy to Defense Security Service Headquarters for Base Realignment and Closure 2005," February 14, 2005

DoD OIG Memorandum, "Audit on the Second Data Call Submission From Defense Security Service Columbus to Defense Security Service Headquarters for Base Realignment and Closure 2005," February 14, 2005

DoD OIG Memorandum, "Audit on the Capacity Analysis Data Call Submission From Defense Security Service Headquarters for Base Realignment and Closure 2005," April 20, 2004

DoD OIG Memorandum, "Audit on the Capacity Analysis Data Call Submission From Defense Security Service Academy to Defense Security Service Headquarters for Base Realignment and Closure 2005," April 1, 2004

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## **Appendix B. Report Distribution**

### **Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Director, Base Realignment and Closure (Installations and Environment)

### **Other Defense Organizations**

Director, Defense Security Service

### **Non-Defense Federal Organization**

Government Accountability Office\*

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\* Only Government Accountability Office personnel involved in the BRAC process are to receive the report.

## **Team Members**

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing, Acquisition and Technology Management prepared this report. Personnel of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report are listed below.

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