

**A**udit

**R**eport



CONFIGURATION CHANGES TO YEAR 2000 COMPLIANT  
MISSION-CRITICAL AND DATE-DEPENDENT SYSTEMS

Report No. D-2000-116

April 25, 2000

Office of the Inspector General  
Department of Defense

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### **Acronyms**

CINC	Commanders in Chief
PSA	Principal Staff Assistant
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
Y2K	Year 2000



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

April 25, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND  
INTELLIGENCE)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER  
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE  
ARMY  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Configuration Changes to Year 2000 Compliant Mission-Critical and Date-Dependent Systems (Report No. D-2000-116)

We are providing this report for your information and use. Because this report contains no recommendations, written comments were not required. However, the Director, Communications and Information, Department of the Air Force provided comments. We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Mr. Raymond A. Spencer at (703) 604-9071 (DSN 664-9071) ([rspencer@dodig.osd.mil](mailto:rspencer@dodig.osd.mil)) or Mr. Thomas S. Bartoszek at (703) 604-9014 (DSN 664-9014) ([tbartoszek@dodig.osd.mil](mailto:tbartoszek@dodig.osd.mil)). See Appendix C for the report distribution. The audit team members are listed inside the back cover.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Robert J. Lieberman".

Robert J. Lieberman  
Assistant Inspector General  
for Auditing

## Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Report No. D-2000-116  
(Project No. 9AB-0054)

April 25, 2000

### Configuration Changes to Year 2000 Compliant Mission-Critical and Date-Dependent Systems

#### Executive Summary

**Introduction.** In Audit Report No. 99-145 "Year 2000 Issues Within the European Command and Its Service Components," April 30, 1999, we noted a concern that DoD had not defined roles and responsibilities in addressing configuration changes to year 2000 compliant systems. We recommended assessing the advisability of a moratorium on system changes in order to maintain the integrity of the systems tested as year 2000 compliant. The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum August 20, 1999, that established a policy to ensure that configuration changes to systems that are mission-critical and date-dependent did not add undue year 2000 risk to, or undermine confidence in, system architectures that were determined to be year 2000 compliant. The policy gave the Commanders in Chief and Office of the Secretary of Defense Principal Staff Assistants veto authority over configuration change proposals approved by the configuration control board for mission-critical and date-dependent systems identified on the Commanders in Chief thin-lines and Principal Staff Assistants functional end-to-end architectures. These provisions were in effect through March 15, 2000. The policy also stated that the Inspector General, DoD, would monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of the configuration change proposal process. This report provides the results of the audit conducted in response to that tasking.

**Objectives.** The audit objective was to determine whether system configuration changes were being appropriately controlled in accordance with the August 20, 1999, Deputy Secretary of Defense policy memorandum and the related DoD implementation guidance of November 9, 1999. Specifically, we reviewed the policy and process of the services and Joint Staff in determining, reviewing, and approving changes to year 2000 compliant systems.

**Results.** The Services generally implemented the August 1999 DoD configuration policy as intended. There were 12 proposed changes to mission-critical and date-dependent systems submitted to the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense. Of the 70 systems we reviewed, 5 systems were subject to the policy and had approved configuration changes after September 1, 1999. Only one change was reported as part of the 12 but the other 4 were not. However, there were no practical adverse consequences. The Commander in Chief of the applicable unified command reviewed and approved the changes to the four systems. In addition, three of the four systems were included in another operational test after the implementation of the changes and the fourth system had changes that did not affect the date function.

**Management Comments.** Although not required to comment, the Director, Communications and Information, Department of the Air Force concurred with the finding in the draft audit report. The Director stated that the 4 changes identified in the

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audit report were not reported by the Air Force because the U. S. Transportation Command agreed to handle the notification to the Joint Staff and the Air Force did not consider the changes to be reportable under the DoD guidance.

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## Background

In Audit Report No. 99-145 "Year 2000 Issues Within the European Command and Its Service Components," April 30, 1999, we raised a concern that DoD had not issued a policy on configuration management to year 2000 compliant systems that defines roles and responsibilities in addressing configuration changes. We recommended assessing the risk of establishing a moratorium on system changes during the last 3 months of the calendar year.

**Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, August 20, 1999.** The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that established policy to ensure that configuration changes to systems that are mission-critical and date-dependent did not add undue year 2000 (Y2K) risk to, or undermine confidence in, system architectures that are Y2K compliant. The policy gives the Commanders in Chief (CINC) and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Principal Staff Assistants (PSA) veto authority over configuration change proposals approved by the configuration control board for mission-critical and date-dependent systems identified on the CINC thin-lines and PSA functional end-to-end architectures. The CINC thin-lines are those systems that the Joint Staff and CINC identified as a minimum number of integrated automated information platforms and systems required to perform critical tasks or missions from sensor to shooter, and are critical to a major theater of war. The PSA functional end-to-end system architectures are systems that are critical to ensure the continuity of critical support functions such as logistics and personnel and readiness. The policy pertains to hardware, software, networking infrastructure, processed materials, services and related technical documentation. However, the policy does not apply to changes needed to prevent Y2K failures or to restore system operations after failure.

The policy requires that following configuration control board approval, the system program manager submit details on the proposed changes including Y2K risk assessments, schedules, and justifications to the affected CINC or PSA who then has 10 working days to disapprove the proposed changes. The policy was effective September 1, 1999, and terminated March 15, 2000.

**Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) Implementation Guidance November 9, 1999.** The Assistant Secretary issued guidance to implement the Deputy Secretary of Defense August memorandum. The guidance states that after approval by the configuration control board and completion of Y2K testing, the affected program executive officers or designated acquisition commanders must forward relevant proposed change information to the OSD and the Joint Staff Y2K offices who will then forward the proposed change information to the respective PSA or CINC. They will have 10 working days to disapprove implementation of the proposed change. The guidance does not pertain to changes that are Y2K related or emergency changes made to restore system operations after failure.

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Although the new policy on configuration management went into effect September 1, 1999, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) did not issue implementation guidance until November 9, 1999.

## **Objectives**

The audit objective was to determine whether system configuration changes were being appropriately controlled in accordance with the August 20, 1999, Deputy Secretary of Defense policy memorandum and the related DoD implementation guidance of November 9, 1999. Specifically, we reviewed the policy and process of the services and Joint Staff in determining, reviewing, and approving changes to year 2000 compliant systems. See Appendix A for a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and prior coverage.

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## **Configuration Changes to Year 2000 Compliant Mission-Critical and Date- Dependent Systems**

The Services generally implemented the August 1999 DoD configuration policy as intended. There were 12 proposed changes to mission-critical and date-dependent systems submitted to the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense. Of the 70 systems we reviewed, 5 systems were subject to the policy and had approved configuration changes after September 1, 1999. Only one change was reported as part of the 12 but the other 4 were not. However, there were no practical adverse consequences. The Commander in Chief of the applicable unified command reviewed and approved the changes to the four systems. In addition, three of the four systems were included in another operational test after the implementation of the changes and the fourth system had changes that did not affect the date function.

### **Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum August 20, 1999**

The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to ensure that configuration changes to systems that are mission-critical and date-dependent did not add undue Y2K risk to, or undermine confidence in, system architectures that are Y2K compliant. The memorandum stated that our office would monitor and report to the DoD Chief Information Officer on the efficiency and effectiveness of the process in managing and reporting on configuration changes to date-dependent mission-critical systems on the CINC thin-lines and PSA functional end-to-end architectures.

### **Sample of Date-Dependent Mission-Critical Systems**

From the October 20, 1999, DoD database, we judgmentally selected for review 55 thin-line and 12 functional end-to end systems that are mission-critical and date-dependent. The functional systems were from logistics and personnel and readiness. In addition, at the request of the Joint Staff, we selected three trusted systems from the CINC list of trusted systems. A trusted system is a mission-critical system that cannot be taken operationally off-line without causing adverse impacts to safety, security, and real world operations. Table 1 shows the universe of systems and the quantity selected for review by Service, and Appendix B lists each system sampled.

**Table 1. CINC Thin-line and PSA Functional End-to-End Systems Date-Dependent and Mission-Critical Universe and Sample Size**

Service Component	Universe			Sample			
	PSA			PSA			
	CINC Thin-line Systems	Functional End-to-End Systems	Total	CINC Thin-line Systems	Functional End-to-End Systems	Trusted Systems <sup>1</sup>	Total
Army	35	33	68	8	4	2	14
Navy	27	18	45	19	4	0	23
Air Force	<u>126</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>33</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>263</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>70</b>

For the systems selected, we obtained and reviewed supporting documentation on proposed configuration changes. We excluded changes that were Y2K related or emergency changes made to restore system operations after failure because the Deputy Secretary's policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), implementation guidance excluded those types of changes. Based on our review and analysis, we identified that 65 systems including the trusted systems, had no configuration changes, had changes that were made prior to September 1, 1999, or had changes that were exempt from the reporting requirements in accordance to the DoD policy and guidance. One Army system had changes made after September 1, 1999, and reported the change to the Joint Staff. Four systems had changes after September 1, 1999. The changes were not reported to the Joint Staff. Our results are shown in Table 2.

**Table 2. Categorization of Configuration Changes to Sample**

Service Component	Systems with No Configuration Changes, Exempt, or Changes Before 9/1/99	Trusted Systems with No Configuration Changes	Configuration Changes After 9/1/99 Reported to OSD and the Joint Staff	Configuration Changes After 9/1/99 Not Reported	Total
Army	12	1	1	0	14
Navy	23	0	0	0	23
Air Force	<u>27</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>33</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>70</b>

<sup>1</sup>The three trusted systems included the Army E-4B DSCS /JRSC Terminal system, system identification number DA00576, the Army MCCC DSCS Satcom, system identification number DA02703, and the Air Force Space Based Infra-Red System Defense Support Program Space Segment, system identification number AS003470.

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Table 3 identifies the system description, the system identification number, and the date of the approved configuration change for the four systems not reported to the Joint Staff or the OSD Y2K offices.

**Table 3. Air Force Systems with Configuration Changes after September 1, 1999**

<u>System Description</u>	<u>System Identification Number</u>	<u>Configuration Board Approved</u>
Advanced Computer Flight Planning System	2000035	10/29/99
AMC Deployment Analysis System	99005193	10/18/99
Combined Mating and Ranging Planning System	31001383	9/27/99
Global Decision Support System	2001101	10/7/99

All four Air Force systems are under the purview of the U.S. Transportation Command CINC. As such the CINC retained configuration change approval for all changes to the configuration of thin-line systems, monitored upgrades, and reviewed the risks of configuration changes exercising veto authority when necessary. As a result, the CINC acted as a configuration control board and reviewed and approved the changes to the four systems. After the Air Force made the changes, three of the four systems participated in the Transportation Command Operational Evaluation C that occurred in late October 1999. Operational evaluations are tests and analysis of a specific system under operating conditions. The tests ensure that the end-to-end functional process flows by identifying core processes and systems required, assessing readiness, and evaluating the need for additional end-to-end testing to demonstrate the readiness of primary functions. The Advanced Computer Flight Planning System did not participate in the operational evaluation but the change to the systems did not involve a date and the CINC reviewed and approved the change.

While the Air Force did involve the CINC in the change process, it did not submit configuration change information to the Joint Staff or to the OSD Y2K office for the systems as there was no requirement to do so at that time. However, when the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) issued implementation guidance in November, 1999 which required that a system's program executive officer forward relevant proposed change information to the OSD and the Joint Staff Y2K offices, the Air Force did not notify the Joint Staff or the Y2K offices of the earlier changes. Notification would have allowed OSD and the Joint Staff visibility over all changes to systems subject to the policy.

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## **Joint Staff and OSD Y2K Offices**

On January 10, 2000, we met with officials from the Joint Staff and the OSD Y2K office who indicated that they were not aware of four Air Force changes that we identified during our review. They received 12 changes to other systems in response to the policy. To ensure visibility over all changes they agreed to contact each Service and CINC and require each to submit information on any changes that may have occurred since September 1, 1999, and have not been reported.

## **Conclusion**

The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum giving the CINCs and the PSAs veto authority over configuration change proposals for mission-critical and date-dependent systems identified on the CINC thin-line or the PSA functional end-to-end system architectures. The policy and implementation guidance was to ensure changes did not add undue Y2K risk to, or undermine confidence in, system architectures that are Y2K compliant. The Services followed policy and guidance as intended. We found only 4 exceptions in our sample of 70 systems. None of the four had adverse consequences. The planned action by the Joint Staff to ensure that any other exceptions are identified is a prudent step.

## **Management Comments**

Although not required to comment, the Director, Communication and Information, Department of the Air Force concurred with the finding in the draft audit report. The Director stated that the 4 changes identified were not reported by the Air Force because the U.S. Transportation Command Commander in Chief agreed to handle the notification to the Joint Staff as indicated in the April 1999 Configuration Management Plan. The Director also stated that the CINC did not consider the changes to be reportable under the guidance because they considered the configuration baseline to be at the end of Operational Evaluation C in late October and not configuration versions that changed between September 1, 1999, and October 27, 1999.

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## Appendix A. Audit Process

This report is one in a series being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD, to monitor DoD efforts to address the Y2K computing challenge. For a listing of audit projects addressing this issue, see the Y2K webpage on Ichnet at <http://www.ignnet.gov>.

### Scope

**Work Performed.** We reviewed and evaluated the progress of DoD and the Services in making configuration changes to mission-critical and date-dependent systems. We evaluated the efforts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force compared with the Deputy Secretary's memorandum, "Limitation on Configuration Changes to Y2K-Compliant Systems" dated August 20, 1999, the Assistant Secretary of Defense Memorandum "Limitation on Configuration Changes to Y2K-Compliant Systems" dated November 9, 1999, and the DoD Y2K Management Plan. We conducted discussions with DoD and Service officials and evaluated certification and configuration change documentation where available.

**DoD-Wide Corporate Level Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Coverage.** In response to the GPRA, the Secretary of Defense annually establishes DoD-wide corporate level goals, subordinate performance goals, and performance measures. This report pertains to achievement of the following goal(s), subordinate performance goal(s), and performance measure(s):

**FY 2000 DoD Corporate Level Goal 2:** Prepare now for an uncertain future by pursuing a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in key warfighting capabilities. Transform the force by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs, and reengineer the Department to achieve a 21st century infrastructure. **(00-DoD-2) FY 2000 Subordinate Performance Goal 2.5:** Improve DoD financial and information management. **FY 2000 Performance Measure 2.5.3:** Qualitative Assessment of Reforming Information Technology Management.

**DoD Functional Area Reform Goals.** Most major DoD functional areas have also established performance improvement reform objectives and goals. This report pertains to achievement of the following functional area objective and goal:

#### **Information Technology Management Functional Area.**

**Objective:** Provide services that satisfy customer information needs.

**Goal:** Upgrade technology base. **(ITM-2-3)**

**General Accounting Office High-Risk Area.** In its identification of risk areas, the General Accounting Office has specifically designated risk in resolution of the Y2K problem as high. This report provides coverage of that problem and of the overall Information Technology Management high-risk area.

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## Methodology

**Audit Type, Dates, and Standards.** We performed this economy and efficiency audit from November 1999 through January 2000, in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD. We relied on computer-processed data without performing tests of system general and application controls to confirm the reliability of the data. However, not establishing the reliability of the database will not affect the results of our audit. We relied on judgmental sampling procedures to develop conclusions on this audit. We judgmentally selected 70 DoD mission-critical and date-dependent systems that are on the CINC thin-line or PSA end-to-end architectures for review.

**Contacts During the Audit.** We visited or contacted individuals and organizations within DoD. Further details are available on request.

**Management Control Program Review.** We did not review the management control program related to the overall audit objective because DoD recognized the Y2K issue as a material management control weakness area in the FY 1998 Annual Statement of Assurance.

## Prior Coverage

**General Accounting Office and the Inspector General, DoD.** The General Accounting Office and the Inspector General, DoD, have conducted multiple reviews related to Y2K issues. General Accounting Office reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Inspector General, DoD, reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.dodig.osd.mil>.

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## Appendix B. Sample Selection of Date-Dependent Mission-Critical Systems

	<u>Description of Mission-Critical System</u>	<u>Identification Number</u>
<b>Department of the Army</b>		
1	Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System	DA01780
2	AN/ASQ-223 – Airborne Reconnaissance Low – Multifunction	DA01423
3	E-4B DSCS /JRSC Terminal	DA00576
4	Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System	DA00137
5	Group Operational Passenger System	DA00046
6	Guardrail/Common Sensor System 3 AN/USD-9B	DA00629
7	Integrated Booking System	DA00481
8	MCCC DSCS Satcom	DA02703
9	Special Operation Attack Helicopter-6J	DA02650
10	Special Operations Helicopter-47D	DA02646
11	Standard Army Maintenance System - 1 & 2 Rehost	DA00802
12	Standard Army Retail Supply System - 2AD	DA00488
13	Total Army Personnel Data Base – Guard	DA00758
14	Worldwide Port System	DA00113
<b>Department of the Navy</b>		
1	Automated Digital Network System	5634
2	Common User Digital Info Exchange Subsystem (Hardware)	5553
3	EP-3 Aries II Tactical Systems	10630
4	E-6A Tacamo Message Processing System	6225
5	E-6B AN/ASC-37 Mission Computer System	6237
6	E-6B AN/ART-54 VLF High Power Transmit Set	6242
7	Gateguard	5547
8	Global Command and Control System Maritime - Afloat Naval Tac Cmd System-Afloat	5651
9	Global Command and Control System Maritime – Ashore Component	5511
10	Global Command and Control System Maritime - Tactical Mobile / Tactical Support Center	5512
11	Integrated Submarine Automated Broadcast Processing System – Ashore	5535
12	Integrated Verdin Transmit Terminal	5592
13	Naval Automated Modular Communications System Afloat Component An/Syq-7a(V) An/Syq-7b(V)	5554
14	Nova	5550
15	Submarine Satellite Information Exchange System	5498
16	Tactical Receive Equipment (Engineering Design Model)	5502
17	Theater Mission Planning Center	7451

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18	Time and Frequency Distribution System	5539
19	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile R/Ugm-109a	8106
20	UADPS-T Tandem	5826
21	UICP Alt-Resys	5839
22	UICP Transition	5840
23	Uniform Automtd Data Prcss Sys	5827

## Department of the Air Force

1	Advanced Computer Flight Planning System	2000035
2	Aircraft Cruise Missile Force Applications System Additions	99008088
3	Air Force Mission Support System	31000312
4	Air Force Satellite Control Network - Command and Control Segment	AS002796
5	AMC Deployment Analysis System	99005193
6	Atmospheric Early Warning System Long Range Radar, AN/FPS 117	99008028
7	Atmospheric Early Warning System R/SOCC-AWACS Digital Interface Link, AN/GSQ-235	99004495
8	Atmospheric Early Warning System Unattended Radar, AN/FPS-124	99008026
9	Atmospheric Early Warning System Advanced Interface Control Unit.	99008029
10	Atmospheric Early Warning System AN/FYQ-93 Computer	99008025
11	Automatic Tracking and Monitoring System	AS006836
12	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System II	99008002
13	CMAS Message Processor	99004754
14	Combined Mating and Ranging Planning System	31001383
15	Contingency Operation/Mobility Planning and Execution System	31001416
16	Contingency Theater Automated Planning System	99008168
17	Enhanced Transportation Automated Data System	2000993
18	Global Decision Support System	2001101
19	Granite Sentry	99004758
20	KC-135 Air Force Mission Support System A/W/E	AS006505
21	Logistics Information Brokering System	99005004
22	Mobile Command and Control Center Space Command	AS004311
23	Moron Optical Space Surveillance System	AS006983
24	PAVE PAWS Phased Array Radar	31002615
25	Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System	31002608
26	Portable Flight Planning Software	99008147
27	Space Based Infra Red System - Attack and Launch Early Reporting to Theater	99005533
28	Space Based Infra-Red System Defense Support Program Space Segment	AS003470
29	Space Based Infra-Red System Defense Support Program Strategic Ground	AS003468
30	Space Defense Operations Center	31002940
31	Special Support Stock Control And Distribution System	99001364
32	Sustainability Assessment Module	99001984
33	Wholesale and Retail Receiving and Shipping	1000152

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## **Appendix C. Report Distribution**

### **Office of the Secretary of Defense**

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Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)  
Deputy Chief Information Officer and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Chief  
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Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

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Chief Information Officer, Department of the Army  
Inspector General, Department of the Army  
Auditor General, Department of the Army

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Naval Inspector General  
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

### **Department of the Air Force**

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Director, Joint Staff

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Senate Committee on Armed Services  
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs  
House Committee on Appropriations  
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations  
House Committee on Armed Services  
House Committee on Government Reform  
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology,  
Committee on Government Reform  
House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International  
Relations, Committee on Government Reform  
House Subcommittee on Technology, Committee on Science

# Department of the Air Force Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Washington, DC

27 Mar 00

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING  
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FROM: AF/SC  
1250 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington DC 20330-1250

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Configuration Changes to Year 2000 Compliant Mission-Critical  
and Date Dependent Systems, (Project No. 9AB-0054)

1. This is in reply to your 7 Mar 00 memorandum providing the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) the option to send Air Force comments on subject report.

2. We concur with the findings, but provide the following clarifying information. Air Mobility Command, which manages the four systems with un-coordinated changes, did not notify OSD and Joint Staff of changes to those systems because USTRANSCOM had agreed to handle OSD and Joint Staff notification requirements on behalf of their components per their Apr 99 configuration management plan. They (USTRANSCOM) did not consider these changes to be reportable under the OSD guidance because they considered the initial baseline to be the system versions at the end of OPEVAL C (held from 18-27 Oct 99) instead of the system versions on 1 Sep 99 as stated in the OSD guidance. The four systems in question were changed between 1 Sep 99 and 27 Oct 99.

3. My point of contact is Mr James Kelly, AFCIC/TTC. He may be reached at 703-602-2206 or DSN 332-2206.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "WJ Donahue".

WILLIAM J. DONAHUE, Lt Gen, USAF  
Director, Communications and Information

## **Audit Team Members**

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