

# Inspector General

United States  
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DoD's Management of the Redistribution  
Property Assistance Team Operations in Kuwait

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AWRDS	Army War Reserve Deployment System
OIG	Office of Inspector General
PBUSE	Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced
RPAT	Redistribution Property Assistance Team
TPE	Theater Provided Equipment



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MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY CENTRAL  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: DoD's Management of the Redistribution Property Assistance Team Operations in Kuwait (Report No. DODIG-2012-071)

We are providing this report for your information and use. This is the first in a series of reports on Redistribution Property Assistance Team (RPAT) operations in Kuwait. Our objective was to determine whether DoD effectively managed RPAT operations in Kuwait to ensure DoD was prepared to handle the anticipated amount of materiel (equipment) related to the drawdown from Iraq. For this report, we reviewed the process for turning in equipment at the Camp Virginia, Kuwait RPAT yard, along with verifying selected documentation related to the turn-in process. Our second report will discuss the subsequent wholesale property accountability and data management of the equipment.

Camp Virginia RPAT officials effectively managed RPAT operations in Kuwait to accomplish their primary mission of supporting the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. Specifically, Camp Virginia RPAT officials relieved units of accountability for their Theater Provided Equipment (TPE), before redeploying<sup>1</sup> to their home stations. During our review, we provided RPAT officials with our observations based on concerns with the 4-corners process, "frustrated" equipment,<sup>2</sup> and security controls. We commend Camp Virginia RPAT officials for implementing corrective actions throughout the audit.

## **Background**

In 2008, the United States and the Republic of Iraq agreed that all U.S. forces would withdraw from Iraq by December 31, 2011. The transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn on September 1, 2010, marked the official end to combat operations by U.S. forces in Iraq. Operation New Dawn initiated the redeployment of thousands of U.S. forces and their equipment. The 402<sup>nd</sup> Army Field Support Brigade established the RPAT operations in Iraq and Kuwait to facilitate and assist the redeployment of the U.S. forces.

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<sup>1</sup> DoD defines redeploying as the transfer of forces and materiel to support another Joint Force Commander's operational requirements or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home or demobilization station for reintegration or out processing.

<sup>2</sup> Frustrated equipment is equipment that arrives at the RPAT yard with incomplete or incorrect documentation, such as a DD Form 1348-1A, "Issue Release/Receipt Document." The equipment is moved to a separate storage lot until the unit can correct the deficiencies.

## ***Overall Mission of the RPAT***

The RPAT mission was to facilitate the turn-in of all excess major end item (Class VII) TPE, improve property accountability, and enable asset visibility of the equipment received. The RPAT allowed all redeploying U.S. forces to have their property book cleared by the appropriate authority to provide immediate relief of accountability and turn-in of TPE.

## ***Mission of the Camp Virginia RPAT***

The mission of the Camp Virginia, Kuwait RPAT was to relieve self-redeploying units<sup>3</sup> of their TPE, clear their property book, and prepare them to redeploy to their home stations. The 402<sup>nd</sup> Army Field Support Brigade set up the Camp Virginia RPAT near the Iraq-Kuwait border to prevent the self-redeploying units from driving through Kuwaiti cities. The Camp Virginia RPAT did not process the same equipment as the RPATs in Iraq. The self-redeploying units turned in the majority of their equipment in Iraq before driving to Kuwait to turn in their TPE at Camp Virginia. The 364<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Sustainment Command, the 553<sup>rd</sup> Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, and the 541<sup>st</sup> Combat Sustainment Support Battalion shared day-to-day operations at Camp Virginia. Figure 1 depicts units arriving at Camp Virginia in October 2011.

**Figure 1. Unit Arriving at the  
Camp Virginia RPAT**



Source: DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG)

## ***Process for Turning In Equipment at Camp Virginia***

The process for turning in equipment began when self-redeploying units arrived at Camp Virginia. The self-redeploying units turned in their remaining items that were required to preserve life and safety (such as their ammunition, medical supplies, individual body armor, and selected expendable items<sup>4</sup>). After the unit successfully turned in their remaining items, contractor personnel inspected the units' TPE to verify that the serial number, the national stock number, and quantity of the items listed on the DD Form 1348-1A, "Issue Release/Receipt

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<sup>3</sup> We defined "self-redeploying units" as those units that drove their vehicles from Iraq to Kuwait for turn-in at the Camp Virginia RPAT.

<sup>4</sup> Expendable items are items that are consumed or lose their identity, such as rations or meals ready-to-eat.

Document,” (DD Form 1348) matched the equipment being turned in. RPAT officials required units to correct deficiencies with their DD Forms 1348 before RPAT officials relieved the units of property accountability. Once the unit resolved the deficiencies identified during inspection, the RPAT officials relieved the unit of property accountability, clearing their property book in the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE) system.<sup>5</sup>

Next, RPAT officials de-installed (removed) equipment from the vehicles and recorded the equipment on the wholesale accountability record. Contractor personnel entered the required information into the Army War Reserve Deployment System (AWRDS)<sup>6</sup> for visibility. AWRDS automatically updates the Logistics Modernization Program system,<sup>7</sup> which is the Army’s official record for wholesale asset accountability.

## **RPAT Officials Accomplished Their Primary Mission of Relieving Units of Accountability**

Camp Virginia RPAT officials effectively managed the RPAT operations to accomplish their primary mission of supporting the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq by relieving units of accountability for their TPE, before redeploying to their home station. As a result, from October 18, 2011, through December 31, 2011, Camp Virginia RPAT officials relieved units of accountability for approximately 2,300 vehicles and 24,600 pieces of non-rolling equipment. In addition, approximately 26,000 U.S. forces redeployed to their home stations from Camp Virginia before the December 31, 2011, deadline.

During our review, we provided RPAT officials with our observations to address concerns with the 4-corners process, frustrated equipment, and security controls. We commend Camp Virginia RPAT officials for implementing corrective actions based on our communication throughout the audit. Additionally, we commend the officials for taking actions to improve the RPAT operations.

### ***Concerns With the 4-Corners Process Communicated to RPAT Officials***

On October 21, 2011, we provided RPAT officials with our observations addressing concerns with the 4-corners process. The 4-corners process began when self-redeploying units arrived at the Camp Virginia RPAT. Members of the unit downloaded their ammunition while their commanders attended a briefing of the RPAT process. Upon completion of the briefing, the unit downloaded their expendable items and medical equipment. After the 4-corners process, unit personnel staged their vehicles by type and size, provided their DD Forms 1348 to Camp Virginia RPAT officials responsible for relieving the units of accountability in PBUSE, and then

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<sup>5</sup> PBUSE is a web-based, automated system that is used to account for and provide Army-wide visibility of equipment at the unit level.

<sup>6</sup> AWRDS is an automated system designed to assist in the accountability, inventory, maintenance, and transfer of TPE for redeploying units.

<sup>7</sup> Logistics Modernization Program is an integrated Army system that provides item managers with asset visibility and is used to manage the Army’s materiel inventory and maintenance operations.

left the RPAT yard until the next process began. The PBUSE contractor made copies of the DD Forms 1348 and verified that each piece of equipment had a shipping address.

During our observations of the 4-corners briefing held on October 18, 2011, RPAT officials provided the briefing in an open tent near running generators, which adversely affected verbal instructions. In addition, several individuals asked the speaker to repeat the information or to speak louder. During the subsequent accountability inspection process, unit personnel seemed unaware of the requirement to turn in a copy of their DD Forms 1348 after the 4-corners process, which caused delays and confusion in the overall processing of equipment.

We communicated with RPAT officials on October 21, 2011, to increase the effectiveness of the briefing conducted before the 4-corners process and increase the efficiency of Camp Virginia RPAT operations. Specifically, we suggested that RPAT officials provide unit personnel with a tangible handout detailing the actions required to ensure successful processing through the RPAT yard. We also suggested that the units could use the handout in conjunction with the verbal briefing provided by the RPAT officials.

Camp Virginia RPAT officials immediately responded to our suggestions by developing an information packet of procedures and required documentation, which they disseminated to the self-redeploying units before the units left Iraq. Camp Virginia RPAT officials stated that they would collect the DD Forms 1348 after the 4-corners process to mitigate the delays encountered during subsequent RPAT processes. During our observations of subsequent units arriving at Camp Virginia and processing through the 4-corners and RPAT yard, we confirmed that the Camp Virginia RPAT officials provided a tangible handout to unit personnel during the initial briefing and RPAT officials visually displayed RPAT yard instructions. By implementing these corrective actions, Camp Virginia RPAT officials increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the 4-corners briefing.

### ***Concerns With Frustrated Equipment Communicated to RPAT Officials***

On November 8, 2011, we provided RPAT officials with our observations addressing concerns with frustrated equipment. RPAT officials categorized equipment as frustrated when self-redeploying units arrived at Camp Virginia without correctly printing or preparing their DD Forms 1348. Deficiencies that caused self-redeploying units' equipment to be frustrated included: (1) data plates did not match the DD Forms 1348, (2) associated equipment was not in the vehicle, (3) equipment in the vehicle did not have documentation, or (4) units did not arrive at Camp Virginia with printed DD Forms 1348. RPAT officials moved frustrated equipment to open lots where they assisted the units in preparing or correcting the applicable paperwork.

RPAT officials stated that from October 18, 2011, through October 25, 2011, only 1 of 12 units arrived at Camp Virginia with correctly prepared and printed DD Forms 1348. The self-redeploying unit that arrived with their DD Forms 1348 correctly prepared and printed processed through the RPAT yard within 4 days. However, using a tracking sheet provided by RPAT officials, we calculated that from October 2011 through December 2011, on average, it took 10 days for units to process through the RPAT yard. The tracking sheet recorded the date each unit arrived as well as the dates each unit cleared the RPAT yard. From the tracking sheet, we

identified that one unit's equipment remained in the frustrated lot for up to 47 days before clearing the RPAT yard. Self-redeploying units with frustrated equipment caused schedule changes, delays, and additional work and manpower from the PBUSE contractor, who assisted the units with preparing and printing their DD Forms 1348. As the number of self-redeploying units processing through the Camp Virginia RPAT increased, the number of frustrated units was also likely to increase, which would have caused bottlenecks, inefficiencies, and delays in returning units to their home stations.

To increase the efficiency of the RPAT yard, we communicated with RPAT officials on November 8, 2011, suggesting that officials provide additional communication to self-redeploying units in Iraq. Although redeploying units received an overall briefing 180-days before redeploying, we suggested that U.S. Central Command officials work with U.S. Forces-Iraq and Camp Virginia RPAT officials to issue further guidance to each of the units still in Iraq. At a minimum, we suggested that the guidance should stress the importance of having accurate, complete, and printed DD Forms 1348 before departing Iraq.

During subsequent observations at the RPAT yard, we observed a decrease in the amount of units arriving at Camp Virginia with frustrated equipment. Specifically, in December 2011, the frustrated equipment storage lots were virtually empty. RPAT officials stated that teams of liaison officers from self-redeploying units in Iraq came to Camp Virginia, in advance, to learn the process and requirements for an efficient turn-in of their equipment. Further, RPAT officials held daily synchronization meetings that included personnel from each phase of the RPAT process, members from self-redeploying units that were processing through the RPAT, and the liaison officers for units scheduled to arrive in the future. The liaison officers and the daily synchronization meetings enhanced the communication for successful turn-in of TPE and appeared to reduce the amount of frustrated equipment at Camp Virginia.

### ***Concerns With Security Procedures Communicated to RPAT Officials***

We provided RPAT officials with our observations on October 27, 2011, addressing concerns with security procedures. Although Camp Virginia officials established security procedures for the RPAT yard to ensure they safeguard sensitive items, we identified potential security weaknesses. The RPAT yard at Camp Virginia processed and stored equipment and materiel, which contained advanced military technology that the United States cannot afford to misplace. Army Regulation 190-16, "Physical Security," May 31, 1991, states that procedures for protecting DoD property should include, but are not limited to security guards, physical barriers, secure containers, badge systems, and security lighting. Additionally, Army Regulation 190-13 "The Army Physical Security Program," February 25, 2011, states that Army officials should create a badge system to ensure only authorized personnel are granted access to a facility.

While assessing the Camp Virginia RPAT yard, we identified concerns with the contractor's security procedures. Our physical observations did not reveal a serious issue with security measures; however, we did note some potential weaknesses that could have resulted in the pilferage of sensitive Government equipment. Although we observed physical barriers, guarded entrances to the RPAT lots, secure containers, and lighting, we identified an unguarded entrance to one of the RPAT storage lots. We also identified that one of the RPAT vehicle storage lots did not have sufficient lighting. Additionally, Camp Virginia officials responsible for security

had an access roster of 272 people with authorized unescorted access. However, the officials did not implement a separate badge system or sign-in roster for those individuals.

Therefore, we communicated with RPAT officials on October 27, 2011, suggesting that Camp Virginia officials implement additional security procedures at the RPAT yard, to reduce the risk for pilferage of sensitive Government equipment. Specifically, we suggested that RPAT officials implement security procedures in the vehicle storage lot that did not have security lighting and at the unguarded entrance. We also suggested implementing a badge system and a sign-in roster and securing all entrances to the RPAT.

RPAT officials immediately responded to our suggestions by preparing a detailed plan to improve the physical security at the RPAT yard. RPAT officials implemented short-term solutions, including patrolling unguarded vehicle storage lots every hour and increasing the security personnel's situational awareness of sensitive items stored at the RPAT. In addition, the RPAT officials set up cones to impede entry through the unguarded entrance, supplemented contractor security guards with military guards, and informed the security guards of the potential physical security threat. Also, officials updated the access roster, removing many individuals no longer requiring access to the yard and incorporated a badge system. Our observations of the security measures in December 2011 confirmed that RPAT officials patrolled vehicle storage lots and implemented a badge system. Although the improved security plan included a requirement for security lights in all of the vehicle storage lots, our follow up observations indicated that RPAT officials did not install security lights. However, the enhanced security measures taken by the RPAT personnel sufficiently strengthened security to decrease the likelihood for pilferage of sensitive Government equipment.

## **Actions Taken to Improve RPAT Operations**

RPAT officials took actions to improve their operations throughout the audit. Specifically, RPAT officials provided additional training for contracted inspectors to ensure they could identify the equipment, began de-installing equipment 24 hours a day, and captured lessons learned for future RPAT operations. RPAT officials also refined standard operating procedures and assisted future sustainment forces by developing best practices for future RPAT operations.

## ***Actions Taken to Correct Initial Inspections***

RPAT officials took actions to provide additional training to contracted inspectors, which resulted in more efficient and effective initial accountability inspections. After completing the turn-in of ammunition and the 4-corners process, the units staged their vehicles for accountability inspection. The inspectors verified that the serial number, the national stock number, and quantity of the items listed on the DD Forms 1348 matched the equipment being turned in. During the accountability inspection process, we observed that contractor personnel could not initially identify the equipment or locate the data plates with the serial number and national stock number. As a result, contracted inspectors relied on the self-redeploying unit to identify various types of equipment and read serial numbers and national stock numbers. To correct this issue, the contractors took training on various types of equipment and developed posters to use as a visual aid in identifying the equipment. Our observation of subsequent units processing through the inspections confirmed that the contractor's initiative improved the process. Specifically, the

contractors no longer needed assistance from self-redeploying units to identify equipment or to locate and read the data plates, which decreased the processing time.

### ***Actions Taken to Correct Backlog Related to the De-installation of Equipment***

RPAT officials took corrective actions to decrease the backlog during the operation to de-install equipment. Once RPAT officials relieved the self-redeploying units of accountability in PBUSE, they simultaneously de-installed the equipment from the vehicles and brought it onto record in the wholesale accountability system. Program managers and multiple contractors de-installed Communications-Electronics Command equipment and basic issue TPE at the Camp Virginia RPAT yard. We observed three of five contractors that de-installed TPE from vehicles at Camp Virginia (Figures 2 and 3). Initially, the de-install process was not a 24-hour operation, resulting in one contractor waiting for another contractor to begin de-installing their equipment. This created a temporary backlog of vehicles waiting to have the equipment de-installed. To mitigate the backlog, Camp Virginia RPAT officials began de-installing equipment 24 hours a day on October 25, 2011, which decreased the delays.

**Figure 2. Equipment De-installation**



Source: DoD OIG

**Figure 3. Equipment De-installation**



Source: DoD OIG

### ***Self-Initiated Actions to Capture Lessons Learned***

RPAT officials captured lessons learned for the pending drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. In January 2012, RPAT officials conducted an After Action Review Symposium to capture RPAT lessons learned, refine standard operating procedures, and assist future sustainment forces with best practices from the responsible drawdown resulting from Operation New Dawn. Additionally, on January 16, 2012, and January 19, 2012, Camp Virginia RPAT officials started two, 10-day RPAT Academy classes and planned to hold at least two more sessions. The goal of the RPAT Academy was to provide a “world-class” learning environment capable of sharing RPAT best practices with any U.S forces and ensure that they understand all functions of the operation to execute or manage RPAT operations in any area of responsibility. This sharing of knowledge by Camp Virginia RPAT officials should help enable personnel who may be involved with the eventual drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

## Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program (MICP) Procedures,” July 29, 2010, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. RPAT officials did not always have internal controls in place to effectively safeguard the advanced military technology processed at the Camp Virginia RPAT yard. Although we did not identify any serious issues with security measures, we did note some potential weaknesses, which could result in the pilferage of sensitive equipment. We provided RPAT officials with our observations on October 27, 2011, detailing our concerns with the security at the RPAT yard. In response to our suggestions, Camp Virginia RPAT officials took immediate corrective action to mitigate the potential weaknesses we identified. We believe the corrective actions sufficiently improved security controls over the Camp Virginia RPAT.

## Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 through April 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We limited our review to the Camp Virginia RPAT operations. Specifically, to determine whether DoD effectively managed the RPAT operations, we interviewed officials, obtained and reviewed documentation, and observed the RPAT process. We also observed and analyzed the data entry process for relieving the units of accountability.

To accomplish our objectives, we coordinated with or interviewed officials from:

- U.S. Central Command,
- United States Forces-Iraq,
- Army G-4,
- U.S. Army Central,
- U.S. Army Materiel Command,
- Defense Contract Management Agency,
- 1<sup>st</sup> Theater Sustainment Command,
- Army Sustainment Command,
- Communications-Electronics Command,
- TACOM,
- 402<sup>nd</sup> Army Field Support Brigade,
- 364<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Sustainment Command,
- 541<sup>st</sup> Combat Sustainment Support Battalion,
- 553<sup>rd</sup> Combat Sustainment Support Battalion,
- Army Field Support Battalion-Kuwait,
- Responsible Reset Task Force, and
- RPAT Contractors.

To gain an understanding of the RPAT process, we reviewed external RPAT standard operating procedures, conducted meetings at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and observed the Camp Virginia RPAT operations. During our site visits at Camp Virginia, Kuwait between October 2011 and December 2011, we observed the RPAT process for 18 of the 85 units that arrived at the Camp Virginia RPAT yard. At Camp Virginia, we observed the RPAT process from arrival of the self-redeploying unit, through their relief of accountability, and the subsequent de-installation and wholesale accountability of the equipment.

To determine whether the Camp Virginia RPAT officials accomplished their primary mission of relieving units of accountability, we:

- reviewed applicable guidance to determine proper procedures for relieving units of their property accountability;
- reviewed prior audit reports, standard operating procedures, and guidance to determine the authority, purpose, and concept of Camp Virginia RPAT operations;
- reviewed controls related to retail property accountability at the RPAT yard; and
- interviewed key personnel at the Camp Virginia RPAT yard and physically observed RPAT operations.

We also reviewed sections of the Federal Property Management Regulation; Federal Acquisition Regulations; Army regulations, memoranda, and pamphlets; and DoD instructions and manuals. We reviewed U.S. Forces-Iraq and 1<sup>st</sup> Theater Sustainment Command Fragmentary Orders and an agreement between the United States and the Republic of Iraq. We obtained and analyzed statistics maintained by the 541<sup>st</sup> Combat Sustainment Support Battalion on the number of units that processed through the Camp Virginia RPAT and the days required to clear the units' property book.

## **Use of Computer-Processed Data**

In performing our review, we relied on computer-processed data from three automated systems: TPE Planner, PBUSE, and AWRDS. However, we did not rely on computer-processed data as the primary support for our conclusions. Therefore, we did not evaluate the sufficiency or reliability of the data in any automated system.

## **Prior Coverage**

During the last 5 years, the GAO, DoD IG and the Army Audit Agency issued seven reports on the Drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq, Drawdown retrograde operations, and RPATs. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>. Unrestricted Army Audit Agency reports can be accessed at <https://www.aaa.army.mil/>.

## **GAO**

GAO-11-774, "Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role," September 16, 2011

GAO-08-930, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq," September 10, 2008

**DoD IG**

DoD IG Report No. D-2010-091, "DOD Needs to Improve Management and Oversight of Operations at the Theatre Retrograde-Camp Arifjan, Kuwait," September 30, 2010

**Army Audit Agency**

A-2011-0077-ALL, "Followup Audit of Retrograde Operations in Iraq: Class VII Theater Provided Equipment," April 12, 2011

A-2011-0063-ALL, "Redistribution Property Assistance Teams," February 14, 2011

A-2010-0098-ALL, "Retrograde Operations in Southwest Asia: Donation and Transfer of Excess Materiel and Supplies," May 7, 2010

A-2010-0022-ALL, "Retrograde Operations Southwest Asia: Multi-Class Retrograde Camp Arifjan, Kuwait," December 7, 2009

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-8905 (DSN 664-8905).



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