

**Audit**



**Report**

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

**REQUIREMENT FOR ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT  
UNITS NOT ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL  
CONTINGENCIES**

Report No. 96-210

August 13, 1996

**Department of Defense**

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### **Acronyms**

GAO  
TPFDD

General Accounting Office  
Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data



**INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-2884



Report No. 96-210

August 13, 1996

**MEMORANDUM FOR AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

**SUBJECT: Audit of Requirement for Army Reserve Component Units Not Assigned  
to Support Regional Contingencies (Project No. 5RA-0010.02)**

### **Introduction**

We are providing this report for information and use. We performed the audit at the request of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs). This report discusses whether the Army Reserve Component is sized and structured to meet the needs of anticipated regional contingencies. The Army Reserve Component includes the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Reports on the Naval Reserve Component (Report No. 96-173) and the Air Reserve Component (Report No. 96-184) were issued previously. Management comments on a draft of this report were considered in preparing the final report.

### **Audit Results**

As of May 1996, the Army had as much as 48 percent of Reserve Component units with deploying missions that were not tasked to support the 2 major regional contingencies concept. As a result, those units are excess to the Army Reserve Component force structure. We postponed the audit at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, and agreed to resume audit work after the Army completed its Total Army Analysis. The Total Army Analysis, according to Army personnel, would identify whether the Army Reserve Component had an excess force structure. Upon resuming audit work, we determined that recommendations from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the DoD Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, and the Joint Staff would remedy force structure issues in the Army Reserve Component. Therefore, we terminated further audit work.

This report contains no recommendations because recommendations in prior GAO reports, the Report of the DoD Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, and new Joint Staff time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) requirements should remedy the force structure issues in the Army Reserve Component.

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## **Audit Objective**

The audit objective was to determine whether a valid need exists for Army Reserve Component units that are not assigned to meet the needs of anticipated regional contingencies. The audit also evaluated the Army management control program as it applied to the audit objective.

## **Audit Process**

**Scope and Methodology.** We obtained DoD and Army policy as it relates to wartime contingency planning. We collected data on the total number and type of Army Guard and Reserve units as of May 1996. We used planning data that were current as of November 1995 and the TPFDDs for the two nearly simultaneous major regional contingency scenario to identify Reserve Component units that were tasked to support regional contingencies. We did not review the Army process for determining that a valid need exists for those units that were not tasked. We relied on the results reported by the GAO and the DoD Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.

We compared the total number of Army Guard and Reserve units available with the numbers and types of units tasked in the most current TPFDDs for the two nearly simultaneous major regional contingency scenario.

**Use of Computer-Processed Data.** We relied on computer-processed data extracted from the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System to identify the units tasked to support regional contingencies. To the extent that we reviewed the computer-processed data, we concluded that they were sufficiently reliable to be used in meeting our primary audit objective.

**Audit Period, Standards, and Locations.** We performed this program audit from November 1994 through May 1996 in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD. We included tests of management controls considered necessary. Enclosure 2 lists the organizations we visited or contacted.

## **Management Control Program**

DoD Directive 5010.38, "Internal Management Control Program," April 14, 1987, requires DoD managers to implement a comprehensive system of management controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the adequacy of those controls.

**Scope of Review of the Management Control Program.** We limited our review to the adequacy of controls over Army Reserve Component unit requirements needed to meet the needs of anticipated regional contingencies. We did not assess the adequacy of management's self-evaluation.

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**Adequacy of Management Controls.** Management controls were adequate in that the DoD and the Army are implementing audit recommendations in prior audit reports to validate and adjust Army Reserve Component requirements based on regional contingency requirements.

## **Prior Audits and Other Reviews**

Since June 1991, the GAO issued five reports that discuss Army Reserve Component unit structure, regional contingency requirements, and wartime mobilization requirements. The DoD Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces also issued two reports that discuss the force structure the Army Reserve Component needs for regional contingencies. See Enclosure 1 for a summary of those reports.

## **Audit Background**

**New Military Strategy.** The traditional role of U.S. military forces focused on meeting global threats with little or no notice. Today, a new military strategy calls for the integration of both Active and Reserve forces into a single force capable of responding decisively to a short-notice regional conflict. In an environment of reduced budgets, downsizing, and restructuring, the Military Departments must identify how their Reserve forces will contribute to the new military strategy that requires rapid response to regional conflicts and at the same time, meet domestic and peacetime needs.

**Army Reserve Component.** The Army Reserve Component includes the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve Component contributes to the total force by providing trained units and personnel for major regional contingencies and national emergencies and by providing a readily accessible base to relieve Active component forces. The Army National Guard also has a state mission to provide the primary response to state emergencies and natural disasters. The Army Reserve Component accounts for 55.7 percent of total forces in the Army. The FY 1995 budget was \$5.8 billion for the Army National Guard and \$3.4 billion for the Army Reserve. As of September 30, 1995, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve had Selected Reserve end strengths of 400,000 and 242,000, respectively.


## **Discussion**

As of May 1996, plans for using Army Reserve Component units for regional contingencies showed that Reserve Component units will provide significant contributions. However, the specific types of Reserve Component units the Army plans to use are significantly fewer than the numbers maintained in the force structure.

**Army Reserve Component Unit Tasking to Support Regional Contingencies.** Army plans for using Army Reserve Component units to support regional contingencies showed that of 3,667 available units, 1,907 were

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tasked in TPFDDs to support operations for the anticipated 2 major regional contingencies. Available units include 1,597 Army National Guard and 1,674 Army Reserve units that have deploying missions and 197 Army National Guard and 199 Army Reserve units that do not have deploying missions. The figure shows the tasking of available Army Reserve Component units.



#### **Tasking of Available Army Reserve Component Units**

**Army National Guard Deploying Units Not Tasked.** Of 1,597 deploying Army National Guard units, 721 were not tasked in the TPFDDs to support 2 major regional contingencies. Table 1 identifies Army National Guard deploying units that were not tasked by functional areas. Table 1 also shows that while transportation, military police, and engineering units are readily tasked in the TPFDDs, infantry, combat support, medical, and armor units are not and, therefore, are excess to the force structure.

**Table 1. Army National Guard Deploying Units Not Tasked to Support Major Regional Contingencies**

<u>Functional Description</u>	<u>Number of Units</u>	<u>Number of Units Not Tasked</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Adjutant General	115	97	84
Air assault	5	5	100
Air defense artillery	23	17	74
Armor	74	50	68
Aviation	104	36	35
Chemical	12	9	75
Combat service support	19	4	21
Combat support	99	67	68
Engineer	194	48	25
Field artillery	131	56	43
Finance	53	23	43
Headquarters	20	8	40
Infantry	156	113	72
Judge Advocate General	4	4	100
Maintenance	92	39	42
Medical	95	58	61
Military history	10	0	0
Military intelligence	39	22	56
Military police	109	19	17
Ordnance	31	4	13
Public affairs	44	12	27
Quartermaster	32	4	13
Signal	44	20	45
Transportation	92	6	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,597</b>	<b>721</b>	<b>45</b>

**Army Reserve Deploying Units Not Tasked.** Of 1,674 deploying units in the Army Reserve, 660 were not tasked in the TPFDDs to support 2 major regional contingencies. Table 2 identifies Army Reserve deploying units that were not tasked by functional areas. Table 2 also shows that while transportation and engineering units are readily tasked in the regional contingency TPFDDs, civil affairs and military intelligence units are not and, therefore, are excess to the force structure.

**Table 2. Army Reserve Deploying Units Not Tasked to Support Major Regional Contingencies**

<u>Functional Description</u>	<u>Number of Units</u>	<u>Number of Units Not Tasked</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Adjutant General	109	47	43
Aviation	13	1	8
Chaplain	8	0	0
Chemical	63	6	10
Civil affairs	36	21	58
Combat service support	91	19	21
Logistics headquarters	39	15	38
Engineer	99	8	8
Finance	11	0	0
Headquarters	11	3	27
Infantry	2	0	0
Judge Advocate General	18	11	61
Maintenance	48	23	48
Medical	184	56	30
Military history	10	0	0
Military intelligence	117	88	75
Military police	81	5	6
Ordnance	25	6	24
Public affairs	28	3	11
Quartermaster	78	2	3
Signal	29	2	7
Training	331	331	100
Transportation	243	18	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,674</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>39</b>

**Army Reserve Component Nondeploying Units Not Tasked.** Of the 396 Army National Guard and Army Reserve units that do not have deploying missions, only 17 units, less than 5 percent, were tasked in the TPFDDs to support the anticipated 2 major regional contingencies. Those units also are excess to the force structure.

**Ongoing Efforts to Reduce Army Reserve Component Force Structure.** The DoD and the Army are either studying or implementing recommendations to review, validate, and eliminate excess force structure in the Army Reserve Component. The recommendations were made in reports issued by the GAO and the DoD Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (see Enclosure 1). The reports identified functional areas in which more force structure existed than was needed. This report confirms that there are areas where the DoD and the Army can focus their reviews of excess force

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structure. Also, effective with new operation plan submissions, the Joint Staff will require changes in the methods the Military Departments use to identify units needed to support operation plans. The Army, for example, must identify in an attachment to the TPFDD any untasked units from locations outside the theater of operations needed to support the operation plan. The change will give visibility over the force structure needed to carry out the military strategy of two major regional contingencies. The DoD and Army studies that are under way, planned actions in response to recommendations, and the Joint Staff requirements should remedy force structure issues in the Army Reserve Component.

## Management Comments

We provided a draft of this report to you on June 19, 1996. Because the report contained no findings or recommendations, comments were not required. Although no comments were required, the Army Reserve Command provided additional information, which we used to revise the number of infantry units listed in Table 2 from 333 units to 2 units. The 331 units removed from the infantry category were reclassified as training units to more accurately reflect their functional description. The revision does not affect the total number of units.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Mr. Harlan M. Geyer, Audit Program Director, at (703) 604-9594 (DSN 664-9594) or Ms. Geraldine M. Edwards, Audit Project Manager, at (703) 604-9489 (DSN 664-9489). See Enclosure 3 for the report distribution. Audit team members are listed inside the back cover.



David K. Steensma  
Deputy Assistant Inspector General  
for Auditing

Enclosures

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## Summary of Prior Audits and Other Reviews

Five GAO reports and two reports from the DoD Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces cover issues related to this audit.

GAO Report No. NSIAD-96-63 (OSD Case No. 1084), "Army National Guard: Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly," March 1996, states that the Army National Guard combat structure far exceeds war requirements. The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army and the Director, Army National Guard, validate the size and structure of all the Guard's combat forces. GAO also recommended that the Secretary of the Army:

- o prepare and execute a plan to bring the size and structure of Army National Guard combat forces in line with validated requirements;
- o convert combat forces to support roles, if needed; and
- o eliminate those forces that exceed requirements.

DoD concurred with all the recommendations and stated that it will implement them based on the results of the Army's Redesign Study and a DoD validation of the Army's support unit shortfall.

GAO Report No. NSIAD-95-80 (OSD Case No. 9809-A), "Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability," March 1995, states that the Army could not provide sufficient numbers of certain types of nondivisional support units for two major regional conflicts. The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Army's ongoing Total Army Analysis:

- o identify the specific unresourced nondivisional support requirements that could be met using Army National Guard divisional support units, and
- o work with the Army National Guard to develop a plan for employing this capability.

The DoD concurred with the recommendations and stated that the results of the Total Army Analysis-2003 would be used to determine whether there is a need to fill shortages of nondivisional support units with unresourced Army National Guard support units.

GAO Report No. NSIAD-95-43 (OSD Case No. 9812), "Force Structure: Army's Support Requirements Process Lacks Valid and Consistent Data," January 1995, states that the data and assumptions that Army programmers use in the Total Army Analysis process are sometimes different from those the Army component planners use for war plans. The GAO recommended establishing procedures and identifying the differences in theater planning requirements and Total Army Analysis requirements to ensure that valid reasons exist for differences or that adjustments be made to requirements. The DoD

## Summary of Prior Audits and Other Reviews

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nonconcurrent, stating that the differences between the Total Army Analysis requirements and theater planning requirements do not reflect inconsistencies. The DoD stated that the differences in requirements may appear significant; however, the two plans are based on different time frames up to 7 years apart, different budget levels, and different threats.

GAO Report No. NSIAD-93-80 (OSD Case No. 9253), "Army Force Structure: Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and Gulf War," December 1992, states that under FY 1992 plans, only 9 percent of the Army Reserve forces would serve in conflicts lasting less than 75 days. The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in reviewing future defense requirements, determine whether the Army's planned size of cadre divisions is consistent with the concept envisioned to implement the reconstitution element of the new national military strategy. GAO also recommended that the Secretary of the Army:

- o substitute Reserve support forces for Active forces,
- o determine whether force structure elements being withdrawn from Europe can be shifted into the Reserves, and
- o evaluate the merits of restructuring one or more of the latest deploying Army National Guard combat divisions to provide additional personnel spaces for Reserve support units.

DoD generally concurred with the recommendations, stating that the concept and sizing of the cadre divisions would be considered during the normal planning, programming, and budgeting cycle. DoD also stated that other GAO recommendations would be considered as part of the congressionally mandated study assessing Active and Reserve force structures.

GAO Report No. NSIAD-92-182 (OSD Case No. 9039), "Army Force Structure: Need to Determine Changed Threat's Impact on Reserve Training Divisions," June 1992, states that the Army could not justify the requirement for 12 training divisions. The GAO recommended that the Army deactivate Reserve training divisions that are not required for a mobilization training mission based on the new military strategy. The DoD partially concurred, stating that it will determine the appropriate force structure when the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, completes its analysis.

Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, May 1995, states that the Army, as the largest Reserve Component, has a combat structure that exceeds requirements for fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, while at the same time reporting shortages in deployable support forces. The report further states that the DoD could make better use of Reserve Component forces by applying general principles for sizing, shaping, and employing the Total Force to better integrate the Reserve Components. Those principles include assigning the Reserve Components all tasks that they can accomplish within the mobilization and deployment times envisioned in the

## Summary of Prior Audits and Other Reviews

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National Security Strategy and ensuring that individuals and units of the Reserve Components are fully incorporated into all relevant operational plans and are actually used in the execution of those plans.

The Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense:

- o verify the Army stated shortfall in support units, and restructure the Army National Guard combat divisions to provide the additional support forces needed, eliminating the excess;

- o eliminate or reorganize Reserve Component forces with lower priority tasks to fill force shortfalls in higher priority areas;

- o determine the readiness of Army National Guard "enhanced readiness brigades"; and

- o assign Reserve Components in peacetime to the unified command responsible for joint training.

Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993, provides the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended changes to the roles and missions of the Military Departments. The report provides for reducing the Army Reserve Component of the excess force structure caused by the downsizing of the Active forces.

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## **Organizations Visited or Contacted**

### **Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements), Washington, DC

### **Joint Staff**

Director for Operations (J-3), Washington, DC  
Director for Logistics (J-4), Washington, DC  
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Washington, DC

### **Department of the Army**

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Washington, DC  
U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA  
Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, DC  
U.S. Army Reserve Command, Atlanta, GA

### **National Guard Bureau**

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Director, Army National Guard, Washington, DC  
Army National Guard Readiness Center, Washington, DC

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House Committee on Appropriations  
House Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations  
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight  
House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal  
Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight  
House Committee on National Security

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