

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS



OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

APRIL 1, 2016–JUNE 30, 2016

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL MISSION

The Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations coordinates among the Inspectors General specified under the law to:

- develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation
- ensure independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations
- promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and prevent, detect, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse
- perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements
- report quarterly and biannually to the Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead Inspector General

(Pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended)

FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to Congress on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). This is our fifth quarterly report on this overseas contingency operation (OCO), discharging our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

OFS involves two complementary missions: 1) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support Mission to train, advise, assist, and equip Afghan security forces, and 2) the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and their affiliates in Afghanistan. The objective of the Resolute Support Mission is to develop self-sustaining Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) that are capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan under responsible Afghan civilian authorities. U.S. counterterrorism efforts remain focused on preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists planning attacks against the U.S. homeland and against U.S. interests and partners.

This quarterly report updates information on significant events involving OFS and the NATO-led efforts to build and strengthen the ANDSF during the period from April 1 to June 30, 2016. This report also highlights oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies and partner oversight agencies during the same period, as well as our ongoing and planned oversight work, as of June 30, 2016.

We remain committed to providing effective oversight and timely reporting on OFS to Congress, U.S. government agencies, and U.S. taxpayers. Our collective oversight work, and its summation in this report, reflects our collaborative approach to providing oversight of the OFS contingency operation.



Handwritten signature of Glenn A. Fine in black ink.

Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense



Handwritten signature of Steve A. Linick in black ink.

Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board
of Governors



Handwritten signature of Ann Calvaresi Barr in black ink.

Ann Calvaresi Barr
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for
International Development

On the cover: (clockwise from top left) Repatriation ceremony at the Ministry of Defense, May 11, 2016 (Resolute Support Media photo); U.S. Army AH-64 Apache helicopter from the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade takes off from Forward Operating Base Dahlke (U.S. Army photo); An A-29 Super Tucano pitches to land in Kabul (U.S. Air Force photo); The 209th Corps, CSB Vehicle Workshop, Afghan National Army School of Engineering (Resolute Support Media photo); A *Ktah Khas* Afghan Female Tactical Platoon member participates in a shooting drill outside Kabul (U.S. Air Force photo).

MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL



Glenn A. Fine

I am pleased to present the fifth report by the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). This report summarizes key events this quarter relating to OFS, and it describes recently completed, ongoing, and planned Lead IG and partner agency oversight work relating to this operation.

The security situation in Afghanistan has remained challenging this quarter. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces—composed of the Afghan military and police—have been combatting an increasing number of attacks from the Taliban and terrorist organizations. This report discusses in more detail the NATO-led efforts to build the capacity and sustainability of these Afghan forces in this unstable environment.

The Lead IG agencies released 2 oversight reports and opened 12 investigations of potential fraud, waste, and abuse related to the OFS mission this quarter. As of June 30, 2016, the Lead IG agencies and oversight partners had 29 ongoing oversight projects and 25 ongoing OFS-related investigations.

This report gives detailed information on the completed, ongoing, and planned oversight projects. The projects relate to efforts to train, advise, and equip the Afghan forces; controls over procurement decisions; intelligence training and counterterrorism coordination; and the accuracy of OFS obligations and disbursements.

We continue our outreach efforts interacting with U.S. government officials, conducting fraud awareness briefings, and maintaining the Lead IG agency hotlines. For example, senior DoD OIG personnel met with officials in Afghanistan during the quarter to discuss the challenges associated with funding and sustaining the Afghan forces. We also met with the Service Inspectors General and Service Auditors General to discuss common audit and investigative issues, and the DoD military criminal investigative organizations to discuss OFS-related criminal investigations.

My Lead IG colleagues and I remain committed to conducting effective oversight of OFS. We especially thank the teams from across the oversight community who conduct this important work.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Glenn A. Fine".

Glenn A. Fine
Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom's Sentinel
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense





A Ktah Khas Afghan Female Tactical Platoon member participates in a shooting drill outside Kabul, Afghanistan, May 29, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, require that a designated Lead IG submit to the United States Congress a quarterly report on each contingency operation subject to Lead IG oversight. This report provides the quarterly update on OFS. It includes an examination of the threat posed by the Taliban and terrorist organizations, summarizes the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, and describes efforts to reach a political settlement to the conflict during the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. Additionally, the report describes U.S. efforts as part of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (“Resolute Support”) to build the capacity and sustainability of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF or Afghan security forces).

The report covers OFS operations and Lead IG oversight activities during the 3-month period from April 1 to June 30, 2016. In addition, it describes completed, ongoing, and planned oversight work conducted by Lead IG partner oversight agencies, such as the Service Audit Agencies, the Government Accountability Office, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Information concerning U.S. counterterrorism operations is classified.

On May 21st, the major Taliban faction suffered the loss of its leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, when a U.S. remotely piloted aircraft destroyed his vehicle in a Pakistan border area.

Combat in Afghanistan increased this quarter as the Taliban launched its spring/summer campaign after rejecting peace overtures. In April, following a major suicide bomb attack in Kabul, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declared that Afghan security forces would take more aggressive action against the insurgency and curtail efforts to reconcile. The Taliban’s strategy this quarter initially involved attacks in northern provinces aimed at retaking Kunduz City, which had temporarily fallen to the insurgency in September 2015. After the ANDSF withstood that offensive, the Taliban shifted its focus to Helmand province in the south, where the ANDSF struggled to prevent Taliban territorial gains.

The insurgency further challenged the ANDSF and attempted to undermine the Afghan government by staging suicide bomb attacks in Kabul, disrupting highway travel, and attacking members of the Afghan judiciary. However, on May 21st, the major Taliban faction suffered the loss of its leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, when a U.S. remotely piloted aircraft destroyed his vehicle in a Pakistan border area. The impact of Mansour’s death on the Taliban threat level or its intent to seek peace remained unclear in the weeks following his death, according to Afghan analysts and media sources. Although assessments of the extent and significance of Taliban influence varied, at the end of the quarter, the Taliban reportedly controlled nine districts across the country (up from eight last quarter), but maintained influence in others.

Two decisions by President Barack Obama were intended to enhance the ability of U.S. forces to assist the ANDSF in combat and to maintain progress in the train, advise, and assist mission. On June 10, President Obama approved DoD’s

recommendation that U.S. forces have expanded authority to assist Afghan forces on the battlefield by authorizing Coalition forces to accompany Afghan forces in ground combat situations and to generate more fire power, especially through close air support. In early July, he announced that the authorized ceiling for troop levels would be reduced to 8,400 (from the current 9,800 ceiling) by the end of 2016, instead of a reduction to 5,500 as previously planned. At a conference in Warsaw in early July, members of NATO, which leads the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan, renewed pledges of financial and troop support to the Afghan government.

Resolute Support reported gradual progress in building Afghan ministerial capacity and ANDSF fighting capabilities, although significant challenges remain. According to the June 2016 DoD report, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, (herein referred to as “the June 2016 DoD report”), and Resolute Support, the Afghan Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI) made improvements in procurement, financial management, training, and strategic communications. Other progress was noted in building strong civilian workforces, implementing a biometric identification system for ANDSF personnel, and expanding intelligence and strategic planning capabilities. However, both ministries continued to face challenges in implementing automated systems needed to strengthen supply, maintenance, personnel, and payroll operations. These systems have the potential to contribute to the sustainability of Afghan security forces in the future and to reduce opportunities for corruption in the management of resources that has long impeded capacity building efforts.

One of the most critical problems facing the Afghan National Army (ANA) concerns the readiness of over 50,000 vehicles in its fleet. The wide variety of donor-supplied vehicles, weak life-cycle management, and shortage of Afghan-trained mechanics have combined to create a situation that poses significant

Selected Key Events, 4/1/2016–6/30/2016

APRIL 9

Secretary of State John Kerry arrives in Kabul for an unannounced visit with Afghan leaders intended to demonstrate support for the Afghan government.

The Afghan parliament confirms President Ghani’s nominations for the positions of Minister of Interior and Attorney General.

APRIL 19

Taliban attack an Afghan government compound in Kabul killing 68 and injuring 347.

MAY 8

President Ghani announces resumption of executions following the Kabul attack.

Six Taliban prisoners hanged, which triggered Taliban attacks against the judiciary.

■ = Taliban Insurgency

APRIL 12

Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour announces the start of the Taliban’s spring campaign.

LATE APRIL

Afghan security forces successfully defend against numerous Taliban attacks in northern Kunduz province.

MAY 18

Fifth meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group.

maintenance challenges for the ANDSF. Development of an improved method of contractor support, known as the National Maintenance Strategy, is underway to address this issue.

According to the June 2016 DoD report, combat performance of the ANDSF, although uneven, continued to improve this quarter compared to a similar period in 2015. With Coalition assistance, the ANDSF modified its fighting strategy to emphasize offensive operations against the insurgency rather than the maintenance of defensive checkpoints. Achievements this quarter included the retraining and re-equipping of several *kandaks* (battalions) of the weakened 215th ANA Corps that defends Helmand province—reportedly one of the most contested territories in the country—and the receipt of additional fixed and rotary wing aircraft that tripled the ANDSF aerial attack capability compared to 2015.

LEAD IG REPORTING AND OVERSIGHT

The Lead IG is responsible for reporting on the oversight activities of the Lead IG agencies, including the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits, as well as future plans for those activities. By the end of the period from April 1 to June 30, 2016, the Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners completed two oversight projects related to activities at the U.S. embassy in Kabul and continued work on 29 ongoing projects. Issues addressed by those projects include: compliance with requirements of U.S.-funded construction contracts, adequacy of ANDSF facility and equipment maintenance, effectiveness of Resolute Support training efforts, and controls over procurement and financial operations. An additional 10 projects are expected to be started before the end of fiscal year 2016. This report provides a summary of the Lead IG oversight work completed during the quarter and oversight projects that are ongoing or planned.

MAY 20

NATO foreign ministers agree to sustain the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan beyond 2016 and signal that funding will continue through 2020.

MAY 25

Afghan Taliban name Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, an extremist religious scholar with no military experience, as the group's new leader.

JUNE 10

Secretary of Defense Carter announces that commanders in Afghanistan will have expanded authority to assist ANDSF combat operations.

JUNE 20

The Afghan parliament confirms President Ghani's selections for Minister of Defense and Chief, National Directorate of Security.

MAY 21

U.S. drone strike in Pakistan kills Taliban leader Mullah Mansour.

JUNE 5

Taliban insurgents kill newly-appointed Afghan attorney general of Logar province and six others during his inauguration ceremony.

JUNE 19

Taliban suicide bomber kills 14 Nepalese security guards on the outskirts of Kabul.

JUNE 30

Taliban attacks a convoy of buses carrying newly graduated Afghan police cadets to Kabul, killing at least 27 and wounding over 40.

Kabul from the air. May 11, 2016.
(U.S. Navy photo)



During the quarter, the criminal investigative components of the Lead IG agencies opened five new OFS-related cases involving theft or corruption. Four cases were closed and 25 remained open, as of June 30, 2016.

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its own agency. These hotlines provide a confidential means for individuals to report improper or unlawful activities. The DoD OIG has a Lead IG Hotline investigator to coordinate the contacts received through the Lead IG agency hotlines and others. During this period, the Hotline investigator received and coordinated 65 contacts related to OFS and opened 34 hotline cases, which were referred to DoD OIG components or other agencies for investigation.

Lead IG officials engaged in a variety of outreach efforts to enhance coordination, remain current on OFS-related activities, and identify potential areas for future projects. In April 2016, a team of senior DoD OIG personnel visited Kabul and Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan to discuss funding, sustainment, and air support matters. Also in April, Major General Gordon B. Davis, Jr., then Commander, CSTC-A discussed oversight from the command's perspective at a DoD OIG-hosted planning meeting of oversight organizations. In routine meetings with the Service IGs, Service Auditors General, and DoD military criminal investigative organizations, the Acting DoD IG discussed Lead IG activities and opportunities for joint or complementary work.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG has ongoing efforts in Afghanistan but no OFS-related programs or activities. As a result, while USAID OIG conducts audits, investigations, and other activities in Afghanistan and coordinates these activities as appropriate, its activities are not discussed in this report.



YA-1408

RESCUE





A two-ship formation of A-29 Super Tucanos fly over Kabul, Afghanistan during a mission on April 28, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo)

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

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To help the reader understand the OFS environment during this quarter, this report first examines the threats posed by various insurgent groups, significant combat developments, and efforts to reach a peace accord. This is followed by a discussion of U.S. support for Resolute Support, an assessment of developments in ANDSF capability based on information provided by commanders in Afghanistan, and an analysis of U.S. funding for OFS and related missions that totaled \$55 billion in FY 2015 and \$42 billion in FY 2016.

Some of the narrative in the first section of the report is based on information obtained from media sources that supplemented material available from government sources. Lead IG oversight projects that assess, evaluate, or audit different aspects of the OFS mission are highlighted in the first section of the report and described in greater detail in the oversight sections.

THREAT REMAINS STRONG AS PEACE PROSPECTS DIM

According to the June 2016 DoD report, the Taliban and other insurgent groups continued to present a threat to Afghan security and stability this quarter as they attempted to reassert their authority and prominence.¹ DoD reports that the ANDSF demonstrated the ability to make adjustments necessary to improve its combat effectiveness and had some success in protecting major population centers and responding to attacks by insurgent fighters. However, the Taliban remained capable of taking rural areas and returning to areas that the ANDSF had previously cleared but subsequently left without a holding force. In addition, the Taliban staged high-profile attacks in or near Kabul, typically by suicide bombers, which undermined public confidence in the Afghan government.² DoD reported that it anticipates a continuing high tempo of insurgent attacks for the rest of 2016 with the future threat environment dependent on the performance of the ANDSF and the stability of the Afghan government.³


United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) assessed 9 of Afghanistan's 407 districts as being under insurgent control as of May 31, 2016 (up from 8 last quarter), with another 27 considered under insurgent influence.⁴ According to USFOR-A, the population of the 9 districts was 524,072, while the population of districts under insurgent influence was 1,983,765 (out of a total population of 33,000,000). Noting that these assessments fluctuate over time, USFOR-A reported that the number of districts under insurgent control or influence increased slightly since March 31, 2016, but explained that the increase could be attributed, in part, to a revised ANDSF strategy of reducing checkpoints to focus combat power on offensive operations.⁵ In June, the MoI confirmed this assessment of insurgent control/influence, according to media reports. The MoI

AT A GLANCE

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

MISSION: U.S. forces carry out two complementary missions under the military operation known as OFS: counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and IS-K in Afghanistan; and support for NATO's Resolute Support capacity-building effort, which seeks to strengthen the ANDSF. OFS began on January 1, 2015, when the United States ended 13 years of combat operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom and transitioned to a NATO-led train, advise, and assist role, while continuing counterterrorism operations. At that point, the ANDSF assumed full responsibility for security in the country.

HISTORY: U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, to remove the Taliban government, which harbored the al Qaeda terrorist organization responsible for the September 11 attacks. The Taliban regime fell quickly and U.S. officials declared an end to major combat in May 2003. Subsequently, the U.S. and its coalition of international partners sought to build a strong, democratic Afghan central government. However, as the new Afghan government developed, NATO-led forces retained the responsibility for national security but encountered persistent efforts by Taliban forces to recapture lost territory. The deteriorating security situation prompted a surge in U.S. troop strength to approximately 100,000 during 2010-2011. The surge reversed Taliban momentum and enabled a gradual reduction of U.S. forces.



U.S. AND AFGHAN LEADERSHIP

A series of national, provincial, and district elections was held in the years following the Taliban removal to select local leaders, a parliament, and a president. The 2014 presidential election resulted in a U.S.-brokered power sharing arrangement between **Dr. Ashraf Ghani**, declared President in a runoff, and **Dr. Abdullah Abdullah**, who was named Chief Executive Officer. The leadership partnership assumed the title, "National Unity Government," and continues to build government institutions and fill leadership positions.

U.S. and Coalition forces are currently led by **General John W. Nicholson**, who assumed command on March 2, 2016. In July 2016, **Major General Richard G. Kaiser**, took command of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, which is responsible for building the capacity of the ANDSF.



Sources: Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, 6/6/2016; DoD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2016; Associated Press, "A Timeline of U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan since 2001," 7/6/2016.

AFGHAN DISTRICTS UNDER TALIBAN CONTROL

KOHISTANAT

Kohistanat district in northern Sar-e-Pul province was captured by the Taliban in July 2015, recaptured by the ANDSF in August, but retaken by the Taliban in October 2015. From Kohistanat, the Taliban can monitor and support insurgents in the northern neighboring provinces.

WARDUJ

Located in Badakhshan province in the northeastern tip of Afghanistan that borders China, Warduj was captured by the Taliban in 2015. The district functions as a staging ground for Taliban offensives against Kunduz province, about 100 miles to the east.

WARDUJ YAMGAN

YAMGAN

Taliban insurgents captured Yamgan district in Badakhshan province in June 2015, amid a reduced central government presence in the district. The district is strategic because it can be used as a base for Taliban operations to take control of Kunduz province.

KHAK-E-AFGHAN

Because it borders the Kabul-Kandahar highway, Khak-e-Afghan district has strategic importance to the Taliban, which has controlled it for 8 years. It is located in Zabol province—the scene of intense infighting among rival Taliban groups following the announcement of the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar in 2015.

NAWA

Nawa district has served as a stronghold for the Taliban and a safe haven for Al Qaeda. It has been under Taliban rule for more than a decade, except for the month of May 2015, when the ANDSF held the district. Situated at the southeast tip of Ghazni province, Nawa is in close proximity to the Pakistani border, which makes it strategically important to the Taliban.

DISHU

Long under the control of the Taliban, Dishu is a sparsely populated district in Helmand province on the Pakistani border. The Taliban have had military training camps here since February 2014.

BAGHRAN

Located at the northern tip of Helmand province, Baghran is considered the Taliban's most secure stronghold and a center of its lucrative narcotics business. Its roughly 100,000 inhabitants have lived under Taliban rule since 2004.

NOW ZAD

Now Zad district contains Dahaneh Pass, a key route connecting Taliban safe havens in northern Helmand to more populated agricultural areas in the south. Coalition forces battled the Taliban there from 2006 to 2009, when the Coalition took control of the pass. The Taliban recaptured the district in July 2015.

MUSA QALA

Strategically important and a center for the heroin trade, Musa Qala came under Taliban control in 2006 following a drawn out battle between Coalition and Taliban forces. Many of the province's 60,000 residents are known to be Taliban sympathizers. Since 2007, control of the district has switched between the Taliban and the ANDSF many times. It has been firmly under Taliban control since February 2016.



also reported that the Taliban is maintaining permanent bases with training centers in 8 of the districts it controls.⁶ (See map showing 9 districts under insurgent control.)

During his June 2016 press conference, Brigadier General Charles H. Cleveland, Resolute Support Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, stated that, in addition to exercising direct control over nine districts and influence over others, the Taliban had the ability to threaten districts that remained under the control/influence of the Afghan government. He explained that the typical Taliban tactic involved massing a force at night, hitting a checkpoint, and then retreating very quickly before ANDSF reinforcements arrived. By staging these and other similar attacks on weakly defended targets, the Taliban has been able to intimidate the local population and thereby gain some measure of influence.⁷ In addition to attacks of that type, Taliban efforts to undermine the Afghan government included suicide attacks in Kabul, targeted strikes against members of the Afghan judiciary, and highway interdictions.⁸

In his May 5 press conference, General Cleveland noted that the degree to which various insurgent groups cooperate with each other complicates the ability to evaluate the kinds of threat they pose. “We see all these [insurgent] organizations working, and working together, maybe sharing terrain, maybe conducting operational acts together,” he said, adding, “Other times, they operate independently and conduct autonomous acts.”⁹

General Cleveland identified several of the insurgent organizations that posed a threat to Afghanistan’s security—the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda (which has two components in Afghanistan), IS-K, and Lashkar-e-Taiba.¹⁰

Taliban-led Insurgents Continue as the Dominant Threat

The Taliban-led insurgency remains the principal threat to Coalition and Afghan forces.¹¹ Despite suffering significant losses in combat with the ANDSF, overall Taliban strength—estimated by General Cleveland to be about 30,000 fighters—appeared to remain constant. After declaring the start to its spring/summer campaign, the Taliban focused initially on northern Afghanistan where they met stiff resistance from the ANDSF. In May 2016, it shifted its focus to its traditional strongholds in Helmand and the surrounding provinces where it continues to control several districts and threaten to take control of several others.¹²

On May 21, 2016, a U.S. drone strike killed Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the leader of a major Taliban faction, in Baluchistan Province of Pakistan, where the *de facto* headquarters of the Taliban is reportedly located.¹³ At the time, Mansour, who had been gaining strength as a Taliban leader, was traveling



Mullah Akhtar Mansour


as a passenger in a taxi on a desolate stretch of highway using a fraudulent Pakistani passport. According to media sources, he was returning from Zahedan, Iran, where he had meetings with Iranian officials, to his base in Quetta, Pakistan.¹⁴

In a press conference on May 23, President Obama described Mansour as a “high-profile leader who has been consistently part of the operations and plans to potentially harm U.S. personnel and who has been resistant to the kinds of peace talks and reconciliation that ultimately could bring an end to decades of war in Afghanistan.”¹⁵

According to media sources, Taliban leaders convened in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan Province in Pakistan, to select a successor to Mansour immediately following his death.¹⁶ Within days, Taliban leaders selected Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, described as an Islamic scholar with little military experience, to succeed Mansour. Before his selection, Akhundzada, who is reported to be about 50, served as one of two deputies to Mansour and the Taliban’s chief justice. Akhundzada has issued numerous religious decrees (“*fatwas*”) that justified Taliban operations, including suicide attacks.¹⁷ He leads a network of religious schools, or madrassas, across Pakistan’s Baluchistan province.¹⁸

"Mansour played a key leadership role in not only orchestrating the Taliban but orchestrating a variety of other [insurgent] organizations...who were perpetrating operations against not only U.S. forces but Coalition and Afghan forces."

—General Joseph Votel, Commander, United States Central Command, at a news conference in Amman, Jordan, May 22, 2016, as quoted by CNN.



Taliban Exploits Mineral Resources

This quarter, *Global Witness*, an international non-profit organization that examines linkages between natural resource exploitation and conflict, reported that the Taliban and other insurgent groups are earning millions of dollars annually through illegal mining operations. Insurgent groups generate revenue by holding hidden interests in mining companies, by extracting protection money from mining officials, and by directly controlling some mining operations. The *Global Witness* report said that smuggling of illegally extracted minerals is now the Taliban's second largest source of revenue after the opium trade. The majority of illegal mining involves extraction of lapis lazuli, a rare blue stone almost unique to northern Afghanistan and found extensively in northeast Badakhshan province. According to media sources, much of the stone is smuggled to neighboring Pakistan where it is sold to Chinese merchants who use it to make jewelry that is in high demand in China.²⁶



Lapus Lazuli carving

Last year the Afghan National Police (ANP) impounded 65 trucks carrying lapis lazuli that had been illegally mined in northeastern Afghanistan. In May 2016, at the second annual anti-corruption conference sponsored by the European Union, the Afghan Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Ghazal Habibyar Safi, said her ministry was establishing a computerized system to capture detailed information about mining contracts, sites, and licenses to combat illegal trade in lapis lazuli and other minerals whose proceeds were going to insurgents rather than the government.²⁷ In June 2016, Afghan security forces were deployed to northern Afghanistan to prevent illegal mining following publication of the *Global Witness* report.²⁸

As part of its new leadership, the Taliban named two deputies—reaffirming as a deputy Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the independent Haqqani terrorist network that has long worked in collaboration with the Taliban, and appointing Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, son of former Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, as a second deputy.¹⁹ Haqqani is reportedly a hardliner who maintains close ties with al Qaeda.²⁰ The Department of State (DoS) has designated the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation has offered a \$5 million reward for information leading to Haqqani's arrest.²¹

Although a Taliban spokesman said those appointments represented the unanimous agreement of Taliban leaders, not all Taliban factions pledged support to the new leadership. A breakaway faction led by Mullah Mohammad

Rasool, which had been battling Mansour's fighters in western Afghanistan, rejected the new selections because they were allegedly decided by a small group of Taliban operatives who were not representative of the movement as a whole.²² The strength and unity of the breakaway faction remained unclear after suffering significant losses in earlier fighting with Mansour's group and the reported disappearance of Rasool in Pakistan.²³

The impact of Mansour's death on the threat posed by the Taliban, its fighting ability, or its desire for peace remained unclear at the end of this quarter. One leading Afghan analyst predicted that the more vicious factions of the Taliban would have greater influence under Akhundzada and that unrestrained violence could be anticipated. Another analyst stated that the Taliban would seek revenge for the killing of Mansour and that Taliban attacks would not decrease.²⁴ USFOR-A, citing open sources, reported that the death of Mansour may have disrupted Taliban local operations, but that Taliban fighting capabilities had not been immediately impacted. However, USFOR-A, citing news reports, indicated that Mansour's death may have long term effects on Taliban capabilities because of disruptions to its command and control structure and financial sourcing.²⁵

Other Anti-Government Organizations

Although the Taliban constitute the major threat to the Afghan government, other terrorist and insurgent forces complicate the battlefield environment and pose a threat to U.S. counterterrorism forces and the ANDSF. These include the following groups:

The Haqqani Network. Described by General Cleveland as historically the most lethal and most competent terrorist organization in Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network has fought alongside the Taliban throughout the 15-year Afghan conflict. General Cleveland noted that the Haqqani Network leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, also serves as a deputy Taliban commander, which places him in position to direct Taliban military operations using established Haqqani tactics.²⁹

According to media sources, the Haqqani Network has long maintained strongholds in northwest Pakistan's tribal areas and is a powerful force in the Afghanistan provinces of Paktika and Paktiya, which border Pakistan. The Haqqani network does not exert similar dominance in southern Afghanistan (Helmand and Kandahar provinces) where the Taliban prevail.³⁰

In his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard G. Olson, stated that the United States has "repeatedly and frankly underscored with the most senior levels of the Pakistani leadership the need to target the Haqqani network" as part of Pakistan's

Although the Taliban constitute the major threat to the Afghan government, other terrorist and insurgent forces complicate the battlefield environment and pose a threat to U.S. counterterrorism forces and the ANDSF.

wider counterterrorism operations.³¹ According to the June 2016 DoD report, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for several insurgent organizations.³² General Cleveland emphasized that the solution to Afghanistan security rests, in part, on addressing trans-regional threats on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.³³

According to General Cleveland, the Haqqani Network has been responsible for some of the highest profile terror assaults—suicide bombings in Kabul as well as attacks in other urban areas in Afghanistan. It has primarily operated in eastern provinces that border Pakistan.³⁴

Al Qaeda. General Cleveland said that al Qaeda has two components operating in Afghanistan: 1) “core al Qaeda” located in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region under the global direction of Ayman al Zawahiri, and 2) al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent, a more recent franchise that maintains a presence in Afghanistan. General Cleveland estimated the two components have a combined strength of 100-300 fighters, who are largely confined to the Afghan provinces of Kunar, Ghazni, and Kandahar. Although al Qaeda alone does not pose a significant threat to the Afghan government, according to General Cleveland, the danger it represents stems from its apparent increased level of collaboration with the Taliban. After Zawahiri publicly swore allegiance to Mansour in the summer of 2015, U.S. authorities have observed “more interaction” between the Taliban and al Qaeda and instances of “them working more together.” U.S. authorities say that al Qaeda serves as an “accelerant” for the Taliban by sharing its capabilities and skills with Taliban fighters.³⁵

Although al Qaeda has relatively few members in Afghanistan, General Cleveland emphasized that U.S. commanders continue to put constant pressure on the al Qaeda network because of its known ability to regenerate very quickly. “If you let them go unchecked,” he said, “and you don’t constantly pressure that network, they’ve got the ability to regrow.” Al Qaeda is one of two terrorist organizations in Afghanistan that U.S. counterterrorism forces may directly target.³⁶

Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K). IS-K, also known as Daesh, is the other terrorist organization that may be directly targeted by U.S. forces under expanded authorities granted by President Obama in January 2016.³⁷ According to a United Nations report, IS-K was formed in the summer of 2015 primarily by a combination of disaffected Afghanistan Taliban fighters, displaced members of Tehrik-e Taliban (a Pakistani terrorist organization), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Few members of IS-K have come directly from Islamic State organizations in Iraq or Syria.³⁸

Numbering between 1,000 and 3,000, with latest estimates putting the figure closer to 1,000, IS-K initially established control or influence over six to eight districts in the eastern Province of Nangarhar. However, ANDSF offensive

operations combined with U.S. airstrikes since January 2016 have significantly curtailed IS-K influence. At the beginning of this quarter, significant IS-K presence was limited to two or three districts in Nangarhar, according to General Cleveland.³⁹ Media sources reported that the airstrikes succeeded in containing IS-K in a mountainous area along the border with Pakistan.⁴⁰

However, in late June, IS-K demonstrated that it remained a potential threat to the Afghan government when approximately 600 heavily armed IS-K fighters staged a series of coordinated attacks on ANDSF security outposts and civilian areas in Nangarhar. Media sources reported that IS-K forces burned as many as 25 homes and killed or wounded 15 civilians but were overcome by the ANDSF in fierce fighting. Over 135 IS-K insurgents were reportedly killed, while the ANDSF suffered approximately 30 casualties.⁴¹

Lashkar-e-Taiba. Identified by General Cleveland as another terrorist group that is collaborating with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba is an Islamic military organization based in Pakistan.⁴² Having ties to global military Islamist organizations, Lashkar-e-Taiba has become increasingly involved in the fight against NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Although it has not claimed responsibility for recent attacks in Afghanistan, analysts report that Lashkar-e-Taiba is committed to violence, is a well-resourced organization capable of carrying out major terror attacks, and can be expected to do so in the future. It is listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by DoS.⁴³

Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin. This terrorist organization is headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a 68-year old warlord, who has fought international and Afghan government forces since the early 1980s, making and breaking alliances with other insurgent groups. It broke with Hezb-e-Islami in 2001, when several Hezb-e-Islami members reconciled with the Afghan government and received ministerial positions. Instead of joining the government, Hekmatyar created a Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin and pledged allegiance to the Taliban.⁴⁴ Representing a small element of the insurgency in Afghanistan, HIG participates in attacks by the Taliban and al Qaeda, but is not considered a serious a threat to the Afghan government.⁴⁵ Its most recent high profile attack involved a 2013 car bombing in Kabul that killed two U.S. soldiers, four U.S. contractors, and eight Afghan civilians.⁴⁶ This quarter, Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin received increased media attention because it became the first insurgent group to seek reconciliation with the Afghan government. (See sidebar page 18.)

Peace Efforts Continue with Little Progress

The United States and its Afghan and international partners made little progress towards achieving a peace accord in Afghanistan, but they continued to work to that end.

Despite the intransigence of the Taliban, members of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group and other members of the international community continued efforts to persuade the Taliban to engage in peace talks.

In the wake of the May 22 airstrike that killed Mansour, who had been staunchly opposed to reconciliation, the Taliban maintained its opposition to peace negotiations with the Afghan government. In a statement released after the airstrike, President Obama stated that “Mansour rejected efforts by the Afghan government to seriously engage in peace talks and end the violence that has taken the lives of countless innocent Afghan men, women and children. The Taliban should seize the opportunity to pursue the only real path for ending this long conflict—joining the Afghan government in a reconciliation process that leads to lasting peace and stability.”⁴⁷

However, initial assessments indicate that Mansour’s replacement, Akhundzada, will spurn peace negotiations and pursue internal Taliban unity in order to achieve a military victory.⁴⁸ Asked about the prospects for peace with the new Taliban leadership during a press conference at the G7 conference in Japan, President Obama predicted that the Taliban would “continue to pursue an agenda of violence” in the short term, but expressed the hope that the Taliban would ultimately recognize “that they are not going to simply be able to overrun the country,” and “enter into serious reconciliation talks” with the Afghan government.⁴⁹

In an April 9 statement published by the United States-Afghanistan Bilateral Commission, Secretary of State John Kerry and Afghan Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani noted that a “negotiated political settlement is the best and surest way to bring peace to Afghanistan.”⁵⁰ On May 18, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, which was created to advance the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan, held its fifth meeting.⁵¹ The Quadrilateral Coordination Group consists of the United States, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China.⁵² During the May meeting, participants discussed ways to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.⁵³ Despite the intransigence of the Taliban, members of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group and other members of the international community continued efforts to persuade the Taliban to engage in peace talks.⁵⁴

In his June press briefing, General Cleveland said that while he did not think there would be serious peace negotiations in the near future, he hoped that small Taliban units—numbering 30-100 fighters each at the district level—would engage in peace talks rather than continue to fight. “I don’t believe we’ll see peace talks anytime in the short term with Mullah Haibatullah,” he said.⁵⁵ Similarly, in a briefing to the United Nations Security Council, Nicholas Haysom, Special United Nations (UN) Representative for Afghanistan, stated that a viable peace process was now “unlikely,” but noted that there were elements within the Taliban movement who questioned whether a military victory was possible or desirable. He expressed optimism that a peace process would eventually emerge.⁵⁶

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: Afghan Extremist-in-Exile Withdraws Offer to Reconcile

Attempts by the Afghan government to make peace with the exiled leader of the extremist Hezb-e-Islami–Gulbuddin organization stalled in June after the group's leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, accused the Afghan government of unilaterally altering provisions in the proposed accord. At the same time, the Afghan government alleged that Hekmatyar made last minute demands that could not be met.⁵⁷



Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Hekmatyar has long refused to make peace with the Afghan government, even as other members of Hezb-e-Islami, an organization he founded in 1977, have joined Afghan governments since 2001 and assumed cabinet positions.⁵⁸ Hekmatyar split from those Hezb-e-Islami members and continued to lead an armed faction, known as Hezb-e-Islami–Gulbuddin. Far smaller than the Taliban, this group's influence is confined to regions of eastern and northeastern Afghanistan.⁵⁹ However, its reconciliation with the Afghan government could have symbolic significance, particularly if other insurgent groups were to follow its lead. Hekmatyar is thought to have ties to some local Afghan Taliban members.⁶⁰ U.S. military personnel had expressed hope that his attendance at the peace table might convince lower level Taliban that peace is preferable to continued fighting.⁶¹

The talks with Hezb-e-Islami–Gulbuddin began in March 2016 and continued into June. In May, media outlets reported the outlines of a draft peace agreement between the Afghan government and the insurgent group, including the release of the group's fighters in government custody in return for the group laying down its arms, respecting the constitution, and cutting off ties to other militant groups.⁶² Although DoS officials also reported that the parties were close to finalizing a peace accord, on June 27 the talks reportedly broke down when irreconcilable conflicts arose between the two sides. At the close of the reporting period the talks had yet to resume.⁶³

Born in 1947 or 1948 in Kunduz province, Hekmatyar is described as an elusive and mercurial figure who remains opposed to Coalition intervention in Afghanistan. Now in his late 60s, he is the author of several books, including "Afghanistan—Another Vietnam for America," "Dreams and Interpretations," and "Bush, the King of Liars." As a student at Kabul University in the early 1970s, he formed Hezb-e-Islami to establish a pure Islamic state in Afghanistan.⁶⁴

COMBAT INTENSIFIES AS THE SPRING CAMPAIGN BEGINS

Insurgent attacks increased in Afghanistan this quarter according to the United Nations and an independent Afghanistan news agency. In his quarterly report to the Security Council, the United Nations Secretary General reported expanded insurgent activity after the Taliban announced its spring offensive, “Operation Omari,” on April 12. In its announcement, the Taliban pledged large scale attacks against “enemy positions,” alongside tactical attacks and targeted killings of military personnel. The United Nations reported that the number of Taliban-initiated attacks almost doubled in the first two weeks of Operation Omari, compared to the previous two weeks, resulting in the highest number of armed clashes recorded for the month of April since 2004, and the highest monthly total since June 2014.⁶⁵

A security study conducted by TOLONews, Afghanistan’s most popular privately-owned news organization, confirmed the increase of insurgent activity and found that the Taliban increased its operations and activities by 77 percent in March and April 2016, compared to the first two months of 2016. Of note, the Taliban increased attacks against the ANDSF from about 50 during January and February to over 130 in March and April.⁶⁶

In response to the stalled peace process and continued insurgent attacks, Afghan President Ghani signaled a shift in the Afghan counter-insurgency strategy. Addressing a joint session of the Afghan parliament on April 25, President Ghani promised expanded military action against insurgents and called on Pakistan to arrest and hand over Taliban leaders who found sanctuary in Pakistan border areas. However, President Ghani left the door open to peace talks by encouraging local Taliban factions to break away from the main body and seek reconciliation with the Afghan government.⁶⁷

The ANDSF adopted a more aggressive counter-insurgency strategy forcing the Taliban to change its battlefield operations. Initially, the Taliban mounted a series of offensive attacks in northern Kunduz province, seeking territorial gains. When Afghan security forces successfully defended against those attacks, the Taliban gradually shifted its emphasis to the south, particularly Helmand and Uruzgan provinces.⁶⁸ The Taliban also began to disrupt travel on major highways by stopping buses and abducting or executing passengers.⁶⁹ In addition, the Taliban targeted members of the Afghan judiciary, allegedly in retaliation for President Ghani’s May 8 decision to execute six Taliban prisoners, who were found guilty of crimes against “civilian national security,” according to Afghan officials.⁷⁰ Throughout the period, the capital of Kabul remained vulnerable to attacks by suicide bombers. Three high-profile attacks killed over 100 people.⁷¹

ANDSF Repels Attacks in Kunduz Province

Attempting to repeat its temporary capture and brief occupation of Kunduz City in September 2015, the Taliban launched aggressive attacks in various locations in Kunduz province during April 2016, but the ANDSF successfully defended main checkpoints and prevented a recapture of the city.⁷² Afghan officials told the media that the ANDSF applied lessons learned from the September experience by improving coordination among army, police, and intelligence units and by sending reinforcements of regular Afghan soldiers and commandos. Additionally, the ANDSF abandoned its previous defensive strategy and launch preemptive strikes against Taliban positions.⁷³ In his May press conference, General Cleveland noted that the ANDSF was “pretty successful” in Kunduz province, going on the offensive and hitting locations where the Taliban was massing forces prior to attack.⁷⁴

Nevertheless, the Taliban remained a threat in the northern provinces. According to media sources, the Taliban mounted a successful attack in mid-May to capture a village in Baghlan province, approximately 60 miles south of Kunduz city, and continued to maintain significant forces and equipment in Kunduz province.⁷⁵ TOLONews reported that about 4,000 Taliban fighters were operating in Kunduz during June and that they were using dozens of military vehicles that they had seized during the temporary capture of Kunduz City last September. In June, local officials reportedly requested the Afghan government to deploy additional security forces to Kunduz.⁷⁶

Southern Provinces—A Primary Taliban Target

Three southern provinces—Helmand, Uruzgan, and Kandahar—have been traditional Taliban strongholds and the most contested parts of the country. The Helmand opium fields are among the most productive in the world, with annual harvests ranging between 5,000 and 9,000 metric tons. The crop generates significant revenue—up to \$3 billion annually—for insurgents, criminal gangs, and corrupt government officials.⁷⁷ The province shares a porous border with Pakistan, where Taliban leaders are reportedly based, adding to its strategic value.⁷⁸ Since May 2015, 3,000 Afghan soldiers and police have been killed in Helmand alone according to media sources. This represents about half of the ANDSF personnel killed throughout Afghanistan over the last 12 months.⁷⁹

General Cleveland said the military expected the Taliban to shift its focus to Helmand and adjacent provinces after the ANDSF had successfully countered Taliban offensives in the north.⁸⁰ However, General Cleveland reported a lull in the fighting in the south during April, presumably because so many Taliban were engaged in harvesting the poppy crop.⁸¹

President Ghani visited Helmand province on June 6 to review the security situation and bolster morale of Afghan forces engaged in heavy fighting.

The one significant Taliban attack in May occurred on May 10 when insurgents killed 17 ANP at two highway checkpoints in Helmand province.⁸² The ANDSF were more active in Helmand during May—raiding a Taliban prison that freed 60 hostages on May 5 and launching an offensive operation on May 19 to retake Helmand's Marjah district, which had been under Taliban control since 2015.⁸³ The Marjah offensive proceeded slowly and stretched into June.⁸⁴

The lull in Taliban activity continued in Helmand until shortly after a U.S. drone strike killed Taliban leader Mansour on May 21. On May 28, the Taliban launched a series of coordinated attacks on three district centers and overran four highway security outposts in Helmand. Up to 60 members of the ANP were reportedly killed.⁸⁵ The attacks illustrated a shift in Taliban tactics from massed attacks to smaller engagements, such as hitting a checkpoint and retreating before the ANDSF can respond.⁸⁶ The media reported that the ANDSF reacted by launching attacks against known Taliban positions, causing as many as 200 Taliban casualties.⁸⁷

President Ghani visited Helmand province on June 6 to review the security situation and bolster morale of Afghan forces engaged in heavy fighting.⁸⁸ The visit followed the killing of an Afghan freelance journalist and an American news photographer on June 5 in a Taliban ambush. The two journalists were traveling on assignment with an Afghan army unit near Marjah when their vehicle was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade.⁸⁹

In addition to Helmand province, the Taliban also increased combat operations in adjacent Uruzgan province, resulting in growing concern on the part of Coalition forces. General Cleveland told reporters that Taliban forces had been engaged in heavy fighting with the ANDSF in Uruzgan through most of May. He said "a handful" of Coalition special forces personnel, who were being deployed intermittently from the Train, Advise, and Assist Command based in Kandahar, were assisting the ANDSF in Uruzgan.⁹⁰ According to media reports, Taliban fighters captured a remote district center in southern Uruzgan on June 14 after days of heavy fighting in which Afghan security forces were supported by Coalition air strikes.⁹¹ A Taliban spokesman, quoted in a news report on June 15, said his organization considers Uruzgan a strategic province and would pursue gaining control of all five district centers there.⁹²


Attacks in Kabul

The Taliban marked the start of its spring campaign with a massive truck bomb attack in the heart of Kabul on April 19, 2016.⁹³ The explosion—at that time the deadliest single incident of its kind in Kabul since 2011—targeted an office compound formerly used by the National Director for Security. At the time, the building was being used by an elite force that is attached to the presidential office and provides security to senior Afghan officials. After the blast, which

MAJOR INSURGENT ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN THIS QUARTER

Between April 1 and June 30, the Taliban's spring offensive included a number of high-profile major attacks across Afghanistan. The capital of Kabul was the hardest hit, with six separate attacks that left 127 dead, including a member of parliament, a judge, judicial staff, police cadets, and security personnel.





Location	Date	Killed	Wounded	Details
Kabul	April 19	68	347	Truck bomb and firearm attack on government compound
Kandahar	May 7	2	—	Insider attack on Romanian special forces
Lashkar Gar	May 10	17	—	Attack on Afghan police at highway checkpoints
Bagram	May 21	—	2	Suicide attack on a NATO convoy
Nad Ali	May 21	4	12	Suicide attack on police training center
Uruzgan province	May 21	6	—	Insider attack at police checkpoint
Kabul	May 25	10	4	Suicide bombing of a bus carrying judicial staff
Helmand province	May 28	57	37	Series of coordinated attacks on Afghan police
Kunduz province	May 30	10	—	MoD personnel killed at roadblock, 200 taken hostage
Ghazni (city)	June 1	6	—	Gunmen attack court building
Kabul	June 5	1	11	Bomb attack on a member of parliament
Marjah	June 5	2	—	An American and an Afghan journalist killed
Pul-i-Alam	June 5	7	—	Provincial attorney general killed
Ghazni province	June 8	12	—	Highway attack on Afghan security forces
Charchino	June 14	12	5	Heavy fighting also left 76 Taliban dead and 36 wounded
Kabul	June 20	14	—	Bombing of a bus carrying Nepalese security guards
Nangarhar province	June 26	3	12	600 IS-K fighters attack security outfits
Kabul	June 28	1	1	Senior appellate court judge killed
Kabul	June 30	33	80	Suicide attacks on a convoy carrying new police cadets

Sources: See endnotes, page 124.

could be felt throughout the city, three Taliban fighters entered the compound and opened fire on surviving staff. Afghan security forces regained control of the area after two hours, during which two of the three attackers were killed while one escaped. The media reported that the attack killed 68 and injured 347, but indicated that the count could go higher.⁹⁴

The Afghanistan Analysts Network, an independent non-profit research organization, reported that the attack was not only designed to harm a key Afghan government security organization, but also intended to “grab headlines and undermine morale.” That is, the Taliban sought to portray the ANDSF as a weak and incompetent force to the Afghan people.⁹⁵ A representative of the MoI acknowledged to media sources that the successful attack in central Kabul revealed “a vacuum” in Afghan security forces.⁹⁶ Two days after the bombing, the MoI announced that it had removed four police officials, including the police chief, in the district where the attack occurred.⁹⁷ President Ghani vowed to avenge the killings and, in response to public pressure, announced that he would resume executions of Taliban prisoners.⁹⁸

According to media reports, the ANDSF prevented at least five major attacks in Kabul plotted by the Taliban since the beginning of this quarter.⁹⁹ In one case, the MoI Major Crimes Task Force thwarted a major rocket attack on Kabul intended to occur on May 13.¹⁰⁰ On May 17, Afghan security forces stopped a would-be suicide bomber from entering a restricted area, close to MoI headquarters.¹⁰¹

However, successful insurgent attacks resumed in June. On June 5, a member of the Afghan parliament was killed by a bomb planted near his residence in Kabul. Eleven others were wounded in the blast.¹⁰² On June 20, a Taliban suicide bomber killed 14 Nepalese security guards in an attack on their minibus traveling in Kabul. Ten days later, Taliban militants launched a twin suicide attack, targeting a convoy of buses carrying newly graduated Afghan police cadets on the western outskirts of Kabul. The media reported the first suicide bomber struck two buses carrying the cadets and a second bomber attacked 20 minutes later after first responders had arrived. At least 33 died and nearly 80 were wounded in these attacks. The Afghan government subsequently announced an investigation into possible negligence on the part of five generals and five other police officials who were involved in transporting the cadets.¹⁰³

In mid-June, the deteriorating security situation in Kabul caused the Afghan government to recommend that foreigners living outside of protected compounds travel with security guards and escorts.¹⁰⁴ On June 22, the DoS issued an updated travel advisory warning U.S. citizens against traveling to Afghanistan because of continued instability and threats by terrorist organizations against U.S. citizens. The advisory cited terrorist attacks in Kabul, in part, as the basis for the update.¹⁰⁵

Attacks on the Afghan Judiciary

As part of a commitment to deal more harshly with insurgents in the wake of the April attack in Kabul that killed nearly 70 people, President Ghani ordered that executions—which had been suspended for several years—be resumed. On May 8, the Afghan government hanged six Taliban prisoners, who had been found guilty of capital crimes, sparking a threat of increased violence directed at the Afghan judiciary from the Taliban.¹⁰⁶ On May 25, a Taliban suicide bomber killed at least 10 people and wounded four in an attack on a bus carrying staff from an appeals court west of Kabul. A Taliban spokesperson claimed the attack was carried out as revenge for the earlier execution of Taliban prisoners.¹⁰⁷

One week later, Taliban gunmen disguised in women's burqas stormed a court building in eastern Ghazni province, killing five civilians and a policeman.¹⁰⁸ On June 5, the newly appointed attorney general of Logar province was among seven people killed when two Taliban insurgents attacked during his inauguration ceremony, which was being held in the appeals court building in the provincial capital. The Taliban claimed both attacks were in response to the May executions.¹⁰⁹ On June 28, unidentified gunmen assassinated a senior appellate court judge at his residence in Kabul. Responsibility for the attack was not immediately determined.¹¹⁰

Disrupting Highway Travel

This quarter, the Taliban continued to disrupt commerce and travel by closing highways. In addition, the new Taliban leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, reportedly ordered bus interdictions and passenger abductions.¹¹¹ In May and June, the Taliban staged five attacks on cars and buses, killing at least 22 passengers and abducting over 80.

The Ring Road, a 1,400 mile two-lane highway that connects major urban centers in Afghanistan, has regularly come under localized attack by insurgents, causing highway blockages that stall traffic and impede cargo movement. In early May, insurgents overran police checkpoints in southern Helmand province, blocking travel between the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah and Kandahar province to the east.¹¹² About the same time, Taliban fighters closed another section of highway that runs between Uruzgan province and Kandahar.¹¹³ In mid-May, insurgents cut off one of the busiest stretches of the Ring Road, a section linking Kabul with Mazar-I-Sharif, an important economic center in northern Balkh province and the gateway for travel to Uzbekistan.¹¹⁴

On May 30, the Taliban stopped several vehicles in northern Kunduz province, seizing nearly 200 passengers, according to media reports. Although most of the passengers were released within 24 hours, the Taliban reportedly killed at least ten passengers who were identified as Afghan security personnel.¹¹⁵

The Taliban website claimed they were able to identify the security personnel by accessing the MoD biometric identification system. However, an MoD investigation found no evidence to support those claims.¹¹⁶

On June 1, the Taliban stopped another bus in northern Afghanistan, releasing women and children passengers but abducting 17 male members of Afghanistan's Hazara community.¹¹⁷ Local authorities reportedly arranged release of the 17 abducted passengers a few days later.¹¹⁸ On June 8, the Taliban staged two highway attacks—one in eastern Ghazni province where Taliban stopped two cars and killed all 12 occupants and another in Kunduz province where they abducted 47 bus passengers of which 7 reportedly escaped.¹¹⁹

A fifth highway attack occurred on June 21 in Helmand province, when Taliban fighters ambushed a series of buses and cars, forcing the occupants out at gunpoint. The fighters released women and children, but took 27 men to an unknown location.¹²⁰ According to media sources, the Taliban later released 21 of the men abducted, because it determined those men had no connection to the ANDSF but threatened action against the remaining 6.¹²¹ The series of attacks led the Ministries of Interior and Transport to issue warnings regarding highway travel, advising that attackers may wear fake military uniforms in order to stop vehicles and setting specific times for travel by passenger vehicles.¹²²

Gen. John Nicholson, Commander, Resolute Support and USFOR-A, listens alongside Chief, National Directorate of Security Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, Minister of Interior Taj Mohammad Jahid and Minister of Defense Abdullah Khan Habibi at Resolute Support Headquarters in Kabul as President Obama announces U.S. troop levels would adjust to 8,400 troops in Afghanistan to support the train, advise and assist mission and enhance a robust counterterrorism mission through 2017. (DoD photo)



President Obama Approves Enhanced Authority to Assist the ANDSF

On June 10, 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced a presidential decision that gave U.S. commanders in Afghanistan additional authority to “act proactively” in situations where Afghan security forces would benefit from U.S. support.¹²³ In a news conference on June 15, Secretary Carter explained that the added flexibility would enable U.S. commanders to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. support for the ANDSF, especially when U.S. forces “can generate strategic effects on the battlefield.” The presidential decision enables commanders to deploy forces to: 1) generate more fire power, especially through close air support, and 2) accompany Afghan forces on the ground and in the air.¹²⁴ The U.S. military used these additional authorities for the first time on June 23, 2016, when U.S. airstrikes hit their intended targets in support of ANDSF operations in southern Afghanistan, according to a DoD spokesperson.¹²⁵

General John W. Nicholson, Commander, USFOR-A and Resolute Support, completed his 90-day on-the-ground assessment in early June and discussed it with senior DoD officials, President Obama, and Members of Congress throughout the month.¹²⁶ According to General Cleveland, the assessment, which is classified, not only examined the threat level from insurgent groups in Afghanistan, but also assessed the resources needed to address that threat, as well as sustain current and anticipated operations.¹²⁷

In an interview with the *Associated Press* on July 16, 2016, General Nicholson stated that the presidential decision to allow more aggressive U.S. action in support of Afghan combat operations could have a game-changing effect on the fight to defeat the Taliban. He emphasized that the new authorities will encourage the Afghans to fight more aggressively rather than keep the primarily defensive posture that has characterized the ANDSF approach in the past. “Armies win on the offense,” he said, “when they (the Afghans) are on the offense, when they are taking the fight to the enemy, that’s how they are going to be successful.” He expressed hope that ultimately the change in strategy could generate enough Afghan offensive momentum to force the Taliban to seek reconciliation with the Afghan government.¹²⁸

On July 6, three days before the start of the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland, President Obama announced an “adjustment to our posture” in Afghanistan, stating that troop levels will be reduced to a ceiling of 8,400 (from the current 9,800 ceiling) by the end of 2016, instead of being reduced to 5,500 as previously announced. Noting that the security situation in Afghanistan remains “precarious,” President Obama emphasized that he constantly reviewed the security strategy in Afghanistan with his national security team and periodically made adjustments to that strategy, such as the force level adjustment in October 2015 and the June 2016 decision to give U.S. forces greater flexibility in assisting ANDSF combat operations.¹²⁹

(continued on next page)

President Obama approves enhanced authority to assist the ANDSF *(continued from previous page)*

Noting that General Nicholson's 90-day assessment provided a fresh look at the security situation in Afghanistan, he stated that the decision to maintain 8,400 U.S. personnel there was based on recommendations from General Nicholson as well as Secretary Carter and General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Acknowledging that Afghan security forces are "still not as strong as they need to be," President Obama asserted that the 8,400 troop level "will allow us to continue to provide tailored support to help Afghan forces continue to improve."¹³⁰

President Ghani welcomed the decision to keep 8,400 troops in Afghanistan, stating that the decision shows "continued partnership between our nations to pursue our common interests."¹³¹



"This announcement, combined with recently approved authorities, sends a strong message to the adversaries of peace and stability in Afghanistan that they will not win militarily, and the only solution for the future is reconciliation."

—General Nicholson's statement on the decision to keep 8,400 personnel in Afghanistan.

FUNDING FOR OFS

For FY 2016, Congress appropriated \$42.9 billion for DoD expenses for OFS. As of March 31, 2016, the DoD Comptroller reported that \$20 billion of this funding had been obligated and \$10.5 billion had been disbursed. Operations and Maintenance represents the largest spending category and includes costs related to maintaining U.S. facilities in Afghanistan, repair and upkeep of equipment, medical services for deployed troops, and transporting troops and equipment to and from Afghanistan.

The President's Budget Request for FY 2017 outlines priorities to continue the mission of reinforcing security and development in Afghanistan. The budget calls for \$41.7 billion to train and equip Afghan military and police, combat terrorism and the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and promote stable governance. Although the 2017 OFS budget request represents a decrease of \$1.2 billion from the 2016 appropriation, it included an increase of \$1.1 billion for in-theater support (\$14.1 to \$15.2 billion).

This budget request, which was proposed in February 2016, was drafted under the premise that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would be drawn down from the current level of 9,800 to 5,500 by the end of the calendar year. However, on July 6, 2016, President Obama announced that he would maintain 8,400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan through the end of his administration.¹³³ Secretary Carter indicated that DoD is in the process of estimating costs and determining whether an adjustment to the OCO budget will be necessary.¹³⁴

Table 1.

FY 2016 OFS Allocation, Obligations, and Percent Obligated

FY 2016 OFS Accounts*	Allocation	Obligations	Percent Obligated
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund	\$3,652.3	\$2,233.6	61.2%
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund**	\$299.5	\$298.6	99.7%
Military Personnel	\$3,047.4	\$1,632.4	53.6%
Operations and Maintenance	\$27,292.5	\$15,055.9	55.2%
Procurement	\$3,113.7	\$729.0	23.4%
TOTAL	\$37,405.4	\$19,974.9	53.4%

Figures shown in millions; obligations current through 3/31/2016.

* Excludes national intelligence programs.

** The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund is a DoD-wide coordinated effort to disrupt the enemy's use of (IEDs). The fund supports three lines of operation: disrupting the networks that fund, develop, and deploy IEDs; defending the warfighter at the point of attack; and training troops in the use of new counter-IED equipment and tactics.¹³²

Sources: DoD Comptroller, "FY 2016 Status of Funds by Appropriation Summary," January 2016; DoD, "FY 2016 Cost of War Report," March 2016.

Afghan Security Forces Fund

The United States provides assistance to the ANDSF through the Afghan Security Forces Fund. This fund supports procurement of equipment, supplies, services, and training, as well as facility and infrastructure construction and maintenance. About one-fourth of the Afghan Security Forces Fund is provided to the Afghan government primarily to fund a portion of ANDSF personnel costs and for base operations support and other minor funding categories. The Afghan Security Forces Fund was appropriated \$3.7 billion in FY 2015 and \$3.6 billion in FY 2016. The President's Budget Request for FY 2017 calls for \$3.5 billion.¹³⁵ Congress is considering a rescission of approximately \$400 million of the FY 2017 Afghan Security Forces Fund.¹³⁶

Congress appropriates funds for the Afghan Security Forces Fund and makes them available for two years from the start of the first day of the fiscal year in which the appropriation occurs. Once this funding is appropriated, it follows a tiered process. First, the money is apportioned by the Office of Management and Budget to the DoD. Next, the DoD Comptroller provides obligation authority for the Afghan Security Forces Fund to CSTC-A and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). CSTC-A provides ASFF to the Afghan government primarily for soldier and police pay and incentives but also for a small amount of Afghan executed contracts to fund minor equipment, facilities maintenance, and fuel.¹³⁷ The majority of ASFF is executed by DSCA working with DoD components to procure goods and services on behalf of the MoD and MoI by means of a "pseudo" Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.¹³⁸ (See sidebar, on page 32 for additional information.)

Table 2.

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Appropriations and Obligations, as of March 31, 2016

\$ Million

	FY 2015	FY 2016	TOTAL
Appropriated	\$3,709	\$3,652	\$7,362
Obligated in FY 2015	\$2,164	—	\$2,164
Obligated in FY 2016	\$1,059	\$293	\$1,353
TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	\$3,224	\$293	\$3,517

Numbers may not add due to rounding

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, "FY 2016 Cost of War Report," March 2016.

Of the \$7.3 billion appropriated to Afghan Security Forces Fund in FY 2015-2016, approximately \$5.3 billion will be obligated by DSCA and the remaining \$2 billion will be obligated by CSTC-A.¹³⁹

As of March 31, 2016, nearly \$2.2 billion in FY 2015-2016 funds and \$1.4 billion in FY 2016-2017 funds had been obligated for OFS expenditures for a net total of \$3.5 billion.¹⁴⁰ Of the funds available through the two current appropriations, DSCA has processed a total of 192 individual FMS cases, making the requested goods and services available to the Afghan government.¹⁴¹

Warsaw NATO Summit

During the reporting period, the United States prepared for the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw. The Afghan government worked with the United States and other donor nations to secure renewed commitments of nearly \$1 billion annually for 2018-2020 from those other nations.¹⁴² Shortly after the close of the summit the White House released a fact sheet stating that 30 countries had renewed pledges to fund the ANDSF through 2020 and that 39 NATO Allies and partners had committed 11,000 troops to sustain Resolute Support beyond 2016.¹⁴³

Oversight of OFS Funding

Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners are currently conducting four projects to examine the use and accountability of U.S. funding that supports OFS.

The DoD OIG is conducting an audit to determine whether CSTC-A and the Afghan government have implemented effective controls over the contract management process that obligates U.S. funds provided directly to the Afghan government. This project is one in a series of audits involving direct funding to the Afghan government in support of the ANDSF.¹⁴⁴

Additionally, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is conducting an assessment of on-budget funding provided to the Afghan government from 2001 to 2014. The project examines the impact of on-budget assistance provided to develop ANDSF capacity and evaluates potentially negative issues that affected on-budget assistance, such as corruption, and efforts taken to mitigate those issues.¹⁴⁵

Foreign Military Sales

The Foreign Military Sales program is a system by which nations procure U.S. military equipment, supplies, and training with the approval and assistance of the U.S. government. After DoS's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs reviews the individual request packages to ensure they are proper and consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, the DoD processes the packages, or "FMS cases," submitted by foreign governments.¹⁴⁶

In executing any FMS transaction, DSCA policy calls for a "total package approach" by which DSCA ensures that the partner nation is able to operate and maintain items purchased into the future and obtain support articles and services necessary for long-term sustainment of those items. The package may include initial support, training, technical assistance, parts, manuals, ammunition, and follow-on support to accompany the transfer of the principal purchase.¹⁴⁷

Because the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund—a DoD appropriation—is used to fund equipment, sustainment of that equipment, supplies, training and other support for the ANDSF, DSCA uses an FMS approach, known as "pseudo-FMS," for cases funded by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund that varies slightly from that typically followed in FMS cases. In contrast to FMS cases where partner nations provide their own national funds to DSCA to fund a procurement, DoD funds DSCA directly, using funds appropriated from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, for procurements made on behalf of the ANDSF. Also, in conventional FMS cases, the host nation must approve the requirement. For pseudo-FMS cases, DoD determines the requirement and host-nation concurrence is not required. DoD is working with the Afghans to develop their capacity to engage in the FMS process.¹⁴⁸

The Foreign Military Sales program is a system by which nations procure U.S. military equipment, supplies, and training with the approval and assistance of the U.S. government.

In May, the DoD OIG began an audit to determine whether the U.S. Navy has adequate accountability for DoD funds that support OFS. The audit will determine the accuracy of obligations and disbursement, as reported in the *Cost of War Report*, for select Navy appropriations.¹⁴⁹

The Government Accountability Office has an ongoing audit to examine DoD's use of OCO funding. The audit will determine the amount of war funds that DoD has authorized and reported under the OCO designation, the extent to which DoD has complied with established criteria for identifying costs included in war funding requests, and DoD progress in transitioning enduring OCO costs to its base budget.

RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

On January 1, 2015, NATO-led forces ended a dual combat and training role in Afghanistan and began the Resolute Support Mission (“Resolute Support”), which focuses on training, advising, assisting, and equipping the ANDSF and building Afghan ministerial capacity. According to the June 2016 DoD report, the objective of Resolute Support is to develop well-trained and sustainable Afghan security forces that can secure the country against persistent insurgent threats.¹⁵⁰

Resolute Support is carried out using a regional approach, with Coalition advisors serving in five train, advise, and assist commands located in the north, south, east, west, and the capital of Kabul. The train, advise, and assist commands outside of Kabul are aligned with four of the six Afghan National Army (ANA) corps. The central Resolute Support “hub” in Kabul includes Resolute Support headquarters; advisors to the MoD and MoI; the Train, Advise, and Assist Command—Capital, which advises the 111th ANA Division responsible for security in Kabul; and two smaller advise and assist cells. The smaller cells provide assistance to the two ANA corps without assigned train,

Afghan Tactical Air Controllers call-in an air strike at a training range near Kabul, Afghanistan, while a Train, Advise, Assist Command-Air Czech Republic air advisor assists from the rear. (U.S. Air Force photo)



advise, and assist commands. Additionally, Resolute Support's Train, Advise and Assist Command-Air assist development of the Afghan Air Force.¹⁵¹

According to the June 2016 DoD report, the train, advise, and assist commands and the advise and assist cells serve as the principal connections between the Afghan ministries and fielded forces—the MoD manages the ANA, while the MoI manages the ANP. The train, advise, and assist commands also play a key role in the Coalition's ability to assess the effectiveness of Coalition ministerial advising efforts and determine how well the ministries are supporting ongoing ANA/ANP operations. Coalition forces also provide limited support during ANDSF combat missions, such as aerial assault, intelligence, and medical evacuation, as the Afghans continue to develop their own capabilities in those areas.¹⁵²

During this quarter, Resolute Support increasingly relied on its expeditionary advising teams to strengthen ANDSF capability in select parts of the country. Those teams, deployed as part of the smaller advise and assist cells in Kabul, have been particularly active in Helmand province where the 215th ANA Corps has struggled to counter insurgent activity in that traditional Taliban stronghold. According to the June 2016 DoD report, approximately 500 advisors were deployed to Helmand in December 2015.¹⁵³ In his May 2016 press conference, General Cleveland stated that the number of U.S. advisors there ranged between 700 and 800.¹⁵⁴ The additional troops reinforced Afghan training efforts for 1,500 fresh Afghan recruits sent to Helmand to replace casualty losses.¹⁵⁵ In addition, U.S. forces assisted in the retraining of six 215th Corps *kandaks* (battalions) that number about 700 soldiers each.¹⁵⁶

According to USFOR-A, Resolute Support was staffed by approximately 12,000 personnel from 37 nations as of June 30, 2016. The United States is the largest force contributor and provides about 5,000 personnel.¹⁵⁷ The size of the Resolute Support force may change according to shifts in mission phase to allow Coalition partners to tailor advisory support and to redeploy troops and equipment no longer required to accomplish a mission.¹⁵⁸

Resolute Support Focus: Eight Essential Functions

Resolute Support focuses on eight key areas, called “essential functions” (EFs), that provide the framework and guidance for the train, advise, and assist effort. Within the Resolute Support organization, a senior DoD or Coalition official is assigned as lead for each EF with all Coalition advisors, whether at the corps, institutional, or ministerial level, aligned under the EF lead. Assessments of ministry progress are measured against the completion of mutually agreed processes or outcomes with the associated ministry as identified in a jointly-developed program of actions and milestones. Additionally, Resolute Support advisors assist the Afghan government in implementing the constitutional guarantee of equal rights to women.¹⁵⁹ A list of EF's and their indicators of effectiveness is provided in Appendix B, page 103.

According to the June 2016 DoD report, “progress on women within the ANDSF is improving, but fragile.”

As reported by CSTC-A, an impediment to progress in some of the EFs stems from the frequent turnover of advisors. Advisors normally serve tours of duty ranging from 6 to 12 months, depending on the decision of the Coalition partner country. As an example, CSTC-A stated that short tours and frequent turnover of advisors in EF2 (transparency, accountability, and oversight) “significantly and negatively impact the mission with loss of institutional knowledge, changes of priorities based upon personal preference, and lack of continuity.” Similarly, CSTC-A indicated that ministerial development is affected by high turnover and explained that newly arriving advisors for EF5 (sustainment) require 4 to 6 weeks to become effective. During that start-up period, the advisors must be able to understand the requirements of their assignment, the operating environment, and organizational interactions, in addition to building relationships with their Afghan counterparts. CSTC-A recommended one-year tour lengths for advisors to maintain “consistency, stability, and unity of effort.”¹⁶⁰

In addition to the eight EF organizations described on the following infographic, USFOR-A has established the Resolute Support Gender Office, a stand-alone advising directorate that provides guidance on gender-related issues to all EFs. Each EF has a gender focal point to make sure that gender issues are incorporated into train, advise, and assist efforts. In this way, the Gender Office encourages the Afghan government to consider gender in establishing policies and procedures throughout the ANDSF.¹⁶¹

According to the June 2016 DoD report, “progress on women within the ANDSF is improving, but fragile.” In that regard, DoD noted that a range of historical, institutional, cultural, and religious barriers hinder female representation and influence with the ANDSF. Many women in the ANA and ANP, as well as their family members, are subject to threats and harassment. Women soldiers and police face additional barriers on the job because of the patriarchal attitudes of some senior male officers and local leaders.¹⁶²

Gender issues remain a priority for Coalition and Afghan senior leaders. USFOR-A reported an increased level of engagement by senior MoD and Mol officials on gender-related matters.¹⁶³ The MoD and Mol have each created more than 5,000 dedicated women-only or gender-neutral positions on their *tashkils* (manpower authorizations).¹⁶⁴ This quarter 57 recruiter positions for women were added to the ANA *tashkil*. Training for new women recruits was provided in Turkey. This quarter 95 ANP recruits completed their fifth week of training in Turkey while 109 ANA recruits began training on May 28. The Mol implemented a women’s promotion board to examine progress in promoting women to higher rank.¹⁶⁵ Gender issues continue to be included in all major Resolute Support briefings and forums with senior Resolute Support and Afghan leaders.¹⁶⁶

QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHTS— EIGHT ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS

The eight essential functions illustrated here provide the framework for Resolute Support. This framework incorporates all aspects of the mission and provides a method for evaluating progress. (A list of EFs and their Indicators of Effectiveness is provided in Appendix A.) This quarter Resolute Support achieved the following results:

EF 1: PLAN, PROGRAM, BUDGET, AND EXECUTE

On June 1, 22 ANA and ANP officers graduated from the Basic Force Management School conducted by EF 1 advisors. The graduates will work in Afghan ministries to assist with requirements determination and allocation of resources. Later that month, ANA officers graduated from a 13-week budget training course. In addition, Afghan officials increased their output of requirements validation and procurement processes with the assistance of EF 1 advisors.¹⁶⁷

This quarter the DoD OIG conducted on-site fieldwork as part of its audit to determine whether CSTC-A and the Afghan government have implemented effective controls over the contract management process that obligates U.S. funds provided directly to the Afghan government. This project is one in a series of audits involving “direct funding” to the Afghan government for support of the ANDSF.¹⁶⁸

EF 2: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT

Despite constant effort on the part of Coalition advisors to encourage progress, Afghan implementation of ministerial internal control and inspection programs has not been as steady as anticipated this quarter. According to CSTC-A, significant effort is still needed to improve the quality of work from planning to report writing. Nevertheless, counter- and anti-corruption initiatives made progress as the MoD and Mol issued their counter- and anti-corruption plans on April 19 and May 3, 2016, respectively. EF 2 advisors will monitor implementation of the plans and assess penalties or awards, pursuant to agreements with the ministries, as performance dictates.¹⁶⁹

On May 17, the DoD OIG announced an oversight project to assess whether Coalition train-advise-assist efforts will enable the MoD and subordinate organizations to develop a transparency, accountability and oversight capability that helps the MoD to run efficient and effective operations, report reliable information about its operations, and comply with applicable laws and regulations. On-site fieldwork is planned in July and August 2016.¹⁷⁰

EF 3: RULE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

NATO advisors promoted the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Justice Center, which will pursue alleged corruption by senior Afghan officials without being subjected to external or political interference. President Ghani announced his support for the center on May 5, 2016, at the European Union Corruption Conference and again on May 12th at the London Anti-Corruption Conference. According to DOD, the center was established and funded on June 30.¹⁷¹ President Ghani also doubled the size (to 300 personnel) of the Major Crimes Task Force, which is led by an Afghan brigadier general who has demonstrated resistance to outside influence.¹⁷²

EF 4: FORCE GENERATION

The Afghan general staff, supported by EF 4 advisors, conducted force retention conferences at four ANA Corps locations and in Kabul this quarter. The purpose of the conferences was to assess Corps retention/reenlistment processes, identify weaknesses, and describe ways to improve soldier retention.¹⁷³

Additionally, eight ANDSF senior leaders completed the EF 4-sponsored Capstone course, which addressed national security issues and was conducted at the British embassy in Kabul, National Defense University in Washington, D.C., and Fort Bragg in North Carolina.¹⁷⁴

EF 5: LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE

MoD officials significantly improved ammunition and fuel consumption reporting this quarter, as the MoD generated ammunition consumption reports for brigade level units. Accuracy in consumption reporting will guide future decisions on procurement of these commodities.¹⁷⁵ On May 25, 2016, 12 ANDSF officers graduated from the 6-week Spectrum Management course conducted by Coalition advisors at Resolute Support headquarters.¹⁷⁶

EF 6: SECURITY CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

Based on Coalition advisor observations during the spring/summer campaign, ANA forces achieved a “partially capable” rating in conducting combined arms operations.¹⁷⁷ (“Partially capable” indicates that unit personnel are able to perform core tasks successfully with limited Coalition support.¹⁷⁸)

As an example, Resolute Support reported that all ANA corps demonstrated the ability to integrate helicopter air support with ground combat operations. Additionally, EF 6 advisors focused on control over ammunition consumption and reporting, long-term (5 year) operational planning, and readiness reporting where, according to Resolute Support, Afghan counterparts continue to make “slow progress.”¹⁷⁹

EF 7: INTELLIGENCE

The ANDSF continue to enhance its intelligence capabilities through multiple systems, including the use of 2 ScanEagle drone systems, 69 Wolfhound radio monitoring systems, 6 Aerostat (blimp) based surveillance platforms, and 17 RAID towers (surveillance equipment mounted on 100 foot towers). Additionally, Afghan-led intelligence training has been expanded from 26 to 32 courses to accommodate new technical capabilities.

*This quarter the DoD OIG completed the fieldwork phase of an evaluation to determine the effectiveness of USFOR-A intelligence training for MoD personnel. The project team deployed to Afghanistan, visiting training and advising sites in the Kabul area and conducting interviews with Coalition advisors. The DoD OIG expects to complete the project next quarter.*¹⁸⁰

EF 8: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

With Coalition assistance, the MoD completed a detailed plan to publicize the ANDSF spring/summer campaign to the Afghan people. Independent of Coalition support, the MoD hosted a 3-day public affairs conference in April to present the plan to MoD and MoI public affairs personnel. Information on ANDSF operations was disseminated at weekly press conferences, by locally printed handbills, and through mobile radio broadcasting systems (“radios-in-a box”). According to USFOR-A, Afghan communicators “flooded the media space” this quarter with information on ANDSF campaign progress.¹⁸¹

BUILDING MINISTERIAL CAPACITY

This quarter, DoD sources reported varying levels of progress in building institutional capacity in the MoD and MoI, which together administer all Afghan security forces. Although DoD, USFOR-A, and CSTC-A noted improved performance in both ministries, reports of progress were frequently qualified with terms such as “modest,” “limited,” or “slower than expected.”

In particular, significant challenges remain in assigning and developing strong ministerial leaders, gaining traction for anti-corruption initiatives, implementing automated systems, strengthening supply chain management, building MoD and MoI institutional training capability, and developing internal maintenance capability (as opposed to using contractors). Conversely, DoD sources reported that there had been noteworthy progress in building a strong core civilian workforce in the MoD and MoI, implementing a biometric identification system for ANDSF personnel, growing intelligence and strategic planning capabilities, and improving strategic communications.¹⁸²

Measuring Success

To assess ministerial progress, Resolute Support has established a rating system based on MoD/MoI attainment of milestones, which are established by mutual agreement between Coalition advisors and their Afghan counterparts. Milestones are grouped by EF and are accomplished over time through the execution of supporting actions to achieve the desired outcome. Ministerial progress is evaluated using a rating scale from one to five as follows:¹⁸³

Table 3.

EF Rating System

Rating	Meaning	Description
1	Scoped and Agreed Upon	The relevant Afghan organization has agreed with the specific supporting action.
2	Initiated	The Afghan organization has commenced work on the specific action.
3	Partially Capable and Effective	The Afghan organization has completed or almost completed work on the action and the result is partially effective.
4	Fully Capable and Effective	The Afghan organization has completed work on the action and the result is fully effective but may still require some Coalition support.
5	Sustaining Capability	The Afghan organization has completed work on the action and the result is sustainable without further Coalition support.

All Afghan security forces are administered by the MoD or MoI

The MoD:

The ANA, which includes:

- The Afghan Air Force
- Three components of Afghan Special Security Forces (ANA Special Operations Command, the *Ktah Khas*, and the Special Mission Wing)

The MoI:

- Afghan Uniform Police
- Afghan Local Police
- One component of Afghan Special Security Forces
- Five specialized police units

Information provided by USFOR-A this quarter indicates that both ministries have made progress in completing actions needed to reach a “sustaining capability.” Coalition advisors track 44 milestones across the 8 EFs for the MoD. This quarter, MoD performance with respect to 18 percent of the milestones was evaluated as “fully capable,” compared to 11 percent at the end of the previous quarter.

Similarly, of the 33 milestones tracked for the MoI, performance for 18 percent of them was evaluated as “fully capable,” compared to 6 percent last quarter. Over 50 percent of the milestones in each ministry were evaluated as “partially capable,” with one MoI milestone achieving the highest rating, “sustaining capability.”

Based on current status, Resolute Support forecasts that the MoD will achieve a “fully capable” rating in 34 percent of its milestones by the end of September 2016, and “sustaining” in 16 percent by that time. Resolute Support forecasts that the MoI will achieve percentages of 46 and 15, respectively.¹⁸⁴

Leadership: A Continuing Challenge

This quarter the Afghan government nominated and confirmed permanent Ministers of Defense and Interior, and the Director of the National Directorate of Security. It also installed a new Attorney General, a key position in the ongoing fight against endemic corruption in Afghan institutions. The Afghan government has faced criticism in the past for its failure to fill key positions—a problem which allegedly hampered counter-insurgency operations.¹⁸⁵

On April 9, the Afghan parliament confirmed President Ghani’s nomination of Taj Muhammad Jahed, a former army general, as Minister of Interior and Mohammad Farid, a member of Afghan’s human rights commission, as Attorney General. Jahed had been serving as acting minister following the abrupt resignation of his predecessor in February 2016. In May 2016, President Ghani appointed Masoom Stanekzai, who had served as Acting Minister of Defense for over a year, to be acting chief of the Directorate of National Security, a position that had been vacant since December 2015. Stanekzai was confirmed in his new position by the Afghan parliament on June 20. At the same time, Abdullah Khan Habibi, formerly chief of the ANA staff, was confirmed as Minister of Defense.¹⁸⁶

Although these appointments bring stability to ministerial leadership, USFOR-A reported that political conflicts within the Afghan government continued to affect leadership quality and negatively impacted ministerial performance. For example, immediately after the confirmation of Jahed as Minister of Interior, false charges were reportedly brought against a key leader with an impeccable record in the ANP recruiting command. He was subsequently removed from his

position even though two separate investigations exonerated him. According to USFOR-A, the removal of that leader opened “corruption opportunities for other senior leaders within the ministry.”¹⁸⁷ Moreover, USFOR-A reported that when Jahed was confirmed, the MoI Inspector General was selected to serve as the MoI Chief of Staff and a new MoI Inspector General was appointed. The changes temporarily disrupted efforts to improve internal controls.¹⁸⁸

Additionally, USFOR-A reported that political disagreements between President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah resulted in delays in making appointments to key ministerial positions and the replacement of well-performing officials with less capable individuals. According to USFOR-A, key leaders who have made exceptional progress in eliminating corruption have in some cases been replaced by officials who resist efforts to eliminate corruption.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, vacant positions were often filled with temporary appointees who were hesitant to make decisions affecting procurement, expenditures, and policy.¹⁹⁰

Political influence has also affected ANDSF leadership decision-making in other areas. USFOR-A reported that demands by political leaders to retain checkpoints in favored locations has undermined Coalition and ANDSF efforts to move away from a defensive checkpoint strategy to more offensive operations. Additionally, demands by political leaders that ANDSF conduct combat operations in certain areas has interfered with ongoing ANDSF efforts to implement established fighting strategies.¹⁹¹



(left to right) Chief, National Directorate of Security Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, Minister of Interior Taj Mohammad Jahid and Minister of Defense Abdullah Khan Habibi listen at Resolute Support Headquarters in Kabul. (DoD photo)

Afghan-Pakistan Relations Deteriorate

According to the June 2016 DoD report, the Afghan government's relationship with Pakistan remains a critical aspect of enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan. Since the beginning of President Ghani's tenure, leaders from both countries have sought to improve relations and seek solutions to the threat posed by insurgent groups that operate in border regions.¹⁹² However, this quarter, Pakistan-Afghanistan relationships were strained by several factors, including:

- President Ghani's demand in April that Pakistan arrest and hand over Taliban leaders who find refuge in that country's border regions. The demand followed a Taliban bomb attack in Kabul on April 19 that killed or wounded over 400 people.¹⁹³ According to media sources, the Pakistan government rejected that demand, instead emphasizing the need for continued peace talks while claiming that Afghanistan allowed Pakistan insurgents to operate from Afghan border locations.¹⁹⁴
- The late April visit to Pakistan of a high level Taliban delegation from its Qatar-based political office reportedly to "restart the peace process" and/or to discuss "border related issues." According to media sources, the Afghan government criticized the visit as "highly questionable," asserting that a terrorist group has no right to visit any country.¹⁹⁵
- Pakistan's closure of a main border crossing with Afghanistan in May because of claims that illegal crossings posed a security threat.¹⁹⁶ Although the border was reopened after three days, tensions resumed when Afghan and Pakistan military forces at the border crossing exchanged gunfire over a period of four days in mid-June. The conflict resulted in the deaths of 4 soldiers with 40 wounded.¹⁹⁷ Expressing concern over the possibility of escalating violence at the border, General Cleveland emphasized that Coalition forces would not participate with Afghan forces in this conflict as it did not involve the insurgency.¹⁹⁸ Fighting subsided after six days and the gate was reopened on June 18.¹⁹⁹
- Increased Pakistani efforts to repatriate nearly 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees who have resided in Pakistan for years. Although Pakistan has regularly extended stays for Afghan refugees, it has recently indicated that refugees need to return to Afghanistan as part of improved border management. However, Afghanistan has requested an extension until 2020 because the country could not accommodate the sudden influx.²⁰⁰ At the end of June 2016, Pakistan authorized a six-month visa extension for Afghan refugees.²⁰¹

In the past, USFOR-A described the Afghan military-to-military relationship with Pakistan as "tense and mistrustful," but reported that gradual progress was being made despite occasional border conflicts.²⁰² However, this quarter, USFOR-A reported a marked setback in the military-to-military relationship,

stating, “much of the progress in M2M [military-to-military] dialogue that had been realized during the previous quarter was either halted or rolled back.” In that regard, USFOR-A cited several instances of armed conflict in border areas that could not be resolved in military channels and required diplomatic intervention.²⁰³

USFOR-A observed a “marked change in Afghan policy toward Pakistan at the highest levels of government” and said that this had direct impact on the relationship at senior military levels. It reported that the Afghan government unilaterally ceased negotiations on the new Pakistan-Afghanistan Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedures, which had seemed near completion in January 2016. Other than one video-teleconference at the one-star level in April, there have been no bilateral conferences at the general officer level between the two countries since February. The ANDSF cancelled the bimonthly counter-IS-K conference, scheduled for April 20, as well as a conference to counter improvised explosive devices. Both conferences involved general officer participation from both countries and have not been rescheduled.²⁰⁴

Although the U.S. airstrike that killed Taliban leader Mansour did not affect the relationship between the Afghan and Pakistani militaries, USFOR-A reported that there has been a noticeable change in the relationship between Coalition forces and the Pakistani military with respect to airspace management along the border. Following the strike on Mansour, the Pakistan Air Force became more aggressive in interrogating unidentified aircraft (most of which are Coalition aircraft) operating in Afghan border airspace and have threatened aircraft that had not been reported as operating there. Efforts by Resolute Support and Pakistan to hold border conferences have been rejected by the ANDSF according to USFOR-A, and the lack of engagement between the militaries has resulted in the escalation of border disputes to the highest levels of government.²⁰⁵

Despite these setbacks, USFOR-A expressed hope that ongoing discussions between the foreign ministers of both countries might lead to a resumption of high level Afghan-Pakistani military-to-military contact and progress toward implementation of the Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedures. Additionally, USFOR-A reported that efforts are underway to reschedule the counter-IS-K conference for the end of July, which would involve general officers and, it hopes, will lead to improved military-to-military relationships.²⁰⁶ According to DoS officials, the Quadilateral Coordination Group has played a key role in keeping lines of communication between the two countries open during times of tension.²⁰⁷

As part of an ongoing inspection of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, the DoS OIG will determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting security and counterterrorism activities in Pakistan.

Following the strike on Mansour, the Pakistan Air Force became more aggressive in interrogating unidentified aircraft

Using Commitment Letters to Improve Financial Accountability

CSTC-A continues to place financial controls on U.S. and international contributions to Afghanistan through a series of financial commitment letters with the MoD and the Mol. Commitment letters address critical conditions the ANDSF must meet to help ensure funding is used appropriately.²⁰⁸

Based on lessons learned in executing commitment letters, CSTC-A refined its commitment letters for Afghan fiscal year 1395 (which began December 21, 2015). The FY 1395 commitment letters include more than 90 conditions that will encourage transparency and accountability of equipment and resources. These letters establish expectations for the responsible management of direct contributions from donor nations. If the criteria spelled out in the commitment letters are not met, total direct contributions may be reduced from initial amounts or funds withheld until corrective steps are taken. These enforcement mechanisms underpin U.S. messaging to Afghan leaders that they must demonstrate accountability and transparency in the expenditure of donor funds.²⁰⁹

ANDSF compliance with commitment letters is reviewed quarterly and, when appropriate, CSTC-A says it recommends corrective action. For the period ending March 31, 2016, CSTC-A reported that it reviewed 47 conditions for the MoD and 48 for the Mol. It found the MoD made satisfactory progress on 28 conditions and insufficient progress on 19; the Mol made satisfactory progress on 30 and insufficient progress on 18. CSTC-A awarded incentive payments in 5 cases (3 MoD, 2 Mol) where progress was especially noteworthy and assessed penalties in 7 cases (3 MoD, 4 Mol) where progress was insufficient. Despite insufficient progress on 30 commitment letter conditions, penalties were not assessed because CSTC-A determined that the failure to attain the specified condition was beyond the control of the ministry, the conditions were insufficiently measurable or assessable, or enforcing the penalties could have affected the ANDSF's ability to execute the 2016 spring and summer fighting season operations.²¹⁰

The CSTC-A Commander advised the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the results of their first quarter conditionality assessment by letters of May 4 and May 8, 2016, respectively.

For the MOD:

- Incentives (additional funding) were awarded to the MoD for completion of a prioritized construction project list, a prioritized road project list, and progress in meeting quarterly female recruiting goals.
- Penalties were assessed to the MoD for the failure to account for lost weapons, a lack of accountability over night vision devices, and the fact that an Afghan soldier went absent without authority while attending training in the United States.²¹¹

For the MOI:

- Incentives were awarded to the MoI for the completion of a project list and an anti-corruption plan.
- Penalties were assessed for the failure to enter at least 95 percent of MoI personnel in the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS), the failure to document ammunition consumption, and the failure to report inventories of small arms and night vision devices. Penalties included withholding funds, reducing ammunition allocations, and ceasing deliveries of small arms weapons and night vision devices.²¹²

The DoD OIG is auditing funding provided by DoD directly to the Afghan ministries to determine the extent of commitment letter enforcement.²¹³ A portion of that funding is used to fund contracts awarded by the MoD and MoI. This quarter DoD OIG personnel conducted fieldwork on an audit to determine whether CSTC-A, the MoD, and MoI have established effective controls over the contract management process.²¹⁴

CSTC-A carries out a separate audit program to evaluate specific areas of MoD and MoI operations. Since January 2016, CSTC-A has completed audits to evaluate payments made to families of Afghan soldiers killed in action; examine MoI expenditures for communications equipment; and determine whether certain aspects of ANA and ANP payroll operations complied with regulations. Ongoing CSTC-A audits are examining accountability for ammunition and vehicles, adequacy of facility maintenance, and payments to retired ANDSF personnel.²¹⁵

"The Resolute Support legacy to Afghanistan will not be guns and ammo...but systems and processes that enable fiscal discipline for the future."

—President Ghani, as quoted by Major General Todd Semonite, then Commander, CSTC-A, at a conference on 6/16/2015.



Building Functional Capability

This quarter Coalition advisors continued to work with their Afghan counterparts in the MoD and MoI to improve Afghan budgeting, procurement, personnel management, and sustainment capabilities. CSTC-A reported that progress is gradual but uneven—clear improvement in some areas while challenges and gaps remain in others. DoD reported that the MoD and MoI have shown an increased capacity to manage complex processes such as procurement and budgeting. However, both ministries struggled to provide logistics support, maintain equipment, and manage personnel and pay systems.²¹⁶

BUDGETING AND PROCUREMENT: SOME IMPROVEMENTS NOTED

During this quarter, the MoD reportedly improved its budgeting and procurement operations, although its continued reliance on inefficient (manual) processes rather than automated systems hampered progress.²¹⁷ Nevertheless, CSTC-A reported that its Afghan counterparts have exercised stronger leadership in the budgeting area this quarter by forming requirements and budget planning units and accepting full responsibility for satisfying established requirements through the procurement system. Additionally, CSTC-A reported that advisors have successfully encouraged Afghan counterparts to take a more disciplined approach to monthly budget committee meetings by following a set schedule, developing a structured agenda, eliciting participation from all attendees, and recording meeting results.²¹⁸

At the beginning of this quarter, the MoD had reportedly approved 295 of 320 contracts needed to satisfy current fiscal year requirements. By the end of May, the MoD had obligated approximately 25 percent of its total fiscal year budget, which DoD considered “a good pace of execution” at that point in the fiscal year.²¹⁹ (The Afghan fiscal year began on December 21, 2015, and runs to December 20, 2016.²²⁰) CSTC-A also continues to make efforts to increase the involvement of the MoD and MoI in the development and validation of requirements for training, supplies, and equipment that will be procured through FMS cases.²²¹

The June 2016 DoD report described the MoI's implementation of sound finance and procurement as “uneven.” With Coalition assistance, the MoI made significant progress in processing procurement requirements. Because major food, fuel, and facilities contracts were due to expire without immediate replacement, MoI personnel worked with Coalition advisors to identify the most critical requirements and award them.²²² Although CSTC-A reported that MoI procurement actions are now 6 months ahead of the previous fiscal year pace, Coalition advisors have encouraged Afghan counterparts to accelerate the requirements determination and procurement process. As a result, the majority of requirements for the next fiscal year are expected to be under contract by December 2016, which CSTC-A considers a “huge accomplishment”

and potentially a harbinger of future performance improvements in the MoI planning, programming, and budgeting operation.²²³

LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE REMAIN SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES

Coalition advisors report having worked with the Afghan ministries to implement a demand-based supply system that relies on accurate warehouse inventories, prompt filling of requirements submitted by operating units, and recording of consumption to guide resupply efforts. However, implementation of the system has lagged because challenges with deploying the required logistics automation system, including limited internet connectivity below the corps level. In April 2016, the MoD issued a directive reverting to reliance on “pushing” out supplies. Under a “push” method, supplies are shipped to forward depots and units based on projections of requirements by the ministry or headquarters elements, rather than requisitioned or “demanded” by units in the field based on a local determination of needs. According to CSTC-A, this change has degraded the ability to meet valid requirements at the Corps level and often results in receipt of unneeded supplies.²²⁴ CSTC-A continues to work with MoD to develop a functional catalog that will provide Afghan Army units with the ability to indentify and requisition needed materials which will help eliminate the current efforts to push needed supplies forward.

Additionally, both ministries, from the national level down, continue to rely on manual (paper) methods for supply transactions, which are inefficient, not readily auditable, and result in voluminous files that are essentially unusable for supply analysis.²²⁵ For the past 6 years, the effort to implement a basic warehouse inventory management system known as the Core Information Management System (Core-IMS) has made slow and uneven progress.²²⁶ It is a proprietary system that has been modified incrementally by adding functions beyond the inventory management functions it is designed to perform. It also has evolved into an internet-based system in a country with limited internet connectivity outside major cities.²²⁷

Considered by CSTC-A as the “back-bone” of efforts to establish sustainment processes for both ministries, Core-IMS is intended to provide country-wide visibility of equipment, consumable supplies, repair parts, and ammunition. It will also enable operating units to submit and record their requirements. In addition to better satisfying unit supply needs, CSTC-A anticipates that full implementation of Core-IMS will lead to improved forecasting of requirements, more accurate budgeting, and reduction of opportunities for corruption in managing supplies.²²⁸

This quarter CSTC-A reported that the ANDSF completed the installation of 165 Core-IMS computers and 18 servers at the ANA Logistics Command in Kabul headquarters and 6 ANA Corps locations. It also deployed



The 209th Corps, CSB Vehicle Workshop, ANA School of Engineering in the northern part of Afghanistan, April 11, 2016. (Resolute Support Media photo)

130 contracted logistics specialists hired from the Afghan population to assist and train ANDSF personnel. According to the June 2016 DoD report, the Core-IMS is now functional across the country at national level logistics nodes and at ANA corps support battalions.²²⁹ This quarter, Coalition efforts focused on loading inventory information to Core-IMS. CSTC-A reported that the ANDSF completed the ammunition inventory upload in June 2016, which enabled an unprecedented cross-leveling of ammunition quantities between two ANA Corps, thereby minimizing ammunition shortages and surpluses in both Corps.²³⁰ According to the June 2016 DoD report, regional logistics hubs had been unwilling and/or unable to cross-level supplies and equipment, exacerbating the ANDSF's problem of not being able to distribute material to the proper locations.²³¹ DoD also reported that the 201st ANA Corps uploaded all of its equipment to Core-IMS, thereby giving the Corps Commander full visibility of his assets.²³² CSTC-A anticipates that the upload of all ANDSF inventory information will be completed by December 2016.²³³

According to CSTC-A, the unsatisfactory readiness state of the ANA vehicle fleet adversely affects combat effectiveness and presents a formidable challenge to Coalition advisors and their Afghan counterparts. A variety of factors has contributed to the steady decline in vehicle availability over time: ineffective life-cycle management of existing assets; shortfalls in institutional maintenance training with a resulting shortage of qualified Afghan Army mechanics, poor performance of the logistics support contract responsible

for ANA vehicle maintenance, failure to systematically identify, fund and procure future vehicle needs; and inadequate spare parts and maintenance support.²³⁴

According to the June 2016 DoD report, the current MoD fleet of approximately 51,000 vehicles consists of 68 major model types with over 200 variations. Due to the number and variety of vehicles, over 20,000 different repair parts have been identified for inclusion in supply system inventories. CSTC-A is working with ANA logisticians to simplify the ANA vehicle fleet by eliminating some vehicle types.²³⁵

SIGAR recently completed an audit of the contract that is currently providing vehicle maintenance services and training for the ANA. The audit found significant weaknesses in the design of the contract, oversight of the contractor by U.S. government personnel, and contractor performance. After 68 contract modifications over a five-year period, the total cost of the contract grew from \$182 million to \$423 million.²³⁶ According to the June 2016 DoD report, the failure of this contract to provide basic services, maintenance, and training was a significant factor in the decline of ANA vehicle availability.²³⁷ In response to the audit, DoD modified the contract to strengthen performance metrics and hired seven additional contracting officer representatives to monitor contractor performance.²³⁸

According to DoD officials, the maintenance contractor is supposed to perform vehicle maintenance that the ANA personnel are not able to perform. However, as described in the SIGAR audit, significant weaknesses in contract specifications, performance, and oversight have rendered the contract approach ineffective in maintaining acceptable vehicle availability.²³⁹ Additionally, the current shortage of trained mechanics limits the ANA maintenance capacity. Based on the size and diversity of the fleet inventory, 3,500 ANA mechanics are required. Yet fewer than 2,800 have been assigned, leaving over 600 vacancies.²⁴⁰ As of June 2016, there were over 982 open vehicle work orders across the nine equipment maintenance sites, exceeding the goal of 80 per site. The shortage of mechanics is compounded by lack of qualified instructors and a limited Afghan institutional training capability. According to DoD officials, the development of both basic and advanced institution training programs for ANA personnel is critical to reducing the dependence on logistics support contractors.²⁴¹

The MoI vehicle fleet is also composed of a wide variety of models and variations. However, in contrast with MoD, 95 percent of MoI's vehicle maintenance has been satisfactorily performed under a logistic support contract.²⁴² As a result, DoD reported that the MoI vehicle fleet has a high operational readiness rate. The major concern is that less than 15 percent of the 47,000 MoI vehicles are the type of tactical vehicle suitable for combat

Based on the size and diversity of the fleet inventory, 3,500 ANA mechanics are required. Yet fewer than 2,800 have been assigned, leaving over 600 vacancies.

situations. At the request of the previous Minister of Interior, DoD is buying armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles for the ANP, who often are engaged in combat with insurgents.²⁴³

A major initiative to address MoD and MoI vehicle maintenance problems involves implementation of the National Maintenance Strategy (NMS), which calls for the establishment of a single overarching contract to supplement maintenance being performed by Afghan personnel, while training Afghan mechanics and logistics personnel. The objective of the NMS is to improve the ability of the Afghans to sustain their vehicle fleets so that the need for contractor support diminishes over time.²⁴⁴ The current NMS strategy calls for establishing 31 maintenance sites across Afghanistan, 68 mobile maintenance teams that can deploy to outlying locations, and 17 advisor teams that provide maintenance and supply training. DoD issued a solicitation for the “National Maintenance Contract” in July 2016 that will consolidate the ANA and ANP maintenance contracts into a single contract that is similar to the current ANA maintenance contract. DoD is evaluating the SIGAR audit of the ANA maintenance contract to apply lessons learned to the new contract. The projected NMS contract award is April 2017.²⁴⁵

GRADUAL PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING AUTOMATED PERSONNEL AND PAY SYSTEMS

With Coalition assistance, the Afghan ministries reportedly made progress in implementing automated systems that are intended to improve personnel management, assist retention by identifying personnel reaching the end of their contracts (enlistments), and strengthen the accuracy and integrity of payroll disbursements. The Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) contains personnel records for all ANDSF personnel who fill an authorized position according to the manpower authorization (*tashkil*). The Afghan Personnel and Pay System will integrate AHRIMS with payroll systems to form a single overarching platform for personnel and payroll management.²⁴⁶ To the extent that payments are electronically made to the authenticated accounts of ANDSF members, the ability of individuals to siphon off payments or redirect them to “ghost,” or non-existent soldiers, should be reduced.²⁴⁷

Although the ANA encountered a data corruption problem in earlier efforts to load personnel records into AHRIMS, progress has reportedly resumed with approximately 69 percent (135,000) of personnel records loaded as of May 2016. USFOR-A reported that one of the major efforts in correcting the ANA personnel records involves properly coding as “inactive” the records of soldiers who have retired, separated, or been killed in action.²⁴⁸ The MoD now has 50 full-time contractors to input and clarify AHRIMS data and has added additional personnel to its *tashkil* for AHRIMS management support.²⁴⁹

The June 2016 DoD report stated that use of the MoD biometric identification card will further enhance MoD personnel management. Mobile teams have been traveling to ANA corps headquarters across the country to collect biometric data (fingerprints and iris scans) from *kandaks* in each region so that soldiers can receive identification cards. As of May 2016, approximately 70 percent of ANA personnel had been registered in the biometric data base.²⁵⁰

The MoI has also made progress in implementing AHRIMS. According to USFOR-A, the MoI had 68 percent (101,000) of its personnel records loaded as of the end of May 2016.²⁵¹ The MoI began adopting the Afghan Personnel and Pay System in phases during May 2016 and will continue the process during the next 18 months. With Coalition assistance, the MoI has installed servers to support the Afghan Personnel and Pay System at six regional ANP headquarters. It is completing the collection of biometric data from all police officers before new MoI identification cards are issued in the second half of 2016.²⁵²

GREATER EMPHASIS ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

According to the June 2016 DoD report, the MoD and MoI must be able to effectively communicate the Afghan government's security strategy not only to enhance recruiting efforts but also to bolster Afghan confidence in the country's security services as being better than the Taliban at providing security and stability. The insurgency has been more active than the government in using media to build public support. Its use of high profile attacks coupled with extensive use of social media dominates news and public awareness.²⁵³ The most recent survey of public perceptions in Afghanistan demonstrates the need for both the MoD and MoI to counter the insurgency communications campaign with robust messaging efforts that highlight ANDSF capabilities and combat success. (See sidebar on page 52.)

USFOR-A described MoD strategic communications as improved and capable. In April, independent of Coalition support, the MoD hosted a conference of all ANA corps and MoI police zone public affairs officers to mount an information campaign to accompany the ANDSF spring and summer campaign. The MoD also issued a five-month strategic communications plan that called for more press conferences and news releases emphasizing ANDSF capabilities rather than casualties and security issues.²⁵⁴

As part of that plan, the June 2016 DoD report stated that the MoD encouraged religious scholars and mullahs to support the summer campaign and to promote ANDSF's Islamic legitimacy to the public. DoD said it was too early to determine whether the religious outreach will impact public perceptions. The MoD also arranged visits for local and international media to provinces where ANDSF fighting has been particularly intense. Press trips included one to Helmand where the ANDSF is fighting the Taliban and one to Nangarhar where

the ANDSF is fighting IS-K. Those visits included joint media events involving local, provincial, and Afghan military leaders and helped publicize ANDSF successes via radio and internet.²⁵⁵

DoD reported that the MoI's strategic communications capability has been one of its strongest functions, but that reductions in personnel assigned to its Media and Public Affairs Directorate this quarter significantly hampered its ability to communicate effectively with the public. This reduced capability is expected to continue until the MoI can fill civilian vacancies. Nevertheless, the MoI has taken steps to improve its strategic communications capability. It has increased the quality and volume of messaging using radio, print, and social media while also improving coordination between ANA and ANP strategic communications activities. The MoI planned to hold its own conference to train its public affairs staff in July. Meanwhile, it has authorized the hiring of additional public affairs personnel at ANP zone headquarters.²⁵⁶

STRENGTHENING THE CIVILIAN WORK FORCE

According to the June 2016 DoD report, the MoD is slowly making progress to increase the number of civilians in its workforce. A strong civilian component will build institutional knowledge and expertise needed to sustain ongoing capacity building efforts and free up soldiers for inherently military duties. A key initiative to improve civilian workforce capability involves hiring young Afghans, recruited primarily from Afghan universities and technical programs, to serve as subject matter experts across the MoD.²⁵⁷ By May 2016 over 60 such recruits, known as the Functional Area Support Team members, were serving in positions to improve finance, procurement, logistics, information technology, and human resource management.²⁵⁸ According to the June 2016 DoD report, initial reporting indicates that ministry staff already relies heavily on Functional Area Support Team personnel due to their proficiency and educational backgrounds.²⁵⁹ Over the next three years, this program could expand to as many as 500 Functional Area Support Team personnel; the current authorization is 336.²⁶⁰

The MoI launched a similar program, known as the Subject Matter Expert program in mid-2015. By May 2016, the MoI had hired over 280 Afghan civilians into the program, assigning approximately 120 to MoI headquarters and deploying approximately 160 across the country to service in ministerial positions.²⁶¹ Over 100 Subject Matter Experts have been assigned to financial management positions, with 73 in facilities management, and 57 assisting with MoI procurement. The MoI is authorized a total of 361 positions under this program.²⁶²

According to DoD officials, the development of professional qualification standards for the MoD/MoI civilian workforce accompanied by a professional education program is critical to the long term success of these programs.²⁶³

Survey: Economy, Safety Remain Afghan Concerns


The quarterly NATO survey of Afghan civilians, called “Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research,” found that positive perceptions of their government and the country’s security remained low. The survey asked 13,521 people questions about confidence in the Afghan government and security forces, the Taliban, the economy, and other political and economic issues. The survey was conducted between May 12 and May 22, 2016, by two opinion research companies: D3 Systems, Inc. and the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research.

Two-thirds of respondents said they were confident in their government, but only 25 percent said they believed the country was heading in the right direction. The same percentage believed the government was doing a good job securing the country. Only 37 percent of respondents said they felt safe traveling on roads in their district.

Views on the strength of the Taliban insurgency were slightly more optimistic than they were in the previous quarter. In May, 33 percent of Afghans surveyed said they thought the Taliban had grown stronger, a 5 percent drop from the previous survey.

The surveyed Afghans had a negative view of the Taliban. Almost 9 in 10 respondents (87 percent) said they thought that a return to Taliban rule would be bad for the people and the country, similar to March 2015.






Notwithstanding the security challenges, perceptions of Afghan security forces remained positive. Almost three in four—73 percent—said they had confidence in the security forces, an increase of 4 percent over last quarter.



However, under 50 percent thought the ANDSF would defeat the Taliban in the next few years.

The survey indicated dissatisfaction with the economy. Although 86 percent of males said they were employed, 61 percent of Afghans said that they are not satisfied with the provision of jobs in their area. Forty-two percent said their economic situation had worsened compared to 45 percent last quarter. This quarter almost half—45 percent—of Afghans said they would emigrate if they had the chance.




Afghan views of international troops remained relatively high. Most Afghans surveyed this quarter supported the presence of international troops in their country. More than half (56 percent) support Resolute Support and favor extension of the mission beyond 2016. Over one-third (38 percent) said they would like international forces to stay in Afghanistan until the ANDSF is fully capable; 34 percent until the Taliban is defeated; 10 percent indefinitely.²⁶⁴



Over 80 percent of Afghans definitely or tentatively support peace negotiations.

67 percent of those surveyed self-identified as illiterate (49 percent men, 69 percent women).

Nearly 75 percent trust the messaging (radio, TV) from the Afghan government.



Source: Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) Wave 32, Date 6/27/2016.

ANDSF: “STILL DEVELOPING BUT INCREASINGLY CAPABLE”

Despite the continuing attacks by insurgent fighters this quarter, the June 2016 DoD report and USFOR-A officials said the ANDSF demonstrated increased ability to respond and prevent significant Taliban gains. The June 2016 DoD report, described ANDSF performance as uneven—capable in some scenarios, still developing in others but, on balance, continuing to improve.²⁶⁵ In its response to a SIGAR request for information, USFOR-A stated that the ANDSF have shown that they are able to protect the majority of the population, conduct large-scale offensive operations successfully, and safeguard the Afghan government with limited Coalition support. Although constrained by capability gaps in a variety of areas, USFOR-A reported that the ANDSF have prevented insurgents from achieving their strategic objectives of taking key urban centers and overthrowing the Afghan government.²⁶⁶

Mr. Nicholas Haysom, the UN’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, echoed the DoD assessment. He acknowledged that the ANDSF face significant challenges but concluded, “For now, though, they are holding their ground.” Mr. Haysom agreed that the ANDSF had successfully applied lessons learned from previous campaigns and this caused the battlefield to be “in a state of flux” with neither side dominant.²⁶⁷



Afghan National Army Honor Guard soldiers await the arrival of distinguished visitors at the seventh Oversight Coordination Body meeting, at the Ministry of Defense’s Chai House. (Operation Resolute Support media photo)

Success in North; Stalemate in South

General Cleveland reported that the ANDSF continued to improve this quarter, preventing the Taliban from achieving territorial objectives in the northern provinces and impeding Taliban offensives in Helmand and neighboring southern provinces. He noted that when the Taliban launched its spring offensive against Kunduz city, the ANDSF “performed well,” recapturing lost territory and targeting locations where the Taliban had massed to prepare for offensive operations. In short, General Cleveland stated that the ANDSF had “actually broken the Taliban there (Kunduz) and, in the short-term, had defeated them.”²⁶⁸

General Cleveland’s description of ANDSF performance in Helmand and other southern provinces was somewhat more guarded. He described an ANDSF offensive to retake Marjah, an area in Helmand controlled by the Taliban since 2015, as “going slow” and acknowledged that the Afghan National Police had “taken a beating from the Taliban” at several checkpoints in Helmand in late May. Describing some encounters in southern provinces as “stalemates,” General Cleveland noted that the ANDSF had enjoyed “some success,” were performing better than they performed last year, and had momentum going into the summer months. According to the June 2016 DoD report, “it remains to be seen whether this positive momentum can be sustained.”²⁶⁹ General Cleveland did not agree with media reports that alleged the Taliban controlled more territory in June than they did at the beginning of 2016.²⁷⁰

Some Progress in Capacity Building; Challenges Remain

Despite the need to respond to continued insurgent attacks, the ANDSF have made progress in a variety of areas with the continued support of Coalition advisors. A major focus of train, advise, and assist efforts this quarter, according to the June 2016 DoD report, was the reconstitution of parts of the 215th Corps in Helmand province amidst persistent violence.²⁷¹ In December 2015, an advise and assist cell from Resolute Support headquarters was forward deployed to Camp Shorab in Helmand to guide the re-training and equipping of four infantry *kandaks* (battalions). Additionally, advisors in Helmand assisted the Afghan Air Force with employing MD-530 and Mi-17 helicopters in support of ANDSF operations, consolidating checkpoints into defensible bases, and coordinating army and police activities.²⁷² During this quarter the strengthened 215th Corps successfully defended Lashkar Gar, the provincial capital of Helmand province, from insurgent occupation.²⁷³

DoD also reported ANDSF progress in other key areas, including the use of mortars and howitzers, planning and conducting operations involving more than one ANDSF component (“cross pillar” operations), and airlift and aerial assault capacity.²⁷⁴ However, persistent capability gaps remain in supply

chain management, equipment readiness rates, and force generation.²⁷⁵ Additionally, USFOR-A reported operational challenges that limit the effectiveness of the ANDSF, such as:

- **Quality of readiness reporting.** Outside of direct observation by Coalition advisors, Resolute Support relies almost exclusively on data provided by the Afghan ministries to evaluate the operational readiness and effectiveness of the ANDSF. According to USFOR-A, the quality of that data varies by ANA corps and ANP regional headquarters. As a result, Coalition advisors continue to emphasize readiness reporting as part of train, advise, and assist efforts.²⁷⁶
- **Use of Afghan Special Security Forces.** According to the June 2016 DoD report, the Afghan Special Security Forces remain the most capable element of the ANDSF and can conduct offensive operations relying on their own intelligence and aviation assets.²⁷⁷ Because of their demonstrated proficiency, the Afghan Special Security Forces are frequently used for conventional missions that would more appropriately be carried out by other ANA or ANP elements.²⁷⁸
- **Holding territory.** Although ANDSF forces have made progress in conducting offensive operations, they fail to proactively pursue the Taliban and neglect to institute holding operations after clearing a designated area.²⁷⁹

THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

During this reporting period, Coalition advisors continued to help rebuild the ANA 215th Corps in Helmand province amid consistent pressure from insurgents. Four *kandaks* were rebuilt after the 215th Corps suffered defeats at the hands of the Taliban in 2015. This quarter the corps was able to defend the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, from insurgents.²⁸⁰ The 215th Corps also conducted clearance operations against the Taliban with support from the ANA 205th Corps. However, the 215th Corps still suffered from a lack of leadership as the Afghan government continued to replace ANA officers who were dismissed as part of the rebuilding effort. Cases against 10 military leaders in the 215th Corps for allegations ranging from facilitating drug trafficking to maintaining “ghost” soldiers on the payroll were in various stages of prosecution.²⁸¹

In other regions of Afghanistan, Coalition advisors worked to increase the ANA’s fighting capabilities, according to DoD. Coalition advisors assisted with the establishment of a 20th division headquarters subordinate to the 209th Corps, which operates in northern Afghanistan. They also helped the ANA develop reserve *kandaks* in multiple corps and adopt a more offensive

The ANA is comprised of:

- 1 Division
- 6 Regional Corps comprised of 3 to 4 infantry brigades and various specialty *kandaks*
- 2 Mobile Strike Force brigades consisting of 7 *kandaks* based in Kabul and Kandahar provinces
- 1 National Engineering Brigade

strategy.²⁸² The June 2016 DoD report stated that the 205th and 215th Corps were able to synchronize operations with analysis and planning from Coalition partners.²⁸³ The report also indicated that, as a whole, the ANA corps are improving their ability to use mortars and D-30 howitzers. They are also increasingly able to use intelligence collected by Afghan sources to conduct operations. A winter training “surge” has made the ANA more proficient at planning and conducting large-scale offensive operations.²⁸⁴

ATTRITION REMAINS A CHRONIC PROBLEM

Despite these successes, the ANA has had difficulty retaining its troop strength. The ANA is authorized to employ 195,000 personnel, and at the end of May 2016, troop levels had reportedly reached about 171,100, including 7,100 Afghan Air Force personnel and more than 800 women. High attrition rates have undermined the ANA’s goal of recruiting about 4,800 new recruits each month. For example, from March to May 2016, the ANA lost an average of 4,500 personnel monthly, or between 2.39 and 3.49 percent of its force. This continuing trend effectively canceled out troop gains.²⁸⁵


USFOR-A reported that the ANA has a higher attrition rate than the ANP, because of deployments far from home. Some attrition is also cyclical: USFOR-A stated that the ANA suffers higher attrition rates between October and February each year.²⁸⁶

According to the June 2016 DoD report, Afghan soldiers have also complained about the quality of the ANA’s leadership, insufficient attention to casualties, and quality of life issues, such as inadequate living and working conditions and shortages of boots and cold weather gear.²⁸⁷ In January 2016, in an effort to maintain troop strengths, the MoD raised the age limit for new ANA recruits from 35 to 40 years. Additionally, the Resolute Support Manpower Working Group has made 21 recommendations to reduce attrition that include:²⁸⁸

- Financial incentives
- Improving medical evacuation
- Housing
- Improved force protection²⁸⁹

USFOR-A reported that it did not observe a link between recruitment or attrition rates and the Afghan government’s recent removal or reassignment of more than 100 ANA generals in an effort to create a more effective Afghan fighting force.²⁹⁰

Figure 1.

Areas of Operation of the Afghan National Army Division and Corps**ANA COMBAT CAPABILITIES DEMONSTRATED THIS QUARTER**

USFOR-A reported that the ongoing advisory mission is improving the ANA's ability to effectively fight insurgents and take, clear, and maintain control over territory. For example, the 201st Army Corps successfully cleared a main road in Kunar province. The 203rd Army Corps cleared two main highways of insurgents in Wardak province. The 205th Army Corps secured the main route in Uruzgan province, enabling civilian traffic and commerce. In addition, the 209th Army Corps defended Kunduz City from capture by insurgents, who had temporarily occupied the city in September 2015.²⁹¹ For an overview of where ANA corps operate, see Figure 1.

USFOR-A reported that ANA forces have been effective at integrating military ground maneuvers, close air support, and emergency rotary wing resupply.²⁹² The ANA has also improved coordination between intelligence and operations, developed artillery proficiency, and increased its capacity to manage ammunition supplies. Despite these gains, the ANA struggled at the general staff and corps levels in conducting effective operational planning and continue to rely on Coalition support. Although the ANA has

reduced static checkpoints in some regions, it still maintains a high number of checkpoints to provide security, using soldiers who could otherwise be deployed to offensive operations.²⁹³

AFGHAN SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES

The Afghan Special Security Forces are made up of three units in the MoD and one in the MoI. MoD elements include the ANA Special Operations Command, a light infantry battalion known as the *Ktah Khas*, and the Special Mission Wing, an aviation unit that provides expeditionary reach for counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks. The General Command of Police Special Units, a security force under the MoI, executes high-risk arrests, provides rapid response to critical situations, and handles hostage situations.

The Afghan Special Security Forces are considered the most capable components among the Afghan security forces according to the June 2016 DoD report, and have conducted successful counterterrorism raids and improved their ability to exploit intelligence. The report also expressed the view that as the Afghan Special Security Forces increase their ability to fight, their operations will outpace Coalition-advised operation and unilateral coalition operations. They also have the lowest attrition rates among the security forces, with a 90 to 95 percent reenlistment rate.²⁹⁴

In his press conference at the beginning of June, General Cleveland emphasized that nearly 80 percent of Afghan Special Security Forces' missions were conducted unilaterally with no assistance from the Coalition. He estimated that 10 to 15 percent had some level of Coalition support, primarily in the form of "enabling operations" where the Coalition participated in planning the operation or provided logistics support. Coalition forces accompanied the Afghan Special Security Forces on the remainder. In these cases, Coalition participation was typically authorized for missions with relatively low risk, high potential payoff, and significant complexity.²⁹⁵

The June 2016 DoD report stated that the Afghan Special Security Forces have become more adept at interdicting materials needed to make improvised explosive devices, degrading the insurgent capability to conduct high profile attacks in Kabul.²⁹⁶ Additionally, the report indicated that the Afghan Special Security Forces have become more proficient at collecting intelligence through the use of radio monitoring systems and improved field communications.²⁹⁷

However, DoD reported continued concern that Afghan Special Security Forces were being misused to perform conventional operations, such as "clear and hold operations," which degrades their combat effectiveness.²⁹⁸ Additionally, the Afghan Special Security Forces suffer from a lack of spare parts, maintenance capability, and military hardware. For instance, special

The Afghan
Special
Security
Forces have
become
more adept
at interdicting
materials
needed
to make
improvised
explosive
devices.

—DoD, *Enhancing
Stability and Security in
Afghanistan*, June 2016



forces units drive Humvees, but they cannot adequately maintain the Humvees due to shortage of spare parts and qualified mechanics. A lack of airplanes, vehicles, and artillery hinders their ability to move quickly and effectively during clashes with the insurgents.²⁹⁹ The ability of the Afghan Special Security Forces' National Mine Reduction Group to clear routes of unexploded ordnance has improved, but still needs to be fully developed.³⁰⁰

Ktah Khas Afghan Female Tactical Platoon members watch as an instructor performs a fast roping training drill outside Kabul, Afghanistan May 29, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo)

The ANA Special Operations Command conducts special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other Afghan security forces. It currently is authorized 11,700 personnel organized into ten *kandaks*. Because it operates outside the ANA corps chain of command, it has a limited ability to secure adequate logistical support. Different ANA headquarters provide different Special Operations Command *kandaks* with varying levels of support. Coalition advisory efforts have concentrated on improving these relationships and on providing advanced mortar training and medical training.³⁰¹

The *Ktah Khas* is a light infantry special operations *kandak* that includes operational and military intelligence companies and a female tactical platoon.

It is authorized 1,050 personnel and reportedly remained close to full strength during this reporting period. It performs counterterrorism raids and has executed operations around Kabul. However, DoD reported that the MoD often employs the *Ktah Khas* as a convention clearing force, rather than as a targeted strike force. This has resulted in an unsustainably high operating tempo that magnifies logistics challenges and reduces combat effectiveness. Although the *Ktah Khas* has reported to be a capable fighting force, it lacks a sufficient number of ground assault teams and dedicated helicopter support, which restricts its mission capability.³⁰²

The Special Mission Wing, which operates as part of the Afghan Special Security Forces, is the only ANDSF unit with night-vision, helicopter assault, and fixed-wing intelligence gathering capabilities. Established to conduct air assault raids and quickly resupply troops, as well as to support counternarcotics operations, it consists of four squadrons, two in Kabul, one in Kandahar, and one in Mazar-e-Sharif. It is authorized 858 personnel and currently has 620. It has had difficulty finding pilots and airplane maintenance personnel.³⁰³ The small size of the unit has meant that a high-priority mission often supplants existing missions. Nevertheless, it is increasingly capable of conducting independent missions. According to the June 2016 DoD report, more than 80 percent of its missions from December 2015 to May 2016 were conducted without Coalition support.³⁰⁴ While almost all of them were reported as counterterrorism missions rather than counternarcotics missions, in many cases there is a direct link between the Taliban and the drug trade.³⁰⁵

The General Command of Police Special Units, under the MoI, consists of approximately 6,000 personnel assigned to three national mission units, 33 provincial special units that operate in direct support of the provincial chiefs of police, and 19 investigative and surveillance units. Personnel may receive both basic and advanced infantry training. According to the June 2016 DoD report, the General Command of Police Special Units has proven itself an operationally effective component of the Afghan Special Security Forces and is anticipated to be able to function independently by the end of 2016.³⁰⁶

This quarter the DoD OIG is conducting an evaluation that assesses Coalition efforts to train, advise, and assist MoD elements of the Afghan Special Security Forces. This evaluation is a continuation of a series of DoD OIG assessments that focus on Coalition efforts to develop the ANDSF into a credible, capable, and sustainable force. A DoD OIG team conducted field work in Afghanistan during February-March 2016, completing over 80 interviews with Coalition and Afghan officials. The team visited both operational and training sites and met with Coalition advisors and Afghan senior officers. Units of the Afghan Special Security Forces provided briefings and interviews relevant to project objectives. The final report, which will be classified, is expected to be issued in September 2016.³⁰⁷

THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE

According to the June 2016 DoD report, the Afghan Air Force made strides this quarter towards enhancing its manpower, aviation assets, and critical capabilities.³⁰⁸ During a recent visit to Afghanistan, which included a review of Afghan Air Force facilities, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph F. Dunford said that “there were some successes, some setbacks, but overall the Afghan forces at least proved resilient.... Now there are some lessons learned from 2015 that can be applied to 2016.” General Dunford emphasized that the priority for the Afghan Air Force is obtaining the parts and maintenance necessary to sustain the new fixed and rotary wing aircraft and begin integrating them into joint operations with Afghan ground forces.³⁰⁹

AFGHAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL

The Afghan Air Force has some of the highest retention rates within the ANDSF. Recruiting and training pilots and maintenance crews is costly and takes several years, but with nearly 90 percent of Afghan Air Force personnel choosing to stay at the end of their contracts (enlistments), their numbers are gradually climbing. To build upon this retention rate, the Afghan Air Force employs public affairs and recruitment teams to bring new personnel onto the force. The Train, Advise, and Assist Command-Air, which is Resolute Support’s air power mission in Afghanistan, continues to expand capacity to train Afghan Air Force personnel in the United States, Czech Republic, United Arab Emirates, and other countries. This approach reportedly helps the Afghan Air Force in Afghanistan focus on combat operations while continuing to develop human capital.³¹⁰

The Afghan Air Force is making progress towards its goal of filling all of its 8,019 authorized positions, of which 7,142 were reportedly filled as of April 2016. While this figure presently includes just 58 women, the current year’s hiring plan opens an additional 103 positions to women. The Afghan Air Force currently has 160 fully-trained, active pilots (not including those who are currently transitioning from one aircraft to another) and over 722 maintenance personnel.³¹¹

The Afghan Air Force now maintains three air wings in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand, in the country’s east, south-center, and west. These bases are complemented by 11 detachments across Afghanistan, of which five have assigned aircraft. As the Afghan Air Force continues to improve its capacity to operate independently, it will serve as a force multiplier for the ANDSF, providing close air attack, logistics, humanitarian relief, air mobility, medical and casualty evacuation, intelligence gathering, air interdiction, and aerial escort mission sets. The Train, Advise, and Assist Command—Air continues to work with the Afghan Air Force to improve its capabilities in these areas.³¹²



An A-29 Super Tucano pitches to land in Kabul, Afghanistan, April 28, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo)

AVIATION ASSETS

In April, the Afghan Air Force achieved initial operational capability with the A-29 Super Tucano, a versatile multi-role turboprop aircraft with air-to-ground attack and aerial reconnaissance capabilities. According to CSTC-A, the Afghan Air Force employs this platform to provide gun, rocket, and unguided munitions capability in support of ANDSF operations. The eight A-29s now in the Afghan Air Force inventory are forward deployed to the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif and the southern province of Kandahar. From those locations, they provide air interdiction and close air support to ANDSF ground forces across the majority of Afghanistan. ANA commanders have praised the success of the A-29 program, and they are increasingly requesting support from the aircraft. From April 1 through June 15, 2016, Afghan A-29s had flown 32 combat sorties, releasing 91 bombs and 28 rockets, according to USFOR-A.³¹³

According to the June 2016 DoD report, the Afghan Air Force made progress with its MD-530 rotary wing force, which now numbers 15 and will grow to



27 by the end of 2016.³¹⁴ Based on the need for close air support at outlying airfields, Contractor Logistics Support has reportedly expanded to enable the MD-530 to operate out of Kabul and Kandahar with three supporting detachments across the country. MD-530 scout weapons teams, operating in pairs, flew close air support missions successfully in contested areas in support of both the 205th and 215th ANA Corps. Demonstrating an increased capacity for joint operations, the Afghan Air Force has integrated MD-530s with ANA-operated ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle assets in order to improve intelligence gathering on threats and target areas.³¹⁵

In addition to improving its attack platforms, USFOR-A reported that the Afghan Air Force has also improved the capability and capacity of its lift platforms. The short-haul turboprop C-208 cargo plane remains central to the Afghan Air Force airlift program, and Afghan pilots and maintenance teams are increasingly demonstrating the competency necessary to operate it independently.

An aircraft, an unmanned aerial vehicle, and an MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicle on display at Bagram Airfield, June 14, 2016. (USFOR-A Public Affairs photo)

Although USFOR-A noted that C-208 utilization temporarily dropped in 2015, due to the termination of pilot training operations at Shindand Air Base and crew transfers to other airframes, the C-208 is seeing increased usage this year, with 1,657 missions flown the first five months of 2016. Additionally, the much larger and faster C-130 cargo plane achieved a significantly higher operational tempo, flying nearly twice as many missions in 2015 as in 2014. The Afghan Air Force is currently on pace to match or exceed that number in 2016. With the addition of a third fully qualified C-130 crew, the Afghan Air Force was able to execute 262 missions through May 31, 2016.³¹⁶

An ongoing oversight project by SIGAR is assessing the operation and maintenance of light air support aircraft that has been provided to the Afghan Air Force, as well as training being provided to Afghan pilots in the United States.³¹⁷

MEDICAL AND CASUALTY EVACUATION CAPABILITIES

According to USFOR-A, the Afghan Air Force is working to fill 20 new flight medic positions with recent medic training school graduates. This will represent a 67 percent increase—from 30 to 50—of available Afghan Air Force flight medic capability. The increase in ambulatory medical coverage on rotary wing assets will result in better point of injury patient extraction and en route medical care. In May, the Afghan Air Force Surgeon General sent the first group of seven medics on an eight-week advanced clinical rotation at the Afghan National Military Hospital to improve the skill sets that Afghan Air Force Medical Evaluation team leaders will need to provide patient care in the future.³¹⁸

The number of medical and casualty evacuation missions has significantly increased this year. During the first 5 months of 2016, the Afghan Air Force transported 76 percent more wounded (3,401 vs 1,929) and successfully completed 133 percent more missions (1,242 vs 553) than during the same period in 2015. All of these operations were conducted via C-208, C-130, Mi-17, or contracted aircraft from the state-owned Ariana Afghan Airlines.³¹⁹

Currently, the Afghan Air Force does not have a codified policy permitting its medics to fly on rotary wing aircraft operated by Momentum Aviation General, an Afghan Air Force contracted helicopter service. Due to the high visibility loss of a helicopter carrying ANA troops in November 2015, the Afghan Air Force Surgeon General is reluctant to proceed without clear policy direction from senior Afghan Air Force leadership. In April, the Afghan Air Force Surgeon General met with Momentum Aviation Group leadership and agreed to provide medic support when able, but only if there was an approved Afghan Air Force policy in place. This policy is currently being worked out by the Afghan Air Force. This issue is not applicable to fixed wing contract aircraft operated by Ariana, which transports human remains and stable patients, with or without the presence of Afghan Air Force medics.³²⁰

THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

According to a recent Congressional Research Service, the ANP has many on-going initiatives aimed at improving the force, although the ultimate success of those initiatives remains hampered by bureaucracy, corruption, and a lack of resources. The Congressional Research Service noted that DoD reports entitled, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, which are issued biannually, tend to be positive and focus on current efforts to build, train and sustain the ANP, thereby providing the impression that the ANP is increasing its overall counterinsurgency effectiveness. At the same time, the Congressional Research Service stated, “many outside assessments of the ANP are negative, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where citizens mistrust and fear the ANP.”³²¹

Table 4.

Afghan National Police Pillars and Sub-pillars

FOUR PILLARS OF THE ANP			
<p>Afghan Uniform Police The Uniform Police is the largest national police agency, at 86,000 authorized personnel, and provides basic police service, traffic police, fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters in all 34 provinces.</p>	<p>Afghan National Civil Order Police The Civil Order Police, with approximately 15,000 personnel, provides the primary offensive capability within the ANP, and reacts to insurgent attacks in remote and high-threat areas.</p>	<p>Afghan Border Police The Border Police authorized at 22,000 personnel, is tasked with securing and safeguarding national borders, extending 50 kilometers into Afghanistan, and protecting Afghanistan’s international airports.</p>	<p>Afghan Anti-Crime Police The Anti-Crime Police, at nearly 2,000 officers, provides specialist services like criminal investigations, biometric, forensics, and specialized security details.</p>
THREE SUB-PILLARS OF THE ANP			One Unit of the Afghan Special Security Forces
<p>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan The Counter Narcotics Police, with approximately 2,800 personnel, lead the ANDSF’s counternarcotics efforts nationally, and in all 34 provinces.</p>	<p>Afghan Local Police The Local Police, with 30,000 authorized personnel, provides security within villages and rural areas to protect the population and facilities, as well as conduct local counterinsurgency missions. In mid-2015, the Afghan Local Police was placed under the command and control of the Afghan Uniform Police.</p>	<p>Afghan Public Protection Force The Public Protection Force is a state-owned enterprise providing contracted facility and convoy security services previously provided by licensed private security firms.</p>	<p>General Command of Special Police Units This specialized unit, with 6,000 personnel, provides the ANP with a capability to provide rapid response to high profile attacks, hostage situations, and other emergencies. DoD reported that it has proven itself to be a highly effective component.</p>

Source: DoD report, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, June 2016.

Though the overall goal of the ANP is to serve as Afghanistan's community police force, performing basic law enforcement and emergency services, it remains heavily engaged in counterinsurgency operations, alongside the ANA. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the ANP and Afghan Local Police "play a critical role in paramilitary operations and in holding areas once the military has cleared them of an active insurgent presence."³²²

According to the June 2016 DoD report, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, the ANP consists of four pillars, three sub-pillars, and an element of the Afghan Special Security Forces called the General Command of Police Special Units. A description of each is provided in Table 4.³²³

The total authorized strength for the ANP remains 157,000, not including the Afghan Local Police or the Afghan Public Protection Force. The Afghan Local Police have a separate authorization of 30,000, while the Afghan Public Protection Force is a state-owned company controlled by the MoI, and its resources are determined by the quantity of contracted work. Unlike the other elements of the MoI, which are funded by DoD and other donor nations, the Afghan Public Protection Force receives no such funding because it is a revenue-generating organization.

Overall ANP strength fluctuates due to recruiting and attrition. Actual ANP strength was 148,000 at the end of May, 2016, based on ANP manpower reports. Women account for 2,600 personnel, or 1.8 percent of current ANP manpower. Afghan Local Police strength was approximately 29,800 at the end of May, while 16,000 personnel were employed by the Afghan Public Protection Force.³²⁵ USFOR-A notes, however, that advisors are not able to verify ANP manpower information due to the decreased number of Coalition advisors available to visit ANP locations.³²⁶

Attrition continues to be a problem for the ANP, according to DoD, and currently stands at 1.9 percent per month.³²⁷ Prior to April 2016, USFOR-A had no advisors assigned to the MoI's General Recruiting Command. Since then, an advisor has been assigned and a manpower work group has been formed to study ANP attrition.³²⁸ Moreover, travel restrictions placed on advisors (lifted in June 2016) and the removal of the Chief of Staff at the MoI General Recruiting Command, led to an overall "degradation of quality recruitment," according to USFOR-A.³²⁹

With Coalition advisor assistance, the ANDSF is implementing automated personnel and payroll systems that will assist in validating ANP reported manpower levels. Full implementation is targeted for early 2017. According to NATO, as of May, 2016, 72 percent of Afghan Local Police personnel were being paid by electronic funds transfer with 28 percent continuing to be paid in cash by a "trusted agent" or middleman. According to NATO, "advances in payroll management allowed donors to realize \$33 million in savings in the past year alone."³³⁰

ZONE REORGANIZATION

According to the June 2016 DoD report, the ANP zone structure was established in November, 2015 to enhance command and control of ANP forces and align them with the ANA corps regions, thereby facilitating coordination between the ANP and ANA.³³¹ The zone structure continues to progress and evolve as the MoI establishes physical headquarters in each zone, assigns personnel, establishes reporting structures, and issues standard operating procedures. However, as of June 2016, DoD reported that two northern zones “lag behind the other six zones” in building capacity.³³²

An overarching challenge for the ANP zone structure and zone commanders remains the relationships between zone commanders and provincial police chiefs. For example, provincial police chiefs may outrank their zone commanders, because the ANP lacks a consistent rank structure. Furthermore, provincial police chiefs, who had previously enjoyed sole command and control of ANP forces in their provinces, have been reluctant to relinquish it.³³³ According to Resolute Support, the zone headquarters standard operating procedures, containing the responsibilities for zone headquarters personnel, has not yet been approved by the MoI. Additionally, establishment of Operational Coordination Centers-Regional, intended to facilitate coordination among the various ANP pillars and subpillars in a given region, “have not made appreciable progress during the reporting period.”³³⁴

TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT

Although the ANP is actively engaged in counterinsurgency operations, its personnel are primarily trained and equipped as a more traditional police force. As a result, DoD has found that the ANP lacks the necessary counterinsurgency training as well as heavy weaponry and equipment required to combat insurgents. According to the June 2016 DoD report, the ANP has higher casualty rates than the ANA because of “inadequate training and equipment, poor planning processes, and a sub-optimal force posture that leaves ANP forces vulnerable at static checkpoints.”³³⁵

The Congressional Research Service reported that the MoI is increasing the number of heavy weapons and armored vehicles fielded to the ANP, which now has approximately 5,000 armored vehicles. However, corruption continues to plague the force and can inhibit the fielding of necessary equipment. In its most recent report on Afghanistan, the Congressional Research Service stated, “In some cases, equipment requisitioned by their commanders was sold and the funds pocketed by the police officers.”³³⁶

While training takes many forms, ANP and Afghan Local Police officers are considered either trained or untrained, as defined by the MoI. According to USFOR-A, over 5,000 ANP personnel were considered untrained as of May 2016, and 4,400 local police were untrained.³³⁷ ANP training is provided by five contractor-operated training programs funded by DoD.³³⁸

Building ANDSF Ability to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices

The improvised explosive device has been a long-standing insurgent weapon of choice against Coalition forces in Afghanistan and has resulted in over 1,400 Coalition military deaths. At their peak in 2010 (when force levels were highest), IEDs caused 368 of 630 total Coalition deaths.³³⁹ The difficulty lay in the IEDs effectiveness against soft targets, such as unarmored vehicles and foot patrols. Moreover, IEDs are cheap, relatively easy to use, and proliferating.³⁴⁰

Over the last decade, the Coalition responded to the threat by spending billions of dollars on various anti-IED gear and on mine-resistant vehicles.³⁴¹ As a result, there have been advances in “standoff metal detection” (detection at a distance) and soldiers can now spot a single piece of metal along a dirt road.³⁴² With the reduction in force levels coupled with improved technology, the number of Coalition deaths by IEDs dropped to zero in 2015 and the first six months of 2016. Only 12 Coalition soldiers were killed by IEDs in 2014.³⁴³ However, IEDs



Nine female Afghan National Army soldiers and Afghan National Policewomen, members of the Female Tactical Platoon, participated in a one-day Counter Improvised Explosive Device Awareness training at the Kabul Military Training Center. (U.S. Navy photo)

Building ANA ability to counter improvised explosive devices

(continued from previous page)



Members of the KKA, Afghanistan's national counter-terrorism unit, train to safely locate, identify and blow in place improvised explosive devices they will encounter throughout Afghanistan. (U.S. Navy photo)

represent a continuing menace to the Afghan security forces and were the second leading cause of Afghan civilian casualties in 2015, accounting for 715 deaths and 1655 injured.³⁴⁴

To combat IEDs, the Resolute Support Counter-IED Directorate assists the ANDSF in training and equipping 3-person ANA and ANP teams that are engaged in IED detection/neutralization and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).³⁴⁵ CSTC-A has provided ANA and ANP units 100 percent of their EOD equipment requirements and continues to procure counter-IED equipment to support the increase in ANP teams from 112 to 200. Since 2011, DoD has bought more than 450 mine rollers for the ANA and ANP to support route clearance operations—although it is unclear how many mine rollers remain operational—and 90,000 mounted and dismounted counter-IED radio controlled electronic warfare devices.³⁴⁶ Afghan security forces have also received medium tactical vehicles, IED jammers, bomb suits, hand-held detectors, and robots, and have set up facilities in Kabul and Herat to analyze IED forensic material.³⁴⁷

Training sufficient numbers of ANA and ANP explosives experts has been a challenge. In January 2016, the ANA had about half of the personnel it needed for EOD operations, despite the ANA's Engineer School graduating an average of 135 EOD and 65 IED specialists annually.³⁴⁸ According to CSTC-A, two key ANA Corps which cover regions with greatest combat intensity—the 209th in Kunduz and adjacent northern provinces and the 215th in Helmand province—were “seriously lacking” in Counter-IED capability due to inefficient EOD and IED disposal manning levels.³⁴⁹ A major reason for the shortage of personnel was that explosives experts were being assigned to staff positions rather than bomb detection due to their ability to read and write.³⁵⁰

Since January 2016, CSTC-A reported that the Coalition has developed an aggressive EOD/IED training program that includes various courses at multiple locations. As of June 2016, the 209th Corps had 29 fully manned teams, up from 14 at the beginning of the year. The number of teams supporting the 215th Corps grew from 4 to 14 since January 2016.³⁵¹ CSTC-A reported that 112 ANP teams were fully manned and equipped and that “a full court press” was initiated this quarter to support the March 2016 decision to add 88 teams to the ANP.³⁵²

ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS

While, as detailed below, little actual progress has been made against corruption, the Afghan government has stated its intent to improve its anti-corruption efforts and has been able to point to some results. In May 2016, the European Union hosted its second annual anti-corruption conference in Afghanistan.³⁵³ At the conference in Kabul, President Ghani called corruption a “national shame” of Afghanistan and a blight on development. He pledged to combat public corruption, implement a transparent government, and end “predatory behavior,” such as land-grabbing and the abuse of the courts. He cited the following as evidence of the government’s success in tackling corruption:³⁵⁴

- Jailing four individuals and recovering \$250 million from the Kabul bank fraud;
- Firing 25 percent of customs officers;
- Blacklisting more than 45 corrupt companies; and
- Replacing 600 court officials.

President Ghani also laid out plans to:

- Reorganize the Council on Governance and Justice to become a High Council for Governance, Law, and Anti-corruption and strengthen it to implement a reform agenda across all levels of government;
- Enhance justice sector reform by establishing new judicial qualifications and rotating or retiring unqualified judges;
- Prioritize for “clean-up” the ministries of interior, transport, mining, public health, communications, and education; and
- Establish a specialized Anti-Corruption Justice Center to pursue corruption allegations involving senior Afghan officials.³⁵⁵

At the conference, the acting Afghan Minister of Defense, Masoom Stanekzai, said there was an “organic link” between corruption and insecurity in the country. He said that narcotics production had increased because of corruption within the security institutions. The World Bank said that Afghanistan needs to take immediate action to improve business license authorization, customs processes, and tax collection.³⁵⁶

“Every day
the nation
suffers, the
poor of
this country
suffer from
corruption
which is
epidemic”

-President Ghani
speaking at the European
Union Conference on
May 5, as quoted by
TOLONews.

In April 2016, the MoD Office of the Inspector General issued a report on counter corruption efforts, which described actions the ministry had taken to combat corruption, including:³⁵⁷

- Tracking of investigations of alleged corruption and prosecutions against those accused of corruption;
- Working with anti-corruption personnel to promote corruption awareness among staff;
- Assessing points of vulnerability to corruption; and
- Protecting journalists and preserving the confidentiality of whistleblowers.

However, according to an analysis conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (a policy research organization), there is still a widespread culture of impunity for the elite and corruption is rife in Afghanistan.³⁵⁸ Petty corruption is endemic and most Afghans perceive they have to pay bribes in order to obtain public services.³⁵⁹ CSTC-A reported that while there is a lot of talk about fighting corruption, little is accomplished without Coalition prompting. According to CSTC-A, high-level support for anti-corruption efforts has not translated into political will to prosecute high-level officials. Rather, individual cases are pursued primarily due to pressure from the Coalition, and senior level officials are rarely prosecuted and often allowed to retire without being subjected to adverse action.³⁶⁰

Despite these challenges, the United States continued to support efforts to institutionalize anti-corruption efforts in the MoD and MoI. During this reporting period, CSTC-A assisted the MoD and MoI in implementing internal controls, such as policies, procedures, and best practices, to support Afghan efforts to fight corruption.³⁶¹ CSTC-A reported that specific anti-corruption initiatives include establishing systems for asset declaration, audits and inspections, and a process for receiving complaints.³⁶²

In May 2016, the DoD OIG initiated an assessment of Coalition efforts to enable the MoD to develop its oversight and internal control capability. Fieldwork began in July 2016 with an on-site visit to Afghanistan scheduled in August. The project is evaluating progress made in building MoD oversight and internal control processes and, if appropriate, will make recommendations to strengthen the Coalition assistance effort in that area.³⁶³ Additionally, SIGAR is conducting an examination of corruption in Afghanistan to determine how the problem evolved since 2001, to analyze the United States' response to the corruption problem, and to identify lessons learned that will assist U.S. authorities to counter corruption in Afghanistan and elsewhere.³⁶⁴



Secretary of State John Kerry has a pull-aside discussion with Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani on May 12, 2016, at Lancaster House in London, U.K., amid their joint attendance at an anti-corruption summit meeting hosted by British Prime Minister David Cameron. (State Department photo)

Resolute Support is also working with Afghanistan's Major Crimes Task Force to train Afghan investigators and prepare cases to test the political will to fight corruption. Since January 2016, the Afghan government has begun providing the task force with operational funds to cover basic expenses such as travel. According to CSTC-A, funding had been held up due to senior official interference and lack of Mol support. Senior Mol leaders, with Coalition assistance, have helped to overcome these and other issues by removing the Commanding General and transferring the entire organization to the Afghan Anti-Crime Police, which is better suited for the Major Crimes Task Force's criminal investigation and counter-corruption mission.³⁶⁵

Since implementing those changes, the task force has opened 200 cases, arrested 99 suspects, seized several hundred thousand dollars in assets and counterfeit currency, and confiscated 120 tons of illegally mined lapis lazuli and 836 tons of other minerals. In one high profile case, a task force investigation led to the arrest of a Provincial Chief of Police from Kapisa province and six others who were charged with orchestrating a large fuel theft scheme. This was the first time a provincial chief of police was arrested for corruption and occurred despite political pressure from high-level Afghans who opposed the arrest.³⁶⁶ In an effort to prevent fuel theft, the Mol Inspector General has agreed to complete five fuel inspections per month, and in recent months, the Mol's reporting of fuel consumption has improved according to CSTC-A.³⁶⁷

CSTC-A reported a steady rise in the number of arrests of senior police officers and prosecutors for alleged corruption following the January 2016 appointment of a new chief of Afghan Anti-Crime Police, which oversees the task force.³⁶⁸ In April, President Ghani agreed to further support the task force by:³⁶⁹


- Increasing its personnel from 130 to 300;
- Establishing wiretap capabilities;
- Creating an anti-corruption court;
- Streamlining the chain of command whereby the task force can bypass corrupt MoI officials; and
- Authorizing investigations of governors, ministers, and other high-ranking officials.

CSTC-A reported that, on June 1, 2016, the MoI signed an agreement with the Afghan attorney general's office to facilitate cooperation between the police and prosecutors.³⁷⁰

Despite these efforts, prosecutorial success in corruption cases remains rare according to CSTC-A. The attorney general's office lacks the ability to follow a majority of cases through prosecution. Although the task force referred dozens of cases for prosecution, it is unable to follow their disposition due to inaction or failure by the attorney general's office to update the case management system. Political interference remains a major problem in nearly all high-level investigations.³⁷¹ In at least one instance, a high-level official in the Afghan Uniform Police threatened to kill a task force member and his men if they initiated an investigation into police units without his permission. The number of threats against anti-corruption officials increased dramatically during this reporting period.³⁷²

These anti-corruption efforts were put in place ahead of a July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw at which donors discussed ongoing funding to Afghanistan. In October 2016, donors will meet again at the Brussels Conference to decide future levels of funding for Afghanistan. Afghanistan has consistently ranked near the bottom of Transparency International's corruption index, and the organization downgraded it in 2015, ranking it third from the bottom ahead of Somalia and North Korea.³⁷³





A U.S. Army AH-64 Apache helicopter from the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade takes off from Forward Operating Base Dahlke, Afghanistan, May 18, 2016. (U.S. Army photo)

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

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Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended, established the Lead IG and created a structure for planning, conducting, and reporting on oversight of overseas contingency operations. This section of the report provides information on Lead IG staffing approaches to perform these oversight functions; outreach efforts by Lead IG agencies; completed Lead IG oversight work related to audits, inspections, and evaluations during the past 3-month period, April 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016; Lead IG investigative activity; and Lead IG hotline activity. Appendix C provides a description of the Lead IG responsibilities and authorities.

USAID has ongoing efforts in Afghanistan but no OFS-related programs or activities. As a result, the USAID OIG conducts audits and investigations in Afghanistan and coordinates these activities as appropriate with other audit and law enforcement organizations, but does not have audits or investigations specific to OFS.

LEAD IG STAFFING

The Lead IG staffing strategy includes hiring new staff for OCO oversight, through the special hiring authority provided within 5 U.S.C. § 3161 and the re-employment of annuitants provided within 10 U.S.C. 9902, as well as assigning existing permanent staff. Each Lead IG agency has assigned newly hired 3161 staff and current permanent staff to the oversight projects identified in this report and in support of the strategic oversight planning and reporting responsibilities.

To support audit, evaluation, and inspection efforts, the Lead IG agencies have adopted an expeditionary workforce model. DoD OIG maintains a field office in Afghanistan, with a small contingent of oversight staff on six-month rotations, to support the DoD OIG's regional activity. DoS OIG also maintains a field office at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, staffed by a small contingent of oversight staff on one-year assignments. In addition, oversight teams from the Lead IG agencies travel to Afghanistan and other locations in the region on a temporary basis to conduct the field work for their projects.

For their investigative work, the Lead IG agencies have hired and deployed investigators to the region to investigate OFS-related fraud and corruption. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), which is the DoD OIG's investigative component, and DoS OIG have deployed special agents to Afghanistan. DoS OIG also has special agents in Germany who assist with investigations concerning Afghanistan.

OUTREACH

Outreach and coordination are important components of the Lead IG work. In addition to visits by project teams to conduct oversight or by special agents who are leading investigations, senior OIG personnel periodically travel into the theater of operation to meet with military and civilian officials in charge of the operation and witness ongoing activities.

During this quarter, Lead IG officials engaged in a variety of outreach efforts to enhance coordination, understand OFS-related activities, and identify potential areas for future projects:

- A team of senior DoD OIG personnel visited Kabul and Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan and met with senior U.S. and NATO officials to discuss the challenges associated with funding and sustaining the Afghan forces amid heavy fighting against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. During this April 2016 visit, the OIG team also learned about the current state of the Afghan Air Force, its aviation inventory, and efforts to train its pilots and maintenance workers.
- The DoD OIG hosted the 34th quarterly meeting of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, where representatives of 12 oversight agencies discussed oversight projects and planning initiatives. The April 21, 2016 meeting featured a presentation from the command perspective by Major General Gordon B. Davis, Jr., then CSTC-A Commander.
- The Acting DoD Inspector General highlighted Lead IG efforts and common audit issues in his quarterly meetings with the Service Inspectors General, the Service Auditors General, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency. He also met with DoD military criminal investigative organizations—the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Air Force Office of Special Investigations—to discuss joint investigations and deconflict investigations related to OFS.

Senior Lead IG officials routinely meet with policy officials, collect information, and conduct research related to OFS activities. Lead IG officials also meet with congressional staff to discuss OFS activities and completed, ongoing, and planned oversight, as appropriate.

Fraud awareness briefings and the DoD Hotline are other avenues for outreach that are discussed later in this section.

COMPLETED AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION PROJECTS

Lead IG agencies released two reports relating to OFS from April 1, 2016 to June 30, 2016.

Final Reports

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OVERSIGHT

Management Alert: Hazardous Electrical Current in Office and Residential Buildings Presents Life, Health, and Safety Risks at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan

MA-16-01, April 12, 2016

The DoS OIG is conducting an audit of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations' construction and commissioning of a new office building and residential apartment building at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. During the course of the audit, the DoS OIG and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers identified life, health, and safety risks to building occupants due to a type of hazardous electrical current—known as objectionable current—in both buildings.

The objectionable current was identified in the New Office Annex building and the Staff Diplomatic Apartment building. The New Office Annex is designed to accommodate more than 900 Department personnel, and when fully occupied, the Staff Diplomatic Apartment building will house nearly 300 residents. When objectionable current flows on metal parts, it can cause electric shock and even death from ventricular fibrillation because of the elevated voltage. It can also cause a fire to ignite if combustible material is placed near the current.

In its Management Alert report, the DoS OIG recommended that Embassy Kabul in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations take immediate action to 1) examine the installation of electrical wiring, equipment, and appliances in both buildings; determine the cause of the objectionable current; and correct the deficiencies; 2) determine what mitigation measures can be immediately taken to eliminate or reduce risk to personnel occupying the buildings; and 3) inform residents, to the extent necessary, of the existence of objectionable current and the risks associated with it and provide instructions on how to eliminate or avoid accompanying hazards.



Secretary of State John Kerry addresses family members and staff at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, on April 9, 2016. (State Department photo)

Improvements Needed To Strengthen Vehicle-Fueling Controls and Operations and Maintenance Contract at Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan
AUD-MERO-16-35; April 17, 2016

In December 2010, the DoS OIG reported that an Afghan fuel vendor, National Fuels, Inc., billed Embassy Kabul for \$346,682 in fuel that it had not received. The DoS OIG conducted this audit to determine whether U.S. Embassy Kabul had implemented adequate controls to safeguard and account for purchased fuel and whether PAE Government Services, Inc. (PAE), the embassy's operations and maintenance contractor, performed its fuel-monitoring duties in accordance with the statement of work.

The DoS OIG made 10 recommendations to Embassy Kabul to improve fuel operations at the embassy and Camp Sullivan including increasing oversight of PAE, updating the Department's vehicle-fueling system to prevent unauthorized access to fuel and promote accountability, reviewing \$1.21 million in unsupported costs, and relocating the fueling station office on the embassy compound to a location that offers sufficient egress capacity in the event of an emergency.

Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group for OFS

The mission of the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group for OFS is to promote the detection, investigation and prevention of fraud and corruption related to OFS programs and operations. The Working Group is a forum for member agencies to identify, coordinate, and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations; share best practices and investigative techniques; and discuss possible proactive measures to detect and deter abuses related to U.S. government contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and other federal assistance awards related to OFS. The members of the working group include:

- Defense Criminal Investigative Service
- Department of State OIG
- U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
- Naval Criminal Investigative Service
- Air Force Office of Special Investigations


SIGAR and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are collaborating agencies of the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group for OFS. Together, the working group and its collaborating agencies coordinated and deconflicted information concerning 45 investigations pertaining to OFS-related matters.

INVESTIGATIONS

Lead IG agencies conduct investigative activity through DCIS and the DoS OIG's criminal investigative components. The DCIS and DoS OIG agents investigate fraud and corruption related to OFS and travel to various locations within the region to conduct these investigations. During the quarter, investigators in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Germany, and Washington, DC, conducted OFS-related investigations.

Lead IG agency components and representatives from the military criminal investigative organizations form the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group. They work together and in coordination with SIGAR and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to detect, investigate, and prevent fraud and corruption in OFS-related programs and operations. USAID OIG does not participate in the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group for OFS and does not have investigations specific to OFS.

Figure 2.

Investigative Activity**Investigative Activity**

During the quarter, the investigative components of the Lead IG agencies opened five new OFS-related cases and closed four cases. DCIS opened four cases that involve allegations of theft and program irregularities. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command opened a case of alleged corruption.

Twenty five investigations involving OFS-related programs and operations remained open as of June 30, 2016. These investigations involved allegations of procurement, grant, and other program fraud; corruption involving U.S. government officials; theft and diversion of government funds or equipment; and other offenses, including disclosure of contractor proprietary information and illegal transfer of DoD technology. Over two-thirds of the investigations involve procurement and program fraud and theft. Operational security and law enforcement concerns prevent discussing the specific allegations in the on-going OFS investigations in this report. Figure 2 provides a breakdown of the ongoing-OFS-related investigations by type.

These open investigations do not include “legacy cases” that DCIS and DoS OIG special agents are continuing to pursue related to actions committed during Operation Enduring Freedom, the combat mission in Afghanistan that concluded in December 2014, or investigations that SIGAR is conducting.

Outreach Efforts


During this reporting period, each of the Lead IG investigative components and the military investigative organizations conducted fraud awareness briefings to educate government personnel, contractors, and other individuals on the Lead IG investigative mission and how to identify indicators of fraud. In total, investigators led more than 100 fraud awareness briefings attended by more than 600 government, civilian, and military personnel; contractors; law enforcement personnel; and foreign officials. These briefings promote fraud awareness, and uncover information about potential fraud and corruption in government programs.

Details on the investigative activities of DCIS and DoS OIG can be found in the following dashboards.

DoDIG/DCIS INVESTIGATIONS

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

As of June 30, 2016



OPEN CASES
10


OPEN CASES BY CATEGORY

Corruption	1
Bribery	1
Theft	6
Theft of Funds	2
Theft of Fuels	2
Theft of Property	2
Program Irregularities	3
Counter Proliferation	1
TOTAL	10

FRAUD AWARENESS BRIEFINGS

No. of Briefings	26
No. of Attendees	264

JOINT OPEN CASES*




SOUTHWEST ASIA SUBJECT LOCATIONS



INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS

Arrests	—
Criminal Charges	—
Criminal Convictions	—
Recoveries	—
Suspension/Debarment	—
Other Admin.	—

SOURCES OF ALLEGATIONS




*Some investigations are joint with more than one agency and some not joint with any other agency. Therefore, the total number of Joint Open Cases may not equal the total number of Open Cases. **Note:** Cumulative since Jan. 1, 2015.

DoS OIG INVESTIGATIONS


OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

April 1, 2016—June 30, 2016

STATUS OF OPEN CASES



SOURCE OF COMPLAINT




INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS

Administrative Actions	19
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
FRAUD AWARENESS BRIEFINGS

No. of Briefings	43
No. of Attendees	1,462


CUMULATIVE OCO CASE STATUS



CASE ALLEGATIONS



COMPLAINT INTAKE BY COUNTRY



Note: Cumulative since December 17, 2014.

HOTLINE ACTIVITY


The Lead IG agencies' hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority for independent review. They are a central part of the Lead IG outreach efforts to educate individuals on fraud, waste, and abuse.

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. Hotline representatives process the complaints they receive and refer them to the appropriate recipient, in accordance with their respective protocols. Any hotline complaint that merits referral is sent to the responsible organization for investigation or informational purposes.

The DoD OIG has a Lead IG Hotline investigator assigned to coordinate the contacts received through the Lead IG agency hotlines and others as appropriate. During the reporting period, the Lead IG Hotline investigator received and coordinated 65 contacts related to OFS and opened 34 cases, which were referred within DoD OIG or to other investigative organizations. As noted in Figure 3, nearly half of the complaints received during this quarter related to personal misconduct and procurement fraud.


In addition to the investigative briefings noted above, the Lead IG Hotline investigator conducts fraud awareness briefings and training events for commanders, service members, DoD civilians, contractors, and facility directors at military installations throughout Afghanistan and in the United States. The purpose of these briefings is to make people aware of the hotline and educate them on preventing, detecting, and reporting fraud, waste, and abuse as it relates to OFS activities.

Figure 3.
Hotline Activity





1. PUSH BUTTON TO OPEN DOOR
2. PULL RING OUT 6 FEET TO JETTISON CANOPY



RESCUE



A F-16 fighter pilot assigned to the 457th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron unfolds an American flag shortly after arriving to Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, April 27, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo)

ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

Strategic Planning	90
Ongoing Projects	92
Planned Projects	97

This section of the report discusses the ongoing Lead IG strategic planning process as well as ongoing and planned audit, inspection, and evaluation work. The ongoing and planned oversight projects are listed in separate tables. Information contained in this section is as of June 30, 2016.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

To develop the FY 2016 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan, effective October 1, 2015, the Lead IG agencies and partners used a joint risk-based planning process that involved reviewing strategic plans and mission-execution documents, related funding activity, systemic management and program challenges, and prior oversight work. The Plan covers oversight of the U.S. military mission and counterterrorism activities related to OFS, and the continuing U.S. reconstruction activities geared to empower the government of Afghanistan's economic and social development.

The Plan organizes all Afghan-related projects into eight strategic oversight areas. These areas are:

- Building Capacity and Capabilities of the ANDSF and Administering and Maintaining Accountability of the Afghan Security Forces Fund
- Building Afghan Government Capacity and Sustaining U.S. Investment in Afghan Institutions and Infrastructure
- Implementing and Executing Anti-Corruption and Counternarcotics Program
- Awarding and Administering Reconstruction Contracts
- Retrograde and Property Management
- Contract Management and Oversight
- RS Mission and Transition to Security Cooperation
- Intelligence and Counterterrorism



Afghanistan Airfield Economic Development Commission
Convenes in Herat, April 7, 2016.
(Resolute Support Media photo)

Lead IG Planning for FY 2017

Representatives from Lead IG agencies and partner oversight entities, such as SIGAR, are currently planning for FY 2017.

Building on the FY 2016 effort, the overall goal of the FY 2017 strategic planning process is to identify oversight projects that will examine the economy, efficiency, or effectiveness of U.S. activities and programs related to Afghanistan and the OFS mission. Considerations that inform this planning and analysis process include the OFS strategic objectives, annual appropriations to support these objectives, identified management challenges and risks, and feedback from departmental and congressional stakeholders. The Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan, detailing the FY 2017 plan and projects for OFS-related missions, will be published in early October 2016.

ONGOING AND PLANNED PROJECTS

Ongoing Projects

As of June 30, 2016, the oversight community has 29 ongoing projects directly related to OFS. The ongoing projects are grouped along strategic oversight area:

- **Building Capacity:** Eight ongoing oversight projects are examining the two building capacity strategic oversight areas involving the ANDSF and Afghan government. SIGAR has six such projects and DoD OIG has two. These projects range from assessments of the train, advise, assist, and equip missions to reviews of vehicle maintenance and building the Afghan government's oversight and internal control capability.
- **Anti-Corruption and Counternarcotics:** Two ongoing projects relate to counternarcotics—the DoD OIG is auditing the DoD support for these requirements and SIGAR is reviewing the specialized units of the Afghanistan counternarcotics police.
- **Contracts and Contract Management:** Eleven oversight projects are reviewing contract management and controls or specific contracts. SIGAR has six ongoing projects related to reconstruction contracts. DoS OIG is conducting two audits at examining controls and the other examining contract compliance, and DoD OIG is conducting two audits related to compliance with policies and guidance.
- **Resolute Support and Transition:** SIGAR has one ongoing oversight project reviewing DoD's oversight of the infrastructure projects being transferred to the Afghan government.
- **Intelligence and Counterterrorism:** Two ongoing oversight projects focus on this issue. DoD OIG is evaluating intelligence training for MoD forces, and DoS OIG is looking at counterterrorism coordination as part of a U.S. embassy inspection.

As part of the Lead IG responsibility to ascertain the accuracy of OCO obligations and disbursements, as required by Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, the DoD OIG is auditing the reliability of the Navy financial data reported for OFS. The Government Accountability Office is evaluating the DoD's use of OCO funds.

Outside of the OFS mission, three oversight agencies are conducting projects related to sexual abuse. DoD OIG and SIGAR received congressional requests to assess aspects of the allegations of child sexual abuse by members of the ANDSF. The Army Audit Agency is reviewing the Army's sexual assault hotline's ability to connect sexual assault victims with coordinator or advocate assistance.

The table below provides the project title and objective for each of these projects.

Table 5:

Ongoing Oversight Projects, as of 6/30/2016

Project Title	Objective
Army Audit Agency	
<i>Testing of Sexual Assault-Related Phone Numbers -Round Six</i>	To verify that sexual assault victims could successfully contact a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator or a Victim Advocate for immediate assistance using the Army's 24X7 sexual assault helpline phone numbers posted on the DoD Safe Helpline.
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General	
<i>Audit of Oversight of Contracts in Afghanistan</i>	To determine whether DoD controls for monitoring contractor performance were effective for contracts in support of enduring functions in Afghanistan. Specifically, to determine whether contracting officer's representatives were properly assigned, appointed, and trained.
<i>Evaluation of USFOR-A Intelligence Training for Afghan Ministry of Defense Forces</i>	To 1) assess USFOR-A's progress towards meeting intelligence training objectives for Afghan MOD forces as identified in OFS NATO-led Resolute Support Mission essential function seven; and 2) identify USFOR-A's specific measures-of-performance for determining whether the Afghan MOD collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence effectively and integrates intelligence into combat operations.
<i>Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces</i>	To determine the extent to which the U.S. and Coalition had met their goal to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces to conduct combat operations.
<i>Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</i>	To focus on answering a number of specific questions, including DoD implementation of Title 10 Leahy Laws regarding human rights violations, raised by several Members of Congress and congressional staff.
<i>Audit of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Controls Over U.S. Direct Assistance Funded Contracts</i>	To determine whether the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and the Afghan MoD and MoI have established and implemented effective controls over the contract management process. This project is part of a series of audits related to U.S. direct assistance for the ANDSF.
<i>Audit of Reliability of Navy Financial Data Reported for Operation Freedom's Sentinel</i>	To determine whether the U.S. Navy has adequate accountability of DoD funds supporting OFS by determining the accuracy of obligations and disbursements, as reported in the Cost of War report, for select Navy appropriations.
<i>Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability</i>	To determine whether U.S. government and Coalition train, advise, and assist efforts will enable the Afghan MoD and subordinate organizations to develop a transparency, accountability and oversight capability that helps the MoD run efficient and effective operations, report reliable information about its operations, and comply with applicable laws and regulations.

Project Title	Objective
<i>Audit of DoD Support for Counternarcotics Requirements</i>	To determine 1) whether DoD effectively supported counternarcotics requirements agreed upon between the Department of Justice and DoD, and 2) how DoD used funding to support those requirements.
Department of State Office of Inspector General	
<i>Inspection of Embassy Islamabad and Constituent Posts</i>	As part of the inspection of Embassy Islamabad, to determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting security and counterterrorism activities in Pakistan. This project will include a classified component.
<i>Audit of Embassy Kabul Construction and Commissioning</i>	To determine whether the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations followed Department policies and guidance governing the affirmation of substantial completion and final acceptance of construction projects at U.S. Embassy Kabul.
<i>Audit of the Department of State's Compliance with Critical Environment Contracting Policies</i>	To determine the extent to which the Department is complying with Public Law 112-239 and 14 FAM 240 requirements for the Department to, among other things, perform comprehensive risk assessments and develop risk-mitigation plans for operational risk associated with contractor performance of critical functions in OCOs and other critical environments. The audit will also look at the Department's role in carrying-out the P.L.112-239, Section 853 requirement for a database on contractor performance that can be used for source selection decisions.
Government Accountability Office	
<i>DoD's Use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funds</i>	To determine 1) the amount of obligated war funds DoD has authorized or appropriated with the OCO/Global War on Terror or emergency designation and the extent to which DoD has identified and reported these obligations; 2) the extent to which Congress has appropriated war funds for non-war purposes; 3) the extent to which DoD has applied the Office of Management and Budget or other criteria in identifying costs for inclusion in its war funding requests; and 4) the extent to which DoD has established and implemented guidance and a plan with milestones for transitioning enduring OCO costs to its base budget.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction	
<i>Assessment of Afghan Air Forces' Operations and Maintenance of Light Air Support (LAS) Aircraft Provided by the U.S. Government and Training of Afghan Pilots in the U.S.</i>	To assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force is operating and maintaining the LAS as intended.
<i>DoD Oversight of Infrastructure Projects Transferred to the Afghan Government</i>	To assess the 1) extent to which the Afghan government uses and sustains assets transferred from DoD; and 2) challenges, if any, that DoD faces in overseeing the use and sustainment of infrastructure that has been transferred to the Afghan government.

Project Title	Objective
<i>Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program for ANA Vehicle Maintenance and Capacity Building</i>	To review DoD's support to the ANA's Technical Equipment Maintenance Program, and specifically, determine 1) the extent to which the ANA Technical Equipment Maintenance Program is meeting its stated goals; and 2) whether key ANA Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract requirements are being met and, if not, assess the reasons why.
<i>Corruption in Afghanistan: Perceptions and Responses of the U.S. Government</i>	To 1) establish a timeline of the corruption problem in Afghanistan, including when, how, and why corruption has swelled over time since 2001; 2) analyze how the U.S. government understood the threat of corruption and how this perception changed over time, and identify the U.S. response in terms of policies, programs, and resources devoted to address the corruption problem; 3) evaluate the adequacy of the U.S. response (policies, programs, and resources) relative to U.S. strategic goals, interests, and risks. Identify where U.S. policies or actions mitigated and/or contributed to corruption; 4) compare U.S. perceptions and responses to corruption to those of the international community; and 5) identify lessons learned from the U.S. experience with corruption in Afghanistan, and make actionable recommendations aimed at policymakers and practitioners as to how best to mitigate corruption or the risk thereof in future U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
<i>Award, Administration, and Performance of Legacy Research Contracts</i>	To determine the extent to which 1) the Army Research Laboratory developed and awarded legacy contracts in accordance with its broad agency announcements for research and analysis contracts, and DoD and federal regulations; 2) the Army Research Laboratory provided oversight of the tasks performed by Imperatis and New Century Consulting in accordance with the broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts; and 3) Imperatis and New Century Consulting performed tasks in accordance with the Army Research Laboratory broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts.
<i>Inspection of the Ministry of Interior's Headquarters Complex</i>	To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the complex is being maintained and used as intended.
<i>Inspection of the Afghanistan Defense Ministry Headquarters Support and Security Brigade Expansion Phase II</i>	To assess whether the 1) work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) complex is being maintained and used as intended.
<i>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase III</i>	To assess whether the 1) work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) project is being maintained and used as intended.

Project Title	Objective
<i>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase IV</i>	To assess whether the 1) work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) project is being maintained and used as intended.
<i>Inspection of the Afghan National Army's Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army Support Command</i>	To assess whether the 1) work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) project is being maintained and used as intended.
<i>Inspection of the Afghan 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing Facilities in Kandahar</i>	To inspect the 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing facilities. Specifically, to assess whether the 1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) facilities are being maintained and used as intended.
<i>Implementation and Effectiveness of On-Budget Assistance</i>	To 1) determine the amount of on-budget assistance provided to Afghanistan from 2001-2014 and the mechanisms used to provide the assistance; 2) assess the impact of on-budget assistance provided to develop the capacity of Afghan ministries; and 3) evaluate potentially negative issues that affected on-budget assistance, e.g., corruption, and how these externalities were mitigated.
<i>Review of the U.S. Government's Implementation of 22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 U.S.C. §2249e, Commonly Referred To As The "Leahy Law"</i>	To determine whether the Leahy Law may prohibit assistance to the ANDSF. The Leahy Law prohibits DoD and DoS from providing assistance to units of foreign security forces.
<i>Security Sector Reconstruction</i>	To trace the role that strategy and planning played throughout the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, and answer the following questions: 1) What were the U.S. policy goals for the ANDSF, why, and how did these goals evolve, and what were the implications on ANDSF design? 2) What were the various designs considered for the ANDSF, why were they chosen, and why did they evolve? 3) How well was the ANDSF design implemented (inputs and outputs)? 4) How well have the ANDSF achieved expected strategic outcomes and why? 5) What are the critical policy and strategy lessons learned from Afghan security sector reconstruction? More than one report may be produced.
<i>Review of DOD Procurement of Proprietary Textiles for the ANDSF</i>	To determine 1) the cost to the U.S. government of using proprietary textile patterns for ANDSF uniforms; and 2) how and why the U.S. government generated the requirement for proprietary patterns for ANDSF uniforms.
<i>The Effect of AWOL Afghan Military Trainees on Afghan Reconstruction Programs</i>	To 1) determine how many Afghan military trainees have gone AWOL while training in the U.S., the trainees rank, specialty, command, the program(s) supported by the training effort, the impact on the program(s) by the loss of these students (financial, operational, morale, etc.); 2) identify the disposition of the AWOL trainees and obtain justifications for State to provide immigration status; and 3) determine the extent to which this issue has impacted the U.S. government's reconstruction effort.

Planned Projects

As of June 30, 2016, Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners plan to start 11 oversight projects related to OFS by the end of FY 2016. These FY 2016 planned projects are listed in the table below.

Table 6 :

Planned Oversight Projects, as of 6/30/2016

Project Title	Objective
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General	
<i>Audit of Controls Over Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Fuel Contracts</i>	To determine whether CSTC-A and the Afghan MoD have established effective controls for oversight of MoD fuel contracts.
<i>Evaluation of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to OFS Counterterrorism Operations</i>	To determine if USFOR-A's airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance allocation process is supporting U.S. counterterrorism operations.
Department of State Office of Inspector General	
<i>Audit of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program in Countries Under the Department of State Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs</i>	To determine the extent to which the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Counterterrorism have 1) developed specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented goals and objectives; 2) developed and implemented an evaluation process to assess host country performance; and 3) established letters of agreement with host countries for sustaining the Antiterrorism Assistance programs. The audit will also assess the bureaus' contract monitoring and oversight, and invoice review processes.
<i>Audit of Construction of the New Embassy Compound-Islamabad</i>	Determine whether the Department is effectively administering the construction contracts for the New Embassy Compound in Islamabad.
<i>Audit of the Department's Invoice Review Processes in Iraq and Afghanistan</i>	To 1) determine whether invoice review policies and procedures, training, staffing, invoice review practices, and accountability measures are sufficient to support overseas contingency operations; and 2) ensure invoice payments are reviewed in accordance with Federal requirements and Department guidance.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction	
<i>Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units</i>	To 1) determine the extent to which counternarcotic police specialized units are achieving their goals; 2) assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units; and 3) assess the long-term sustainability of the specialized units.

Project Title	Objective
<i>Use of the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System to Track and Monitor U.S. Direct Assistance Funding to the Afghan Government</i>	To 1) describe how the Afghan government uses Afghanistan Financial Management Information System to track and monitor U.S. direct assistance funds; 2) identify the capabilities and weaknesses of Afghanistan Financial Management Information System for tracking and monitoring U.S. direct assistance funds; and 3) determine the extent to which U.S. agencies are working with the Afghan Ministry of Finance to address weaknesses within the system.
<i>Resolute Support's Progress in Executing its Train, Advise, and Assist Mission</i>	To 1) Identify the metrics the Resolute Support Mission uses to determine the success of its mission to develop the capacity of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, and assess the extent to which these metrics have been met; and 2) Determine what factors contribute to the mission's successes and failures.
<i>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its Mi-17 Fleet</i>	To assess 1) the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the Mi-17s currently in its fleet; and 2) DoD's efforts to ensure that the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the Mi-17s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.
<i>Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW) Use and Maintenance of Its PC-12s</i>	To assess 1) the extent to which the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s currently in its fleet; and 2) DoD's efforts to ensure that the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.
<i>Department of Defense Efforts to Advise the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior</i>	To assess 1) the extent to which DoD has clearly articulated the goals, objectives, and strategy of its advisory efforts; 2) DoD's advisory efforts, including funding, the number of advisors and contractors, their assigned locations, and criteria for selecting the advisors, among other things; and 3) the methods DoD uses to measure success.





Repatriation ceremony at the Ministry of Defense, May 11, 2016.
(Resolute Support Media photo)

APPENDIXES

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APPENDIX A: Lead Inspector General Statutory Requirements

Section 8L, Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended	Pages
Appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under this subsection.	1, 110-112
Develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation.	77-98
Review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.	32, 92-93
Employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.	78
Submit to Congress on a biannual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including:	
status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and	3-4, 77-98
overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.	90-98
Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.	1-98
Note: The Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) are the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Inspector General of the Department of State, and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.	

APPENDIX B:

Resolute Support Essential Functions

The Resolute Support Mission focuses on eight essential functions (EF) and associated sub-functions in order to develop capable and sustainable Afghan security ministries and forces.³⁷⁴ These EFs comprise the following:

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 1: PLAN, PROGRAM, BUDGET, AND EXECUTE

EF 1 has three priorities: increase resource management capability within the ministries; build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Under EF 1 resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of funds being spent.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD and Mol are able to accurately identify requirements, programs, and funding over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance
- Ministry of Finance provides timely guidance to enable Mol and MoD to develop a budget
- MoD and Mol are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements
- MoD and Mol are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes
- MoD and Mol are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned
- MoD can fully pay all their employees accurately and in a timely and secure fashion.
- Ministry of Finance provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to Mol and MoD
- MoD and Mol possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 2: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT

Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. EF 2 advisors work with the MoD and the Mol to help improve internal controls, as well as maintain accountability and oversight to improve transparency. Under EF 2, CSTC-A administers measures, such as financial commitment letters, that establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over all aspects of resource management, to ensure the Afghan government's proper use of funds from the United States and international donors.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD Ministerial Internal Controls Program is effectively implemented and sustainable
- MoD and Mol IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability
- General Staff IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability
- Critical items (the “big four” issues—fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level
- Ensure appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan government

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 3: CIVILIAN GOVERNANCE OF THE AFGHAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND ADHERENCE TO RULE OF LAW

An ANDSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to a professional ANDSF's ability to provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan's institutions of governance. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the Mol to help ensure the ANDSF respect and adhere to the rule of law and operate in accordance with Afghanistan's constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. Efforts focus primarily on preventing and responding properly to gross violations of human rights, such as extra-judicial killings, and significant acts of corruption.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD and Mol have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other gross violations of human rights
- MoD and Mol identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and gross violations of human rights
- MoD and Mol inter-ministerial cooperation with the Attorney General's Office on corruption adjudication, and with the Attorney General's Office on gross violations of human rights allegations

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 4: FORCE GENERATION

EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and ANP utilize the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The force generation train, advise, and assist mission is grounded in an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build a more professional force.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and MoI utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force
- MoD implements civilianization goals and objectives as outlined in the bilateral agreement
- MoD and MoI manpower plans are developed and used to project future manpower requirements that inform recruiting goals, mitigate attrition rates, and achieve desired end strength
- MoD and MoI establish systems to integrate lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; and programs of instruction
- All untrained ANP receive formal police training, and MoI prevents future untrained police by forecasting training requirements and scheduling courses to accommodate recruit intakes
- The ANA has established a system for training in air and ground coordination; capability established and used for information operations delivery
- Training delivered that results in reduced casualties



An Afghan Air Force Mi-17 helicopter parks for a refuel at Forward Operating Base Joyce, Afghanistan, May 9, 2016. (U.S. Marines photo)

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 5: SUSTAIN THE FORCE

EF 5 advisors work to help the ANDSF sustain combat power through maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. EF 5 is divided into three parts. First, advisors assist the ANP and ANA in logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons predominantly at the corps and national levels. Second, advisors assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Third, advisors assist in the fields of communications, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communications network.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Measurement and reporting has command emphasis
- ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements
- ANDSF has adequately executed a demand-based inventory management system
- ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors
- Mol assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the Coalition-funded AMS contract
- MoD has developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable
- MoD and Mol have sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill *tashkil*, the official list of personnel and equipment requirements
- MoD and Mol have an operational and sustainable medical logistics process
- ANP operates inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines
- The Afghan government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare
- MoD is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government
- MoD and Mol are able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure
- MoD is able to sustain information management systems throughout its lifecycle
- MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems
- MoD is able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations
- Mol is capable of managing its portion of frequency spectrum for the Afghan government

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 6: PLAN, RESOURCE, AND EXECUTE EFFECTIVE SECURITY CAMPAIGNS

EF 6 advisors work to help the ANDSF effectively employ combat power in support of the Afghan government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors assist with strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council, the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts are designed to develop the capability of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn translated into operational and seasonal plans supported by effective security campaigns.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Office of the National Security Council delivers national security guidance through the national strategic security document set (National Threat Assessment, National Security Policy, and National Security Strategy)
- Assistant MoD for Strategy and Policy leads and delivers strategic documents (National Military Strategy and Guidance for Operational Planning) on time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware) to inform subordinate planning
- Assistant MoD for Strategy and Policy leads and delivers the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance on time and of sufficient quality to inform and drive the departmental capability development process
- General Staff Plans Directorate deliver planning guidance and a coherent, synchronized campaign planning process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy delivers strategic documents on time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware), monitors implementation and manages change through a robust force management process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy monitors the implementation of strategy and planning, and delivers guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct combined arms operations
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with ANP
- ANA has assessed its capability gaps at the operational level and implemented improvements to address the gaps
- ANA has a sustainable capability to prepare detailed plans and orders at the corps level with strategic guidance from the MoD
- ANP has an established and sustainable capability to coordinate ANP inputs to ANA operations
- ANA Special Operations Command develops as a strategic MoD asset capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining the force
- ANA Special Operations Command is able to synchronize special operations brigade and special operations district operations within the framework of corps security operations in support of the Afghan government and MoD objectives
- Special Mission Wing develops as a strategic Afghan government organization capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining a force to conduct special operations force air assault and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability in support of the Afghan Special Security Proces
- Afghan Air Force has developed sustainable enterprise manning, a sustainable aerial fires capability, and a sustainable theatre mobility system

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 7: DEVELOP SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND PROCESSES

EF 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant MoD for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence, and the National Threat Intelligence Center, also known as the Nasrat. The goal of this effort is to ensure that the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages security issues
- MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making and into ANA Special Operation Command and ANA corps level operations
- Directorate of Police intelligence human intelligence institutes a sustainable human intelligence network that can act and report on intelligence requirements and tasking
- Establish a National Military Intelligence Center as an operational intelligence center capable of retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various intelligence sensors and developing products that support Afghan government intelligence operations
- Directorate of Police intelligence trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment requirements to meet operational needs
- Establish enduring and sustainable organic intelligence capability at Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and ANA Special Operation Command

An Air Force Airman scans an airfield for potential threats at Camp Shorabak. (U.S. Air Force photo)



ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 8: MAINTAIN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan government to counter insurgent messaging and offer a positive narrative to the Afghan people and the international community. Efforts seek to help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both within their own organizations and externally. Advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improved communications within the Afghan security ministries and forces while continuing to reinforce successes and look for opportunities to improve.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Develops and sustains events and mechanisms designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities, and direction.
- Afghan government develops and distributes strategic communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and products
- General Staff Operations Directorate Information Operations has the knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as necessary) yearly [personnel and equipment] *tashkil* inputs, as well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which will enable the MoD information operations capability throughout the country.

RESOLUTE SUPPORT GENDER OFFICE

In addition to the eight EFs, the Resolute Support Gender Office seeks to train, advise, and assist Afghan leadership to ensure that an appropriate gender perspective is incorporated into planning for all policies and strategies within the security ministries and through implementation at the ANA and ANP levels. Since gender issues cross all EFs, advising in this area is not restricted to one EF.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and plans on gender integration
- MoI and MoD provide safe training and working environment (facilities) for women
- MoI and MoD takes actions to eliminate gender-based violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of women

APPENDIX C: Lead Inspector General Responsibilities and Authorities

In January 2013, Congress passed the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which amended the Inspector General Act of 1978 to add a new section 8L. It directs responsibilities and authorities to the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and to the Inspectors General (IGs) for the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the oversight of overseas contingency operations (OCO). Specifically, it details the duties of the designated Lead Inspector General for an OCO and addresses jurisdictional conflicts.³⁷⁵

COORDINATION

Section 8L provides a new mandate for the three Lead IG agencies to work together from the outset of an OCO to develop and carry out joint, comprehensive, and strategic oversight. Each IG retains statutory independence, but together, they apply extensive regional experience and in-depth institutional knowledge in a coordinated interagency approach to accomplish oversight responsibilities for the whole-of-government mission. Essentially, when joint oversight projects are to be carried out among them,³⁷⁶ the Lead Inspector General, in consultation with the other two IG offices, will designate one of the three staffs to lead the project. The standard operating procedures of that IG office will take precedence.³⁷⁷

In general, DoD IG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG conduct oversight projects within the boundaries of their individual office missions. However, OCO programs and operations often involve coordinated work among multiple agencies, including military operations. Pursuant to section 8L, the Lead Inspector General will determine which IG has principal jurisdiction among the Lead IG agencies. When none of the three Lead IGs has jurisdiction, the Lead IG is to coordinate with the appropriate agency to ensure that comprehensive oversight takes place.³⁷⁸

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Lead IG approach leverages dedicated, rotational, and temporary staff from each of the Lead IG agencies to perform various operational activities, including joint strategic oversight planning. The Lead Inspector General must develop, update, and provide to Congress an annual joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each OCO. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed independent oversight, internal management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects.

REPORTING

As required by section 8L, the Lead Inspector General is responsible for producing quarterly and biannual reports to Congress and making these reports available to the public online. Biannual reports include the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits; the status of referrals to the Department of Justice; and overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by IGs, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits. Reports—published after each fiscal quarter—provide updates on U.S. programs and operations related to the OCO.³⁷⁹ The Lead Inspector General manages the timely production of congressionally mandated reports in a coordinated effort among the three Lead IG offices and other IG agencies, as appropriate.

The Lead IG reports to Congress rely on information supplied by federal agencies in response to questions from the Lead IG agencies, as well as information announced by federal agency officials in open-forum settings. Where available, as noted in each report, the Lead IG agencies also consult reputable open source reporting in an effort to verify and assess such information. However, in light of the operational realities and dynamic nature of each OCO, the Lead IG agencies have limited time to test, verify, and independently assess all of the assertions made by these agencies. This is particularly true where the Lead IG agencies have not yet completed oversight of these assertions through audits, inspections, or evaluations.


THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OFS

Operation Enduring Freedom ended on December 31, 2014. Operation Freedom's Sentinel began on January 1, 2015, a new overseas contingency operation as defined by Title 10 U.S.C.101(a)(13).³⁸⁰ At the onset of the OCO, the Lead IG agencies had already developed a comprehensive framework for their joint oversight strategy. These agencies have always had plenary authority to conduct independent and objective oversight. For more than a decade, while they conducted independent oversight of their agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, they also worked jointly on several projects requiring cross-agency collaboration. Since 2008, they have met quarterly, along with the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction, and the Service Auditors General to coordinate their oversight and avoid duplication of effort.

In consultation with the three IGs, the CIGIE Chair designated Jon T. Rymer as Lead Inspector General for OFS on April 1, 2015.³⁸¹ On May 4, 2015, Lead Inspector General Rymer appointed DoS Inspector General Steve Linick to serve as the Associate Inspector General for OFS, in keeping with the provisions of section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended.³⁸² Lead Inspector General Rymer resigned on January 8, 2016, and Glenn A. Fine became Acting Inspector General for the Department of Defense. On January 11, 2016, the CIGIE Chair reaffirmed the DoD IG was the Lead IG for OFS.³⁸³



A California Army National Guard UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter transports troops from Forward Operating Base Dahlke, to FOB Fenty in Afghanistan, May 20, 2016. (U.S. Army Photo)



Ministry of Defense, Kabul, Afghanistan.
(Resolute Support Media photo)

Acronyms and Definitions

Acronym	Definition
AHRIMS	Afghan Human Resource Information Management System
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
Core-IMS	Core-Information Management System
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DoD	Department of Defense
DoD OIG	Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DoS	Department of State
DoS OIG	Department of State Office of Inspector General
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EF	Essential Function
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FY	Fiscal Year
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IS-K	Islamic State-Khorasan
<i>kandak</i>	battalion
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
Lead IG agencies	DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG
MoD	Ministry of Defense
Moi	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMS	National Maintenance Strategy
OCO	Overseas contingency operation
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
<i>tashkil</i>	the official list of ANDSF personnel and equipment requirements
UN	United Nations
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID OIG	U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

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Members of the 455th Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron raise a new flag during a flag retirement ceremony at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, May 28, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo)

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