



Results in Brief: Review of the Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan (U)

What We Did

We evaluated the Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan to determine if they improved the ability of intelligence to provide critical information regarding the population, economy and government of Afghanistan to senior leaders and commanders in the field. We also sought to determine if the Stability Operations Information Centers addressed the problems identified by International Security Assistance Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (CJ2) Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA in the paper “*Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*,” 2010.

What We Found

The International Security Assistance Force established the Civil-Military Integration Program in response to the problems identified in *Fixing Intel*. The structure of the Civil-Military Integration Program exceeds the recommendations made by Major General Flynn. While the Civil-Military Integration Program is an ad-hoc organization, it has improved the ability to provide the kinds of information needed. However, there are still obstacles to overcome. There is confusion within the program regarding the roles and responsibilities of different entities. Also, while current doctrine identifies the requirement to gather and analyze human terrain information, it is unclear in assigning ultimate responsibility for it to any organization or identifying specific processes. There are also ongoing problems regarding information sharing in a coalition environment which were addressed in Inspector General Report 11-INTEL-13, “Improvements Needed in Sharing Tactical Intelligence with the International Security Assistance Force –

Afghanistan (ISAF) (U)” July 18, 2011 that hamper the Civil-Military Integration Program’s ability to provide information most effectively.

What We Recommend

We recommend integrating the various Civil-Military Integration Program capabilities into doctrine and into U.S. military organizational structures and to modify joint doctrine documents to ensure human terrain doctrine is consistent, to give the proper emphasis required by modern warfare, and to assign ultimate responsibility for its implementation.

We further recommend clarifying the relationship between the Consolidated Stability Operations Center and the other Civil-Military Integration Program entities, ensuring each of the Stability Operations Information Centers maintain a level of manning consistent with established norms, and educating existing staff entities on the capabilities of the Civil-Military Integration Program.

The recommendations made will not only improve our capabilities in Afghanistan but will ensure that the lessons learned in Afghanistan will be meaningfully captured and can thereby be leveraged during future joint operations.

Management Comments and Our Response

Of our five recommendations, management concurred with two and was responsive to these two recommendations, which have been resolved. The other three still require comments and a plan of action.