The Department of Defense established the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII) in 1967 as the single, automated central repository that identifies investigations conducted by DoD investigative agencies and personnel security determinations made by DoD adjudicative authorities. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense, Security and Information Operations, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) is responsible for providing policy and guidance for the DCII. The Defense Security Service is the executive agency responsible for maintaining system hardware and applications for storage and retrieval of data in the DCII. The DoD investigative agencies and central adjudicative facilities are responsible for the accuracy of data entered in the DCII. As of March 2000, the DCII had approximately 24 million individuals indexed, with approximately 30 million investigative dossiers and security clearance eligibility tracings.
The overall audit objective was to determine the accuracy, integrity, timeliness, and availability of information in the DCII database. The audit determined the impact of DCII information on the future Joint Personnel Adjudication System.
An estimated 1.4 million of the 24 million DoD personnel, contractors, and foreign nationals in the DCII had incomplete social security number-based investigative dossiers and clearance tracings. The Army Crime Records Division and the Navy Criminal Investigative Service reported a cumulative estimate of over 107,000 obsolete investigative dossiers and clearance tracings in the DCII. Data reliability affected the productivity of DoD adjudicators and security officers, and impeded reasonably estimating the number of periodic reinvestigations needed (finding A).
The Defense Security Service Operation Center-Columbus assigned over 1,400 pseudo social security numbers of which 524 were inconsistent and did not conform to Office of Personnel Management guidance. In addition, no tracking process was established for foreign nationals with limited access authority and indexed in the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index. As a result, foreign nationals were inadequately identified in the DCII, and multiple foreign nationals were assigned the same pseudo social security number (finding B).
We recommend that the Director, Security Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) establish a unique primary personal identifier to enter data in the DCII; establish quarterly analysis of the DCII for obsolete records; and revise guidance regarding pseudo social security numbers.
We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Service, modify the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index to restore functions and validate social security number fields. We further recommend that the Director establish procedures to compare and update operations and regulatory documents, incorporate Federal guidelines, and identify and delete test data.
We issued a draft of this report February 15, 2001. We did not receive comments from the Director, Security Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), and the Director, Defense Security Service, and request that they provide comments by July 9, 2001.
Although not required to comment, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service provided comments on the audit results and recommendations. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service generally agreed with the recommendations except for the recommendation to establish the social security number as a unique identifier. We discuss the Naval Criminal Investigative Service comments on the recommendations following each applicable recommendation. A discussion of the comments on the audit results is in Appendix D of the report and the complete text is in the Management Comments section.
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