
June 16, 2004



Human Capital

Management of Marine Corps
Enlisted Personnel Assignments in
Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
(D-2004-086)

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Acronyms

ASR	Authorized Strength Report
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
M&RA	Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MARCENT	U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command
MARFORPAC	U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
T/O	Table of Organization
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command



INSPECTOR GENERAL
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June 16, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR
PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Report on the Management of Marine Corps Enlisted Personnel
Assignments in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
(Report No. D-2004-086)

We are providing this report for review and comment. The Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations did not respond to the draft report; however, we considered comments from the Director, Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division when preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. Marine Corps comments were partially responsive. We request that the Director, Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division provide additional comments on Recommendations 1.a. and 1.b. by August 16, 2004.

If possible, please send management comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to Audls@dodig.osd.mil. Copies of the management comments must contain the actual signature of the authorizing official. We cannot accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, they must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Mr. Donald A. Bloomer at (703) 604-8863 (DSN 664-8863) or Ms. Sandra L. Fissel at (703) 604-8828 (DSN 664-8828). See Appendix C for the report distribution. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

By direction of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing:

Shelton R. Young
Assistant Inspector General
for Readiness and Logistics Support

Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense

Report No. D-2004-086

June 16, 2004

(Project No. D2003LA-0151)

Management of Marine Corps Enlisted Personnel Assignments in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Executive Summary

Who Should Read This Report and Why? DoD civilian and military personnel who are responsible for the management of military personnel should read this report. The report discusses how standard operating procedures would help reduce confusion about personnel staffing levels at headquarters level and at the warfighting level, as well as help improve optimization of personnel staffing levels.

Background. I Marine Expeditionary Force, as one of the Marine Corps' warfighting commands, deploys in response to component commander taskings to conduct small-scale contingencies within joint operations. This report addresses Marine Corps enlisted personnel staffing requirements and personnel staffing levels of selected I Marine Expeditionary Force infantry and non-infantry battalions, which deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom between January and February 2003.

Marine Corps battalions' enlisted personnel staffing levels were below the 100 percent of their table of organization¹ requirement. In addition, 1st Marine Division officials stated that in the months just before deploying, they were unable to retain key personnel who had orders to special duty assignments, such as recruiting duty and drill instructor duty and other taskings from higher headquarters. Headquarters Marine Corps also did not approve the filling of I Marine Expeditionary Force's 453 contingency coded billets,² which required I Marine Expeditionary Force's headquarters staffs to conduct 24-hour operations under wartime conditions.

Results. According to Marine Corps officials, Marine Corps battalions that deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom successfully completed their mission; however, they did so with vacant enlisted warfighting positions. Specifically, three infantry battalions, a light armored reconnaissance battalion, and an artillery battalion reported personnel staffing levels just before deployment of 93 percent, 83 percent, 75 percent, 84 percent, and 87 percent, respectively, of their table of organization. The Marine Corps did not have formal standard operating procedures to deploy in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions; did not fully and timely implement its mobilization management plan; and had not developed a formal management control plan. As a result, Marines faced higher risks during deployments due to increased demands placed on limited personnel resources. Developing and implementing standard operating procedures for units deploying in support of combatant commanders' warfighting

¹ A table of organization describes the Marine Corps organizational manpower requirements in terms of grade and military occupational specialty.

² Contingency coded billets are those billets filled under wartime conditions and are included in the Marine Corps' overall structure for readiness and operational purposes.

missions; modifying the current mobilization plan; and developing a formal management control plan will help optimize personnel staffing levels during future deployments and will correct the weakness identified in this report. See the Finding section for the detailed recommendations.

Management Comments and Audit Response. The Marine Corps concurred with the intent of the recommendation to modify the current mobilization plan to include additional procedures, other than activating the Individual Ready Reserve, for increasing personnel staffing levels when deploying in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions. The Marine Corps did not concur with the recommendations to develop and implement standard operating procedures for units deploying in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions and to develop and implement a formal management control plan for planning, directing, coordinating, and supervising active forces.

The Marine Corps stated that standard operating procedures were successfully followed to the extent possible. We do not believe that the Marine Corps has standard operating procedures that address manpower issues for deployment in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions or a formal management control plan that identifies the management of personnel in deploying units as an assessable unit.

We request that the Director, Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division in the Office of the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs provide additional comments on the final report by August 16, 2004. See the Finding section of the report for a discussion of management comments and the Management Comments section of the report for the complete text of the comments.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	i
Background	1
Objectives	3
Finding	
Staffing of Warfighting Positions	4
Appendixes	
A. Scope and Methodology	14
Management Control Program Review	15
B. Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response	16
C. Report Distribution	18
Management Comments	
Marine Corps Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division	21

Background

Marine Corps Manpower System. The objective of the Marine Corps manpower system is to “provide the appropriate number of trained and experienced Marines to commanders to perform their missions.”

Manning Process. In order to accomplish its mission, the Marine Corps prioritizes requirements and allocates resources. Through the manning process, the Marine Corps determines which table of organization (T/O) structure billets, or personnel positions, it requires and, therefore, plans to buy with its available budget. The “buy” terminology is used to refer to the number of billets, or personnel positions, the Marine Corps budget will be able to sustain. A T/O describes the Marine Corps organizational manpower requirements in terms of grade and military occupational specialty (MOS).¹ Once the Marine Corps has determined which billets it requires and will buy, an authorized strength report (ASR) is produced. The Personnel Management Division, Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA), then begins the staffing process using the ASR.

Staffing Process. The Personnel Management Division then distributes the current assignable inventory, or actual available Marines, by applying a computerized staffing goal model to match the billets on the ASR from the assignable inventory. Applying the computerized staffing goal model revises the billets intended to be staffed based on the available inventory.

Assignable inventory comprises Marine Corps personnel who are available for active duty assignment. Marine Corps personnel who are patients, prisoners, trainees, and transients, better known as “P2T2,” reduce the assignable inventory. However, DoD Instruction 1120.11, “Programming and Accounting for Active Military Manpower,” April 9, 1981, states that P2T2 is reported as part of the active, and available, military end strength, specifically stating that the following personnel will be reported as part of the active military end strength of the Marine Corps:

- patients hospitalized more than 30 days,
- prisoners incarcerated more than 30 days but less than 6 months,
- trainees in entry level accession or in training in excess of 20 weeks, and
- transients who are in a permanent change of station status.

Marine Corps Requirements and Personnel. The Marine Corps is organized as a general purpose “force in readiness” to support national needs. The Marine Corps is divided into four broad categories: operating forces; the Marine Corps Reserve; the supporting establishment; and Headquarters, U.S. Marine

¹ A military occupational specialty is a code used by the Marine Corps to describe a group of related duties and is used to identify skill requirements.

Corps. In FY 2003, the Marine Corps end strength, excluding the Reserves, was 156,520 enlisted personnel and 18,118 officers, for a total of 174,638 active personnel. That same year, the Marine Corps P2T2 was determined to be 29,564 personnel, giving the Marine Corps a net total of 145,074 active, and available, personnel. However, in FY 2003, the Marine Corps determined that it needed to fill 153,772 billets to accomplish the Marine Corps mission. Therefore, the Marine Corps was unable to staff 8,698 required billets.

U.S. Central Command. For Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Marine Corps received its mission from the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). USCENTCOM is one of nine combatant commands.² A combatant command is composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments and has a broad continuing mission under a single commander. USCENTCOM is composed of components from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command. The USCENTCOM area of responsibility includes 25 nations and extends from the Horn of Africa to Central Asia. The Marine Corps component that serves USCENTCOM is the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command (MARCENT).

U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command. MARCENT is one of the five Marine Corps components;³ however, only two Marine Corps components have permanently assigned forces: U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC). The Commander, MARFORPAC is also the Commander, MARCENT. I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is a subordinate unit of MARFORPAC.

I Marine Expeditionary Force. I MEF, headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California, is one of the Marine Corps' warfighting commands and, as such, deploys in response to combatant commander taskings to conduct small-scale contingencies within joint operations. I MEF provided the main Marine Corps effort in support of OIF. I MEF includes the command element and one active duty Marine division, known as the 1st Marine Division. The units we visited—three infantry regiments and one battalion from each regiment, a light armored reconnaissance battalion, and the artillery regiment and one of its battalions—are part of the 1st Marine Division.

Infantry. The primary mission of the infantry regiment is to locate and destroy the enemy or to repel an enemy assault. I MEF's infantry regiments consist of a headquarters company and four infantry battalions. The infantry battalions are the tactical force with which the regiment accomplishes its mission. An infantry battalion consists of a headquarters and service company, a weapons company, and three rifle companies. For FY 2003, an infantry battalion's T/O identified a requirement for 45 officers and 843 enlisted personnel, for a total of 888 personnel.

² The nine combatant commands are U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Strategic Command.

³ The five Marine Corps components are Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic; Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; Marine Corps Forces, Europe; Marine Corps Forces, South Command; and Marine Corps Forces, Central Command.

Light Armored Reconnaissance. A light armored reconnaissance battalion's mission is to conduct reconnaissance, security, and economy of force⁴ operations for the ground combat element. Each light armored reconnaissance battalion has the ability to deploy as its own unit or as part of a ground combat element. I MEF's light armored reconnaissance battalion consists of a headquarters and services company and four light armored reconnaissance companies. For FY 2003, a light armored reconnaissance battalion's T/O identified a requirement for 44 officers and 868 enlisted personnel, for a total of 912 personnel.

Artillery. The artillery regiment is the primary source of fire support for a Marine division, and the artillery battalion is the basic tactical unit of the artillery. I MEF's artillery regiment consists of four artillery battalions. The mission of the artillery regiment is to provide close and continuous fire support by neutralizing, destroying, or suppressing targets that threaten the success of the supported Marine division. To be responsive to rapidly changing tactical situations, an artillery regiment's operations and actions are closely coordinated with those of the infantry. An artillery battalion consists of a headquarters battery and three firing batteries. For FY 2003, an artillery battalion's T/O identified a requirement for 47 officers and 577 enlisted personnel, for a total of 624 personnel.

Objectives

Our overall audit objective was to evaluate the Services' management of the assignment process for military personnel. Specifically, the audit was to evaluate whether the assignment process for officers and enlisted personnel was managed to minimize the amount of time essential warfighting positions were vacant, to ensure that qualified personnel were assigned to those positions, and to ensure that training requirements to fully perform the duties of those positions were being met. In addition, we were to evaluate how vacant essential warfighting positions impacted the readiness of deployed forces. We also were to review the management control program as it related to the overall objective.

This report addresses the personnel management process for Marine Corps battalions that deployed in support of OIF with vacant enlisted warfighting positions, and how the vacant enlisted warfighting positions impacted the readiness of deployed forces. We also reviewed the management control program as it related to those objectives. Because enlisted warfighting positions remained vacant during deployment, the audit objectives to determine whether qualified and trained personnel were assigned to those positions became moot. This report does not address officer assignments. Initial audit work did not identify areas of concern warranting additional audit verification. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology and our review of the management control program.

⁴ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-1, "Ground Combat Operations," April 4, 1995, defines economy of force as "the commander allocat[ing] the minimum essential combat power to exert pressure in secondary efforts and concentrat[ing] his greatest strength at the decisive point."

Staffing of Warfighting Positions

According to Marine Corps officials, Marine Corps battalions that deployed in support of OIF successfully completed their mission; however, they did so with vacant enlisted warfighting positions. Specifically, staffing levels below 100 percent of T/O were reported just before deployment by three infantry battalions (93 percent, 83 percent, and 75 percent), one light armored reconnaissance battalion (84 percent), and one artillery battalion (87 percent). Enlisted warfighting positions remained vacant because M&RA:

- did not have formal standard operating procedures for deployment in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions,
- did not fully and timely implement its mobilization management plan, and
- had not developed a formal management control plan.

As a result, Marines faced higher risks during deployments in support of OIF due to increased demands placed on limited personnel resources.

Marine Corps Guidance

M&RA and Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations have developed policies, procedures, and plans to implement Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) policies and decisions regarding manpower and deployment matters.

Unit Deployment Program Procedures. Marine Corps Order P3000.15B, "Manpower Unit Deployment Program Standing Operating Procedures," October 11, 2001, establishes manpower policies and procedures for scheduled deployments of units in connection with the Unit Deployment Program. The Order stabilizes personnel by reducing personnel assignments into and out of a deploying unit to allow the commander the opportunity to prepare the unit for deployment. The Order also states that manpower planners will use deployment staffing (status) reports to identify staffing shortages within a deployment-designated unit. The Order further states that the important difference for the deploying unit is that non-deployable personnel must be replaced.

Manning and Staffing Levels. M&RA officials stated that because assignable inventory never matches requirements, the CMC established a staffing precedence to accommodate operational needs, CMC policy, and the mismatch between assignable inventory and requirements. Marine Corps Order 5320.12D, "Precedence Levels for Manning and Staffing," May 23, 2001, establishes policy directing how manpower resources will be allocated and distributed and sets precedence levels for manning and staffing. The Order states that excepted commands, which include the Marine Corps Recruiting Command and the Marine Security Guard Battalion, will be manned and staffed at 100 percent of their T/O

by grade and MOS. Priority commands, which include the I MEF command element and infantry battalions, are to have a staffing level of 95 percent of their T/O. Proportionate share commands (Pro Share), which include light armored reconnaissance and artillery battalions, are to receive fair share apportioned staffing of the remaining assignable inventory, thereby also absorbing the shortages of assignable inventory.

Mobilization Management Plan. The Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (the Plan), February 17, 1999, sets forth policies, procedures, guidance, and responsibilities for mobilization of the Marine Corps. The Plan states, “Mobilization provides a means for quickly increasing active force levels, whether in response to an immediate threat to national security or to keep pace with resurgent global threat.” According to M&RA officials, the Plan is the Marine Corps’ method of transitioning unit personnel strengths from peacetime staffing levels to contingency staffing levels. The Plan, however, does not specify staffing levels that deploying battalions should reach.

Management Control Program. Marine Corps Order 5200.24C, “Marine Corps Internal Management Control Program,” July 15, 1998, states that managers will incorporate basic internal management controls in the strategies, plans, guidance, and procedures governing all of their programs and operations. The Order further states that a management control plan, which indicates the number of scheduled and accomplished management control evaluations and identifies assessable units, progress toward accomplishment of annual program requirements, the method of monitoring and evaluation, and the date the evaluation was completed, should be in written format. The Order also requires documentation of management control activities to the extent needed to effectively manage operations. The mandated documentation should show the type and scope of the review, the responsible official, important dates and facts, the key findings, and the recommended corrective actions.

Warfighting Positions

According to Marine Corps officials, I MEF battalions located at Camp Pendleton and Twentynine Palms, California, that had been deployed in support of OIF successfully completed their mission; however, they did so with vacant enlisted warfighting positions. The Marine Corps staffing precedence policy identifies infantry battalions as priority commands, which are to receive a staffing level of 95 percent of their T/O. However, personnel staffing levels just before deployment did not always reach 95 percent of the T/O. Battalion personnel stated that shortages included key positions, such as infantry squad leader and platoon sergeant. In addition, non-deployable personnel who were unable to deploy due to medical or legal reasons further reduced the number of personnel that deployed with the battalions.

To determine staffing levels of enlisted warfighting positions, we visited three infantry battalions, one light armored reconnaissance battalion, and one artillery battalion that had been deployed in support of OIF. The following

table shows battalion staffing levels in December 2002; the battalions deployed during January and February 2003.

Enlisted Personnel Staffing Levels Before Deployment			
	<u>T/O</u>	<u>Personnel On Board</u>	<u>Percentage of T/O</u>
Infantry Battalion 1	843	783	93
Infantry Battalion 2	843	696	83
Infantry Battalion 3	843	630	75
Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion	843	709	84
Artillery Battalion	577	503	87

Infantry Battalion Personnel Staffing Levels. M&RA normally tracks the personnel strengths of infantry battalions by monitoring the deployment status reports for battalions participating in regularly scheduled deployments under the Marine Corps Unit Deployment Program. The deployment status reports identify personnel strength by MOS. Specifically, a deployment status report identifies the battalion's computerized staffing goal, personnel on board, and non-deployable personnel. We determined the pre-deployment personnel staffing levels for the three infantry battalions visited by reviewing deployment status reports submitted to M&RA for December 2002. All three infantry battalions were scheduled to deploy between January and February 2003.

The December 2002 deployment status reports of the three infantry battalions reported having enlisted personnel staffing levels below 95 percent of their T/O. The infantry battalions reported enlisted personnel staffing levels of 93 percent, 83 percent, and 75 percent, respectively, of their T/O. The reports noted a goal of 90 percent of T/O, which M&RA officials stated was the goal for the infantry battalions based on the available inventory determined by the computerized staffing goal model. Marine Corps Order 5320.12D sets the goal at 95 percent of T/O.

Non-Infantry Battalion Personnel Staffing Levels. Battalions other than infantry are not required to submit deployment status reports to M&RA. The light armored reconnaissance battalion and the artillery battalion are considered Pro Share, meaning they receive an apportioned share of the remaining assignable inventory. The light armored reconnaissance battalion and artillery battalion that

we visited also deployed between January and February 2003. Because those battalions were not required to submit deployment status reports, we determined pre-deployment personnel staffing levels from other documentation (monitor trips) provided by M&RA officials. M&RA officials stated that monitor trips pull personnel data out of the Marine Corps Total Force System Data Base, which is the repository for all Marine Corps personnel data. M&RA officials also stated that they use the monitor trips to compare a battalion's T/O to its on board strength, which allows them to make necessary adjustments within the battalion. However, the monitor trips that we reviewed did not include the level of detail found in the deployment status reports, such as the on-board strength by MOS and the number of non-deployable personnel.

For FY 2003, T/O was 843 enlisted personnel for the light armored reconnaissance battalion and 577 enlisted personnel for the artillery battalion. In January 2003, the light armored reconnaissance battalion reported 709 enlisted personnel, which was 84 percent of its T/O. In January 2003, the artillery battalion reported having 503 enlisted personnel, which was 87 percent of its T/O. As part of the main effort deploying in support of OIF, additional priority should have been given to those battalions in order to increase personnel staffing levels closer to their T/O.

Key Personnel Status. In addition to not meeting personnel staffing requirements, 1st Marine Division officials stated that in the months just before deploying in support of OIF, they were unable to retain key personnel who had orders to other duty assignments. Because battalions spend months training together in preparation for combat in order to reach a standard of combat readiness, loss of key personnel just before deployment for actual combat degraded unit combat readiness. According to Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-0A, "Unit Training Management Guide," November 25, 1996, "combat-ready units are manned with motivated, disciplined, and proficient Marines; led by tactically and technically competent leaders; and conditioned through physically tough and mentally demanding training that ranges from individual Marine battle drills to joint combined-arms exercises." The readiness status of some companies within the battalions was degraded due to the loss of trained and proficient Marines who had trained with the battalions over the past 2 years and were reassigned just before deployment for actual combat.

Special Duty Assignments. Battalions of the 1st Marine Division lost key personnel to special duty assignments, such as recruiting duty and drill instructor duty. In December 2002, 214 enlisted personnel who held leadership positions in the 1st Marine Division's battalions had orders to special duty assignments. Those duty assignments would have removed the most critical leaders at the lowest level of the Marine Corps combat element—the squad leader (E5) and the platoon sergeant (E6). Squad leaders are the primary trainers of young enlisted Marines and directly supervise and instruct them on combat operations. Platoon sergeants are second in command of the platoon and are accountable for the leadership, discipline, training, and welfare of all the enlisted members of the platoon. Platoon sergeants coordinate the platoon's maintenance and logistical requirements and handle personal needs of individual Marines. In order to maintain cohesion and keep those essential leaders in place, the Commander, 1st Marine Division had to justify requests for retention for all

214 personnel. Even after that massive effort, the 1st Marine Division still lost 38 key leaders to special duty assignments.

Taskings. The 1st Marine Division's battalions lost key personnel up until the battalions' deployment dates through continual tasking of personnel to augment higher headquarters. According to 1st Marine Division officials, key personnel, primarily staff personnel, were tasked to fill approximately 162 billets at higher headquarters, such as I MEF, USCENTCOM, and MARCENT. That in turn forced the 1st Marine Division to replace those personnel with non-trained individuals, which ultimately hurt the continuity and overall combat readiness of the 1st Marine Division. According to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, "Warfighting," June 20, 1997, "the personnel management system should seek to achieve personnel stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering cohesion, teamwork, and implicit understanding." The continual tasking of personnel from battalions that were preparing for deployment reduced the readiness and the cohesion of those units.

Contingency Coded Billets. Headquarters Marine Corps did not approve the filling of I MEF's 453 contingency coded billets on its T/O. Contingency coded billets are those billets that are filled under wartime conditions. They are included in the Marine Corps' overall structure for readiness and operational purposes. Those billets would enable I MEF's headquarters staffs to conduct 24-hour operations. The additional personnel are critical to ensure continuity of operations. Because I MEF could not fill its contingency coded billets, those warfighting positions also remained vacant when I MEF deployed in support of OIF, which required I MEF headquarters staffs to work longer shifts in order to conduct 24-hour operations under wartime conditions.

Staffing Procedures

Enlisted warfighting positions remained vacant because the Marine Corps did not have formal standard operating procedures for deployment in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions; did not fully and timely implement its mobilization management plan; and had not developed a formal management control plan.

Deployment Procedures. The Marine Corps did not have formal standard operating procedures for deployment in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions. M&RA is responsible for formulating Marine Corps force manpower plans, policies, and procedures, which implement the CMC's policies and decisions. M&RA had standard operating procedures that addressed manpower issues for regularly scheduled deployments. However, M&RA did not have standard operating procedures that addressed manpower issues for deployment in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions; specifically, M&RA did not have standards for staffing levels of deploying personnel.

Deployment Personnel Staffing Levels. M&RA did not have formal standards for deployment personnel staffing levels. The Marine Corps

Strategy 21, November 3, 2000, states, “As the premier expeditionary ‘Total Force in Readiness,’ the Marine Corps will be tailored to answer the Nation’s call at home, or abroad.” However, M&RA experienced challenges in staffing the Marine Corps’ highly deployable combat battalions while preparing for deployment in support of OIF. The lack of established deployment personnel staffing levels hindered the deployment process and caused confusion in deploying battalions. During the deployment for OIF, there was confusion as to what staffing level each battalion was to obtain. MARCENT officials stated that M&RA had not established a definitive deployment staffing level. In order to complete its planning process, I MEF requested a deployment staffing level from M&RA through MARCENT. An official deployment staffing level did not reach the battalions until November 2002, which was late in the deployment process, and I MEF was required to revalidate requirements already identified on its T/O.

Validating Requirements. I MEF evaluated its operating strength to determine the number of deployable and non-deployable personnel, and identified personnel shortages. I MEF officials stated that they spent many hours validating personnel requests to M&RA for requirements already identified on the T/O and approved through the normal manning process. Each I MEF battalion prioritized its personnel shortages into three categories: critical, significant, and routine. After shortages were prioritized, I MEF concluded that approximately 5,000 additional personnel were needed in order to deploy at the proper “go-to-war” strength of 100 percent of T/O. I MEF personnel in command positions were under the assumption that they should deploy at 100 percent of T/O because operating force battalions were modeled on operational capabilities for warfighting requirements, which are based on 100 percent staffing of T/Os. For the 5,000 identified personnel shortages, I MEF attempted to fill them by using internal personnel assets. I MEF then sent requests for individual augmentees to MARCENT to address the personnel shortages it was not able to fill.

Filling Requirements. MARCENT first searched within its own command for personnel to fill the shortages. When that search did not fill all of I MEF’s shortages, MARCENT forwarded the remainder of the personnel shortages to M&RA. MARCENT also eliminated two of the categories I MEF had used to prioritize the shortages: significant and routine. MARCENT divided the third category, critical, into three prioritized subgroups and M&RA concentrated on filling those three subgroups. MARCENT emphasized that all Marine Corps component command elements were involved in the process for filling personnel shortages because M&RA used a “global-sourcing” technique that requires Marines to support a deployment regardless of prior or current assignment. However, not all personnel shortages in the critical category were filled in those battalions deploying in support of OIF.

Mobilization Management Plan. The Marine Corps did not fully and timely implement its mobilization management plan. The Marine Corps’ mobilization management plan states that the Marine Corps mobilizes in order to augment and reinforce the active force, replace casualties, and sustain forces during a crisis. The mobilization management plan includes the movement and processing of mobilized Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to increase its manpower resource pool. IRR is a portion of the pre-trained individual manpower pool, which is used

to fill critical time- and skill-sensitive billets. However, M&RA officials stated that they felt that involuntarily activation of the IRR was not an option available to them.

Use of Individual Ready Reserve. M&RA officials stated that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued guidance that strongly suggested that involuntary activation of the IRR was discouraged. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness memorandum, “Addendum to Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks,” July 19, 2002, provided guidance for managing Reserve component members identified for mobilization. The memorandum states, “Emphasis shall be placed on the use of Selected Reserve units and individuals, and volunteers of any category of the Ready Reserve, prior to involuntarily calling members of the IRR or ING [Individual National Guard] to active duty, with the caveat that critical mission requirements are the paramount consideration.”

M&RA officials stated that 2,063 Marines in the IRR were involuntarily activated between January and February 2003 in support of OIF. M&RA officials also stated that even though they received approval for the activation, it may not have been clear that the activation was involuntarily because soon afterward it was made known to them that it was not to happen again. M&RA officials stated that, since then, they have had to submit each request for IRR activation to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA) for approval.

Because of the lack of standard operating procedures for deployments in support of combatant commanders’ warfighting missions and the lack of full and timely implementation of the mobilization management plan, the Commander, I MEF made a decision that I MEF battalions would not deploy with less than 90 percent of their T/O. The CMC then issued planning guidance in November 2002 that stated battalions deploying in support of OIF would deploy at 90 percent, or as close to 100 percent, of their T/O as possible. The guidance did not definitively identify deployment personnel staffing levels and led to confusion as to what personnel staffing levels M&RA manpower managers were trying to reach. In addition, the Plan used to reinforce the active duty force when preparing for deployment does not provide deployment personnel staffing levels.

Management Control Plan. Management controls include the plan of organization, methods, and procedures adopted by management to ensure that the organization’s goals will be met. Although M&RA had policies and procedures addressing personnel assignments, as of March 2004, M&RA did not have a formal management control plan that identified the management of personnel in deploying units as an assessable unit. The formal management control program includes a management control plan identifying assessable units, progress toward accomplishing program requirements, the method of monitoring and evaluating, and dates that evaluations were completed and ensures that programs and operations are proceeding with integrity and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. M&RA officials could not provide evidence of documented management control evaluations.

Management Initiatives

Personnel Changes. M&RA officials stated that they took several actions to increase the personnel staffing levels of I MEF battalions preparing for deployment.

Diverted Resources. To increase personnel staffing levels of deploying battalions, M&RA diverted graduating classes from the School of Infantry at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to I MEF battalions. The Marine Corps has two Schools of Infantry, one located on the East Coast and one located on the West Coast. M&RA normally assigns students graduating from the School of Infantry on the East Coast to II MEF, located at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and assigns students graduating from the West Coast school to I MEF, located at Camp Pendleton, California. M&RA officials stated that all graduating classes were diverted to I MEF beginning in November 2002. Although those efforts increased entry-grade personnel staffing levels, it did not increase personnel staffing levels for more experienced mid-grade personnel, such as infantry platoon sergeants and squad leaders.

Stop Move and Stop Loss. To assist in filling personnel shortages during OIF, the CMC released Marine Administrative Message 007/03, "Marine Corps Stop Move and Stop Loss Policy," January 7, 2003. Stop move actions allow the Military Departments to stabilize active duty personnel for assignment to theaters of operation or other high-priority duties, while stop loss actions allow the Military Departments to retain personnel beyond their terms of service. The Marine Administrative Message authorized the use of stop loss for all Marine Corps personnel effective January 15, 2003, and the immediate stop move for all Marine Corps personnel except those with orders to special duty assignments. Marines with orders to special duty assignments were allowed to continue to execute their orders until the CMC released Marine Administrative Message 108/03, "Implementation of Stop Move within Special Duty Assignments," March 12, 2003.

I MEF and 1st Marine Division officials expressed concerns about the delay in implementing the stop move and stop loss policy and stated that the policy would have been more helpful if implemented sooner. The delay in implementing the policy allowed experienced Marines in leadership positions to leave just before deployment, leaving a vacancy for an inexperienced Marine to fill.

Conclusion

Because enlisted warfighting positions remained vacant during deployments, Marines faced higher risks during deployments due to increased demands placed on limited personnel resources. Because maintaining appropriate personnel staffing levels under normal conditions can present M&RA manpower managers with challenges, it is even more important to have standard operating procedures that provide specific guidance to help battalions reach optimal personnel staffing

levels when deploying in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions.

Having standard operating procedures for warfighting missions that address staffing issues similar to those faced by battalions participating in the Marine Corps Unit Deployment Program would minimize confusion among manpower managers at all levels. Infantry battalions participating in the Marine Corps Unit Deployment Program are required to submit a deployment status report on the 28th of each month to M&RA. The report is used to identify staffing shortages within a deployment-designated unit. M&RA, however, does not require non-infantry battalions to submit deployment status reports. The level of detail found in the Unit Deployment Program standard operating procedures should be required not only for regularly scheduled deployments, but also for unscheduled deployments.

A formal management control plan, which identifies the number of scheduled and accomplished management control evaluations, assessable units, progress toward accomplishment of annual program requirements, the method of monitoring and evaluation, and the date the evaluation was completed, will help ensure that programs and operations are discharged with integrity and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response

A summary of management comments on the finding and our audit response is in Appendix B. Management comments on the recommendations are discussed in the following section. See the Management Comments section of this report for the complete text of the comments.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response

1. We recommend that the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs:

a. Develop and implement standard operating procedures for units deploying in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions. The standard operating procedures should address, at a minimum, deployment personnel staffing levels, special duty assignments, taskings, and contingency coded billets.

Management Comments. The Director, Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division in the Office of the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs nonconcurred, stating that the standard operating procedures were successfully followed to the extent possible under DoD guidance and Joint Staff procedures.

Audit Response. The comments are nonresponsive. Although the Director stated that standard operating procedures were successfully followed to the extent possible, he did not provide us with standard operating procedures that address manpower issues for deployment in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions. As a result, we were unable to determine whether the standard operating procedures were successfully followed as stated in the comments. It is our opinion that standard operating procedures need to, at a minimum, address special duty assignments, taskings, and contingency coded billets and need to establish a standard deployment personnel staffing level. Such standard operating procedures would reduce confusion concerning staffing levels for deploying battalions, improve battalion cohesion, and improve battalion readiness levels. We request that the Director reconsider his position and provide additional comments in response to the final report.

b. Develop and implement a formal management control plan for planning, directing, coordinating, and supervising active forces.

Management Comments. The Director nonconcurred, stating that the Marine Corps has and follows a formal management control plan. The Director also stated that the specifics of Marine Corps Order 5200.24C, "Marine Corps Internal Management Control Program," are being reviewed and, if appropriate, changes will be made to the Marine Corps Order.

Audit Response. The comments are nonresponsive. We made repeated attempts to obtain the formal management control plan from M&RA. As of March 2004, M&RA officials could not provide evidence of documented management control evaluations. DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Management Control (MC) Program Procedures," requires the Director to establish a documented evaluation of the management controls of an assessable unit regardless of changes made to Marine Corps Order 5200.24C. We request that the Director reconsider his position and provide additional comments in response to the final report.

2. We recommend that the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations modify the current mobilization plan to include additional procedures, other than activating the Individual Ready Reserve, for increasing personnel staffing levels when deploying in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions.

Management Comments. The Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations did not provide comments on a draft of this report. The Director, Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division nonconcurred, stating that the Marine Corps mobilization plan is being revised and includes multiple options and procedures for meeting required staffing levels.

Audit Response. The comments are responsive. We request that the Director provide our office with a copy of the revised mobilization plan when it is issued.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We reviewed the processes and procedures the Marine Corps uses in the assignment of personnel. We met and interviewed officials from:

- the Office of the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs,
 - Manpower Management Officer Assignments,
 - Manpower Management Enlisted Assignments,
 - Manpower Plans and Policy Division;
- Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Total Force Structure Division;
- the Office of the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations;
- MARCENT;
- I MEF and subordinate battalions; and
- II MEF and subordinate battalions.

We reviewed applicable regulations, policies, procedures, and management plans, dated August 1954 through November 2003, related to the assignment process and mobilization of the Marine Corps. We interviewed officials at the headquarters level to determine the Marine Corps assignment process. We further interviewed officials at I MEF and subordinate battalions at Camp Pendleton, California, and II MEF and subordinate battalions at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to determine the process used to identify personnel operating strengths and shortages and the method used to request personnel for identified shortages during deployments.

Our audit focused on the review of I MEF battalions that had deployed in support of OIF. Specifically, we determined whether those battalions deployed with vacant enlisted warfighting positions. We requested, obtained, and analyzed deployment status reports, other personnel staffing documents, memorandums, and T/Os to determine personnel staffing levels. Those documents were dated from July 2002 through January 2003.

We performed this audit from July 2003 through April 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We limited our scope to the Marine Corps due to resource constraints.

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

General Accounting Office High-Risk Area. The General Accounting Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides coverage of the Strategic Human Capital Management high-risk area.

Management Control Program Review

DoD Directive 5010.38, “Management Control (MC) Program,” August 26, 1996, and DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Management Control (MC) Program Procedures,” August 28, 1996, require DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of management controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the adequacy of the controls.

Scope of the Review of the Management Control Program. We reviewed M&RA standard operating procedures for enlisted military personnel assignments. Specifically, we determined whether management policies and procedures were established to manage personnel for deploying battalions.

Adequacy of Management Controls. We identified a material management control weakness for M&RA, as defined by DoD Instruction 5010.40. M&RA management controls for the management of personnel in deploying battalions were not adequate to ensure that battalions achieve optimal personnel staffing levels. The recommendations if implemented, will correct the identified weakness and would result in optimal personnel staffing levels for deploying battalions, lowering the demands and risks faced by all Marines. A copy of the report will be provided to the senior official responsible for management controls in M&RA.

Adequacy of Management’s Self-Evaluation. M&RA officials had not developed a formal management control plan and, therefore, did not identify management of personnel in deploying units as an assessable unit and did not identify or report the material management control weakness identified by the audit.

Prior Coverage

No prior coverage has been conducted on management of Marine Corps personnel assignments during the last 5 years.

Appendix B. Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response

Marine Corps Comments. The Director, Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division in the Office of the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs disagreed with the information we used to assess staffing levels and stated that manpower managers use monitor trips to assess staffing levels, not deployment status reports. The Director stated that we should have assessed staffing levels as of the time of deployment and execution, March 23, 2003, not as of December 2002, because battalions continued to receive personnel after they deployed. The Director added that CMC guidance sets the staffing goal, which was not 95 percent as stated in our report. The Director also stated that we should have considered the detached portions of battalions in our assessment of staffing levels and that each battalion had subordinate units detached or deployed elsewhere.

The Director disagreed with the report's information, approach, and conclusions with respect to key personnel. In regard to special duty assignments, the Director stated that 325 orders were canceled and that I MEF lost only 6 Marines to special duty assignments. In regard to contingency coded billets and individual augmentee taskings, the Director stated that I MEF received 182 individual augmentees, which brought I MEF's overall staffing level to over 100 percent of its T/O.

The Director stated that the Marine Corps has worked to minimize the operational impact that individual augmentee taskings have on units; however, the Marine Corps' requirement to fill those billets has not been eased. The Director stated that the Marine Corps continues to receive taskings for personnel to fill joint billet requirements with individual augmentees. He added that the lack of validation and prioritization of those requirements by the Joint Staff contributed to the difficulties the Marine Corps faced in filling requirements. The Director noted that the Marine Corps provided augmentees for 777 joint billets during OIF.

The Director disagreed with our decision to not include in the report I MEF's overall staffing level from January to April 2003. The Director stated that at the time I MEF and its subordinate units executed their mission in March 2003, I MEF was at 95 percent of its T/O in the aggregate and at more than 100 percent of its T/O with individual augmentation.

The Director also disagreed with the breadth of our analysis, stating that the staffing of I MEF's personnel requirements in support of OIF must be placed in the proper context of all Marine Corps' operational requirements and the guidance to meet those requirements. The Director stated that although I MEF provided the main Marine Corps effort in support of OIF, consideration should have been given to II MEF and III MEF; MARFORPAC; Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic; and the Marine Corps Reserve.

The Director stated that the report should have addressed the additional constraint imposed by DoD policy against mobilization of the IRR, pointing out that IRR

mobilization is part of the Marine Corps mobilization plan. He stated that if the IRR mobilization had been undertaken, there would have been no personnel shortfalls or staffing pressures as discussed in the report.

The Director also disagreed with the report's conclusion and stated that the report is flawed in its approach and information.

Audit Response. M&RA officials provided us results of their January 2003 monitor trips, which showed staffing levels below 100 percent of T/O at the time of deployment or just prior. Specifically, three infantry battalions, a light armored reconnaissance battalion, and an artillery battalion reported personnel staffing levels of 90 percent, 79 percent, 73 percent, 84 percent, and 87 percent, respectively. As stated in the report, although M&RA uses monitor trips to determine staffing levels, monitor trips do not provide manpower managers at M&RA with critical non-deployable personnel information.

As reflected in the Director's comments, March and April 2003 monitor trips still reported staffing levels below 100 percent of T/O. In addition, the April 2003 monitor trips reflect that two of the three infantry battalions were below the 95 percent staffing goal as established by Marine Corps Order 5320.12, "Precedence Levels for Manning and Staffing," May 23, 2001. The staffing levels presented in the report also reflect the staffing level of the entire battalion, regardless of whether or not portions of that battalion were deployed elsewhere. In addition, we believe that optimal personnel staffing levels for deploying battalions should be reached prior to deployment to allow those battalions the maximum time possible to properly train new personnel and to build unit cohesion.

M&RA officials provided us with information that conflicted with the information we obtained during our visit with 1st Marine Division personnel, who specifically stated that 38 key leaders were lost to special duty assignments. In addition, the Director stated that I MEF received 182 augmentees, which brought I MEF's overall staffing level to over 100 percent of T/O in the aggregate; however, we did not verify or report on staffing levels in the aggregate because we believe that the staffing levels of individual battalions more accurately reflect personnel staffing. In regard to I MEF's 453 contingency coded billets, we were repeatedly told by I MEF and M&RA officials that contingency coded billets were not approved to be filled.

While we acknowledge that the Marine Corps has to fill joint billet requirements with individual augmentees, the audit's scope did not include evaluating the Joint Staff's validation and prioritization of those requirements. The report does address the additional constraint imposed by DoD policy against IRR mobilization.

Appendix C. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff

Department of the Navy

Commandant of the Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Director, Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division
Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command
Commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force
Commander, 1st Marine Division
Commander, 1st Force Service Support Group
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Naval Inspector General
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

Combatant Command

Inspector General, U.S. Joint Forces Command

Non-Defense Federal Organization

Office of Management and Budget

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Armed Services

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

House Committee on Armed Services

House Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, Committee on Government Reform

Marine Corps Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division
3280 Russell Road
Quantico, VA 22134

IN REPLY REFER TO:
1001
MPP-50
MAY 13 2004

From: Director, Manpower Personnel Plans and Policy Division
To: Director of Readiness, Logistics, and Support, Department of Defense Inspector General

Subj: MANAGEMENT OF MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

Ref: (a) DoD IG Memorandum for D/C M&RA dtd 5 Apr 2004
(b) CMC Planning Guidance in Support of OIF dtd Nov 02 [classified: secret]
(c) Commander, JFCOM Memorandum For USD(P&R) dtd 12 Mar 04
(d) HQMC(PP&O) Memorandum for ASN(M&RA); Subj: Rebalancing Forces, dtd 30 Jul 03

Encl: (1) HQMC(MP) Information Paper; Subj: The Successful Use of the Marine Corps IRR in OIF, dtd 19 Nov 03

1. We have reviewed the draft DoD IG proposed report provided in the reference and nonconcur with the overall report, its conclusions, and its recommendations. Specific comments are as follows.

a. Disagree with the information used to assess staffing levels of Marine Corps units in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Rationale: Staffing levels are determined by "Monitor Trips" (MONTRIPS), not deployment status reports. As explained to DoD IG staff, MONTRIPS is a system that pulls together the following data on a monthly basis (first 10 days of the month): (1) Unit Table of Organization, (2) Unit Authorized Strength Report, (3) Unit Staffing Goal, (4) Unit Personnel On Board, and (5) Projected On Board for the next 3 months and 6 months. The personnel data gathered by MONTRIPS is from the Marine Corps Total Force System Data Base. MCTFS is the repository of all Marine Corps personnel data. Data is entered into the system via Unit Diary entries that are made by units within the Marine Corps, and the overall data is refreshed two to three times per week. MONTRIPS is used by HQMC (MM) to determine unit staffing levels and make the necessary adjustments to ensure staffing goals are met.

Subj: MANAGEMENT OF MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS IN
SUPPORT OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

b. Disagree with the report's timing of the assessment of unit staffing levels.

Rationale: Units continued to receive personnel even after deployed; therefore, staffing levels should be assessed at the time of deployment, not December 2003, and at the time of execution, 23 March 2003. With the timing of the MONTRIPS, the staffing levels at the time of execution are shown by the April 2003 MONTRIPS.

c. Disagree with the report's statement of the Marine Corps' staffing level goal for units deployed in support of OIF.

Rationale: CMC Guidance set the staffing level goal in reference (b). That staffing goal is classified; however, it was not 95% as stated in the report.

d. Disagree with the report's conclusion as to staffing levels of specific units and whether those levels met the staffing goals.

Rationale: Although the report does not identify the units, DoD IG staff stated that the five units in question were 1/7, 2/1, 3/5, 3d LAR, and 1/11. The staffing levels of those units were as follows:

Unit	Deployed	Feb 03 MONTRIPS	Mar 03 MONTRIPS	Apr 03 MONTRIPS	Met Goal
2/1*		89.00%	89.20%	88.80%	✓
3/5	30 Jan 03	86.40%	89.70%	95.28%	✓
1/7	29 Jan 03	83.50%	87.00%	94.46%	✓
3 rd LAR	15 Feb 03	86.60%	86.00%	93.00%	✓
1/11	6 Feb 03	88.50%	93.00%	94.20%	✓

*2/1 was not "deployed in support of OIF." It was deployed on a MEU in Jan 03 and diverted to OIF in Jan 03. At the time it deployed, it met staffing goals. At the time it was diverted, it was already a combat ready unit and maintained that status throughout.

e. Disagree with the report not considering the detached portions of the units in question.

Rationale: All the units above had subordinate units detached and deployed elsewhere; therefore, the staffing levels would have to be measured for each Bn(-).

Subj: MANAGEMENT OF MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS IN
SUPPORT OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

f. Disagree with the report's information, approach, and conclusions with respect to Key Personnel, Special Duty Assignments, Individual Augmentee (IA) taskings, and Contingency Coded Billets.

Rationale:

(1) As to Key Personnel and Special Duty Assignments, HQMC(MM) cancelled orders for 325 Marines from I MEF and I MEF, in its entirety, lost only 6 Marines for Special Duty Assignments.

(2) As to Contingency Coded Billets, IA taskings, and IA relief, I MEF received 182 IAs for OIF. This brought I MEF's overall staffing level over 100%.

(3) As to IA taskings in general, it is important to note, and a broader analysis would have included, the following. There is an ever-increasing demand for Joint IAs. The Marine Corps has worked to minimize the operational impact IA taskings have on units; however, the Marine Corps' requirement to fill these billets has not been eased. The Marine Corps received and continues to receive continual taskings for personnel to fill Joint IA billets. The lack of validation and prioritization of these requirements by the Joint Staff pursuant to CJCSI 1308.10 contributed to the difficulties the Marine Corps faced in filling these requirements. During OIF the Marine Corps filled 777 Joint IA requirements.

g. Disagree with the report not including or considering I Marine Expeditionary Force's (I MEF's) overall staffing levels in January through April, 2004.

Rationale: At the time I MEF and its subordinate units executed their OIF missions in March 2003, I MEF was staffed, in the aggregate of onhand/ T/O, at 95%. Again, with IA augmentation, to include mobilized Reservists, I MEF's onhand staffing exceeded 100% of T/O.

h. Disagree with the report not taking a broader analysis.

Rationale: The Marine Corps' staffing of I MEF's personnel requirements in support of OIF must be placed in the proper context of all of the Marine Corps' operational requirements, the guidance to meet those requirements, and the resulting personnel assignments. At a minimum this should include DoD's Planning Guidance for OIF, DoD's Mobilization/Demobilization policies, CMC's Planning Guidance for OIF, and consideration of II MEF, III MEF, MARFORPAC, MARFORLANT,

Subj: MANAGEMENT OF MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS IN
SUPPORT OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

MARFORRES, and the supporting establishment (most particularly the requirement for Special Duty Assignments and Force Protection billets). It is important to recognize that while I MEF was the main effort for OIF, the other MARFORs and MEFs contributed significant forces. Their unique insights are essential to arrive at an accurate conclusion and potential recommendations.

i. Disagree with the report not addressing the additional constraint imposed on the Marine Corps by the DoD policy against the mobilization of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members.

Rationale: Mobilization of Marines in the IRR is part of the Marine Corps Mobilization Plan and individual IRR Marines plan for it as well. Had the mobilization of the IRR been undertaken as planned, there would have been no personnel shortfalls or staffing pressures of the type discussed in the draft report. Enclosure (1) provides specific information on the contribution and successful use of the Marine Corps IRR in support of OIF.

j. Disagree with the report's conclusions, specifically, "Because enlisted warfighting positions remained vacant during deployments, Marines faced higher risks during deployments due to increased demands placed on limited personnel resources."

Rationale: The report is flawed in its approach and information.

k. Disagree with the report's recommendations. Specific comments to the draft report's recommendations are as follows:

(1) Report's Recommendation: Develop and implement standard operating procedures for units deploying in support of Combatant Commanders' warfighting missions. The standard operating procedures should address, at a minimum: deployment personnel staffing levels, special duty assignments, and contingency coded billets.

Response: Standard operating procedures exist and were successfully followed to the extent possible under DoD guidance and Joint Staff procedures. It is important to understand that Commanders determine required staffing levels after mission analysis and course of action selected to perform the mission. Thereafter, the process operates to meet those staffing levels and Individual Augmentation is based upon requirements for additional staff to support the operation/mission.

Subj: MANAGEMENT OF MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS IN
SUPPORT OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

(2) Recommendation: Develop and implement a formal management control plan.

Response: The Marine Corps has and follows a formal management control plan. The requirements for a management control plan and the specifics of MCO 5200.24C, "Marine Corps Internal Management Control Program," are being reviewed. The report's comments are noted, and, if required, improvements in report documentation will be made, or, if appropriate, changes made to the MCO.

(3) Report's Recommendation: Modify the current mobilization plan to include additional procedures, other than the Individual Ready Reserve, for increasing personnel staffing levels when deploying in support of Combatant Commanders' warfighting missions.

Response: The Marine Corps mobilization plan, MAID-P, is being revised and includes multiple options and procedures for meeting required staffing levels. The Marine Corps IRR is a viable, relevant mobilization resource for the Total Force Marine Corps. For Reserve Marines, time in the IRR is a natural and expected step in their overall continuum of service - just as natural and expected as their move from IRR to Selected Reserve or their move within the Selected Reserve from a unit to Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) billet and back. Although DoD guidance has discouraged truly involuntary mobilization of the IRR, the Marine Corps' degree of reliance on the IRR is consistent with overall DoD policy and guidance to date. Noteworthy is that a major recommendation of the Joint Forces Command Mobilization Process Reform Project, reference (c), is the Services' improved, less administratively burdensome access to their IRR. Furthermore, as recommended in the Marine Corps' response, reference (d), to Secretary of Defense "Rebalancing Forces" Memo and pointed out to DoD IG staff, updating the DoD Master Mobilization Plan (May 1988) would assist the Services in effecting mobilizations consistent with DoD desires and guidance.

2. I and my staff am available to again discuss these matters with DoD IG in greater detail prior to the release of a final report. HQMC (M&RA) POC for this matter is Major Gary Dean, MPP-10, (703) 432-9224, deangd@manpower.usmc.mil.


T. F. GHORMLEY

19 Nov 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subj: THE SUCCESSFUL USE OF THE MARINE CORPS INDIVIDUAL
READY RESERVE (IRR) IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

1. Purpose. To provide information on the Marine Corps' successful use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

2. Background. As expressed in the Marine Corps' responsive Memoranda on Rebalancing Forces (30 Jul 03 and 12 Sep 03), the Marine Corps IRR is a mobilization manpower resource. The Marine Corps IRR consists of individual Marines who have had extensive (at least 4-6 years) training in either the Active Component or Reserve Component. Their experience, and the Marine Corps' ability to access their experience, significantly contributed to the operational success of the Total Force Marine Corps in OIF.

3. Discussion

a. Overall Contribution of the IRR. Of the almost 24,000 Marine Corps Reservists mobilized from September 11, 2001 through August, 2003, 4,380 (18.5%) of them were members of the IRR. With the mobilization of 19,314 Reservists in Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units or Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) detachments, 46.41% of the Marine Corps Selected Reserve was mobilized. Because of the successful utilization of the IRR, however, the percentage of overall Marine Corps Ready Reserve mobilization was reduced to 17.28%. The Marine Corps IRR is truly part of the ready reserve and significantly contributes to the Total Force.

b. IRR Contribution in Specific Occupational Fields. In some occupational fields in which more than 50% of the Selected Reserve was mobilized, the mobilization manpower resource provided by the IRR has been instrumental in both accomplishing the current missions and positioning the Marine Corps Ready Reserve for sustained use through the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The table below shows, by occupational field, the percentage of the SMCR members (in units or IMA detachments) mobilized, the percentage of Ready Reserve (SMCR plus IRR) mobilized, and what the

Encl (1)

Subj: THE SUCCESSFUL USE OF THE MARINE CORPS INDIVIDUAL
READY RESERVE (IRR) IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

percentage of SMCR mobilization would have been without the
IRR contribution.

Occupational Field	% SMCR Mobilized	% Ready Reserve Mobilized	% SMCR Mobilized if IRR not available
Law Enforcement	69%	24%	108%
Intelligence	67%	28%	101%
Fixed Wing (KC-130)	86%	32%	90%
Infantry	52%	20%	68%
Materiel & Storage Issue	51%	19%	58%

c. IRR Contribution to Filling Individual Augmentee (IA) Requirements. Marine Corps IRR members also make a very significant contribution toward the Total Force meeting Individual Augmentee (IA) requirements, to include Joint IA requirements. For example, during peak mobilization in May 2003, the Marine Corps had about 4,500 IA requirements, 852 of which were Joint IA requirements. To meet that requirement, about 2,000 IRR members were mobilized. Without access to the manpower resource of the IRR, the Marine Corps Total Force would have been strained to fill the IA requirements arising from OIF.

4. Conclusion. The IRR is and has always been an integral part of the Marine Corp' ability to meet its mobilization requirements. Through ongoing efforts, the Marine Corps maintains up-to-date personal contact information on the almost 60,000 members of the IRR as well as routinely screening and assessing their mobilization potential. Retaining Marines in the IRR and maintaining contact with them and their mobilization potential has created a continuum of participation based on the needs of the service and the availability of the individual. This continuum of service allows the IRR to be a ready and available mobilization resource as proven by the contributions the IRR made to the Total Force operational success in OIF.

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Team Members

The Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing of the Department of Defense, Readiness and Logistics Support prepared this report. Personnel of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense who contributed to the report are listed below.

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