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Inspector General

United States Department of Defense

ALLEGED MISCONDUCT: GENERAL JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, U.S. MARINE CORPS VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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ALLEGED MISCONDUCT: GENERAL JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, U.S. MARINE CORPS VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

We initiated the investigation to address an allegation that General (Gen) James E. Cartwright, U.S. Marine Corps, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), [redacted] The complaint to this Office alleged that [redacted] while on temporary duty (TDY) to [redacted] Tbilisi, Georgia, [redacted] Based on our preliminary review of the matter, we investigated the allegation as potentially constituting [redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted];
- [redacted]
- Failure to fulfill leadership responsibilities in a manner consistent with Title 10, United States Code, Section 5947 (10 U.S.C. § 5947), "Requirement of exemplary conduct" and paragraph 1100, "Military Leadership," subparagraph 2, "Responsibility" of the Marine Corps Manual.

We confirmed that Gen Cartwright conducted official travel with his staff, which included [redacted] to Tbilisi, Georgia, in March 2009. [redacted] However, we confirmed that Gen Cartwright spent several hours alone with [redacted] in his room in Tbilisi between 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. on the night of March 30 and morning of March 31, in part for purposes unrelated to official duties, [redacted]

[redacted] Additionally, we concluded that Gen Cartwright's failure to correct [redacted]

[1] The complainant identified [redacted] However, we found that [redacted] We refer to [redacted] in this report.

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behavioral shortcomings was inconsistent with the leadership requirements established by 10 U.S.C. § 5947 and the Marine Corps Manual. [redacted]

We provided Gen Cartwright the opportunity to comment on [redacted] tentative conclusions by letter dated January 19, 2010. In his response dated February 17, 2010, Gen Cartwright disagreed with our conclusions, [redacted] Additionally, he emphasized that where his staff departed from his principles of conduct, he acted promptly and decisively, that appropriate corrective measures were applied, [redacted] He characterized our investigation as relying on scattered opinions and perceptions without any factual substantiation.[2]

We carefully considered Gen Cartwright's response [redacted] However, we stand by our conclusion that Gen Cartwright's failure to correct [redacted] was inconsistent with established leadership requirements.

[redacted] during travel to Tbilisi. As described in greater detail below, [redacted] became intoxicated on the trip and unable to perform [redacted] duties. Additionally, we identified another official event where [redacted] became similarly intoxicated. While these two isolated episodes are of significant concern, [redacted]

[2] While we have included what we believe is a reasonable synopsis of Gen Cartwright's response, we recognize that any attempt to summarize risks oversimplification and omission. Accordingly, we incorporated comments from the response throughout this report where appropriate and provided a copy of the response to the cognizant management officials together with this report.

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[redacted]

We affirm our conclusion that Gen Cartwright's failure to correct behavioral shortcomings on the part of [redacted] was inconsistent with established leadership regulations. We disagree with Gen Cartwright's assertion that he fulfilled those responsibilities by referring them to his [redacted], because Gen Cartwright was witness to those incidents (his [redacted] was not), Gen Cartwright [redacted] and his close relationship with [redacted] mandated his personal intervention. Additionally, we note that the [redacted] recalled that [redacted] was alerted to the intoxicated behavior by [redacted] in Tbilisi by an outside source (not Gen Cartwright) and only then, after the [redacted] raised the matter to Gen Cartwright, did Gen Cartwright direct [redacted] to take corrective action. Given the circumstances, we conclude that Gen Cartwright had an obligation to initiate action promptly on his return.

We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy consider appropriate corrective action with respect to Gen Cartwright.

This report sets forth our findings and conclusions based on a preponderance of the evidence.

II. BACKGROUND

Gen Cartwright assumed his duties as VCJCS in August 2007. During the prior period of 2004-2007 he served as Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.

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[redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

[redacted] Given the scope of Gen Cartwright's responsibilities and the differences between local time overseas and Eastern Standard Time, staff member visits could be required at any time of the day or night. Typically, [redacted] by virtue of [redacted], would report to Gen Cartwright more frequently than any other staff member.

III. SCOPE

We interviewed Gen Cartwright twice, [redacted] and 13 additional witnesses including members of Gen Cartwright's personal and security staffs and all individuals identified in the complaint to this Office. Persons interviewed with knowledge of the relationship or events in [redacted] Georgia included:

- [redacted] to Gen Cartwright, [redacted] for Gen Cartwright.
- [redacted] to the VCJCS [redacted].
- [redacted] assigned to the PSB, [redacted]

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- [redacted] detailed to perform Personal Security Officer (PSO) duties in the Office of the VCJCS.
- [redacted], assigned to the PSB and detailed to perform PSO duties in the Office of the VCJCS.
- [redacted] assigned to the PSB and detailed to perform PSO duties in the Office of the VCJCS.
- [redacted] assigned to the PSB and detailed to perform PSO duties in the Office of the VCJCS.
- [redacted] to the VCJCS.
- [redacted] to the VCJCS.
- [redacted] supporting the VCJCS.
- [redacted] to the VCJCS.

We examined relevant documents and the standards that govern the issues under investigation. Specifically, we examined [redacted] for Gen Cartwright's TDY travel to [redacted] Tbilisi, Georgia, including [redacted], duty rosters, itineraries, room assignments, [redacted], and after action reports.

Both Gen Cartwright and [redacted] waived their rights to counsel and to remain silent, and provided sworn testimony during the investigation. Both [redacted]. None of the witnesses we interviewed testified to any knowledge of [redacted] Gen Cartwright and [redacted] or offered evidence that the [redacted] Further, we identified no [redacted] documentary evidence to support [redacted]

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IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

[redacted]

Standards.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 5947 (10 U.S.C. § 5947) "Requirement of exemplary conduct"

This statute requires all commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service to:[3]

- show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination;
- be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command;
- guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and
- take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

[redacted]

[3] 10 U.S.C. 5001 defines a "member of the naval service" as a person appointed or enlisted in, or inducted or conscripted into, the Navy or the Marine Corps.

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Marine Corps Manual, Paragraph 1100, "Military Leadership" subparagraph 2 "Responsibility"

Subparagraph 1100.2.c., states, "An individual's responsibility for leadership is not dependent on authority. Marines are expected to exert proper influence upon their comrades by setting examples of obedience, courage, zeal, sobriety, neatness, and attention to duty."

Subparagraph 1100.2.d. notes that the distinguishing privilege of the officer corps is the "special trust and confidence, which is expressly reposed in officers by their commission." Subparagraph (1) states that the basis for that special trust and confidence is the presumption of

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integrity, good manners, sound judgment, and discretion, which "is jeopardized by the slightest transgression on the part of any member of the officer corps." For that reason, subparagraph (1) imposes the following responsibility, which is of particular interest in this case:

> Any offense, however minor, will be dealt with promptly, and with sufficient severity to impress on the officer at fault, and on the officer corps. Dedication to the basic elements of special trust and confidence is a Marine officer's obligation to the officer corps as a whole, and transcends the bonds of personal friendship.

Facts

This section first sets forth witness observations concerning [redacted] as background for the description of events that occurred on official travel.

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[redacted]

[redacted] noted occasions where [redacted] had too much to drink, citing instances of an Alfalfa Dinner in Washington, D.C. and the TDY to Tbilisi, Georgia.

[redacted]

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Facts Regarding Official Travel to Tbilisi, Georgia, March 2009[4]

Gen Cartwright and his staff departed from Andrews AFB on March 28, 2009, en route to Tbilisi, Georgia. They made a fuel stop in Shannon, Ireland, arrived in Tbilisi at 7:19 p.m. on March 29, and checked into the [redacted] On March 30, 2009, Gen Cartwright's official itinerary began at 8:45 a.m. with a visit to the U.S. Embassy and concluded at 9:19 p.m. on his return to the hotel from a visit to the residence of the President of Georgia. The group remained overnight in the hotel and departed for the airport at 7:25 a.m. on March 31.

During this trip Gen Cartwright occupied a single large room that included a bench/divan at the foot of his bed. [redacted]

[4] Witnesses' recall of events and their sequence on the evening of March 30, 2009, was inconsistent. We attribute the inconsistent or conflicting testimony to the passage of time, [redacted] and, in certain cases, the consumption of alcohol by some witnesses that evening.

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Evening -- March 30, 2009

9:00-11:00 p.m.

Gen Cartwright and his party returned to the hotel about 9:20 p.m. following his participation in the press conference. Gen Cartwright remained at the hotel, where at 10:00 p.m. and accompanied by he ate dinner in the hotel restaurant, as did several other staff members. He returned to his room at 11:15 p.m.

11:00 p.m.-1:00 a.m.

testified went to Gen Cartwright's room prior to dinner to assist him with various tasks. Following dinner, recalled went to the hotel lounge, consumed a glass of wine, and returned to room with another glass. On arriving in room, telephoned in the United States. did not disclose the specifics of phone call to us, but other witnesses stated explained that the call to upset very much, and went to Gen Cartwright's room at least two times that evening to

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discuss it. [redacted] went the first time about 11:00 p.m. and stayed until 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m., but could not recall exactly how long [redacted] stayed. [redacted] testified [redacted] was very distraught as [redacted] discussed [redacted] with Gen Cartwright and sought advice regarding the situation [redacted]

[redacted] stated Gen Cartwright was making phone calls when [redacted] arrived, and he was dressed in civilian clothing. [redacted] explained [redacted] had consumed wine and was upset and crying, and Gen Cartwright talked [redacted] through the issues [redacted]. When [redacted] departed his room and returned downstairs [redacted] saw a group of staff members who had returned from the bars. They noticed [redacted] was upset and invited [redacted] to join them in the hotel lounge. [redacted] sat with them for a time prior to returning to Gen Cartwright's room, where [redacted] believed [redacted] remained for at least 2 hours.

[redacted], who was on duty [redacted] testified [redacted] observed [redacted] enter Gen Cartwright's room prior to 1:00 a.m. [redacted] relieved [redacted] at 1:00 a.m. and remained on duty until 8:00 a.m. [redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted] was in Gen Cartwright's room. [redacted] told us [redacted] did not recall seeing anyone else enter the room during this period. [redacted] testified [redacted] did not recall observing [redacted] depart Gen Cartwright's room. However, we received consistent testimony that [redacted] returned to the lounge area, where [redacted] joined [redacted] who had returned from their outing. Witnesses testified [redacted] was intoxicated and visibly upset, spoke to [redacted] about [redacted] and bought one or two rounds of drinks. [redacted]

1:00 a.m.-3:00 a.m.

[redacted] testified that during [redacted] second visit to Gen Cartwright's room, [redacted] stayed at least 2 hours, remaining until 3:30 or 4:00 a.m., or possibly until 45 minutes prior to assembling with the group for departure.[5] [redacted] stated that during this visit, one of the [redacted] came into the room. It was a busy night and Gen Cartwright was on and off the phone. [redacted] and Gen Cartwright were seated on a bench at the end of the bed where [redacted] continued to talk [redacted] At some point [redacted] lay back on the bed and fell asleep from the combined effects of distress, fatigue, and alcohol. [redacted] recalled sleeping in Gen Cartwright's room for approximately 45 minutes, but could not remember who escorted [redacted] back to [redacted] own room.

[redacted] testified that [redacted] was asleep in [redacted] room when, between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., [redacted] received a call from the National Military Command Center seeking to contact Gen Cartwright. [redacted] told us that [redacted] contacted [redacted] and they went to inform

[5] The itinerary in the [redacted] indicated "bag drag," the time to gather, screen, and load bags and equipment, would begin at 6:00 a.m. on March 31, 2009. One witness testified bag drag began at 5:30 a.m. The [redacted] indicated all bags were accounted for at 5:50 a.m.

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Gen Cartwright. [redacted] testified [redacted] assisted Gen Cartwright with the phone call and then returned to [redacted] room.

[redacted] testified [redacted] was asleep when, sometime after midnight, [redacted] received a call from [redacted] about the call from the National Military Command Center. [redacted] stated that [redacted] and [redacted] went to assist Gen Cartwright make a secure call, so [redacted] went back to sleep. Sometime later, between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., [redacted] recalled that [redacted] knocked on [redacted] door. Visibly upset and impaired from the effects of alcohol, [redacted] told [redacted] about [redacted] and [redacted] intent to talk to Gen Cartwright. [redacted] advised [redacted] against that because of the late hour. [redacted] went [redacted] stated that 20 to 45 minutes later, [redacted] came back, knocked on Gen Cartwright's door, and entered his room.

3:00-5:00 a.m.

We received varying accounts of the activities of Gen Cartwright's staff, including [redacted] during this period and the testimony was imprecise or inconsistent regarding times and events. [redacted] testified [redacted] was asleep in [redacted] room [redacted] when, at approximately 3:30 or 4:00 a.m. [redacted] heard other members of Gen Cartwright's staff return from the bar and disperse to their rooms. [redacted] testified that, sometime after 4:00 a.m., the group returned from the bar, but that [redacted] had rejoined Gen Cartwright sometime before that. [redacted] testified [redacted] returned from the bar along with the group, and that [redacted] could not find [redacted] way to [redacted] room. [redacted], still on duty [redacted] testified [redacted] was with the group as they returned from the bar, but went to Gen Cartwright's room rather than [redacted] own.

5:00-7:30 a.m.

[redacted] testified that, at approximately 5:00 a.m. [redacted] became concerned that "bag drag" -- the time to gather, screen, and load bags and equipment -- was approaching but there was no sign of Gen Cartwright's bags or of [redacted] [redacted] knocked on Gen Cartwright's door, which was ajar, entered, and observed [redacted] hunched over on the edge of the bed. [redacted] roused [redacted] to assist [redacted] back to [redacted] room. [redacted] then retrieved Gen Cartwright's bags as [redacted] was too intoxicated to do so [redacted] observed that [redacted] was "coming in and out of consciousness," but could not determine whether it was due to exhaustion, intoxication, emotional stress and fatigue, or the fact that [redacted] had not been asleep all night.

[redacted] testified that [redacted] called [redacted] to assist with bag drag. [redacted] entered Gen Cartwright's room looking for [redacted] and found [redacted] laying on the bed; Gen Cartwright indicated that [redacted] was asleep. [redacted] described that [redacted] was fully clothed and Gen Cartwright was dressed in uniform pants and a t-shirt. [redacted] roused [redacted] and sent [redacted] room to prepare for departure.

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Bag drag was completed at approximately 5:50 a.m. [redacted] testified [redacted] knocked on [redacted] door to make sure [redacted] was awake, because [redacted] was late. [redacted] then reported to [redacted] in uniform, and told [redacted] about [redacted]. [redacted] appeared to have been crying, smelled of alcohol, and [redacted] believed [redacted] was intoxicated. [redacted] testified there was speculation afterward that [redacted] was still drunk when [redacted] reported for duty on March 31, 2009. [redacted]

Gen Cartwright's version of events in Tbilisi

Gen Cartwright testified that the Tbilisi TDY occurred shortly after Russia's entry into Georgia. He believed he spent the first evening in Tbilisi working within the U.S. Embassy. He spent the second evening with the Georgian President, which included their joint participation in a late night press conference. He stated that, on that second evening, he chose not to dine outside the hotel due to general security concerns and the attention his personal and host-nation security escorts would have generated. He, [redacted] and other staff members dined in the hotel restaurant. All tables were two-person tables and [redacted] sat at his table. Following dinner, [redacted] came into his room for final checks, and when [redacted] departed, he went to bed.

He was awakened between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. by [redacted] followed by [redacted], because the National Military Command Center relayed a request for him to make a secure telephone call in reference to a document that required his review. He stated, [redacted] obviously had been with the crowd and they had been out drinking." After a short while, it became clear to him that [redacted] and [redacted] were not able to establish the necessary telephone connection, and [redacted] remained in his room while [redacted] summoned [redacted] for assistance in making the connection for his call.[6] He stated that at some point while his attention was on either the phone call or document review, "The door was open, the security guys were outside [redacted] sat down on the chair and I think [redacted] passed out. I mean [redacted] was basically done." He described that [redacted] was seated on the bench at the foot of his bed and "hunched over" with [redacted] upper torso on the bed.

[redacted] asked Gen Cartwright if he wanted [redacted] to remove [redacted] and he declined. [redacted] then departed, which left [redacted] and [redacted], who was working on the equipment. Gen Cartwright testified to his belief that other staff were out in the hallway.

[6] In his initial interview, Gen Cartwright believed [redacted] was the [redacted] who successfully made the connection. He did not dispute that it was actually [redacted] when we presented him with that information in a second interview.

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Following the phone call, while he was alone with [redacted] who was asleep, he worked on the document. At some point while he worked, [redacted] awoke and began talking incoherently:

> I just remember that when [redacted] woke up that [redacted] was talking about [redacted] was talking about being downstairs; there was a lot of conversation there. It seemed emotional, you know, again, but I was occupied at the time both with what I was doing on the terminal and the phone call. So I don't recall a discussion about [redacted]

When he finished with the document, [redacted] stood up, signaled to him that [redacted] was okay, and departed his room. He believed the whole sequence lasted not more than one hour, that he was alone with [redacted] for no more than 15 minutes during that time, and that the time [redacted] left was likely between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m., although he stated it was possible his estimates of elapsed time were wrong. Gen Cartwright stated he had no recollection of what others described as a subsequent visit by [redacted] following the sequence of events involving the phone call. He told us he went to bed, got about one hour of sleep, rose, changed into his uniform, and then there was a knock on the door for his bags.

[redacted]

We asked Gen Cartwright why he chose to leave [redacted] in [redacted] condition in his room given the potential perceptions versus having someone escort [redacted] out. In his first interview he explained that he knew a staff member was returning to his room and that he had not seen [redacted] had fallen asleep until he turned and realized [redacted] was not responding to him. In his second interview, he elaborated that he had separated [redacted] whom he assumed had been drinking together. He believed conditions were such that others in the area clearly had the ability to observe into his room. He recalled "heads pop in and out during this period of time," and felt that he was not really alone.

Gen Cartwright stated that this trip stuck out in his mind because [redacted] had obviously consumed significant amounts of alcohol. While he acknowledged their need to "blow off steam," he noticed that [redacted] clearly hung over the next morning, and [redacted] did not look well. He expressed to us his discomfort with the general behavior of his staff on the Tbilisi trip. He stated that he did not inquire into events or personally counsel anyone, but looked to [redacted] as the senior military person in charge of both military and

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civilian staff to inquire into matters. He stated he expected [redacted] to take appropriate action, but not necessarily to inform him (Gen Cartwright) of actions taken.

We received testimony that Gen Cartwright did not speak of the events in Tbilisi until he returned to the Pentagon and [redacted] based on notification from Army CIDC or other security personnel, conferred with him on the matter. As a result, [redacted] verbally admonished [redacted] for the breakdown in discipline which occurred in Tbilisi, and warned that another incident would result in the offender's relief. [redacted]

Facts Concerning the Alfalfa Club Dinner in January 2009

During our investigation we were made aware of an event that occurred prior to the Tbilisi trip, which was relevant to matters at issue.

[redacted] testified that in January 2009, [redacted] accompanied Gen Cartwright to the annual Alfalfa Club Dinner, at which President Obama delivered remarks. Gen Cartwright and [redacted] were seated in separate areas during the event. While [redacted] waited for Gen Cartwright in a reception area [redacted] had a verbal altercation with a U.S. Secret Service agent who though [redacted] had too much to drink. [redacted], who had also observed that [redacted] was intoxicated, defused the situation by assuring the agent [redacted] would have no more to drink and would talk to no one. When Gen Cartwright emerged from the dinner, [redacted] walked him and [redacted] to Gen Cartwright's car, recalling, "it was noted [redacted] was intoxicated." Gen Cartwright instructed [redacted] to make sure [redacted] got home safely. After dropping Gen Cartwright off at his quarters, [redacted] drove [redacted] home.

As Gen Cartwright did not broach in our first interview the matter of [redacted] conduct at the Alfalfa Club Dinner, we raised the subject in our second interview. Gen Cartwright testified that, when he left his table to depart the event that evening, it was clear to him that [redacted] was "inebriated." He suggested to us that [redacted] might have been provided drinks that [redacted] did not expect to contain alcohol. He explained that, on the return trip, [redacted] chattered "incoherently" in the vehicle, and that he directed [redacted] to drive [redacted] home rather than allow [redacted] to drive [redacted]. The next duty day he made inquiries of his staff and his regular contacts on the White House staff regarding the matter, and told us he believed the incident had something to do with [redacted] attempting to access an area or room which was restricted. Gen Cartwright acknowledged he did not "get more information" on

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the incident. When we asked, he responded he did not speak with [redacted] about the matter, choosing instead to defer to [redacted].

Discussion

[redacted]

We stand by our original conclusion that Gen Cartwright's failure to correct [redacted] behavioral shortcomings was inconsistent with the leadership requirements established by 10 U.S.C. § 5947 and the Marine Corps Manual.

[redacted]

We set forth the following analysis to support these conclusions.

[redacted]

- [redacted]

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[redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted] felt [redacted] had license to visit Gen Cartwright in his room in Tbilisi, late at night and while intoxicated, even after being advised against that visit by a member of the security team;

  [redacted] Gen Cartwright allowed [redacted] to enter his Tbilisi hotel room late at night in an intoxicated state while noting [redacted] spoke "incoherently" and at length about [redacted]

- [redacted] Gen Cartwright allowed [redacted] to remain in his Tbilisi hotel room for some period of time, after realizing [redacted] fell asleep from the effects of alcohol, on the foot of his bed; and

- [redacted] Gen Cartwright witnessed [redacted] questionable conduct in both Tbilisi and at the Alfalfa dinner, but chose not to directly confront or correct [redacted] behavior.

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[redacted]

Failure to Address [redacted] *Shortcomings*

10 U.S.C. § 5947 charges those in authority in the naval service to "guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices" and correct "all persons who are guilty of them." Marine Corps policy, as expressed in the Marine Corps Manual, notes that sound judgment and discretion are among the basic elements that form the basis for the "special trust and confidence" reposed in the officer corps, which is jeopardized by the slightest transgression on the part of any member. Accordingly, "[a]ny offense, however, minor, will be dealt with promptly, and with sufficient severity to impress on the officer at fault." The obligation of every Marine officer to ensure that special trust and confidence is "wholly deserved" transcends the bonds of personal friendship.

Gen Cartwright observed that [redacted] had become drunk on duty when he departed the Alfalfa Dinner. In addition, he learned there was an incident involving a Secret Service agent, a possible indicator of further unacceptable behavior. We consider his attempts to get the facts behind the incident superficial – most notably, he chose not to speak to [redacted] on the matter.

Two months later in Tbilisi, [redacted] again became intoxicated while on duty, this time with [redacted] members of the staff. Gen Cartwright testified that [redacted] had been drinking and was unable to resolve a problem with making a telephone connection. He acknowledged [redacted] remained in his room and talked "incoherently" before falling asleep. [redacted] reported late for the bag drag, apparently still suffering from the effects of alcohol. Still, Gen Cartwright did not personally take action to correct [redacted] behavior.

We conclude that Gen Cartwright did not fulfill his responsibility to impress upon [redacted] the importance of sobriety and sound judgment, and that his failure to objectively

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confront conduct jeopardized the special trust and confidence imposed on Based on the evidence in this case, it is reasonable to conclude that Gen Cartwright allowed the "bonds of personal friendship" to deter him from dealing with shortcomings "promptly, and with sufficient severity."

Response to Tentative Conclusions

We provided Gen Cartwright the opportunity to comment on our tentative conclusions by letter dated January 19, 2010. In his response dated February 17, 2010, which attached a supplemental memorandum signed by Gen Cartwright stated that where his staff departed from his principles of conduct, he acted promptly and decisively, that appropriate corrective measures were applied, He characterized our investigation as relying on scattered opinions and perceptions without any factual substantiation. We carefully considered Gen Cartwright's response, which we found not fully congruent with his previous testimony.

With respect to conduct at the Alfalfa dinner, Gen Cartwright previously testified on November 17, 2009, that when he saw at the conclusion of the Alfalfa dinner, it was clear to him that had been drinking. He described that on the ride home, engaged in ". . . real constant chatter, but none of it coherent," and "one subject jumping right into the middle of the sentence to another subject." He was sufficiently concerned that he told his security officer to drive home. He recalled that his security officer

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later informed him that a guest had provided [redacted] "a series of drinks" which had caused [redacted] to become drunk, the security officer intimating to him (Gen Cartwright) that [redacted] did not realize what was happening [redacted] Gen Cartwright stated he was somewhat troubled with the "unwitting" characterization of his [redacted] conduct. He further testified he made inquiries of his staff and his White House contacts, but never obtained the full set of facts.

In his February 17, 2010, response, Gen Cartwright altered his description of [redacted] behavior, stating instead that [redacted] did not appear completely steady, and he thought [redacted] unsteadiness *may* have been related to alcohol ingestion. He stated he referred the matter for resolution to his [redacted], who later informed him that [redacted] had ingested only one drink at the event, and that [redacted] had directed [redacted] not to drink at official events or while on duty in the future. Although Gen Cartwright described only that the Secret Service had prevented [redacted] from transitioning a room adjoining the ballroom, the supplemental memorandum provided by [redacted] described that [redacted] engaged in an argument and became insubordinate with a Secret Service agent. [redacted] memorandum further indicated that he ([redacted] asked [redacted] to inquire with the Secret Service on Gen Cartwright's behalf regarding the potential filing of a complaint.

Regarding events in Tbilisi, the fact that Gen Cartwright permitted [redacted] to enter his room late at night in an intoxicated state and remain there after falling asleep at the foot of his bed is not in dispute. In testimony, Gen Cartwright acknowledged [redacted] was unable to assist him in resolving a communications issues, and that he sent for others to assist him. [redacted] t he did not want to rejoin [redacted], as he was concerned the two had been drinking together, and might continue to drink together if not separated. [redacted]

In his February 17, 2010, response, Gen Cartwright stated that he retained [redacted] in Tbilisi hotel room because [redacted] state of intoxication and emotional distress warranted his personal supervision. We view with concern the fact that Gen Cartwright chose not to personally correct this second instance of intoxication just 2 months after the Alfalfa dinner, particularly because of [redacted] obvious inability to coordinate staff and security matters prior to leaving Tbilisi.

With respect to events in Tbilisi, [redacted] testified that after first being informed of events by either Army CIDC or by security personnel, it was [redacted] who approached Gen Cartwright rather than Gen Cartwright alerting [redacted] told us, "No, [Gen Cartwright] didn't talk to me about it." [redacted] stated that after [redacted] brought the matter to Gen Cartwright's attention, the general responded, "Yeah, I heard about it too." [redacted] told us it was a matter Gen Cartwright expected [redacted] to deal with. When asked what information [redacted] did receive from Gen Cartwright, [redacted] responded, "I got nothing. Gen Cartwright – Gen Cartwright almost never talks to me."

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[7] [redacted]

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[redacted] described [redacted] own condition as upset, but not intoxicated. Two other staff members reported to [redacted] that [redacted] had been drinking, but would not state [redacted] passed out from drinking. [redacted] explained that [redacted] never received full details regarding [redacted] actions in Gen Cartwright's room, commenting:

> What's funny is, is that's the piece I would have never looked into because -- other than the fact [redacted] was drinking -- because [redacted] job is to basically monitor [Gen Cartwright] [redacted] That is [redacted] job.

[redacted] acknowledged that while [redacted] responsibilities included the general "care and feeding" of the staff, ". . . if I'm going to actually institute some sort of disciplinary action, it has to come from the man who they physically work for."

While Gen Cartwright, in his response to our tentative conclusions, and [redacted] in [redacted] addendum to that response, both acknowledged that the general expected [redacted] to address [redacted] conduct in Tbilisi, neither elaborated that Gen Cartwright did not raise the issue to [redacted] or that Gen Cartwright did not provide [redacted] specific details of [redacted] conduct.

In weighing Gen Cartwright's response, we placed greater reliance on [redacted] sworn testimony, which we found both forthcoming and thorough. Conversely, we found Gen Cartwright's response less forthcoming and thorough. We accept that Gen Cartwright could defer certain staff matters to [redacted] However, our review of the evidence established that Gen Cartwright failed to provide [redacted] with notice or details of [redacted] conduct in Tbilisi sufficient for [redacted] to have a fully informed basis to either counsel [redacted] or to recommend disciplinary action.

Although Gen Cartwright's response also contended that none of the behavior could be considered "dissolute or immoral," we note that Merriam-Webster defines *dissolute* as "lacking restraint, especially marked by indulgence in things (as drink and promiscuous sex) deemed vices." Accordingly, we stand by our initial conclusion that Gen Cartwright did not correct obvious behavioral shortcomings on the part of [redacted] and, therefore, did not execute his leadership responsibilities consistent with 10 U.S. C. 5947 and Marine Corps policy.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

[redacted]

[redacted] Gen Cartwright's response to obvious behavioral shortcomings on the part of [redacted] was not consistent with standards for executing leadership responsibilities established by 10 U.S. C. 5947 and Marine Corps policy.

[redacted]

VI. RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy consider appropriate corrective action with respect to Gen Cartwright.

b(6)
b(7)(C)

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Inspector General
Department of Defense



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