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Report No. D-2011-051

March 21, 2011

Inspector General

United States
Department of Defense



DoD Needs Synchronized Communication Activities and an Integrated Information Operations Capability in Afghanistan

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Acronyms and Abbreviations (U)

USSOCOM -
(b)(1): Sec.

GIRoA

JIOWC

IJC

IO

ISAF

MISO

NATO

PSYOP

RC

USFOR-A

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Joint Information Operations Warfare Center

ISAF Joint Command

Information Operations

International Security Assistance Force

Military Information Support Operations

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Psychological Operations

Regional Command

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

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MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: DoD Needs Synchronized Communication Activities and an Integrated Information Operations Capability in Afghanistan (Report No. D-2011-051)
(U)

(U) We are providing this report for review and comment. Improving the synchronization and integration of communication efforts will enable the Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, to explain coalition and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan objectives to the people of Afghanistan. In addition, by addressing the personnel shortfalls, clarifying the Office of the Secretary of Defense's responsibilities for Information Operations, and developing a comprehensive strategy for Information Operations, the Commander will have a more mature Information Operations capability in Afghanistan. We considered comments from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan when preparing the final report.

(U) DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. The comments from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan were only partially responsive. Therefore, we request additional comments on Recommendations A.1.a and A.1.c by April 20, 2011.

(U) Please provide comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible, send management comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only). Copies of management comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to Michael J. Roark at (703) 604-9187 (DSN 664-9187). If you desire, we will provide a formal briefing on the results.

Daniel R. Blair
Deputy Inspector General
for Auditing

Unclassified when separated from classified enclosures.

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Results in Brief: DoD Needs Synchronized Communication Activities and an Integrated IO Capability in Afghanistan (U)

What We Did (U)

(U) We reviewed how U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan conducted Information Operations (IO) in Afghanistan and focused our review on how IO is synchronized with other communication disciplines. We also assessed the oversight and support DoD organizations provided to commands conducting IO in Afghanistan. To provide the results of our audit field work in a timely manner, on September 17, 2010, we issued a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, to address synchronization of communication activities in Afghanistan and IO oversight responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

What We Found (U)

(U) Generally, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan synchronized and focused their communication activities on the lines of operation from the ISAF operation plan. However, communication efforts at the ISAF Joint Command were not optimally synchronized because there were vacancies in key IO positions, cross-functional teams made coordination difficult, ^{USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)} [redacted] was not fully integrated into the ISAF Joint Command. Coordinated efforts between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command are needed because synchronized communication efforts are critical at this stage of the campaign to strengthen support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and inform and explain coalition objectives to the people of Afghanistan.

(U) Several DoD organizations provided targeted IO support to fill specific capability gaps in Afghanistan. However, ISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan faced challenges obtaining personnel

in non-military information support operations (ISAF and ISAF Joint Command) and military information support operations positions (Regional Commands). This occurred because DoD is not optimally organized to integrate IO nor to implement a comprehensive investment strategy that provides consistent financial resources. Without sufficient personnel from all IO core capabilities, adequate staffing of military information support operations units at the tactical level, and consistent financial resources, the Commander, ISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, does not have a fully integrated IO capability, which limits the U.S. forces' ability to effectively conduct IO in Afghanistan.

(U) Our September 17, 2010, memorandum suggested that the Deputy Secretary of Defense examine IO oversight responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Strategic Command, and modify DoD Directive 3600.01 as needed. On January 25, 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum reorganizing DoD organizational responsibilities for IO and directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to revise Directive 3600.01 to reflect this change. These actions addressed our management requests concerning IO organizational oversight responsibilities; therefore, we did not make any additional recommendations regarding these matters.

Management Comments and Our Response (U)

(U) The comments from U.S. Force-Afghanistan were partially responsive for recommendations A.1.a and A.1.c. Please see the recommendations table on the back of this page.

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan	A.1.a, A.1.c	A.1.b

(U) Please provide comments by April 20, 2011.

Table of Contents (U)

(U) Introduction	1
Objectives	1
Background	1
Review of Internal Controls	3
(U) Finding A. Communication Activities in Afghanistan Were Not Optimally Synchronized at the Operational Level	4
Synchronizing Communication Activities in Afghanistan	4
Effective Synchronization at the Strategic Level	4
Synchronization Challenges at the Operational Level	5
Coordinated Efforts Needed at All Levels to Achieve Communication Objectives	6
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response	7
(U) Finding B. DoD Can Develop a More Integrated IO Capability in Afghanistan	9
Support Provided for Conducting IO in Afghanistan	9
IO Personnel Shortfalls	9
Lack of a Fully Integrated Capability and Comprehensive Investment Strategy for IO	10
Integrated IO Capability Needed in Afghanistan	12
Management Actions Taken to Improve IO Oversight	13
(U) Appendices	
A. Scope and Methodology	14
Prior Coverage	15
B. Communication Efforts in Afghanistan	16
C. Support for Conducting IO in Afghanistan	21
D. Memorandum on IO in Afghanistan	23
E. Classified Documents	27
(U) Management Comments	
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan	29

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Introduction (U)

Objectives (U)

(U) Our audit objective was to evaluate the ability of U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to conduct Information Operations (IO) in Afghanistan. In addition, we assessed the support provided by DoD organizations that enable those commands to conduct IO. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the objectives.

(U) Officials from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/USFOR-A asked us to focus our review on how IO is synchronized with other communication disciplines in Afghanistan to achieve the desired communication effects of the Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A. To provide the results of our audit fieldwork in a timely manner, we issued a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan on September 17, 2010. Our memorandum suggested that the Deputy Secretary of Defense examine IO oversight responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Strategic Command and modify DoD Directive 3600.01 as needed. Management did not respond to the memorandum. A copy of the memorandum is attached as Appendix D.

Background (U)

(U) Joint Publication 3-13, "Information Operations," February 13, 2006, defines IO as the coordinated execution of five core capabilities: electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations (PSYOP),¹ military deception, and operations security. The core capabilities, in conjunction with supporting and related capabilities, such as public diplomacy and public affairs, are used to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

(U) Joint Publication 3-61, "Public Affairs," May 9, 2005, defines public affairs as those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in DoD.

Communication Efforts (U)

(U) Communication efforts in Afghanistan are conducted by organizations within the U.S. Central Command, USFOR-A, and ISAF.


¹ (U) During our audit fieldwork the term PSYOP was in effect; however, on December 3, 2010, the Secretary of Defense changed the term PSYOP to Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

United States Central Command (U)

(U) U.S. Central Command was established January 1, 1983, and is located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The U.S. Central Command area of responsibility consists of 20 countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. U.S. Central Command, working with national and international partners, promotes development and cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and transnational aggression in order to establish regional security and stability.

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (U)

~~(S//NOFORN)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(d)



International Security Assistance Force (U)

(U) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ISAF² has been deployed since 2001 under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and is composed of 46 contributing nations. ISAF supports the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) by conducting operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capacity and will of the insurgency, supporting the growth in capacity and capability of Afghan National Security Forces, and facilitating improvements in governance and socioeconomic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population. The ISAF Joint Command (IJC)³ is responsible for directing the day-to-day operations of coalition forces. ISAF has six Regional Commands (RCs) that report to IJC and conduct operations at the tactical level in Afghanistan.

Communication Organizations (U)


~~(NC//REL ISAF)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(d), 1.4(g), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a)



² (U) The Commander, ISAF, also serves as the Commander, USFOR-A.

³ (U) The Commander, IJC, also serves as the Deputy Commander, USFOR-A.

⁴ (U) USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.7(e), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.7(e)



Lines of Operation (U)

~~(SECRET NATO//ISAF)~~

OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

[REDACTED]

~~(FOUO)~~ The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and the Commander, ISAF, signed the "Civilian-Military Campaign Plan," in August 2009. A subordinate "2010 Integrated Civilian-Military Afghanistan Communication Plan," March 26, 2010 (the Blue Plan), enables the U.S. Embassy and ISAF to combine respective capabilities in support of the August 2009 Civilian-Military Campaign Plan.

USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e), USSOCOM - (b)(3) 10 USC Sec 130c

[REDACTED]

~~(NATO//ISAF UNCLASSIFIED)~~

OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e)

[REDACTED]

Review of Internal Controls (U)

(U) We determined that internal control weaknesses in the Office of the Secretary of Defense existed as defined by DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program (MICP) Procedures," July 29, 2010. DoD responsibilities for the oversight of IO integration were fragmented. However, we are making no recommendations because on January 25, 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum directing DoD IO organizational changes that will correct the internal control weaknesses. We will provide a copy of the report to the official responsible for internal controls in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Finding A. Communication Activities in Afghanistan Were Not Optimally Synchronized at the Operational Level (U)

(U) Communication activities at ISAF Headquarters (strategic level), including public affairs, IO, and traditional communication, were generally well synchronized and focused on the five lines of operation delineated within the ISAF operation plan. However, communication activities were not optimally synchronized at IJC (operational level). This occurred because there were several challenges in how IJC was organized to conduct communication activities. Specifically, there were a number of vacancies in key IO positions, cross-functional teams made coordination difficult, and USSOCOM - (b)(1)
Sec. 1.7(e) was not fully integrated into the IJC. As a result, a coordinated effort between all levels of command was not fully realized for communication activities in Afghanistan. Synchronizing communication efforts is critical at this stage of the campaign to strengthen support for the GIRoA and inform and explain coalition and GIRoA objectives to the people of Afghanistan.

Synchronizing Communication Activities in Afghanistan (U)

(U) Synchronizing communication activities involves coordinating and planning at all levels of command to ensure communication efforts are complementing and working in concert with each other. This is essential in order to optimally achieve the desired communication objectives of the Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A. In the "COMISAF [Commander, ISAF] Communication Directive," March 1, 2010, the Commander, ISAF, states that he expects communication considerations to be integrated into all levels and stages of planning. Further, the directive states that every leader and member of the command is responsible for integrating communication considerations into each plan and action.

Effective Synchronization at the Strategic Level (U)

(U) Communication activities at ISAF Headquarters were generally synchronized and focused on five lines of operation from the ISAF operation plan. Communication efforts in Afghanistan include four primary communication elements: public affairs, MISO, IO, and traditional communication. The purpose of these communication efforts is to expand media outreach, counter extremist voices, build communication capacity, and strengthen people-to-people ties.

Communication activities at ISAF headquarters were generally synchronized and focused on five lines of operation from the ISAF operation plan.

(U) During our site visit, we observed or identified several approaches being used at ISAF Headquarters for synchronizing communication effects:

- (U) formal and informal coordination;
- (U) ISAF Operation Plan;
- (U) 2010 Integrated Civilian-Military Afghanistan Communication Plan (the Blue Plan);
- (U) Commander, ISAF, Communication Directive; and
- (U) Information Initiatives Working Group.

~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a)



Synchronization Challenges at the Operational Level (U)


~~(S//REL to USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a)




(U) Communication activities were not optimally synchronized at IJC because there were significant IO organizational challenges at IJC. Specifically, there were a number of vacancies in key IO positions at the IJC, cross-functional teams made coordination difficult, and ^{USSOCOM}~~(b)(1) Sec.~~ was not fully integrated into the IJC.

Vacancies in Key IO Positions (U)

~~(NATO//ISAF Restricted)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)



OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a)



~~(NATO//ISAF Restricted)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

Coordination with Cross-Functional Teams (U)

~~(NATO//ISAF Restricted)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

- USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) (U)
- (U) USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)
- (U) USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)
 - (U) USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)
 - (U) USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)

Coordinated Efforts Needed at All Levels to Achieve Communication Objectives (U)

~~(NATO//ISAF RESTRICTED)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

~~(NATO//ISAF RESTRICTED)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response (U)

A.1. (U) ^{USCENTCOM - (b)(5)} [Redacted]

a. (U) ^{USCENTCOM - (b)(5)} [Redacted]

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Comments (U)

(U) ^{USCENTCOM - (b)(5)} [Redacted]

Our Response (U)

(U) ^{USCENTCOM - (b)(5)} [Redacted]

b. (U) ^{USCENTCOM - (b)(5), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 17(e)} [Redacted]

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Comments (U)

(U) ^{USCENTCOM - (b)(5), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 17(e)} [Redacted]

Our Response (U)

(U) ^{USCENTCOM - (b)(5)} [Redacted]

c. (U) ^{USCENTCOM - (b)(5)} [Redacted]

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Comments (U)

(U) ^{USCENTCOM - (b)(5)} [Redacted]

(U) USCENTCOM - (b)(5)
[Redacted]

Our Response (U)

(U) USCENTCOM - (b)(5)
[Redacted]

Finding B. DoD Can Develop a More Integrated IO Capability in Afghanistan (U)

(U) Several DoD organizations were providing targeted IO support to ISAF/USFOR-A to fill specific capability gaps. However, ISAF/USFOR-A faced personnel shortfalls in non-MISO positions; at the operational level, IJC had vacancies in IO positions; and at the tactical level, the RCs faced critical shortfalls in MISO personnel. This occurred because DoD was not optimally organized to provide oversight and foster integration of IO and did not have a comprehensive funding strategy to provide consistent financial resources for IO. Without sufficient personnel from all five IO core capabilities and consistent resources, the Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A does not have a fully integrated IO capability to achieve his counterinsurgency objectives.

(U) On September 17, 2010, we issued a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Commander, USFOR-A, addressing IO oversight responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In our memorandum, we suggested that the Deputy Secretary of Defense examine IO oversight responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On January 25, 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum reorganizing DoD organizational responsibilities for IO and directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to revise DoD Directive 3600.01 to reflect this change. These actions addressed our management requests concerning IO organizational oversight responsibilities; therefore, this Finding has no recommendations.

Support Provided for Conducting IO in Afghanistan (U)

~~(S//REL ACCU)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), USSTRATCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(c), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

IO Personnel Shortfalls (U)

~~(NATO//ISAF RESTRICTED)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b)
[Redacted]


(U) The ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Communication stated that it is so difficult to fill vacancies for communication positions in Afghanistan that he had to personally identify individual personnel to fill vacancies on a case-by-case basis.

~~(S//REL ACCU)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

~~(S//REL ACCU)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), USSTRATCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a)



~~(NATO/ISAF RESTRICTED)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b)



OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b)



~~(FOUO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(5), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.7(e)



Lack of a Fully Integrated Capability and Comprehensive Investment Strategy for IO (U)

(U) DoD is not organized optimally to provide adequate oversight of Department IO efforts and to foster integration of IO, and does not have a comprehensive funding strategy to provide consistent financial resources for IO.

(U) DoD Directive 3600.01, "Information Operations," August 14, 2006, assigns certain DoD organizations responsibilities to provide an integrated IO capability to Joint Force Commanders. Specifically, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is responsible for developing and overseeing DoD IO policy and integration activities, as well as coordinating, overseeing, and assessing the efforts of the DoD components. U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for integrating and coordinating DoD IO core capabilities of Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, MISO, Military Deception, and Operations Security that cross geographic areas of responsibility or across the core IO areas. Combatant Commands are responsible for executing IO and identifying and prioritizing IO requirements. Therefore, DoD organizations that play a supporting role in IO, such as the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and U.S. Strategic Command, are responsible for providing an integrated IO capability to operational commands, such as ISAF/USFOR-A.

Lack of a Fully Integrated IO Capability (U)

(U) By definition, IO is an integrating function. Specifically, DoD Directive 3600.01 states that IO is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, PSYOP, Military Deception, and Operations Security, in

(U) concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

~~(NATO/ISAF RESTRICTED)~~

OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)



IO Oversight Responsibilities are Fragmented (U)

(U) Six components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense are assigned IO


...responsibilities are diffused across the Office of the Secretary of Defense in multiple offices, and in the recent past, this division of responsibilities has often led to fragmented and inconsistent oversight.

responsibilities in DoD Directive 3600.01. However, both the "IO Roadmap," October 2003, and the "DoD Report on Strategic Communications" identified systematic problems regarding Office of the Secretary of Defense organizational structure for IO. Both studies noted that responsibilities are diffused across the Office of the Secretary of Defense in multiple offices. The DoD Report on Strategic

Communications stated that in the recent past, this division of responsibilities has often led to fragmented and inconsistent oversight.

~~(FOUO)~~

OSD/JS - (b)(5), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)



U.S. Strategic Command IO Responsibilities (U)

~~(FOUO)~~

OSD/JS - (b)(5), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)



~~(FOUO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(5), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 17(e)
[Redacted]

Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (U)

(U) The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System is an analysis process that defines capability gaps, capability needs, and approaches to provide those capabilities within a specified functional or operational area. The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System uses Joint Capability Areas as an organizational construct. Joint Capabilities Areas are a collection of like DoD capabilities, functionally grouped to (U) support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capability portfolio management, and capabilities based force development and operational planning.

(U) The five core IO capabilities are dispersed among multiple Joint Capability Areas. For example, MISO and Military Deception are in the Building Partnerships Joint Capability Area, while Computer Network Operations is in both Force Application and Battlespace Awareness. As stated in the "Defense-Wide Information Operations Program and Capability Review Summary," June 2009 (the IO Program Review), this fragmentation makes accounting and development of a unified resource strategy more difficult, and complicates the Department's goal of applying IO as an integrated set of capabilities.

DoD Lacks a Comprehensive Investment Strategy for IO (U)

(U) DoD has not implemented a comprehensive investment strategy to provide consistent financial resources for operational commands, such as ISAF/USFOR-A, to conduct IO.

DoD IO Funding Strategy (U)

~~(NATO/ISAF RESTRICTED)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(d), 14(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 14(a), (b)(5)
[Redacted]

Integrated IO Capability Needed in Afghanistan (U)

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(d), 14(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 14(a), (b)(5)
[Redacted]

OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(d), 14(e), USCENTCOM (b)(1) Sec. 14(a), (b)(5)
[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENCTOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b)(5)



Management Actions Taken to Improve IO Oversight (U)

(U) On September 17, 2010, we issued a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to provide the results of our audit fieldwork in a timely manner. A copy of the memorandum is attached as Appendix D. Specifically, our memorandum suggested that the Deputy Secretary of Defense examine IO oversight responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Strategic Command, and modify DoD Directive 3600.01 as needed.

(U) In 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed a Front End Assessment for IO to review IO management and oversight responsibilities. On January 25, 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum reorganizing DoD organizational responsibilities for IO. Specifically, responsibility for IO oversight and management moved from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Consequently, the Secretary of Defense also directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to revise DoD Directive 3600.01 to reflect this change. The Secretary of Defense also clarified that proponentcy for joint IO resides with the Joint Staff and individual capability responsibilities will reside with the appropriate Combatant Commands. For example, the U.S. Strategic Command was assigned responsibility for Computer Network Operations and Electronic Warfare. Finally, the Secretary of Defense memorandum highlighted the need for DoD to develop standardized budgeting methodologies for IO related activities.

(U) These actions address our suggestions in the September 2010 memorandum and will help the Department resolve ongoing organizational challenges, therefore, we did not make any recommendations regarding this matter.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology (U)

(U) We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 to December 2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with current or former officials from the following organizations:

- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities)
- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- (U) U.S. Central Command; ISAF/USFOR-A; IJC; RC-South; RC-East
- (U) U.S. Strategic Command; JIOWC
- (U) U.S. Special Operations Command; Joint Military Information Support Command
- (U) U.S. Joint Forces Command
- (U) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
- (U) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
- (U) Joint Staff
- (U) 82nd Airborne Division
- (U) USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)

(U) We reviewed Joint Publication 3-13 to determine joint doctrine for IO, Joint Publication 3-13.2 to determine joint doctrine for MISO, and Joint Publication 3-61 to determine joint doctrine for public affairs. We also reviewed DoD Directive 3600.01 to determine organizational responsibilities for IO; DoD IO Roadmap to determine the organizational structure, investment strategy, and roles and responsibilities for the Department; and the Unified Command Plan (2002-2008) to determine roles and responsibilities of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and other Combatant Commands for IO.

(U) To obtain a specific understanding of communication activities in Afghanistan, we visited ISAF Headquarters and USFOR-A. Specifically, we met with the ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, and representatives from public affairs, USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e), traditional communication, integrated plans, assessments, USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e) Atmospheric Program-Afghanistan, IJC, past and present forces assigned to RC-East, and RC-South.

USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)

USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e) We obtained and reviewed key documents such as operation plans, civil-military plans, and Requests for Forces from ISAF.

(U) To obtain a better understanding of the funding process for IO, we obtained and reviewed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01G, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," March 1, 2009; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01D, "Functional Capabilities Board," May 26, 2009, among others. We also obtained IO budget data to estimate the level of funding required for IO activities across the Department.

Use of Computer-Processed Data (U)

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Prior Coverage (U)

(U) During the last 5 years, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and Air Force Audit Agency have issued 8 reports discussing IO. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>.

(U) Air Force Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil domains over the Internet at <https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=OO-AD-01-41> by those with Common Access Cards.

DoD IG (U)

(U) DoD IG Report No. D-2010-033, "Information Operations in Iraq," January 21, 2010. This report is not publicly available.

(U) DoD IG Report No. D-2009-115, "Summary of Information Operations Contracts in Iraq," September 29, 2009.

(U) DoD IG Report No. D-2009-091, "Information Operations Contracts in Iraq," July 31, 2009.

(U) DoD IG Report No. D-2009-090, "Information Operations Career Force Management," July 2, 2009.

(U) DoD IG Report No. 07-INTEL-06, "DoD Involvement with the Rendon Group," March 6, 2007. This report is not publicly available.

(U) DoD IG Report No. D-2007-001, "Information Operations Activities in Southwest Asia," October 6, 2006. This report is not publicly available.

(U) DoD IG Report No. D-2006-083, "Information Operations in U.S. European Command," May 12, 2006. This report is not publicly available.

Air Force (U)

(U) F2005-0003-FD3000, "Information Operations Personnel Data Verification," April 1, 2005.

Appendix B. Communication Efforts in Afghanistan (U)

~~(S//REL ACGU)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)




ISAF Headquarters (U)

(U) The ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Communication conducts IO, traditional communication, and public affairs.


IOTF (U)

~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)



- ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e)
- ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e)
- ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM

~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)



~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ OSD/J5 - (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e),
USCENTCOM - (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)

OSD/J5 - (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USSOCOM - (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)



(U) Source: Task Force-41

Traditional Communication (U)

(U) Traditional communication is a unique effort initiated by the ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Communication in Afghanistan that enables ISAF and USFOR-A to reach the Afghan people through indigenous channels. It includes outreach to elders, religious leaders, youth, and women through jirgas, shuras, and other outreach engagements. Traditional communication uses face to face engagement to disseminate messages by word of mouth.

~~(NATO//ISAF CONFIDENTIAL)~~ OSD/J5 - (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1)
Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b)



(U) One example is the Takhar jirga held to promote moderate Islam and counter insurgent Islamic themes. According to an ISAF/USFOR-A official, this jirga was considered highly successful because, after its completion, eight insurgents turned themselves in and swore allegiance to GIRoA. Traditional communication was especially promising due to its focus on establishing long term relations with the Afghan people, in cooperation and coordination with the U.S. Embassy-Kabul.

Public Affairs (U)

(U) Public affairs in Afghanistan consisted of functional teams comprised of 400 personnel across the country. Public affairs functional teams conducted public affairs planning, integrated information, promoted GIRA outreach, carried out media relations, and conduct internal communication. Public affairs personnel used the ISAF secret network to share information and to coordinate among ISAF, IJC, and the RCs. Guidance for public affairs themes and messages was aligned with ISAF lines of operation. Public affairs press releases were posted daily on ISAF's website to ensure wide distribution. The approval process for public affairs products depended on the scale and whether senior officials need to comment (such as for civilian casualties, ISAF casualties, or cross-border issues).

ISAF Joint Command (U)

~~(ISAF RESTRICTED)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

~~(ISAF RESTRICTED)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) (U)

~~(ISAF RESTRICTED)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
[Redacted]


RC-East (U)

~~(FOUO)~~ RC-East is one of the six RCs under IJC. OSD/JS - (b)(5), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

~~(FOUO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(5), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)



~~(FOUO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(5), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)



RC-South (U)


~~(SECRET NATO//ISAF)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(d), 14(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 14(a), 14(b), 14(d), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 14(a), 14(c), 14(e), 14(g)




Other Organizations (U)

~~(FOUO)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(5), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)



(U) USSOCOM - (b)(3) 10 USC Sec 130c


(FOUO) USSOCOM - (b)(3) 10 USC Sec 130c


Appendix C. Support for Conducting IO in Afghanistan (U)

~~(S//REL ACGU)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)




U.S. Strategic Command Forward Integration Team (U)

~~(S//REL ACGU)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USSTRATCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(c), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)



Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (U)

(U) The JIOWC supports USFOR-A in its key leader engagement and IO mission through the ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USSTRATCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(c), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)~~



Military Information Support Team-Afghanistan (U)

~~(S//REL ACGU)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)



U.S. Joint Forces Command (U)

(U) U.S. Joint Forces Command conducted a Mission Rehearsal Exercise program as part of pre-deployment training. The latest Mission Rehearsal Exercise for Afghanistan, Unified Endeavor 2010-1, was intended to provide a realistic operational environment that enables forces and attached forces to rehearse expected missions. The training environment was based on input of the projected conditions from organizations such as U.S. Central Command and USFOR-A to ensure local, regional, national, and international complexities of the operational environment are replicated. Unified

(U) Endeavor 2010-1 had eight training objectives, one of which was information engagement. The objective was to employ information engagement to communicate and influence multiple audiences, integrate all components of information engagement in staff organization, and coordinate with subordinate and higher headquarters to apply resources and promulgate messages in a timely fashion to achieve desired effect.

(U) Additionally, U.S. Joint Forces Command supported Overseas Contingency Operations joint exercise programs through the Overseas Contingency Operations Exercise Engagement Training Transformation program. This program had a staff of IO subject matter experts that provided IO training as required to meet Overseas Contingency Operations training requests.

Appendix D. Memorandum on IO in Afghanistan (U)



~~SECRET~~
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

September 17, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: Audit of Information Operations in Afghanistan (Project No. D2010-D000JA-0138.000) (U)

(U) We are issuing this memorandum in response to the April 2010 memorandum from the Secretary of Defense asking that we provide our results on the subject as soon as possible. This memorandum summarizes the results of our fieldwork on Information Operations (IO) in Afghanistan; a subsequent audit report will provide more detailed information on our findings and recommendations. Due to the importance of communication efforts in Afghanistan, providing timely feedback is important to the success of ongoing operations.

(U) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) officials asked us to focus our audit on how IO is synchronized with other communication disciplines in Afghanistan to achieve the desired communication effects of the Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A. We also assessed the support provided by DOD organizations that enables those commands to have an integrated IO capability in Afghanistan.

(U) To conduct audit fieldwork, we visited or contacted ISAF headquarters, ISAF Joint Command (IJC), Regional Command (RC)-South, and RC-East officials in Afghanistan, from June 27 through July 9, 2010. We also visited DOD organizations that provide supporting roles in IO, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Background (U)

(U) DOD Directive 3600.01, "Information Operations," August 14, 2006, defines IO as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception, and Operations Security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

~~UNCLASSIFIED SECRET~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e);
USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

~~UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources
DECLASSIFY ON: March, 17, 2035

~~SECRET~~

~~(NATO/ISAF SECRET)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a)

(U) Synchronization and integration of communication efforts in Afghanistan are critical at this stage of the campaign, and IO is a vital component of those efforts. Without an integrated IO capability, the Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A may not have all the necessary tools to communicate effectively with the Afghan population.

Synchronization of Communication Activities in Afghanistan (U)

(U) At the strategic level, communication activities at ISAF headquarters, including public affairs, IO, and traditional communication, were synchronized and focused on common lines of operation from the ISAF Operation Plan. Specifically, ISAF headquarters used several methods to synchronize their communication efforts:

- o (U) formal and informal coordination;
- o (U) ISAF Operation Plan;
- o (U) 2010 Integrated Civilian-Military Afghanistan Communication Plan (the Blue Plan);
- o (U) Commander, ISAF, Communication Directive; and
- o (U) Information Initiatives Working Group.

~~(NATO/ISAF SECRET)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a)

~~(NATO/ISAF RESTRICTED)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 1.4(a)

(U) Unity of effort between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels is needed because communication efforts are critical at this stage of the campaign to communicate effectively with the people of Afghanistan. To address these concerns, we suggest that the Deputy Commander, USFOR-A, adequately staff the IJC IO division and integrate ~~USSOCOM~~ into IJC planning and operations.

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Integrated IO Support from DOD Organizations (U)

~~(S//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GDR)~~ OSD/J5 - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e),
USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USSTRATCOM -
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(c), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Examples of the integration challenges in Afghanistan include:

- ~~(S//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GDR)~~ OSD/J5 - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e),
USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

- ~~(S//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GDR)~~ OSD/J5 - (b)(5), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)

[REDACTED]

- (U) USCENTCOM - (b)(4), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ OSD/J5 - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS - (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d), 1.4(e), USCENTCOM - (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)

(U) By definition, IO is an integrating function. However, without sufficient personnel from all five core capabilities of IO, adequate staffing of PSYOP units at the tactical level, and consistent financial resources, the Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A, may not have a fully integrated IO capability to use in Afghanistan. To address these concerns, we suggest the Deputy Secretary of Defense examine IO oversight responsibilities for OSD and U.S. Strategic Command, and modify DOD Directive 3600.01, as needed. Also, we suggest the Deputy Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive IO funding strategy that both provides resources to commands to conduct IO and institutes more robust accountability and oversight over those resources.



Carol N. Gorman
Director
Joint and Southwest Asia Operations

Cc: Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
Commander, U.S. Central Command
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command
Director, Joint Staff

~~SECRET~~

Appendix E. Classified Documents (U)

- (U) ^{USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)} [REDACTED]: SECRET
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: March 22, 2004
- (U) Exhibit R-2, RDT & E Project Justification: SECRET//NOFORN
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: February 2010
- (U) ^{USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]: SECRET
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: Undated
- (U) ^{USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec 17(e)} [REDACTED] SECRET//REL ACGU
Declassified Date: September 15, 2019
Generated Date: Undated
- (U) INFO MEMO: SECRET
Declassified Date: November 4, 2018
Generated Date: April 8, 2010
- (U) E-mail, Program Data to March 2010 Congressional Report on IO:
SECRET//NOFORN
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: March 2010
- (U) Information Operations Roadmap: SECRET//NOFORN
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: October 30, 2003
- (U) USSTRATCOM Forward Integration Team Briefing Slides (SFIT): SECRET//REL
TO USA, ACGU
Declassified Date: March 17, 2035
Generated Date: April 1, 2010
- (U) ISAF COM ISAF OPLAN: NATO//ISAF SECRET
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: September 9, 2009
- (U) ISAF DCOS Communication Briefing Slides: SECRET//REL USA//ISAF//NATO
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: May 11, 2010

(U) [REDACTED] : ISAF RESTRICTED
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: July 1, 2010

(U) [REDACTED] : SECRET//REL USA, ACGU
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: July 3, 2010

(U) RC(S) Information Operations Capability Brief: NATO//ISAF SECRET
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: June 17, 2010

(U) [REDACTED] : SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: June 29, 2010

(U) [REDACTED] : SECRET//NOFORN
Declassified Date: Undated
Generated Date: Undated

(U) [REDACTED] : SECRET//REL
ACGU
Declassified Date: September 2019
Generated Date: September 2009

(U) [REDACTED] : SECRET
Declassified: August 20, 2020
Generated: Undated

(U) [REDACTED] :
SECRET
Declassified Date: February 2019
Generated Date: February 2009

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Comments (U)



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A DCOS COMM

21 February 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General, Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive,
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

SUBJECT: Comments to the Draft Report Recommendations on Department of Defense
Communication Activities and Information Operations in Afghanistan (Project No. D2010-
D000JA-0138.000)

USCENTCOM - (b)(5), USSOCOM - (b)(1) Sec. 17(e)



USFOR-A DCOS COMM

SUBJECT: Comments to the Draft Report Recommendations on Department of Defense Communication Activities and Information Operations in Afghanistan (Project No. D2010-D000JA-0138.000)

USCENTCOM - (b)(5)

2. The point of contact for this memorandum is



GREGORY J. SMITH
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Chief of Staff, Communications
United States Forces- Afghanistan

~~SECRET~~



Inspector General
Department of Defense

~~SECRET~~