March 1, 2016 —
The WIN-T program is a network that distributes classified and unclassified information by voice, data, and real-time video and is the backbone of the Army’s tactical communications network. Our objective was to determine whether the Army adequately justified the procurement quantity of 3,674 for the Warfighter Information Network–Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2.
Program Executive Office, Command, Control, Communications–Tactical (PEO C3T) officials calculated the WIN-T Increment 2 planned procurement quantity of 3,674; however, they did not support the need for the planned procurement quantity throughout the life cycle.
This occurred because PEO C3T officials used an unapproved force structure1 for the WINâ€‘T Increment 2 planned procurement quantity, and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command officials did not follow required processes to validate the quantity and cost in the capability production document.
Additionally, the Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, determined the Mission Command portfolio was unaffordable and unsustainable; therefore, changes to the portfolio may impact the WINâ€‘T Increment 2 planned procurement quantity. The Mission Command portfolio consists of systems that contribute to tactical and strategic communications and includes the WINâ€‘T Increment 2.
As a result, the Army has no assurance the procurement of 3,674 WINâ€‘T Increment 2 units, at a cost of $9.1 billion, is necessary or valid, and is the appropriate quantity needed for future Army forces.
We recommend PEO C3T use an approved Army force structure to calculate procurement quantity, estimate Army units beyond the approved Army force structure to cover the production and fielding period through FY 2029, and update acquisition documents with any changes based on the results of refining the Mission Command portfolio.
We recommend the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, revise WINâ€‘T Increment 2 funding based on an approved Army force structure.
We recommend the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, update plans, revise requirements documents with any changes based on the results of refining the Mission Command portfolio, and submit an updated capability production document for validation.
We recommend the Deputy Commanding General, Futures/Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, conduct an analysis to validate the capability production document is using the approved quantity and cost and submit the validated document to the Army Requirements Oversight Council for validation.
We recommend the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Chair, Army Requirements Oversight Council, conduct an analysis to validate that the capability production document includes the approved force structure quantity and cost.
Management Comments and Our Response:
Comments from Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Chair, Army Requirements Oversight Council addressed Recommendations 2, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b and 5.b, respectively. However, PEO C3T and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command did not address all the specifics of Recommendations 1.a, 1.b, 3.a and 3.c. As a result of management comments, Recommendation 5.a was added for the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Chair, Army Requirements Oversight Council.
The Army’s force structure establishes Army positions and organizations and designs combat and support units.