DoD IG Publications http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm DoD IG Publications RSS Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:00:59 GMT Audit Report - U.S. Africa Command’s Management of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7567 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-121)<br>Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management<br>U.S. Africa Command’s Management of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (Project No. D2017-D000CN-0057.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) effectively managed Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) transactions for logistics support, supplies, and services.</p> <p>Background</p> <p>ACSAs are bilateral agreements between the United States and authorized foreign entities for the exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services. ACSAs allow logistical exchanges between the United States and the military forces of eligible countries and international organizations. The ACSA program gives the commander increased flexibility in addressing logistical requirements. Implementing arrangements are supplementary agreements that prescribe details, terms, and conditions to effectively implement cross-servicing agreements. While these arrangements normally are more detailed than the ACSAs, they must be completely consistent with the ACSAs they support. An implementing arrangement is a type of international agreement under DoD Directive 5530.3, &ldquo;International Agreements,&rdquo; June 11, 1987.</p> <p>Federal law grants the Secretary of Defense the authority to use ACSAs. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&amp;L]) is the focal point for the ACSA program. DoD Directive 2010.9, &ldquo;Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements,&rdquo; November 24, 2003, establishes ACSA policy and assigns responsibilities for the OUSD(AT&amp;L), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Military Departments, Defense agencies and combatant commands and for the implementation of the ACSA program.</p> <p>As part of the responsibility assigned in DoD Directive 2010.9, the CJCS provides guidance for implementing the ACSA and assigns roles and responsibilities for the Joint Staff, combatant commands, direct reporting units, and Defense agencies reporting to the Secretary of Defense through CJCS Instruction 2120.01D, &ldquo;Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements,&rdquo; May 21, 2015. CJCS Instruction 2120.01D directs the use of ACSAs in accordance with Federal law.<sup>1</sup> It also requires the use of the ACSA Global Automated Tracking and Reporting System (AGATRS) to fully document all transfers of logistics support, supplies, and services between U.S. and foreign entities under ACSA authorities and states that the program should be executed by designated ACSA officials at the lowest organizational level.</p> <p>Finding</p> <p>USAFRICOM did not effectively manage the ACSA orders it executed and was not required to oversee ACSA orders executed by its Subordinate Components in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility. Specifically, USAFRICOM and its Subordinate Components did not include all minimum essential data elements on ACSA orders and upload source documents supporting line items on ACSA orders into AGATRS. In addition, some Subordinate Components were not maintaining ACSA orders in AGATRS or tracking ACSA orders under ACSA authorities. Specifically:</p> <ul> <li>U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa did not maintain all transactions in AGATRS,</li> <li>U.S. Naval Forces Africa did not know that ACSA orders were used for medical activities, and</li> <li>U.S. Air Forces Africa did not document that meals were provided under ACSA authorities.</li> </ul> <p>Furthermore, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa entered into four agreements that met the intent of an implementing arrangement without understanding the requirements for completing and coordinating an implementing arrangement.</p> <p>These conditions occurred, in part, because the OUSD(AT&amp;L) did not monitor compliance with DoD Directive 2010.9 as required or establish training requirements for personnel who execute ACSA orders. In addition, the CJCS provided implementation guidance that does not apply to Military Departments and some Defense agencies and does not establish clear training requirements. Furthermore, neither the Secretary of the Navy nor the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), issued ACSA policy or program guidance, and USAFRICOM did not update its ACSA instruction.</p> <p>As a result, the CJCS, Secretaries of Military Departments, and Commander, USAFRICOM, did not have assurance that logistics support, supplies, and services transactions executed in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility were accurate or reimbursed. For example, we reviewed ACSA orders from January 2014 through December 2016 and identified that the DoD did not have assurance that 196 orders, valued at $32.1 million, for logistics support, supplies, and services were accurate or reimbursed. Furthermore, USAFRICOM&rsquo;s Subordinate Components may not be capturing the transfer of items or services as logistics support, supplies, and services in support of an ACSA, resulting in inaccurate program records for DoD Components or the Military Services not being reimbursed for logistics support, supplies, and services. Finally, poor implementation of the ACSA program will reduce flexibility for commanders to address logistical shortfalls.</p> <p>Recommendations and Management Actions Taken</p> <p>We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics:</p> <ul> <li>Review the current implementation and execution of the ACSA program and update DoD Directive 2010.9 to define oversight responsibilities for Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Departments, Defense agencies, Joint Staff and combatant commands; to require use of a DoD system of record to maintain ACSA orders; to define ACSA order and billing officials roles; and to clarify requirements for implementing arrangements.</li> <li>Develop and issue program guidance as required by DoD Directive 2010.9 for the Military Services and Defense agencies.</li> <li>Develop a training program or training program requirements for the implementation of the ACSA program and execution of ACSA authorities.</li> </ul> <p>In response to the discussion draft, the OUSD(AT&amp;L) issued DoD Memorandum, &ldquo;Delegation of Responsibilities under Departments of Defense Directive 2010.9, &lsquo;Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements,&rsquo;&rdquo; July 19, 2017. The policy memorandum delegates to the Joint Staff the responsibility for allocation of ACSA ceilings to Defense agencies and issuance of program management guidance to Defense agencies and Military Departments. The OUSD(AT&amp;L)&rsquo;s actions taken partially addressed our recommendation; therefore, we consider this part of the recommendation closed.</p> <p>We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) designate a Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters Marine Corps Office of Prime Responsibility to oversee the execution of the ACSA program for their respective Service Components.</p> <p>We recommend that the Commander, USSOCOM, issue interim guidance for the implementation and execution of the ACSA program.</p> <p>During the audit, on April 28, 2017, USSOCOM issued a policy memorandum to provide guidance for the use of ACSA authorities and the execution of ACSA orders. The policy memorandum provides roles and responsibilities and specific requirements for both logistics ACSA program managers and financial ACSA program managers. USSOCOM&rsquo;s actions taken addressed our recommendation; therefore, this recommendation is closed.</p> <p>We recommend that the Commander, USAFRICOM, issue a formal ACSA instruction that includes requirements to complete the 25 minimum essential data elements and upload required supporting documentation in AGATRS.</p> <p>During the audit on June 20, 2017, USAFRICOM&rsquo;s ACSA instruction, with requirements for minimum essential data elements and support documentation, was approved and signed. USAFRICOM&rsquo;s actions taken addressed our recommendation; therefore, this recommendation is closed.</p> <p>We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Air Forces Africa, develop and implement a plan to properly track and maintain all orders for logistics support, supplies, and services, whether paid in cash or electronically, provided to foreign military personnel using ACSA authorities in AGATRS.</p> <p>We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, review U.S. Navy logistics support, supplies, and services provided to foreign military services in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility to determine whether the support and services are supplied under ACSA authority and for the support and services provided under ACSA, track and maintain ACSA orders in accordance with the updated DoD policy.</p> <p>We recommend that the CJCS issue program management guidance to Defense agencies and Military Departments as required by DoD Memorandum, &ldquo;Delegation of Responsibilities under Departments of Defense Directive 2010.9, &lsquo;Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements,&rsquo;&rdquo; July 19, 2017.</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Director of International Cooperation, OUSD(AT&amp;L), responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, agreed with the recommendations to update the DoD Directive 2010.9 to define oversight responsibilities, require use of DoD system of record, and develop training program requirements. Therefore, these recommendations are resolved but will remain open. We will close these recommendations once we verify that the updated DoD Directive 2010.9 fully addresses the recommendations and that training program requirements were developed for the implementation and execution of the ACSA. We expect receipt of the training requirements no later than December 2018.</p> <p>The Director partially agreed with the recommendation to define ACSA order and billing officials&rsquo; roles and responsibilities and clarify what is acceptable for establishing parameters under ACSA authorities.</p> <p>The Director stated that the management detail for ACSA staff roles and responsibilities is addressed in CJCS Instruction 2120.01D and is now applicable to all DoD Components that use ACSA. The Director stated that the OUSD(AT&amp;L) will consult with the Joint Staff to determine whether any changes in CJCS Instruction 2120.01D are necessary. The action taken that delegates to the Joint Staff the responsibility for issuing program management guidance satisfies the intent of this recommendation. Therefore, this recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that the OUSD(AT&amp;L) and Joint Staff have determined whether changes in CJCS Instruction 2120.01D are necessary.</p> <p>The Director stated that the OUSD(AT&amp;L) has determined that CJCS Instruction 2120.01D provides sufficient guidance concerning implementing arrangements. However, CJCS Instruction 2120.01D does not provide any guidance on a memorandum of understanding or any other arrangements that are acceptable for placing terms and conditions on the acquisition or transfer of logistics support, supplies, and services. Therefore, the recommendation to clarify what is acceptable for establishing parameters under ACSA authorities is unresolved and will remain open. We request that the Director provide guidance to DoD ACSA users for supplemental agreements to implementing arrangements under ACSA authority or update DoD Directive 2010.9 to clarify requirements on what is acceptable for establishing parameters under ACSA authorities.</p> <p>The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) did not respond to the finding and the recommendation to designate a Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters Marine Corps Office of Prime Responsibility to oversee the execution of the ACSA program for their respective Service Components. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and will remain open. We request that the Assistant Secretary provide comments on the final report.</p> <p>The Chief, Logistics Readiness Division, U.S. Air Forces Africa, responding for the Commander, U.S. Air Forces Africa, disagreed with the finding and the recommendation to develop and implement a plan to properly track and maintain all orders for logistics support, supplies, and service, whether paid in cash or electronically, provided to foreign military personnel using AGATRS. The Chief stated that U.S. Air Forces Africa has a procedure in place to ensure the accurate tracking of logistics support, supplies, and services. Although a process was provided, it did not mention foreign national headcount totals and the associated cash collected on-site being placed on an ACSA order and the ACSA order being uploaded into AGATRS. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and will remain open. We request that the Chief provide documentation of the process, including the use of AGATRS and ACSA program manager role, the action or plan of dissemination to U.S. Air Forces Africa ACSA users, and the expected date of completion.</p> <p>The Chief of Staff, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, responding for the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, agreed with the finding and the recommendations to review U.S. Navy logistics support, supplies, and services provided to foreign military services to determine whether support and services are supplied under ACSA authority and to track and maintain the logistics support, supplies, and services provided under ACSA authority in accordance with DoD policy. Therefore, this recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendations once we verify the results of the review, and the training plan or documented training policy.</p> <p>The CJCS did not provide official comments; however, the Joint Staff took action to address the recommendation to issue program management guidance to Defense agencies and Military Departments.</p> <p>The Deputy Director for Strategic Logistics, Joint Staff J4, issued a memorandum reiterating that the OUSD(AT&amp;L) delegated to the Joint Staff the responsibility to issue ACSA program management guidance. The Joint Staff J4 also notified the Military Departments that CJCS Instruction 2120.01D is applicable to the Military Departments and is the program management guidance the Departments should follow. The CJCS&rsquo;s actions taken addressed our recommendation; therefore, this recommendation is closed.</p> <p><hr /> </p> <p><sup>1</sup> Sections 2341-2350, title 10, United States Code.</p></Blockquote> Thu, 21 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7567 Technical Assessment Report - Followup Evaluation on DoD Office of Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2014-121, "Military Housing Inspection-Japan," September 30, 2014 http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7563 Technical Assessment Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-118)<br>Topic: Follow-up Military Housing inspection<br>Followup Evaluation on DoD Office of Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2014-121, "Military Housing Inspection-Japan," September 30, 2014 (Project No. D2016-D000PT-0171.000)<br><Blockquote><p><span style="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 107%">Objective</span></p> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">We determined whether the Military Departments and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&amp;L]) implemented the recommendations from DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) Report No. DODIG-2014-121, &ldquo;Military Housing Inspections &ndash; Japan,&rdquo; September 30, 2014.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt"><span style="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 107%">Findings</span></div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">In our 2014 report, we discussed our inspection of 15 military housing facilities in Japan, where we identified 1,057 deficiencies in fire protection, electrical systems, environmental health and safety, and housing management, which posed a risk to the health, safety, and well-being of warfighters and their families.&nbsp;Our prior report made various recommendations for corrective action.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">In this followup evaluation, we determined that the Military Departments had partially implemented the following recommendations from our prior report:</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt 0.5in; text-indent: -0.5in">&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Conduct an effective root cause analysis and perform corrective actions for all 1,057 deficiencies identified.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Ensure that deficiencies do not exist in other housing units.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt 0.5in; text-indent: -0.5in">&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Ensure that the inspection, maintenance, and repair programs are in compliance with applicable codes and standards for fire protection systems,&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; electrical systems, and environmental health and safety.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt 0.5in; text-indent: -0.5in">&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Ensure that sufficient, qualified resources are assigned and available to inspect and verify that all housing facilities are in compliance with fire&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; protection requirements, electrical system requirements, and environmental health and safety requirements.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Ensure that housing management systems are implemented and procedures are followed.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">The Military Departments collectively reported that 874 of the 1,057 (83 percent) deficiencies documented in Report No. DODIG-2014-121 were corrected as of August 2016.&nbsp;We followed up on 218 deficiencies at 5 of the 15 installations previously inspected, and we found that the Army had corrected 26 of 28 (93 percent), the Navy corrected 20 of 23 (87 percent), the Air Force corrected 62 of 89 (70 percent), and the Marine Corps corrected 54 of 78 (69 percent) of the 218 deficiencies.&nbsp;In 2016, we inspected a total of 91 buildings&mdash;74 of which contained deficiencies documented in 2014.&nbsp;In addition to determining whether deficiencies documented in 2014 were corrected, we inspected all 91 buildings to determine whether other similar deficiencies existed.&nbsp;We found that similar deficiencies did exist in these buildings.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">We found cases where the Military Departments corrected similar deficiencies in locations other than those that were detailed in the prior report.&nbsp;However, we also found instances where deficiencies identified in the prior report were not addressed.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">In response to our June 2016 Request for Information, the Military Departments each individually stated that their inspection, maintenance, and repair programs comply with applicable codes and standards.&nbsp;However, despite significant efforts by the Military Departments to address the deficiencies identified in 2014, based on the followup findings noted above, we concluded that the Military Departments did not fully comply with applicable codes and standards for inspection, maintenance, and repair programs.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">Additionally, in response to our June 2016 Request for Information, the Military Departments stated that sufficient and qualified resources were assigned and available to inspect and verify that housing facilities were in compliance with fire protection, electrical system, and environmental health and safety requirements.&nbsp;However, the number of deficiencies identified during our followup evaluation indicates that sufficient resources were not applied.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">As a result, we determined that the Military Departments did not fully implement the recommendations from Report No. DODIG-2014-121.&nbsp;Those recommendations, while resolved, remain open and we will continue to monitor the DoD&rsquo;s response to these recommendations until corrective actions are completed.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">Finally, the Office of the USD(AT&amp;L) had nonconcurred with the recommendations from our prior report to issue mold and radon assessment and mitigation guidance in the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document.&nbsp;We disagreed with its response and requested that management reconsider our recommendations and provide us additional comments.&nbsp;In response to our request for followup information in June 2016, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Basing, responding for the USD(AT&amp;L), stated that his office was in the process of developing and issuing, by October 2017, DoD guidance to resolve inconsistencies among the Military Services for assessing, remediating, and preventing mold; and assessing and mitigating radon.&nbsp;Therefore, those recommendations are resolved but remain open.&nbsp;We will close these recommendations once we verify that the new DoD policy includes appropriate guidance for assessing, remediating, and preventing mold; and assessing and mitigating radon.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt"><span style="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 107%">Recommendations</span></div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">We did not make any recommendations in this report.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt"><span style="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 107%">Management Comments and Our Response</span></div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">The Army provided management comments agreeing with a draft of this report.&nbsp;In addition, the Navy and Air Force did not provide written management comments; however, they agreed with the findings and conclusions of a draft of this report verbally and by e-mail.&nbsp;Although not required to comment, the Marine Corps agreed with our conclusions and provided management comments suggesting that we clarify what is required to close all remaining deficiencies and recommendations from the prior report.&nbsp;Therefore, we clarified in this report what is required to close the remaining deficiencies.&nbsp;We also provided the Marine Corps with a list of the deficiencies that we followed up on during our 2016 reinspections and whether each deficiency was corrected.</div> <div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt">The recommendations from the prior report are resolved but will remain open.&nbsp;We will close all recommendations from the prior report once we verify that appropriate corrective actions were completed for all 1,057 deficiencies or after we receive a mitigation plan or an acceptance of risk memorandum signed by the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, or higher.&nbsp;No further comments are required.</div></Blockquote> Thu, 14 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7563 Audit Report - Independent Auditor’s Report of Department of State Funds Transferred to DoD for Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Prevention http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7562 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-120)<br>Topic: Financial Management<br>Independent Auditor’s Report of Department of State Funds Transferred to DoD for Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Prevention (Project No. D2017-D000FT-0100.000) Thu, 14 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7562 Audit Report - The Global Discovery Program and DoD Counternarcotics Agreements http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7560 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-119)<br>Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management<br>The Global Discovery Program and DoD Counternarcotics Agreements (Project No. D2016-D000CG-0163.000) Mon, 11 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7560 Announced Projects - Evaluation of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip an Iraqi Police Hold Force in support of Stability Operations (Project No. D2018-D00SPO-0018.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7558 Evaluation of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip an Iraqi Police Hold Force in support of Stability Operations (Project No. D2018-D00SPO-0018.000) Fri, 08 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7558 Announced Projects - Termination of Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Iraqi Federal Police (Project No. D2017-D00SPO-0117.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7555 Termination of Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Iraqi Federal Police (Project No. D2017-D00SPO-0117.000) Thu, 07 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7555 Announced Projects - Audit of Payments for Services Provided to Department of Veterans Affairs Beneficiaries Under Health Care Sharing Agreements at Selected Army Medical Centers (Project No. D2017-D000CJ-0183.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7559 Audit of Payments for Services Provided to Department of Veterans Affairs Beneficiaries Under Health Care Sharing Agreements at Selected Army Medical Centers (Project No. D2017-D000CJ-0183.000) Wed, 06 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7559 Audit Report - Joint Requirements Oversight Council Procurement Quantity Validation Process for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (Redacted) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7557 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-117)<br>Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management<br>Joint Requirements Oversight Council Procurement Quantity Validation Process for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (Redacted) (Project No. D2016-D000AU-0118.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) properly validated procurement&nbsp;quantities for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).</p> <p>Background</p> <p>We performed this audit because the DoD Office of Inspector General previously reported in three reports that the Army, Navy, and Air Force could not support or justify the need for procurement quantities of the Warfighter Information Network‑Tactical Increment 2, the CH‑53K Heavy Lift Helicopter, or the MQ‑9 Reaper, respectively. The deficiencies identified in the three prior reports demonstrated that the DoD may waste billions of dollars on excess quantities for weapon systems. Therefore, we conducted this audit to review JROC&rsquo;s procedures for evaluating procurement quantities for MDAPs.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>An MDAP is an acquisition program that is designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&amp;L]) or has an estimated total cost of more than $480 million for research, development, test, and evaluation or $2.79 billion for procurement. We nonstatistically selected the Navy&rsquo;s Littoral Combat Ship, the Air Force&rsquo;s KC‑46A Tanker Modernization, and the Army&rsquo;s Joint Air‑to‑Ground Missile to review the JROC process for validating requirements documents.&nbsp;</p> <p><font size="2">The Military Services develop capability requirements documents and submit the documents to JROC for validation. Validation is the review and approval of capability requirements documents by a designated validation authority. The JROC Charter outlines and defines the participants in the JROC validation process. JROC is chaired by the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and consists of generals and admirals from the Military Services and combatant commands.</font></p> <p>In 2013, the law was amended and required JROC to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by ensuring appropriate tradeoffs were made among life‑cycle cost, schedule, performance, and procurement quantity when establishing and approving joint military requirements. This was the first time the law included specific reference to procurement quantity in the JROC responsibilities.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>During the audit, Public Law 114‑328, &ldquo;The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,&rdquo; December 23, 2016, amended 10 U.S.C. &sect; 181 (2013) and revised the responsibilities of JROC. As amended, 10 U.S.C. &sect; 181 (2017) transfers JROC&rsquo;s responsibilities for ensuring appropriate tradeoffs among life‑cycle cost, schedule, performance, and procurement quantity to a new investment review process the Secretary of Defense is required to establish for MDAPs that reach Milestone A after&nbsp; October 1, 2017. DoD Instruction 5000.02, &ldquo;Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,&rdquo; January 7, 2015, defines acquisition Milestone A as an acquisition investment decision to pursue specific product or design concepts, and to commit resources to develop technology and reduce risks before committing resources for system development.</p> <p>Finding</p> <p>JROC officials accepted MDAP procurement quantities that were included in requirements documents provided by Military Service acquisition officials but did not obtain input and reviews for procurement quantity from officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense when validating requirements documents. This occurred because Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System guidance does not define JROC roles and methods for assessing and reviewing procurement quantity. As a result, JROC officials could not ensure that appropriate tradeoffs were made between life‑cycle cost, schedule, performance, and procurement quantity in accordance with 10 U.S.C. &sect; 181 (2013).</p> <p>Additionally, JROC officials may validate requirements documents with inaccurate procurement quantities for programs that reached, or will reach, Milestone A on or before October 1, 2017, which could result in the Military Services buying more weapon systems than necessary and wasting billions of dollars. As of March2017, JROC was validating requirements documents for 13 MDAPs with estimated total costs exceeding $140 billion.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identify the MDAPs that have reached, or will reach, Milestone A on or before October 1, 2017, and will not be affected by the new investment review process required by the FY 2017 change to 10 U.S.C. &sect; 181.</p> <p>For these programs, we recommend that the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:</p> <ul> <li>establish a practice within JROC to consistently evaluate procurement quantity submitted by sponsors and execute procedures to assess the validity and accuracy of the procurement quantity submitted by sponsors;&nbsp;</li> </ul> <ul> <li>require subordinate boards to obtain input and reviews from advisors and stakeholders to assess and review procurement quantity;&nbsp;</li> </ul> <ul> <li>establish expectations for stakeholders and advisors, particularly the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, to assist JROC in evaluating procurement quantity throughout the validation process; and&nbsp;</li> </ul> <ul> <li>document and maintain the methodology for evaluating procurement quantity for each validation decision.</li> </ul> <p>We also recommend that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for MDAPs that reach Milestone A after October 1, 2017:</p> <ul> <li>clearly define the roles and responsibilities for supporting the new investment review process required by the FY 2017 change to 10 U.S.C. &sect; 181 in ensuring appropriate tradeoffs are made among life‑cycle cost, schedule, performance, and procurement quantity when developing recommendations for program costs;&nbsp;</li> </ul> <ul> <li>clearly define the roles for assessing, reviewing, and analyzing procurement quantity;</li> </ul> <ul> <li>&nbsp;develop and implement oversight procedures and accountable methods to ensure that procurement quantity is evaluated;&nbsp;</li> </ul> <ul> <li>establish expectations and accountability for the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, in ensuring appropriate tradeoffs are made among life‑cycle cost, schedule, performance, and procurement quantity.</li> </ul> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided comments on the finding and stated that requirements oversight is a complex process that includes participation of leaders across the DoD. The Vice Chairman also stated that JROC does not assess nor establish procurement quantities in isolation but rather considers them in the entire context between cost, schedule, performance and procurement quantity to determine the most effective means to satisfy the capability need.</p> <p>The Vice Chairman stated the Joint Staff believes the report was written without a complete understanding of the validation process; contained several misleading statements that implied the JROC process resulted in wasteful spending; and included technical errors in its discussion of several MDAPs.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>We agree with the Vice Chairman that requirements oversight is a complex process that includes participation of leaders across the DoD. Overall, however, we found a lack of evidence revealing actual consideration by JROC of procurement quantity. We found no instances where JROC obtained input for procurement quantity from stakeholders and advisors. JROC is the final validation authority on requirements documents that link warfighter needs, acquisition, and funding activities.</p> <p>We concluded that the JROC process for validating procurement quantities may result in inaccurate procurement quantities. Based on the dollar values of the programs we reviewed in this and the previous DoD OIG audit reports we identified, we consider it reasonable to have stated that if JROC validated a requirements document for an MDAP with an inaccurate procurement quantity, billions of dollars could be wasted.</p> <p>The Vice Chairman&rsquo;s response accepted the recommendations, but did not address the recommendations, or identify a completion date; therefore, the recommendations are unresolved and remain open. We request the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specifically address the recommendations by October 6, 2017. &nbsp;</p> <p>Three versions of section 181 in title 10 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) are relevant to this audit. According to 10 U.S.C &sect; 181 (2007), JROC is required to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying, assessing, and approving joint military requirements. Joint military requirements are the capabilities necessary to fill or prevent a gap in a DoD core mission area, and requirements documents must describe the quantities of assets required to attain the capability requirements. Therefore, under 10 U.S.C &sect; 181 (2007), JROC has had a duty to assess and review procurement quantity as part of its validation of MDAPs since 2007.</p></Blockquote> Wed, 06 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7557 Audit Report - Defense Logistics Agency Fuel Contract for Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7556 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-116)<br>Topic: Joint Warfighting and Readiness<br>Defense Logistics Agency Fuel Contract for Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar (Project No. D2016-D000RE-0091.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We evaluated the effectiveness and oversight of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy 2016 aviation fuel (JA1) contract, valued at $754.8 million.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, we evaluated the effectiveness of the Al Udeid Air Base (AUAB) fuel requirements process and oversight of the JA1 fuel contract payment process.</p> <p>Findings</p> <p>Air Force and DLA Energy officials effectively managed the AUAB fuel requirements process. Specifically, Air Force and DLA Energy officials followed the DoD and Air Force guidance to properly develop fuel requirements and contracted for up to 390.6 million gallons of fuel for January through December 2016. In addition, Air Force fuel service center officials properly collected and stored daily AUAB fuel consumption data in the Fuels Manager Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bulk Petroleum Contingency and Capabilities Report systems. As a result, fuel delivered from January through December 2016 was sufficient to sustain AUAB mission operations. In addition, Air Force and DLA Energy officials maintained realistic fuel consumption data to continue developing future fuel requirements for AUAB.</p> <p>However, DLA Energy officials did not provide effective oversight of the contract payment process. Specifically, for 6 of the 22 contractor invoices submitted from January through December 2016:</p> <ul> <li>DLA Energy quality assurance representatives (QARs) improperly certified three of the invoices because the QARs did not verify that JA1 fuel quantities listed on the DD Forms 250 matched the invoiced fuel quantities.</li> </ul> <ul> <li>DLA Energy officials did not ensure valid and timely payments were made for three of the invoices because the contracting officer did not ensure the payment period was restarted once the contractor submitted corrected invoices and accurate banking information.</li> </ul> <p>As a result, DLA Energy improperly paid $58,816 in interest charges. Without effective oversight of the contract payment process for the JA1 fuel contract, DLA Energy will continue to make incorrect payments.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>As a result of discussions with the DLA, we redirected the recommendations to the Director, DLA, who has the authority to implement the recommendations. We recommend that the Director, DLA, direct the contracting officer to:</p> <ul> <li>direct the QARs to verify that the JA1 fuel delivery quantities stated on the contractor invoices match the amounts stated on the DD Forms 250 before invoices are submitted for payment, and</li> </ul> <ul> <li>recoup the $58,816 in interest paid to the contractor for delivery orders 0002, 0009, and 0013, and adjust the payment period when a payment is delayed because of contractor error.</li> </ul> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Director, DLA Acquisition, responding for the Director, DLA, agreed with the recommendation to ensure the QARs verify the JA1 fuel delivery quantities before invoices are submitted for payment. The Director, DLA Acquisition, stated that the QARs will receive training on all elements that must be inspected and accepted by QARs in the Invoice, Receipt, Acceptance, and Property Transfer web‑based application, which the contractors use to create and submit electronic invoices and DD Forms 250. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and will be closed once we receive training completion certificates for the QARs.</p> <p>The Director, DLA Acquisition, also agreed with the recommendations to recoup the $58,816 in interest paid to the contractor and to adjust the payment period when a payment is delayed because of contractor error. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved and will be closed once DLA officials provide documentation to verify the $58,816 was recouped and documentation detailing the process for working with DLA Finance to ensure that the corrected invoice receipt date is recorded in the DLA Finance Enterprise Business System</p> <p><hr /> 1 JA1 is a kerosene grade cut fuel that is suitable for most turbine aircraft.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 05 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7556 Infomation Releases - Novo Nordisk Agrees to Pay $58 Million for Failure to Comply with FDA-Mandated Risk Program http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7564 Novo Nordisk Agrees to Pay $58 Million for Failure to Comply with FDA-Mandated Risk Program (.pdf 237KB)<br><br><Blockquote>Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Novo Nordisk Inc. will pay $58.65 million to resolve allegations that the company failed to comply with the FDA-mandated Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for its Type II diabetes medication Victoza, the Justice Department announced today.</Blockquote> Tue, 05 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7564 Announced Projects - Audit of Defense Logistics Agency Energy Savings Performance Contracts (Project No. D2017-D000CI-0179.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7545 Audit of Defense Logistics Agency Energy Savings Performance Contracts (Project No. D2017-D000CI-0179.000) Fri, 01 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7545 Announced Projects - Audit of the Air Force's F-15 Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System (Project No. D2017-D000AU-0177.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7544 Audit of the Air Force's F-15 Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System (Project No. D2017-D000AU-0177.000) Fri, 01 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7544 Announced Projects - Contract Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2018 Defense Health Program Enterprise General Fund Basic Financial Statements (Project No. D2017-D000FT-0180.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7546 Contract Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2018 Defense Health Program Enterprise General Fund Basic Financial Statements (Project No. D2017-D000FT-0180.000) Fri, 01 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7546 Announced Projects - Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons at DoD Facilities in Kuwait (Project No. D2017-D00SPO-0182.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7553 Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons at DoD Facilities in Kuwait (Project No. D2017-D00SPO-0182.000) Fri, 01 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7553 Announced Projects - Management of Army equipment in Kuwait and Qatar (Project No. D2017-D000CN-0184.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7554 Management of Army equipment in Kuwait and Qatar (Project No. D2017-D000CN-0184.000) Fri, 01 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7554 Announced Projects - Summary Audit of U.S. Direct Funding Provided to Afghanistan (Project No. D2017-D000CI-0176.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7543 Summary Audit of U.S. Direct Funding Provided to Afghanistan (Project No. D2017-D000CI-0176.000) Fri, 01 Sep 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7543 Audit Report - Defense Information Systems Agency’s Expired Communication Service Authorizations http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7551 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-113)<br>Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management<br>Defense Information Systems Agency’s Expired Communication Service Authorizations (Project No. D2016-D000CL-0197.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) implemented adequate controls over communication service authorizations (CSAs). We reviewed 29 CSAs with a value of at least $212.2 million.</p> <p>The DISA is responsible for purchasing telecommunication services for the DoD. The Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization (DITCO), a component of DISA, provides the contracting support to acquire telecommunications services. These services are obtained under CSAs, which are contracts used solely for the acquisition of telecommunication services. Payments to vendors for those services are funded by the Defense Working Capital Fund.</p> <p>Customers reimburse the Defense Working Capital Fund for services obtained under CSAs and DISA charges external customers a surcharge to recover overhead costs.</p> <p>Findings</p> <p>DITCO contracting personnel did not have adequate controls to effectively oversee 29 CSAs with a value of at least $212.2 million. Specifically, DITCO contracting personnel:</p> <ul> <li>did not properly re-award 11 expired CSAs;</li> <li>did not discontinue, in a timely manner, 3 expired CSAs that were no longer needed by the customer;</li> <li>could not determine whether there was still a valid need for 13 expired CSAs;</li> <li>improperly extended the performance period of 1 expired CSA; and</li> <li>did not discontinue 2 expired CSAs when the services were transferred to another contract.</li> </ul> <p>For 16 CSAs, DITCO contracting personnel did not maintain adequate contract files. In addition, for 19 CSAs, DISA&rsquo;s charges to the customer exceeded disbursements to the vendor and DITCO personnel did not return excess funds to the customers or remedy vendor underpayments in a timely manner.</p> <p>These problems occurred because DITCO contracting personnel did not follow Federal and DoD regulations and internal guidance for awarding and administering contracts. Additionally, DITCO contracting personnel focused on awarding new service contracts and not managing and overseeing existing CSAs.</p> <p>By allowing expired CSAs to continue after the performance period ended, DITCO contracting personnel did not ensure that a valid need still existed for the services provided by the CSA or that the DoD received the best value through competition. For example, the DoD continued to pay for services on one expired CSA for nearly five years after the military base closed. CSA customers were also left vulnerable to cost fluctuation, substantial price increases, and possible loss of services because a valid contract no longer existed. Consequently, the DoD made at least $80.9 million in improper payments on expired CSAs, and $3.3 million could have better supported the warfighter if funds were returned prior to expiration.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that the Director, DISA, in coordination with the Director, Procurement Services Directorate, DITCO:</p> <ul> <li>Complete a comprehensive review of all expired CSAs, including services that may have transferred to another contract, to determine whether they should be discontinued or re-awarded and take appropriate action.</li> <li>Complete a comprehensive review of all soon-to-expire CSAs to determine whether they should be discontinued or re-awarded and take appropriate action.</li> <li>Develop and maintain a system to enable both Defense Information Systems Agency personnel and customers to track the status of CSAs.</li> <li>Develop standard operating procedures to ensure consistent oversight of communication services authorizations in accordance with Federal and DoD regulations.</li> <li>Determine whether payments on expired CSAs were improper. Report the results and initiate recovery actions, when appropriate, in accordance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act.</li> </ul> <p>We recommend that the Director, Procurement Services Directorate, DITCO:</p> <ul> <li>Institute procedures for all contracting personnel to monitor CSAs for instances when the amount paid by the customer consistently exceeds charges billed by the vendor and perform account reconciliation efforts in accordance with the &ldquo;Desktop Procedures for the PL82 AP Validation Database.&rdquo;</li> <li>Revise &ldquo;Desktop Procedures for the PL82 AP Validation Database&rdquo; to require returning valid excess funds back to the customer and correcting vendor underpayments in a timely manner.</li> </ul> <p>We recommend that the Acting DoD Chief Information Officer, in coordination with the Director, DISA, develop a long term strategy to address active, expiring, and expired CSAs, along with communication improvements between customers and contracting officers.</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Vice Director, DISA, responding on behalf of the Director, DISA, agreed with our recommendations to review expired and soon-to-expire CSAs, implement system improvements, improve standard procedures, and determine whether payments on expired CSAs should be recovered. The Vice Director stated that DISA was aggressively working a comprehensive list of expired and soon-to-expire CSAs and had reduced the number of expired CSAs from 10,000 in 2012 to 986 as of July 2017.</p> <p>The Vice Director stated that a new CSA management module will emphasize that contracting officers must discontinue services if they have not received a customer re-award request or justification. The Vice Director also stated that the module will enhance customer notifications, will provide customers with an expiration and suspense date for completing a review and revalidation of the requirements, and will be more convenient for its customers.</p> <p>The Vice Director further stated that the CSA management module will be fielded in the second quarter of FY 2018 and that DISA will coordinate with the Office of General Counsel on recovering any identified improper payments. Therefore, Recommendations 1.a, 1.b, 1.c.1-4, 1.d.1-4, and 1.e are resolved but will remain open until we verify that the comprehensive review has been completed, the number of expired CSAs has been reduced, and that the module is operational and the improper payment review has been completed.</p> <p>The Director, Procurement Services Directorate, DITCO, agreed with our recommendations to improve procedures for its contracting personnel. The Director stated the revised procedures and new weekly billing reconciliation will identify excess funds and provide guidance on reviewing the accuracy of contract obligation amounts. Therefore, Recommendations 2.a and 2.b are resolved but remain open. We will close Recommendations 2.a and 2.b once we verify the procedures have been revised.</p> <p>The Acting Principal Deputy, responding on behalf of the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), agreed and stated that the DoD CIO will continue coordinating with DISA and DITCO on validating CSAs and providing guidance to its customers. The Acting Principal Deputy stated that the DoD Chief Information Officer will partner with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and DoD Components to reinforce policy requiring customers to inform DISA of actions on reviewing, revalidating, and terminating services. Therefore, Recommendation 3 is resolved but will remain open until we verify the coordination efforts have occurred.</p></Blockquote> Fri, 25 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7551 Audit Report - Independent Auditor’s Report on the Examination of the Defense Logistics Agency’s DoD Chief Financial Officer’s Statistical Sample Inventory Program http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7552 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-115)<br>Topic: Financial Management<br>Independent Auditor’s Report on the Examination of the Defense Logistics Agency’s DoD Chief Financial Officer’s Statistical Sample Inventory Program (Project No. D2016-D000FI-0204.000) Fri, 25 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7552 Infomation Releases - Bettendorf Doctor Pleads Guilty to Health Care Fraud http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7566 Bettendorf Doctor Pleads Guilty to Health Care Fraud (.pdf 182KB)<br><br><Blockquote>DAVENPORT, IA – On August 22, 2017, Dr. Paul Matthew Bolger, 45, of Bettendorf, Iowa, pleaded guilty to 18 counts of false statements relating to health care matters and five counts of introduction of misbranded drugs. </Blockquote> Thu, 24 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7566 Audit Report - Documentation to Support Costs for Army Working Capital Fund Inventory Valuation http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7547 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-114)<br>Topic: Financial Management<br>Documentation to Support Costs for Army Working Capital Fund Inventory Valuation (Project No. D2016-D000FI-0145.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether sufficient, accurate, and appropriate documentation existed to support costs for Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) inventory valuation.</p> <p>We statistically sampled 970 of 296,839 inventory transactions, valued at $870.2 million, which were based on historical costs recorded in the Logistics Modernization Program system during the second quarter FY 2016.</p> <p>Finding</p> <p>Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA[FM&amp;C]) personnel did not provide sufficient, accurate, and appropriate documentation to support the costs recorded for 818 of 970 statistically sampled AWCF inventory transactions. We project that the ASA(FM&amp;C) cannot support at least 291,408 AWCF inventory transactions, valued at $690.8 million of the $870.2 million in AWCF inventory items acquired in the second quarter FY 2016. This occurred because the ASA(FM&amp;C) ineffectively performed discovery and corrective action phase activities of the financial environment related to AWCF inventory business processes.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, the ASA(FM&amp;C) did not:</p> <ul> <li>develop detailed standard operating procedures, flowcharts, and narratives describing the AWCF inventory business processes;</li> </ul> <ul> <li>identify the key positions that needed to be contacted to identify, maintain, and provide key supporting documentation for the transactions associated with AWCF inventory processes; and</li> </ul> <ul> <li>develop corrective action plans to remediate known documentation deficiencies.</li> </ul> <p>In addition, the U.S. Army Materiel Command did not design the Logistics Modernization Program system with the functionality to identify receiving and invoice documents stored in another system. Finally, ASA(FM&amp;C) personnel could not identify the amounts it previously credited to customers for inventory items returned for credit or repair.</p> <p>As a result, the Army is not ready for an AWCF financial statement audit and will likely not be audit ready by the mandatory deadline on September 30, 2017. The Army&rsquo;s inability to provide supporting documentation for AWCF inventory transactions is one reason it receives an annual disclaimer of opinion. Consequently, the Army is unable to support the $10.6 billion value of its Inventory, Available and Purchased for Resale, reported on the AWCF balance sheet as of September 30, 2016, as reflected in the Army&rsquo;s disclaimer of opinion.<sup>2</sup></p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that the ASA(FM&amp;C):</p> <ul> <li>establish detailed standard operating procedures, flowcharts, and narratives for each inventory business process (1.a);</li> </ul> <ul> <li>identify key supporting documentation for each inventory process (1.b);</li> </ul> <ul> <li>develop a &ldquo;perfect package&rdquo; of supporting documentation for transactions associated with AWCF inventory processes (1.c);<sup>3</sup></li> </ul> <ul> <li>identify and document key positions for each business process (1.d);</li> </ul> <ul> <li>ensure memorandums of understanding with service providers clearly identify who would maintain the documentation, where the documentation would be stored, protocols for requesting and providing documentation, and documentation retention policies (1.e);</li> </ul> <ul> <li>develop corrective action plans and milestones to correct the problems (1.f); and</li> </ul> <ul> <li>develop a process to maintain credit values given for returns for credit and unserviceable credit transactions (1.g). &nbsp;</li> </ul> <p>In addition, the ASA(FM&amp;C), in coordination with U.S. Army Materiel Command, should incorporate data fields within the Logistics Modernization Program system to identify the goods receipt and invoice documents in the Invoicing, Receipt, Acceptance, and Property Transfer system.</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations), responding for the ASA(FM&amp;C), partially agreed with our finding and agreed with our recommendations.</p> <p>The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations) stated that the Army implemented Recommendations 1.d and 1.e and has begun to implement Recommendations 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.f, and 1.g. However, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations) did not describe the actions taken to implement Recommendations 1.d and 1.e or elaborate on how or when Recommendations 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.f, and 1.g would be implemented. Therefore, these recommendations are unresolved and remain open. We request that the ASA(FM&amp;C) provide the details on how and when the recommendations would be implemented by September 25, 2017. We will close the recommendations once we receive and verify that the ASA(FM&amp;C) has implemented the recommendations.</p> <p>The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations) agreed to incorporate data fields within the Logistics Modernization Program system to identify the goods receipt and invoice documents, stating that a system change request was implemented in the Logistics Modernization Program on May 22, 2017. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close the recommendation once we receive evidence of system implementation and verify that the ASA(FM&amp;C) and U.S. Army Materiel Command have the ability to trace the receiving reports and invoice documents from the Logistics Modernization Program system to the Invoicing, Receipt, Acceptance, and Property Transfer system.<hr /> </p> <p><sup>1</sup> During the discovery phase, the reporting entity defines and documents its business processes and financial environment; identifies the key supporting documentation needed for its business processes and financial environment; identifies and classifies any deficiencies with its supporting documentation; and defines its strategy for achieving audit readiness. The corrective action phase is the second phase and is designed to correct deficiencies identified during the discovery phase.</p> <p><sup>2</sup> Report No. DODIG-2017-009, &ldquo;Independent Auditor&rsquo;s Report on the Army Working Capital FY 2016 and FY 2015 Basic Financial Statements,&rdquo; November 9, 2016.</p> <p><sup>3</sup> &ldquo;Perfect packages&rdquo; include all requested journal vouchers and supporting documentation necessary to support a transaction</p></Blockquote> Thu, 24 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7547 Announced Projects - MQ-9 Reaper Hotline Evaluation-Alleged Improper Acceptance of Defective Products (DoD OIG Project No. D2017-DOOOPT-0174.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7550 MQ-9 Reaper Hotline Evaluation-Alleged Improper Acceptance of Defective Products (DoD OIG Project No. D2017-DOOOPT-0174.000) Wed, 23 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7550 Special Plans and Operations Report - Evaluation of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7540 Special Plans and Operations Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-111)<br>Topic: European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)<br>Evaluation of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) (Project No. D2016-D00SPO-0144.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective:</p> <p>To evaluate the extent to which the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), focused on the Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) countries of Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia: &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;increased the OAR countries&rsquo; responsiveness, interoperability, and sustainability through capacity building and increased U.S. military exercises and training activities; &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; improved the OAR countries&rsquo; infrastructure necessary to deploy, train, and sustain their respective military forces; &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; established metrics to assess the OAR countries&rsquo; progress against the ERI&rsquo;s Exercise and Training, Improved Infrastructure, and Build Partner Capacity lines of effort; and &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; has been coordinated and integrated with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military capabilities.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>Findings:</p> <p>The United States European Command&rsquo;s (USEUCOM) use of ERI funding augments the State Partnership Program (SPP).&nbsp; The SPP enhances cooperation among U.S., allied, and partner-nation militaries to build defense and security capabilities, a key ERI focus.&nbsp;&nbsp; This enhanced cooperation occurs because the ERI funded U.S. National Guard units, through SPPs, to maintain training relationships with USEUCOM allied and partner nations, including the six OAR countries.&nbsp; Embassy-assigned U.S. Military Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs) coordinated and facilitated U.S. National Guard training resources in support of ERI-funded training opportunities.&nbsp; As a result of ERI support for the SPP, USEUCOM, component headquarters, and U.S. Embassy country teams, through the BAOs, maintained oversight and status of host-nation military proficiency, and gained support of U.S. National Guard subject-matter experts to help meet increased ERI training requirements. &nbsp;</p> <p>The sustainability of ERI is at risk because support for ERI imposes new requirements on USEUCOM and its subordinate commands without an equivalent increase in force authorizations, stressing USEUCOM&rsquo;s diminishing personnel resources.&nbsp; Additionally, ERI funds, which are Overseas Contingency Operations appropriations, are normally planned for only one year, versus the DoD&rsquo;s 5-year Future Years Defense Program planning cycle, which identifies the immediate base budget priorities and the future projections for the next four fiscal years.&nbsp; As a result, USEUCOM and OAR countries may be unable to sustain ERI&rsquo;s contribution to allied and partner military capabilities. &nbsp;</p> <p>OAR countries do not yet have procedures or transportation infrastructure in place to allow timely U.S., allied, and partner-nation military deployments.&nbsp; In addition, U.S. agreements with OAR countries governing infrastructure use do not sufficiently clarify facility access, sustainment, and development plans.&nbsp; These challenges exist for three reasons.&nbsp; First, OAR countries lack movement agreements with other NATO countries, transportation infrastructure and related capacity evaluations, and experience with controlling military convoys and equipment belonging to multiple security forces.&nbsp; This increases the risk of insufficient transport capacity to deploy U.S., allied, and partner-nation military forces rapidly to deter aggression against OAR countries.&nbsp; Second, USEUCOM&nbsp;&nbsp; has not completed host-nation facility agreements with OAR countries, which increases the risk of denial or delay of U.S. forces&rsquo; access to OAR country ERI-funded facilities, and risks inadequate OAR country facility sustainment.&nbsp; Third, all ERI funds, including those subject to military statutes and regulations, are 1-year or 3-4-year appropriations rather than 5-year military construction funding, which increases the risk of an inability of OAR countries to commit to long-term ERI infrastructure budgets and plans. &nbsp;</p> <p>USEUCOM has not established specific metrics to assess the impact of ERI-funded activities supporting allied- and partner-nation exercises and training, improved infrastructure, and military capacity-building activities. This occurred because the existing USEUCOM-developed assessment processes do not isolate and therefore cannot measure the impact of ERI separate from that of all other U.S.-funded support for training, infrastructure, and capacity-building activities in NATO countries.&nbsp;&nbsp; Without assessment of ERI results, it is difficult for the DoD to measure OAR-country progress and to justify to Congress the need for additional resources required to advance the five ERI lines of effort. &nbsp;</p> <p>OAR countries did not receive important NATO planning information related to deterrence training and programs funded by ERI.&nbsp; For example, OAR countries did not receive advance notice of the Warsaw Summit 2016 decision to deploy NATO forces to the Baltics and relocate U.S. forces from the Baltics and Black Sea regions to Poland in early 2017.&nbsp;&nbsp; Additionally, OAR countries did not receive details regarding the plans for integration of OAR country military forces with U.S. theater military operations.&nbsp; This situation impeded OAR countries&rsquo; timely planning, building of necessary constituent support, and commitment of resources for future operations. &nbsp;</p> <p>Recommendations:</p> <p>We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, assess competing mission and personnel priorities relative to the ERI to determine whether USEUCOM and its subordinate commands have sufficient personnel resources to execute the ERI mission. &nbsp;</p> <p>We recommend that the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense develop options for changes to the ERI budgeting cycle to better align with and support allied and partner-nation training and capacity-building activities. &nbsp;</p> <p>We recommend that the Commander, United States European Command: &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp; &nbsp;ensure that future infrastructure facility improvements meet U.S. and NATO operational requirements and, at a minimum, meet NATO infrastructure-related standards. &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; complete the assessment and survey of transportation networks to determine how to enhance the responsiveness of U.S. and OAR country forces in Europe. &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; conclude agreements with host nations to address the access, use, and long-term maintenance and sustainment of ERI-support infrastructure. &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp; &nbsp;request an ERI funding authorization that supports multiyear infrastructure construction and improvements. &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; consider developing and establishing command processes to assess the impact of ERI funds on&nbsp;exercises and training, infrastructure improvement, and activities in support of building allied and partner capacity. &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp; &nbsp;integrate the newly deployed U.S. Armored Brigade Combat Team and the four North Atlantic Treaty Organization Enhanced Forward Presence battalions in the OAR countries&rsquo; exercises and training, to ensure continued ERI collaboration and interoperability. &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp; &nbsp;complete theater-wide operations plans to inform decisions for ERI support to fill training gaps in the national military plans of OAR countries, and to convey a coordinated and unified message to allied and partner countries. &nbsp;</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Responses:</p> <p>The Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director, Joint Staff, and the Deputy Commander, United States European Command, agreed with our recommendations to: &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; determine whether USEUCOM has sufficient personnel resources to execute the ERI mission (Recommendation B.1); &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; develop ERI budgeting-cycle options to better align and support allied and partner-nation training and capacity building (Recommendation B.2); &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp; &nbsp;ensure that future infrastructure facility improvements meet U.S. and NATO operational and design standards (Recommendation C.1); &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; request an ERI funding authorization that supports multiyear infrastructure construction and improvements (Recommendation C.4); &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; establish processes to assess the impact of ERI funds on allied and partner-nation exercises and training, infrastructure, and capacity building (Recommendation D); and &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; complete theater-wide operations plans that inform decisions for ERI support to fill training gaps in allied and partner-nation military planning. (Recommendation E.2). &nbsp;</p> <p>These recommendations are resolved, but they remain open.&nbsp; To close these recommendations, we request that: &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Director, Joint Staff, provide an update on findings from the Joint Staff&rsquo;s April 2017 assessment of competing mission and personnel priorities in USEUCOM; &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense provide an update on development of ERI budget-cycle options; and &nbsp;</p> <p>&bull;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Deputy Commander, USEUCOM, provide: &nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;&nbsp; an update on the synchronization of U.S. and NATO operational requirements and design standards inUSEUCOM&rsquo;s revised Support to NATO CONPLAN; &nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;&nbsp; a copy of the Military Construction portions of the FYs 2018 and 2019 Five Year Defense Plans submitted by USEUCOM to facilitate long-term, multiyear infrastructure funding when complete; &nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;&nbsp; a copy of USEUCOM&rsquo;s FY 2019 budget request for additional ERI assessment capabilities once prepared; and &nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;&nbsp; an update on USEUCOM&rsquo;s planning, coordination, and messaging efforts to assist allies and partners to fill gaps in their national military plans. &nbsp;</p></Blockquote> Tue, 22 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7540 Announced Projects - Evaluation of the Technology Readiness of the Navy's Next Generation Jammer Program (Project No. D2017-DOOOPT-0146.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7542 Evaluation of the Technology Readiness of the Navy's Next Generation Jammer Program (Project No. D2017-DOOOPT-0146.000) Mon, 21 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7542 Investigative Policy and Oversight Report - Evaluation of Military Criminal Investigative Organizations’ Closed Death Investigations Concluding in Suicide as the Manner of Death http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7541 Investigative Policy and Oversight Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-110)<br>Topic: Evaluation of Military Criminal Investigative Organizations<br>Evaluation of Military Criminal Investigative Organizations’ Closed Death Investigations Concluding in Suicide as the Manner of Death (Project No. 2016C010)<br><Blockquote><p>We evaluated 188 Military Criminal Investigative Organization (MCIO) death investigations concluding in suicide as the manner of death opened on or after January 1, 2014, and closed on or before December 31, 2015, to determine whether the investigations were completed in accordance with DoD, Military Service, and MCIO guidance. Our evaluation included MCIO work and assistance on 146 (77.7 percent) of the 188 cases that were investigated either solely or primarily by Federal, State, or Local law enforcement agencies that had jurisdiction to investigate the service members&rsquo; deaths. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the &quot;Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,&quot; published in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.</p></Blockquote> Fri, 18 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7541 What is New - Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom's Sentinel | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017 http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/index_detail.cfm?id=7539 Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom's Sentinel | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017 Thu, 17 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/index_detail.cfm?id=7539 Infomation Releases - Defense Contractor Agrees to Pay $9.2 Million to Settle False Billing Allegations http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7538 Defense Contractor Agrees to Pay $9.2 Million to Settle False Billing Allegations (.pdf 110KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc. (HII), a publicly traded company headquartered in Newport, Virginia, has agreed to a $9.2 million settlement of allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by knowingly overbilling the government for labor on U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships at its shipyards in Pascagoula, Mississippi. Under the settlement, HII will make a payment of $7.9 million which, combined with earlier repayments, will result in the settlement recovery of approximately $9.2 million.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 15 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7538 Audit Report - Defense Organizations Price Reasonableness Determinations for Federal Supply Schedule Orders for Supplies http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7537 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-112)<br>Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management<br>Defense Organizations Price Reasonableness Determinations for Federal Supply Schedule Orders for Supplies (Project No. D2017-D000CF-0047.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether Defense organizations made determinations of fair and reasonable pricing for General Services Administration (GSA) Federal supply schedule orders awarded for purchases of supplies. Supplies purchased from the GSA Federal supply schedule are considered commercial items. The Federal supply schedule program allows the Government to purchase commercial supplies and services&mdash;such as software licenses, batteries, and digital maps&mdash;at prices associated with volume buying. We reviewed a nonstatistical sample of 57 orders, valued at $48 million, at Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), DoD Human Resources Activity (DoDHRA), Defense Health Agency (DHA), and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). This is the third and last in a series of audits on GSA Federal supply schedule orders.</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), issued policy memorandum, &ldquo;Class Deviation&mdash;Determination of Fair and Reasonable Prices When Using Federal Supply Schedule Contracts,&rdquo; (class deviation) on March 13, 2014. The class deviation requires DoD contracting personnel to make determinations of fair and reasonable pricing for GSA Federal supply schedule orders for supplies and fixed-price services. A deviation is the issuance or use of a policy, procedure, solicitation provision, contract clause, method, or practice of conducting acquisition actions of any kind at any stage of the acquisition process that is inconsistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. A class deviation is a change from guidance that affects more than one contract action.</p> <p>Finding</p> <p>WHS, DoDHRA, and DTRA contracting officers made adequate price reasonableness determinations for 10 orders, valued at $7.7 million. Specifically, WHS, DoDHRA, and DTRA contracting officers compared the only quote to adequately prepared independent Government estimates (IGEs), compared the only quote to historical prices that were specifically identified, or compared prices offered under two quotes. In addition, WHS, DoDHRA, and DTRA contracting officers signed and dated price reasonableness determinations for the 10 orders.</p> <p>However, WHS, DoDHRA, DHA, and DTRA contracting officers did not adequately document and support whether the prices paid for 47 orders, valued at $40.3 million, were fair and reasonable. Specifically:</p> <ul> <li>For 40 orders, WHS, DoDHRA, DHA and DTRA contracting officers did not adequately document fair and reasonable pricing. Specifically, the contracting officers did not make price reasonableness determinations, did not sign price reasonableness determinations they made, did not approve in writing price reasonableness determinations made by contract specialists, or made price reasonableness determinations after the award. A DoDHRA contracting officer stated that the contracting officer&rsquo;s signature on the order certified that the price was fair and reasonable. WHS, DHA, and DTRA contracting officers stated that not signing and dating the price reasonableness determinations was an oversight.</li> <li>For 11 orders, WHS, DoDHRA, and DTRA contracting officers relied on inadequate IGEs that did not identify the source of the information because they relied on the knowledge of the preparers of the IGEs rather than asking the preparers to document and support the estimate and because they were under tight timeframes to award the orders.</li> <li>For 10 orders, WHS, DoDHRA, DHA, and DTRA contracting officers relied on the price lists of the same vendor that submitted the only quote. Contracting officers stated that they were too busy to perform additional price analysis, that the orders were sole-source awards, that they performed other price analysis but did not document the other price analysis in the contract file, or that they performed other price analysis but could not locate the documentation.</li> <li>For one order involving one quote, a DoDHRA contracting officer relied on a discount that the vendor provided as the only price analysis technique. The contracting officer had left the DoDHRA; therefore, we were unable to determine why the contracting officer relied only on the discount.</li> <li>For one order involving two quotes, a WHS contracting officer used a quote eliminated from consideration for technical reasons to make the price reasonableness determination without verifying whether the price was still valid for comparison purposes. The contracting officer had left the WHS; therefore, we were unable to determine why that occurred.</li> <li>For two orders involving one quote, the WHS contracting officers stated that they performed price analysis, but did not document the price analysis in the contract file.</li> </ul> <p>In addition, the Director, DPAP, and WHS, DoDHRA, DHA, and DTRA management have not issued guidance or provided training to contracting officers related to price reasonableness determinations and price analysis for orders for supplies awarded after Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy issued the class deviation.</p> <p>During the audit, we briefed the Deputy Director for Contract Policy and International Contracting, DPAP, on our findings and proposed recommendations. The Deputy Director stated that DPAP is developing a guidebook for purchasing commercial items. The guidebook will address price reasonableness determinations and price analysis for commercial items, including supplies purchased from the GSA Federal supply schedule, which are considered to be commercial items. In addition, the Deputy Director explained that DPAP officials are coordinating with the Defense Acquisition University to develop training on the requirements in the guidebook. During this meeting, we suggested that DPAP and the Defense Acquisition University should develop the training instead of each Defense organization developing its own training to ensure consistent training across the DoD. The DPAP official agreed and stated that the recommendations should be directed to DPAP instead of the Defense organizations visited during the audit.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that the Director, DPAP, develop and implement guidance for performing and documenting price analysis and making price reasonableness determinations for GSA Federal supply schedule orders for supplies and develop training for contracting personnel on the guidance.</p> <p>Management Comments&nbsp;and Our Response</p> <p>The Deputy Director for Contract Policy and International Contracting, DPAP, responding for the Director, DPAP, agreed with our finding and recommendations to provide guidance and develop training. The recommendations are resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendations once we verify that DPAP has issued the guidance and developed the training.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 15 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7537 Infomation Releases - Singapore Executives Sentenced for Fraud in International Navy Corruption Scandal http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7533 Singapore Executives Sentenced for Fraud in International Navy Corruption Scandal (.pdf 101KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>Two former executives of foreign defense contractor Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) were sentenced on Friday for conspiring to submit bogus claims and invoices to the U.S. Navy in an effort to win contracts and overcharge the U.S. Navy by tens of millions of dollars as part of a years-long corruption and fraud scheme.</p></Blockquote> Sat, 12 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7533 Audit Report - Navy Leases for Energy Production Projects (Redacted) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7530 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-109)<br>Topic: Protecting Key Defense Infrastructure<br>Navy Leases for Energy Production Projects (Redacted) (Project No. D2017-D000CI-0004.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether the Department of the Navy properly awarded and obtained fair market value for leases supporting energy production projects.</p> <p>We conducted this audit based on an allegation reported to the Defense Hotline. The allegation stated that the Army and Navy leased land to utility companies without using competitive procedures to select the lessee, and the Army and Navy are not receiving rent greater than or equal to the fair market value of the land. We previously audited Army leases supporting energy production projects in report DODIG-2016-137.</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The United States Code allows the Secretaries of the Military Departments to lease non-excess property when the Secretary determines that the property is not currently needed for public use, that the lease is advantageous to the United States, and that the lease will promote national defense or be in the public interest. The same statute requires that the Secretaries of the Military Departments use competitive procedures to select the lessees and that the lessees pay in cash or in-kind consideration greater than or equal to the fair market value of the leased property. In-kind consideration is nonmonetary compensation given as payment for the leased land.</p> <p>As of October 5, 2016, the Navy executed 11 leases of real property in support of energy projects, and we selected 10 of those 11 leases for review. We did not review the remaining lease because a DoD OIG team reviewed it during a prior audit.</p> <p>Finding</p> <p>We determined that Navy Resilient Energy Program Office officials properly awarded the 10 leases reviewed supporting energy production projects in accordance with the United States Code. Specifically, Navy Resilient Energy Program Office officials issued solicitations, evaluated proposals, and obtained approval to award the leases.</p> <p>In addition, the Navy will obtain fair market value for 10 leases supporting energy production projects if the Navy receives payment in the form of the agreed upon in-kind consideration. However, for 3 of the 10 leases, if the Navy does not receive payment in the form of in-kind consideration, the Navy will not receive cash payments greater than or equal to the fair market value of the land. This occurred because a Navy real estate contracting officer did not use the correct acreage to develop the rent schedule in two of the leases. For the third lease, the Navy real estate contracting officer modified the lease to increase the acreage but did not update the cash payment rent schedule. As a result, if the Navy does not receive payment in the form of in-kind consideration, the Navy will receive $290,000 less than the fair market value of the land.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that the Director, Navy Resilient Energy Program Office direct the real estate contracting officer to modify the Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, lease to include the revised acreage or modify the lease to include a revised rent schedule developed using the acreage awarded in the lease. In addition, we recommend that the Director, Navy Resilient Energy Program Office direct the real estate contracting officer to modify the Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, Georgia, and Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia, leases to include a revised rent schedule developed using the acreage awarded in the lease. Furthermore, we recommend that the Director, Navy Resilient Energy Program Office, develop a process to ensure Navy real estate contracting officers update the lease rent schedule when Navy Resilient Energy Program Office officials revise the lease acreage.</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, responding for the Director, Navy Resilient Energy Program Office, agreed with and implemented our recommendations as follows:</p> <ul> <li>the real estate contracting officer modified the Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, lease to include the revised acreage;</li> <li>the real estate contracting officer modified the Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, Georgia, and Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia, leases to include the revised rent schedule developed using the acreage awarded in the lease; and</li> <li>the Acting Deputy Director, Navy Resilient Energy Program Office, disseminated to Navy real estate contracting officers instructions for updating the lease rent schedule when Navy Resilient Energy Program Office officials revise the lease acreage.</li> </ul> <p>The management actions taken during the audit fully addressed the specifics of the recommendations and we consider the recommendations closed.</p></Blockquote> Fri, 11 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7530 Infomation Releases - Navy Contractor Admits Accepting Funds from Port Engineer Administering Contracts Involving his Company http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7534 Navy Contractor Admits Accepting Funds from Port Engineer Administering Contracts Involving his Company (.pdf 122KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>SAN DIEGO &ndash; Alfonso Liburd, the President and Chief Executive Officer of San Diego-based defense contractor NEVWEST, Inc. (&ldquo;NevWest&rdquo;), pleaded guilty today to improperly aiding and abetting Navy Port Engineer, John Nasshan (charged elsewhere), who improperly administered projects in which he (Nasshan) had a financial interest.</p></Blockquote> Thu, 10 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7534 Infomation Releases - Nurse-Practitioner Found Guilty of Federal Charges for Illegally Distributing Oxycodone and Money Laundering --- Defendant Ran Pain Management Practice in Southeast Washington http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7532 Nurse-Practitioner Found Guilty of Federal Charges for Illegally Distributing Oxycodone and Money Laundering --- Defendant Ran Pain Management Practice in Southeast Washington (.pdf 108KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>WASHINGTON - Ivan Lamont Robinson, a licensed nurse practitioner who was based in Southeast Washington, was found guilty by a jury today of 42 federal charges that he distributed oxycodone outside the legitimate scope of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose, and two counts of money laundering.</p></Blockquote> Thu, 10 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7532 Audit Report - United States Transportation Command Triannual Reviews http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7528 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-108)<br>Topic: Financial Management<br>United States Transportation Command Triannual Reviews (Project No. D2016-D000FS-0219.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) performed triannual reviews (TARs) of certain financial transactions in accordance with applicable regulations. Specifically, we determined whether the TARs performed provided reasonable assurance that unliquidated obligations, accounts payable, unfilled customer orders, and accounts receivable transactions were valid, accurate, and complete.</p> <p>Finding</p> <p>We focused on May 31, 2016, and September 30, 2016, for our review. USTRANSCOM did not perform TARs during this period in accordance with the DoD Financial Management Regulation. This occurred because Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate personnel did not develop required processes and procedures to complete TARs. In addition, USTRANSCOM personnel stated that Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness workload priorities precluded completion of TAR reporting efforts under DoD Financial Management Regulation guidelines. Instead, Directorate personnel limited their review to actions on a manually created open document list (ODL) that did not contain all open obligations as required by the DoD Financial Management Regulation. As a result, USTRANSCOM was unable to determine that unliquidated obligations of $1.8 billion, accounts payable balances of $0.7 billion, accounts receivable balances of $1.3 billion, and unfilled customer orders were valid, accurate, and complete.</p> <p>Furthermore, because USTRANSCOM was unable to provide sufficient supporting documentation we were unable to obtain reasonable assurance that those balances were properly reported. Because TARs were not completed as required, USTRANSCOM and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD may not have had reliable financial information to make informed decisions.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that the Director, Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate, USTRANSCOM, develop and implement procedures to execute triannual reviews in accordance with DoD Financial Management Regulation requirements. The processes and procedures should ensure that each commitment, obligation, accounts payable, unfilled customer order, and accounts receivable is properly recorded, and reports are prepared for submission in the DoD standard format. Moreover, the processes and procedures should identify staff positions responsible for executing proper TARs.</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Deputy Commander, USTRANSCOM, agreed with our finding and recommendations. The Deputy Commander agreed to coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Air Force to develop, document, and implement processes and procedures to execute triannual reviews in accordance with Office of Secretary of Defense guidance, including identifying responsible personnel. Additionally, the Deputy Commander agreed to ensure reports are correctly and accurately prepared based on Office of Secretary of Defense guidance. We consider the Deputy Commanders comments responsive to our recommendations; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open.</p> <p>We will close this recommendation once we verify that USTRANSCOM has developed, documented, and implemented processes and procedures for properly executing the triannual review that include identifying responsible personnel, coordination with the Office of Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Air Force, and detailed instructions to ensure reports are correctly prepared based on Office of Secretary of Defense guidance. The Deputy Commander, USTRANSCOM, estimated that the recommendation would be implemented by September 30, 2017.</p></Blockquote> Wed, 09 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7528 Infomation Releases - Government Contractor Pleads Guilty To Making False Claims And False Statements --- Claimed to be Working When She Was Not http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7531 Government Contractor Pleads Guilty To Making False Claims And False Statements --- Claimed to be Working When She Was Not (.pdf 117KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>Baltimore, Maryland - Shawn Penn, age 41, of Pasadena, Maryland, pled guilty today in federal court to making false claims and false statements. Penn falsely represented to her employer that she was working as a security guard at a government facility, when she was actually elsewhere.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 08 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7531 Audit Report - Followup Audit: U.S. Naval Academy Museum Management of Heritage Assets http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7522 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-107)<br>Topic: Improving Financial Management<br>Followup Audit: U.S. Naval Academy Museum Management of Heritage Assets (Project No. D2016-D000XD-0200.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) Superintendent had implemented recommendations in DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2012-017, &ldquo;U.S. Naval Academy Officials Did Not Adhere to Contracting and Gift Policies,&rdquo; November 7, 2011.</p> <p>The USNA Superintendent had agreed to direct the USNA Museum Director to:</p> <ul> <li>establish written policies and procedures for recording gifts,</li> <li>provide additional oversight and status reports on recording inventory,</li> <li>conduct an inventory,</li> <li>implement and record all gifts into the Naval Heritage and History Command (NHHC) inventory system,</li> <li>assign complete identification numbers to all gift records, and</li> <li>establish access controls to the inventory system to prevent unauthorized modification or deletion of inventory records.</li> </ul> <p>Background</p> <p>Report No. DODIG-2012-017 identified that in-kind gifts (non-monetary gifts classified as heritage assets that have historical significance) were not properly recorded into the inventory system; a complete inventory of all items maintained by the USNA Museum had never been done; 21,700 of nearly 53,000 heritage assets in the Museum&rsquo;s inventory system did not have an identification number or a complete identification number; security controls were not established to prevent unauthorized modification or deletion of heritage assets in the inventory system; and the inventory system of the NHHC, which is responsible for preserving, analyzing, and disseminating U.S. Naval history and heritage, was not used.</p> <p>Finding</p> <p>The USNA Museum Director implemented recommendations to establish policies and procedures for recording inventory, provide quarterly reports to NHHC, assign identification numbers to items in the inventory system, and establish security access controls to prevent unauthorized modification or deletion of inventory records.</p> <p>In response to the prior audit, the USNA superintendent stated that a baseline inventory of all heritage assets had been completed in 2014. We requested but USNA museum officials could not provide documentation to support that a baseline inventory was conducted in 2014. We then reviewed their current inventory system to determine when these heritage assets were last inventoried. We determined that 30,857 (50 percent) of 61,693 recorded heritage assets were not inventoried following the issuance of the prior audit report. The Museum officials stated that the museum experienced a complete turnover in management staff since the last audit in 2011, and the documentation was not maintained to support that an inventory was conducted. Using the current inventory system, we also determined that 129 artifacts had been physically transferred to the Smithsonian National Museum of American History, but a transfer agreement was never finalized.</p> <p>In addition, we identified 270 items that may be duplicates or belong to a group of items that have already been accessioned (accepted by the museum). Furthermore, we identified 45 items that museum officials considered lost; however, museum officials did not complete a DD Form 200 &ldquo;Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss&rdquo; to record those lost items when necessary.</p> <p>Additionally, the Director has not implemented the NHHC inventory system as agreed to in the prior report. This occurred because he was waiting for system testing and transfer of inventory records to the new system, both of which were scheduled to be completed by July 2017. Therefore, we determined that this recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the actions the USNA staff takes fully addresses the recommendation.</p> <p>Without a complete and accurate inventory, the museum heritage assets remain vulnerable to loss and theft. In addition, the inventory reported on the Department of the Navy Balance Sheet, Note 9, &ldquo;Property, Plant and Equipment,&rdquo; Section &ldquo;Heritage Assets and Stewardship Land,&rdquo; may not be accurate.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that the USNA Superintendent direct the USNA Museum Director to:</p> <ul> <li>prioritize the completion of a baseline inventory of all U.S. Naval Academy Museum assets and document the inventory results;</li> <li>reconcile the USNA Museum Found-in-Collection and duplicate records with already accessioned inventory items, when possible;</li> <li>complete a DD Form 200 for lost assets as the director deems it necessary, or document the reason if the form was not needed; and</li> <li>prepare and complete a transfer agreement for any artifacts that were physically transferred to the Smithsonian Museum. If the permanent transfer of these artifacts is not completed, then these artifacts should be recorded as loaned items in the USNA Museum inventory.</li> </ul> <p>We also recommend that the USNA Inspector General provide progress updates to the USNA Superintendent on completion of the baseline inventory.</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The USNA Superintendent addressed all specifics of the recommendations. Specifically, to prioritize the completion of a baseline inventory, the USNA requested support, reassigned staff, suspended most public and midshipmen tours, and reduced academic support for midshipmen research papers. The USNA will reconcile the USNA Museum Found-in-Collection and duplicate records and will develop a plan to determine the disposition of items that cannot be reconciled to existing records. The USNA will complete the DD Form 200 when required and prepare a transfer agreement for the artifacts that were physically transferred to the Smithsonian Museum. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendations once we verify that the information provided and actions the USNA takes fully addresses the recommendations.</p> <p>The USNA Superintendent, responding for the USNA Inspector General, addressed all specifics of the recommendation requiring the Inspector General to update the USNA Superintendent quarterly on the progress of the baseline inventory. The USNA will periodically validate results through on site verification. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the information provided and actions the USNA takes fully addresses the recommendation.</p></Blockquote> Mon, 07 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7522 Special Plans and Operations Report - Evaluation of U.S./Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability (MoD OICC) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7521 Special Plans and Operations Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-105)<br>Topic: Equipping and Training Iraq and Afghan Security Forces<br>Evaluation of U.S./Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability (MoD OICC) (Project No. D2016-D00SPO-0153.000)<br><Blockquote><p>SPO is working to publish an unclassified version of the report that will be posted here&nbsp;at a later date.&nbsp; &nbsp;</p></Blockquote> Fri, 04 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7521 What is New - Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2017 - June 30, 2017 http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/index_detail.cfm?id=7520 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2017 - June 30, 2017 Thu, 03 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/index_detail.cfm?id=7520 Announced Projects - Audit of Base Support Contracts in Bahrain (Project No. D2017-D000JB-0149.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7507 Audit of Base Support Contracts in Bahrain (Project No. D2017-D000JB-0149.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7507 Announced Projects - Audit of Commercial Item and Fair and Reasonable Pricing Determinations for Ammonium Perchlorate (Project No. D2017-D000AH-0163.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7511 Audit of Commercial Item and Fair and Reasonable Pricing Determinations for Ammonium Perchlorate (Project No. D2017-D000AH-0163.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7511 Announced Projects - Audit of DoD Incident Response Capability for Mission-Critical Control Systems (Project No. D2017-D000RD-0168.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7498 Audit of DoD Incident Response Capability for Mission-Critical Control Systems (Project No. D2017-D000RD-0168.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7498 Announced Projects - Audit of DoD Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Invoice Review and Payment (Project No. D2017-D000JB-0171.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7514 Audit of DoD Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Invoice Review and Payment (Project No. D2017-D000JB-0171.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7514 Announced Projects - Audit of Funding for Electromagnetic Pulse Commission (Project No. D2017-D000CF-0160.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7510 Audit of Funding for Electromagnetic Pulse Commission (Project No. D2017-D000CF-0160.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7510 Announced Projects - Audit of Noncompetitive Information Technology Contracts at the Defense Health Agency (Project No. D2017-D000CG-0172.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7513 Audit of Noncompetitive Information Technology Contracts at the Defense Health Agency (Project No. D2017-D000CG-0172.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7513 Announced Projects - Audit of Spare Parts Procured From TransDigm Group Inc. (Project No. D2017-D000AH-0162.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7515 Audit of Spare Parts Procured From TransDigm Group Inc. (Project No. D2017-D000AH-0162.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7515 Announced Projects - Audit of the Army and Marine Corps Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (Project No. D2017-D000AU-0150.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7505 Audit of the Army and Marine Corps Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (Project No. D2017-D000AU-0150.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7505 Announced Projects - Audit of the Trans-Africa Airlift Support Contract (Project No. D2017-D000CN-0157.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7512 Audit of the Trans-Africa Airlift Support Contract (Project No. D2017-D000CN-0157.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7512 Announced Projects - Audit of the U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor Modernization (Project No. D2017-D000AT-0151.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7506 Audit of the U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor Modernization (Project No. D2017-D000AT-0151.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7506 Announced Projects - Contract Oversight for the Audit of the United States Transportation Command Working Capital Fund Financial Statements for FY 2018 (Project No. D2017-D000FL-0158.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7509 Contract Oversight for the Audit of the United States Transportation Command Working Capital Fund Financial Statements for FY 2018 (Project No. D2017-D000FL-0158.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7509 Infomation Releases - Orange County Man Pleads Guilty to Federal Charge of Failing to Properly Overhaul Part Used on Apache Helicopters http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7529 Orange County Man Pleads Guilty to Federal Charge of Failing to Properly Overhaul Part Used on Apache Helicopters (.pdf 131KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>LOS ANGELES &ndash; A Yorba Linda man who owns a Gardena company that contracted with the U.S. Army to overhaul linear actuators used on Apache helicopters pleaded guilty to violating his contract with the military by making unauthorized repairs to motors inside the part.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7529 Announced Projects - Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2018 U.S. Special Operations Command General Fund Financial Statements (Project No. D2017-D000FP-0156.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7508 Oversight of the Audit of the FY 2018 U.S. Special Operations Command General Fund Financial Statements (Project No. D2017-D000FP-0156.000) Tue, 01 Aug 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7508 Announced Projects - Quality Control Review of Baker Tilly Virchow Krause, LLP FY 2016 Single Audit of the National Marrow Donor Program (Project No.D2017-DAPOSA-0175.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7519 Quality Control Review of Baker Tilly Virchow Krause, LLP FY 2016 Single Audit of the National Marrow Donor Program (Project No.D2017-DAPOSA-0175.000) Mon, 31 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7519 Technical Assessment Report - Followup on DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2015-013, “Military Housing Inspections – Republic of Korea,” October 28, 2014 http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7499 Technical Assessment Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-104)<br>Topic: Military Housing Inspection<br>Followup on DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2015-013, “Military Housing Inspections – Republic of Korea,” October 28, 2014 (Project No. D2016-D000PT-0170.000)<br><Blockquote><p>We are providing this report for your information and use. This is a followup on DoD Office of Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2015-013, &quot;Military Housing Inspections &ndash; Republic of Korea,&quot; October 28, 2014. We found that the Army and Air Force had not fully implemented the recommendations from our previous report, and that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is implementing the recommendations from our previous report. We conducted our inspection in accordance with the &quot;Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,&quot; published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.</p> <p>We considered management comments on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Housing, and Partnerships; Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations; and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Korea, addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, no further comments are required.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 25 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7499 Infomation Releases - Former Employee of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan Pleads Guilty to Soliciting Approximately $320,000 in Bribes From Contractors http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7517 Former Employee of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan Pleads Guilty to Soliciting Approximately $320,000 in Bribes From Contractors (.pdf 113KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>A former employee of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) based in Afghanistan pleaded guilty today to soliciting approximately $320,000 in bribes from Afghan contractors in return for his assistance in U.S. government contracts.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 25 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7517 Infomation Releases - Pharmacist Pleads Guilty to Health Care Fraud Charges for Role in $192 Million Compounded Medication Scheme; Pharmacy Marketer Also Pleads Guilty http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7516 Pharmacist Pleads Guilty to Health Care Fraud Charges for Role in $192 Million Compounded Medication Scheme; Pharmacy Marketer Also Pleads Guilty (.pdf 171KB)<br><br><Blockquote>The Pharmacist in Charge of a Hattiesburg, Mississippi compounding pharmacy pleaded guilty today to health care fraud charges for his role in a scheme that defrauded TRICARE and private insurance companies out of at least $192 million in payments for medically unnecessary compounded medications.</Blockquote> Tue, 25 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7516 Testimony - Statement of Michael Roark Assistant Inspector General Contract Management and Payments Directorate Testifying on Accountability and Security of Weapons and Equipment in Iraq and Kuwait Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House Armed Services Committee http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/testimony_detail.cfm?id=7504 Statement of Michael Roark Assistant Inspector General Contract Management and Payments Directorate Testifying on Accountability and Security of Weapons and Equipment in Iraq and Kuwait Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations House Armed Services Committee (.pdf 343KB) Tue, 25 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/testimony_detail.cfm?id=7504 Special Plans and Operations Report - Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 Funding http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7497 Special Plans and Operations Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-099)<br>Topic: Section 1206/2282 Funding<br>Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 Funding (Project No. D00SPO-0190.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objectives</p> <p>Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Defense (DoD) Global Train and Equip Program, created pursuant to Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Section 1206 (2006),&nbsp; as amended, henceforth &ldquo;Section 1206,&rdquo; effectively managed and enhanced partner-nation security-force capabilities.&nbsp; Our specific objectives were to determine whether Section 1206:</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;efforts resulted in improved partner nation capability to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in stability operations with U.S. Armed Forces,</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;performance-feedback data informed DoD Section 1206 program decision making,</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;was administered by DoD officials consistent with U.S. statutes and guidance, and</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;coordination between the DoD and the Department of State (DOS) at all levels appropriately supported planning and execution.</p> <p>Findings</p> <p>The FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1206, authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism and stability operations.</p> <p>The use of Section 1206 funds by the DoD and the DOS provided partner nations with equipment, training, and services to enhance their capabilities to conduct counterterrorism and stabilization operations.&nbsp; Partner nations, along with DoD and DOS stakeholders, reported continued interest in receiving this support.</p> <p>Although the DoD and the DOS had established systematic interagency coordination processes in planning and execution, the DoD needs to enhance its Section 1206 management and reporting.&nbsp; Specifically, we determined that:</p> <p>1)&nbsp;The DoD had not established Section 1206 as a distinct and fully developed program, including:</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;developing a programmatic strategy with clear objectives and an overarching execution plan, and</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;allocating sufficient personnel and other resources necessary to effectively manage Section 1206.</p> <p>2)&nbsp;Project proposal guidance, selection criteria, analysis procedures, and metrics for determining results achieved from Section 1206 implementation required improvement:</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;Project proposal guidance was not sufficiently instructive or enforced.</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;Project proposals did not always include data or analysis essential to enable prioritization about projected costs, benefits, and risks.</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;Performance measurement methodology did not sufficiently define progress achieved with respect to programmatic goals.</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;Section 1206 reporting to congressional and senior-level DoD and DOS leaders has not been sufficiently informative in explaining the collective impact of Section 1206 in support of U.S. counterterrorism and stability operation objectives.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that:</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;designate a lead manager with sufficient authority, resources, and staff capacity to effectively plan and execute the mission authorized by Section 2282, and&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;develop a comprehensive implementation plan.</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, ensure that implementation of Section 2282 results in projects based on:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;proposals that fully describe partner-nation requirements and the means to sustain the capability provided;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;a selection process that enables proposals to be prioritized on the basis of a comprehensive comparison of the respective costs, benefits, and risks;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;performance measures and indicators that enable senior-level management reviews in accordance with applicable Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and other Government directives and guidance.</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;identify process deficiencies that impede fast, effective procurement and provision of fully operational equipment &ndash; and develop a plan to address these deficiencies; and&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp;ensure that Geographic Combatant Command and United States Embassy Security Cooperation personnel are aware of, and fully use, all funding authorities and sources available for sustaining capabilities provided by Section 2282.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Combat), performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, responding for management, agreed with 13 of the 15 recommendations in this report, partially agreed with the 14th recommendation, and did not respond to the remaining 15th recommendation.&nbsp; However, management&rsquo;s comments did not fully meet the intent of certain recommendations to:</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;Identify process deficiencies impeding fast, effective procurement and delivery of fully operational equipment and develop sufficient internal controls to preclude the shipment of incomplete or inoperable equipment.</p> <p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &bull;&nbsp;Develop a comprehensive plan to address the deficiencies identified in the previous bullet, ensuring that responsible DoD personnel use all Federal Acquisition Regulation and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement authorizations, as well as allowable waiver and exemption options, to meet program requirements. &nbsp;</p></Blockquote> Fri, 21 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7497 Audit Report - Under-Vehicle Force Protection Requirement for the Army Paladin Integrated Management Program (Redacted) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7518 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-103)<br>Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management<br>Under-Vehicle Force Protection Requirement for the Army Paladin Integrated Management Program (Redacted) (Project No. D2016-D000AU-0203.000) Fri, 21 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7518 Infomation Releases - Miami Resident Indicted for Impersonating a Federal Officer http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7496 Miami Resident Indicted for Impersonating a Federal Officer (.pdf 114KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>Benjamin Greenberg, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida; John Khin, Special Agent in Charge, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS); and Thomas Robarge, Special Agent in Charge, Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS), made the announcement.</p></Blockquote> Wed, 19 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7496 Infomation Releases - Former Employee of U.S. Government Contractor in Afghanistan Pleads Guilty to Accepting Over $250,000 in Kickbacks From Subcontractor http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7495 Former Employee of U.S. Government Contractor in Afghanistan Pleads Guilty to Accepting Over $250,000 in Kickbacks From Subcontractor (.pdf 118KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>A former employee of a U.S. government contractor in Afghanistan pleaded guilty today to accepting over $250,000 in illegal kickbacks from an Afghan subcontractor in return for his assistance in obtaining subcontracts on U.S. government contracts.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 18 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7495 Audit Report - Transmittal of the Qualified Opinion on the Defense Information Systems Agency General Fund Financial Statements for FY 2016 http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7535 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-101)<br>Topic: Financial Management<br>Transmittal of the Qualified Opinion on the Defense Information Systems Agency General Fund Financial Statements for FY 2016 (Project No. D2016-D000FL-0157.000) Mon, 17 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7535 Audit Report - Transmittal of the Unmodified Opinion on the Defense Information Systems Agency Working Capital Fund Financial Statements for FY 2016 http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7536 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-102)<br>Topic: Financial Management<br>Transmittal of the Unmodified Opinion on the Defense Information Systems Agency Working Capital Fund Financial Statements for FY 2016 (Project No. D2016-D000FL-0157.000) Mon, 17 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7536 Audit Policy and Oversight Report - External Peer Review Report on the Army Internal Review Program http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7493 Audit Policy and Oversight Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-100)<br>Topic: External Peer Review<br>External Peer Review Report on the Army Internal Review Program<br><Blockquote> <p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: ">We reviewed the system of quality control for the Army Internal Review (IR) Program in effect for the year ended December 31, 2015. A system of quality control encompasses the Army IR Program&rsquo;s organizational structure and policies adopted and procedures established to provide it with reasonable assurance of conforming to Government Auditing Standards (GAS).The elements of quality control are described in GAS. The Army IR offices are responsible for establishing and maintaining a system of quality control designed to provide reasonable assurance that the organization and its personnel comply with professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements in all material respects. Our responsibility is to express an opinion, based on our review, on the design of the system of quality and the Army IR Program&rsquo;s compliance with standards and requirements. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p>.</p></Blockquote> Fri, 14 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7493 What is New - Compendium of Open Office of Inspector General Recommendations to the Department of Defense http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/index_detail.cfm?id=7492 Compendium of Open Office of Inspector General Recommendations to the Department of Defense Thu, 13 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/index_detail.cfm?id=7492 Infomation Releases - National Health Care Fraud Takedown Results in Charges Against Over 412 Individuals Responsible for $1.3 Billion in Fraud Losses http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7494 National Health Care Fraud Takedown Results in Charges Against Over 412 Individuals Responsible for $1.3 Billion in Fraud Losses (.pdf 207KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Tom Price, M.D., announced today the largest ever health care fraud enforcement action by the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, involving 412 charged defendants across 41 federal districts, including 115 doctors, nurses and other licensed medical professionals, for their alleged participation in health care fraud schemes involving approximately $1.3 billion in false billings.</p></Blockquote> Thu, 13 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7494 Audit Report - Defense Logistics Agency Compliance With the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7489 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-098)<br>Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management<br>Defense Logistics Agency Compliance With the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act (Project No. D2016-D000CG-0140.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) personnel complied with the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act when they purchased covered items such as food, clothing, tents, textiles, and hand or measuring tools.</p> <p>Background</p> <p>We performed this audit in response to Section 1601 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014.<sup>1 </sup>&nbsp;To determine whether DLA personnel complied with the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act, we reviewed a nonstatistical sample of 88 contracts with an obligated value of $386.9 million, out of 2,382 contracts across DLA with an obligated value of $700.4 million, awarded from October 1, 2014, through March 31, 2016. The Berry Amendment directs DoD personnel to ensure funds appropriated or otherwise available to the DoD are not used to procure covered items if the items were not grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced in the United States. The Buy American Act requires, with certain exceptions, that only articles, materials, and supplies that were mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States are used to fulfill Federal procurement and construction contracts.</p> <p>Findings</p> <p>DLA contracting personnel complied with the Berry Amendment for 13 of the 32 contracts reviewed. However, DLA personnel at 3 of the 4 contracting offices visited did not comply with the Berry Amendment for the remaining 19 contracts, valued at $453.2 million.<sup>2</sup></p> <p>Specifically, for 14 of the 19 noncompliant contracts, DLA contracting personnel at DLA Troop Support Philadelphia and DLA Aviation Richmond omitted the Berry Amendment implementing clause because they: were unfamiliar with the Berry Amendment, relied on their contract writing system, relied on another official to prepare and review the contract before award, or committed an administrative error. For four noncompliant contracts, contracting personnel at DLA Troop Support Philadelphia did not prepare award notices containing required language to notify the public of the purchase of nondomestic items because they were unaware of the requirement and mistakenly relied on DLA&rsquo;s electronic contracting systems to include the information or they misinterpreted the requirement and believed that it did not apply. For one of these contracts, DLA Troop Support Philadelphia contracting personnel also purchased foreign-made items without the required supporting documentation and approval because they misinterpreted the Berry Amendment requirements. Contracting personnel at DLA Maritime Puget Sound purchased items containing nondomestic components on the remaining noncompliant contract without the required supporting documentation and approval because they improperly applied an exception to waive the Berry Amendment requirements.</p> <p>As a result, contracting personnel at DLA Troop Support Philadelphia and DLA Aviation Richmond had limited assurance that purchased items complied with the Berry Amendment and suppliers may have provided nondomestic items. In addition, DLA Troop Support Philadelphia personnel did not notify the public regarding a lack of domestically-produced items, and contracting personnel at DLA Troop Support Philadelphia and DLA Maritime Puget Sound committed potential violations of the Antideficiency Act.<sup>3</sup></p> <p>DLA personnel at the three contracting offices visited<sup>4</sup> complied with the Buy American Act for 44 of the 56 contracts reviewed but did not comply for the 12 remaining contracts, valued at $1.8 million.</p> <p>DLA contracting personnel at DLA Troop Support Philadelphia and DLA Aviation Richmond omitted the Buy American Act implementing clause because they relied on their contract writing system or because of an administrative error. In addition, DLA Aviation Richmond contracting personnel purchased non-U.S.-manufactured items on one contract because they erroneously awarded a small business set-aside contract to an ineligible foreign manufacturer.</p> <p>As a result, contracting personnel at DLA Troop Support Philadelphia and DLA Aviation Richmond had limited assurance that items purchased on 12 contracts complied with the Buy American Act and suppliers may have provided nondomestic items.</p> <p>Corrective Actions Taken</p> <p>Contracting personnel at DLA Troop Support Philadelphia and DLA Aviation Richmond corrected some of the deficiencies identified during the audit. Specifically, DLA contracting personnel modified all 14 Berry Amendment contracts and modified 1 of the 12 Buy American Act contracts with the required implementing clause. In addition, DLA Aviation Richmond contracting personnel issued a local notice to reinforce compliance with the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act and officials at both contracting offices conducted training on both domestic-sourcing restrictions.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that DLA officials determine whether noncompliant items were delivered and, when appropriate, obtain compliant replacement items; amend standard operating procedures and internal processes to improve compliance with the Berry Amendment and Buy American Act; issue special notices to inform the public on the lack of domestically-produced items; require that contracting and technical personnel receive training that incorporates the Buy American Act and Small Business Program requirements when soliciting and awarding an acquisition as a small business set-aside; and review the potential Antideficiency Act violations.</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response </p> <p>The Director, Defense Logistics Agency Acquisition, responding for the Commander, Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support; Commander, Defense Logistics Agency Aviation; and the Commander, Defense Logistics Agency Land and Maritime, generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. The Director agreed to modify contracts we identified as deficient to include the required Berry Amendment and Buy American Act implementing clauses and to determine whether non-compliant items were delivered under the contracts, and where appropriate, obtain replacement items. The Director also agreed to provide training to contracting personnel on procurements subject to the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved but will remain open until DLA provides documentation to verify that the contracts have been modified, the product reviews are completed, and that the training satisfies the recommendation specifics.</p> <p>The Director, Defense Logistics Agency Acquisition, commenting for the Director, Defense Logistics Agency Finance, partially agreed with the recommendation to initiate a preliminary review in accordance with the DoD 7000.14-R, &ldquo;DoD Financial Management Regulation,&rdquo; volume 14, chapter 3, to determine whether reportable violations of the Antideficiency Act occurred on contracts SPE1C1-15-M-2729 and SPMYM2-15-C-0007 on which DLA contracting personnel procured nondomestically produced footwear that did not comply with the Berry Amendment. The Director stated that a preliminary review was initiated on March 3, 2017, for contract SPMYM2-15-C-0007 and will be completed by June 30, 2017. However, the Director disagreed that a preliminary review was required for contract SPE1C1-15-M-2729 because the Director of Defense Logistics Agency, approved a domestic nonavailability determination for footwear on January 18, 2017, that retroactively applied to contract SPE1C1-15-M-2729.</p> <p>We disagree that the Director, Defense Logistics Agency&rsquo;s approval of a domestic nonavailability determination more than a year after contracting personnel procured the noncompliant footwear, and more than a year after the footwear was delivered and the contract closed, eliminated the preliminary review for a potential Antideficiency Act violation. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and remains open.</p> <p>We request that the Director, Defense Logistics Agency Finance, initiate a preliminary review in accordance with DoD 7000.14-R, &ldquo;DoD Financial Management Regulation,&rdquo; volume 14, chapter 3, to determine whether reportable violations of the Antideficiency Act occurred on contract SPE1C1-15-M-2729. Additionally, we request that the Director, Defense Logistics Agency Finance, provide DoD policy on &ldquo;retroactive&rdquo; nonavailability determinations. We request that the Director, Defense Logistics Agency Finance, provide comments to the final report by August 7, 2017.</p> <hr /> <p><sup>1</sup> Public Law 113-66, &ldquo;National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,&rdquo; December 26, 2013, which requires the DoD Inspector General to conduct periodic audits of contracting practices and policies related to procurement under section 2533a, title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.).</p> <p><sup>2</sup> We identified 20 deficiencies on 19 contracts.</p> <p><sup>3</sup> The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. &sect; 1341) does not permit Government officials to make or authorize obligations or expenditures that exceed amounts appropriated or funded for that purpose. The Berry Amendment is a statutory prohibition on the use of DoD funds.</p> <p><sup>4</sup> We did not review contracts at DLA Aviation Philadelphia for compliance with the Buy American Act. &nbsp;</p></Blockquote> Fri, 07 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7489 Audit Report - Protection of Electronic Patient Health Information at Army Military Treatment Facilities (Redacted) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7490 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-085)<br>Topic: Cyber Security<br>Protection of Electronic Patient Health Information at Army Military Treatment Facilities (Redacted) (Project No. D2016-D000RC-0187.000) Thu, 06 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7490 Announced Projects - Audit of Defense Information Systems Agency Contract Awards (Project No. D2017-D000CL-0153.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7471 Audit of Defense Information Systems Agency Contract Awards (Project No. D2017-D000CL-0153.000) Mon, 03 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7471 Announced Projects - Audit of Navy Systems Management Activity’s Financial Statement Compilation Adjustments and Information Technology Corrective Action Plan Validation Process (Project No. D2017-D000FS-0148.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7470 Audit of Navy Systems Management Activity’s Financial Statement Compilation Adjustments and Information Technology Corrective Action Plan Validation Process (Project No. D2017-D000FS-0148.000) Mon, 03 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7470 Announced Projects - Audit of the Supply Chain Risk Management of Strategic Capabilities at the Air Force Space Command (Project No. D2017-D000AG-0155.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7472 Audit of the Supply Chain Risk Management of Strategic Capabilities at the Air Force Space Command (Project No. D2017-D000AG-0155.000) Mon, 03 Jul 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7472 Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Report - Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance with Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7474 Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-089)<br>Topic: Counterintelligence and Insider Threat<br>Evaluation of Military Services' Compliance with Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program Security Reviews and Monitoring Programs (Project No. Project No.D2016-DISPA-0162.000) Wed, 28 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7474 Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Report - Evaluation of the DoD Process for Allocating Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capability in Support of Operation Inherent Resolve http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7488 Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-097)<br>Topic: Intelligence<br>Evaluation of the DoD Process for Allocating Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capability in Support of Operation Inherent Resolve (Project No. D2016-DISPA2-00060.000) Wed, 28 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7488 Audit Report - Audit of the Training and Airframe Evaluations for the H-60 Black Hawk Helicopter http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7473 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-096)<br>Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management<br>Audit of the Training and Airframe Evaluations for the H-60 Black Hawk Helicopter (Project No. D2016-D000AT-0214.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether the U.S. Army (Army) effectively managed its modernization of the H-60 Black Hawk (H-60) helicopter fleet. Specifically, we reviewed the Army&rsquo;s H-60 new equipment training strategy and airframe condition evaluations.</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The H-60 helicopter is used by the active duty Army, U.S. Army National Guard (Guard), and the U.S. Army Reserve (Reserve). According to Project Manager Utility Helicopters officials, the modernized fleet will consist of 1,375 H-60M helicopters and 760 H-60V helicopters by FY 2035. The H-60M helicopter is the newest helicopter in the H-60 fleet with a digital cockpit and autopilot capabilities. The Army is developing the H-60V helicopters by upgrading the H-60L analog cockpit to a digital cockpit. The H-60V cockpits are expected to be visually identical to the H-60M cockpits and allow an H-60M pilot to fly an H-60V helicopter with limited additional training.</p> <p>New equipment training provides H-60 pilots with information about the helicopter&rsquo;s use and support requirements. Airframe condition evaluations are annual reviews of the structural parts of the H-60 helicopter. Army policy requires all H-60 helicopters to be evaluated annually for structural defects, unless valid exemptions exist.</p> <p>Findings</p> <p>The Army did not provide adequate funding and training for H-60 pilots on the new equipment. This occurred because Army officials did not agree which Army organization was responsible for funding and conducting H-60 new equipment training. The Army will need $152.9 million more than it has budgeted to provide new equipment training for a total of 1,390 H-60 pilots from FY 2018 through FY 2035. If no action is taken, the Guard will have a shortage of 160 trained H-60 pilots by FY 2026.</p> <p>Additionally, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command officials did not effectively manage airframe condition evaluations for the H-60 fleet. During the annual evaluation period from March 1, 2016, through February 28, 2017, the Army did not conduct an airframe condition evaluation, as required by Army regulation and policy, for 460 of 2,098 H-60 helicopters. This occurred because U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command officials did not provide adequate oversight of the H-60 airframe condition evaluations. Specifically, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command officials did not require an evaluation for all H-60 helicopters or verify that all exemptions were valid, coordinate with unit commanders to ensure all H-60 helicopters were available for evaluation, and require evaluations of H-60 helicopters that were less than 3 years old. Evaluators identified safety problems with some H-60 helicopters that required the unit commander to ground (restrict flying) those helicopters. However, the unit commander did not always allow evaluators to finish the evaluation of additional helicopters because he did not want to ground more helicopters if additional safety problems were identified. As a result, Army pilots and crew could be flying H-60 helicopters with unidentified structural defects, which could impact the life and safety of the helicopter and its crew. Furthermore, Army officials may select the wrong helicopters for maintenance, modernization, or retirement.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, provide training capacity for new equipment training to all pilots on H-60M and H-60V helicopters. In addition, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) require the Project Management Utility Helicopters to fund H-60M and H-60V new equipment training until all new equipment has been fielded. We also recommend that the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command:</p> <ul> <li>determine which helicopters did not receive an evaluation during an evaluation period and ensure that those helicopters receive evaluations during the next evaluation period;</li> <li>coordinate with U.S. Army Forces Command to communicate to all H-60 unit commanders that they are required to comply with applicable airframe condition evaluation guidance;</li> <li>require the airframe condition evaluation teams to document a unit commander&rsquo;s refusal to make a helicopter available for evaluation and report that refusal to the Commander, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command; and</li> <li>coordinate with the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center to determine whether helicopters that are less than three years old should undergo airframe condition evaluation and update applicable regulations and publications as necessary.</li> </ul> <p>Furthermore, we recommend that the Project Management Utility Helicopters designate a H-60M and H-60V New Equipment Training Manager and evaluate the impact of funding the new equipment training has on the H-60M and H-60V programs&rsquo; costs and update program documentation as needed.</p> <p>Management Comments&nbsp;and Our Response</p> <p>The Vice Chief of Staff, Army; the Commander, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command; and the Project Manager Utility Helicopters provided comments in response to a draft of this report.</p> <p>The Vice Chief of Staff, Army, agreed with our recommendation to provide future training capacity for new equipment training to all pilots on H-60M and H-60V helicopters. The Vice Chief of Staff stated that the Army will ensure that future reviews address the total force needs. The Vice Chief of Staff also stated that the Army will provide additional resources for H-60 training if institutional training cannot accommodate future training needs. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Vice Chief of Staff has ensured that all U.S. Army H-60M and H-60V pilots will receive initial training.</p> <p>The Commander, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, agreed with our recommendations to provide oversight and ensure annual H-60 airframe condition evaluations are conducted as required. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved but remains open. We will close these recommendations once we verify that the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command has:</p> <ul> <li>developed an annual evaluation schedule that encompasses all helicopters and communicated it to H-60 unit commanders;</li> <li>ensured that helicopters not evaluated will be given priority for evaluation in the next evaluation period;</li> <li>demonstrated that evaluators have been instructed on how to document why a helicopter is unavailable for evaluation, including a unit&nbsp;commander&rsquo;s refusal to make a helicopter available for evaluation, and report that refusal to the Commander, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command; and</li> <li>completed its review of the required evaluation interval and make changes to applicable regulations and publications as necessary.</li> </ul> <p>The Project Manager Utility Helicopters agreed with our recommendations to designate a H-60M and H-60V New Equipment Training Manager, and to evaluate the impact of funding the new equipment training on the H-60M and H-60V programs&rsquo; costs and update program documentation as needed. The Project Manager designated H-60M and H-60V New Equipment Training Managers. Therefore, the recommendation is closed. The Project Manager also agreed to evaluate the impact of funding the new equipment training has on the H-60M and H-60V programs&rsquo; costs and update program documentation as needed. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that the Project Manager Utility Helicopters has completed the evaluation and updated the program documentation.</p> <p>The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) did not respond to our recommendation to require the Project Management Utility Helicopters to fund H-60M and H-60V new equipment training until all new equipment has been fielded. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and remains open. We request that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) provide comments on the final report.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 27 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7473 Infomation Releases - Defense Contractor Sentenced To 30 Months In Federal Prison For $53 Million Procurement Fraud And Illegal Gratuities Scheme http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7486 Defense Contractor Sentenced To 30 Months In Federal Prison For $53 Million Procurement Fraud And Illegal Gratuities Scheme (.pdf 0.1MB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>Baltimore, Maryland &ndash; On June 27, 2017, U.S. District Judge Marvin J. Garbis sentenced Andrew Bennett, age 37, of Tampa, Florida to 30 months in prison, followed by 36 months of supervised release, for a wire fraud conspiracy and for paying illegal gratuities to a government official, in connection with the award of more than $53 million in federal government contracts. Judge Garbis also ordered Bennett to pay forfeiture and restitution in the amount of $500,000.00</p></Blockquote> Tue, 27 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7486 Audit Report - Audit of Air Force Munitions Requirements and Storage Facilities in the Republic of Korea (Redacted) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7478 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-094)<br>Topic: Joint Warfighting and Readiness<br>Audit of Air Force Munitions Requirements and Storage Facilities in the Republic of Korea (Redacted) (Project No. D2016-D000RA-0142.000) Mon, 26 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7478 Infomation Releases - Owner of New England Compounding Center Sentenced for Racketeering Leading to Nationwide Fungal Meningitis Outbreak http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7487 Owner of New England Compounding Center Sentenced for Racketeering Leading to Nationwide Fungal Meningitis Outbreak (.pdf 0.2MB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>The owner and head pharmacist of New England Compounding Center (NECC) was sentenced today to nine years in prison in connection with the 2012 nationwide fungal meningitis outbreak, the Department of Justice announced today.</p></Blockquote> Mon, 26 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7487 Audit Report - U.S. Army’s Management of the Heavy Lift VII Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7469 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-095)<br>Topic: Enabling Effective Acquisition and Contract Management<br>U.S. Army’s Management of the Heavy Lift VII Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East (Project No. D2017-D000JB-0048.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether the Army properly managed the requirements of the Heavy Lift VII (HL7) commercial transportation contracts.</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The HL7 contracts provide commercial transportation for moving Army equipment, cargo, and personnel throughout the Middle East. The Heavy Lift program supports Operation Inherent Resolve. The Army uses four contractors to fulfill its heavy lift transportation requirements, with each contractor performing under a separate contract. The Heavy Lift program is in its seventh iteration, so these contracts are referred to as the HL7 contracts.</p> <p>The HL7 contracts were designed to provide transportation in Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. In May 2016, Army Contracting Command&ndash;Rock Island (ACC-RI) awarded a $5.95 million task order on the HL7 contracts in support of Trans-Arabian Network (TAN) ground transportation. The TAN task order expanded the capabilities of the original HL7 contracts to transport cargo between Kuwait and Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates.</p> <p>This is the second audit on the HL7 contracts. The first audit (DODIG-2017-035) focused on the Army&rsquo;s oversight of HL7 contractors in Kuwait and determined that the Army did not provide effective oversight or administration of the HL7 contracts.</p> <p>Finding</p> <p>The Army did not adequately manage the HL7 contract requirements. Specifically, the Army ordered an average of 39 percent more transportation assets than it needed throughout the life of the HL7 contracts.</p> <p>This occurred because the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) (1st TSC) did not</p> <ul> <li>analyze HL7 asset usage for intra-Kuwait movements and did not continuously evaluate HL7 requirements so it could increase or decrease orders based on operational need; or</li> <li>identify and correct the inefficiencies in the Army&rsquo;s planning and execution of theater transportation missions.</li> </ul> <p>In addition, Army requirement review boards did not require adequate information in order to properly validate the number of HL7 assets requested. Also, the Army over-ordered HL7 services because it did not properly plan the TAN task order and did not take appropriate measures to ensure its full operational use. Furthermore, ACC-RI included excessive guaranteed minimum payments to each of the HL7 contractors, which prompted the Army to order services to meet the guaranteed minimums rather than what was actually required within that period of performance.</p> <p>As a result, the Army wasted $53.6 million throughout the life of the HL7 contracts on services that it did not require.<sup>1</sup>&nbsp;</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), direct supported units to use the TAN, establish metrics for TAN movements, and perform quarterly assessments of the TAN&rsquo;s performance and effectiveness.</p> <p>We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT), develop procedures to ensure that requirement review boards not only validate the need for commercial transportation in the Middle East, but also validate the number of HL assets that 1st TSC requests.</p> <p>We recommend that the Executive Director, ACC-RI establish a reasonable and achievable guaranteed minimum on the Heavy Lift VIII (HL8) contracts to ensure the Army does not pay for services that it will not use.</p> <p>Additionally, we recommend that the Commander, 1st TSC, implement a systemic process for collecting HL asset usage and establish a consistent schedule for analyzing usage information in order to use quantitative and qualitative factors when forecasting requirement quantities on future task orders; review instances of poor mission planning and execution that resulted in ordering wasted assets and implement corrective actions to prevent those inefficiencies from re-occuring; and, update the requirement review process standard operating procedures to ensure requirements packages that are submitted to the review boards include all information necessary for the board to make an informed decision.</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Chief, CENTCOM Logistics and Engineering Directorate, Distribution Division, on behalf of the Commander, CENTCOM, agreed with our findings and recommendation to direct supported units to use the TAN, establish metrics for TAN movements, and perform quarterly assessments of the TAN&rsquo;s performance and effectiveness. CENTCOM issued an Execute Order during the audit that directed subordinate units to use the TAN. Furthermore, the Execute Order directed ARCENT, in coordination with the CENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, to develop appropriate metrics to support, at a minimum, quarterly assessments of the TAN&rsquo;s performance and effectiveness. This recommendation is resolved and will be closed when the actions are fully implemented.</p> <p>The G-4 (Chief), ARCENT Logistics, on behalf of the Commander, ARCENT, agreed with our findings and recommendation to develop procedures that ensure requirement review boards not only validate the need for commercial transportation in the Middle East, but also validate the number of HL assets that 1st TSC requests. However, the Chief, ARCENT Logistics, did not elaborate on how or when updated procedures would be developed. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and will remain open. We request that the Commander, ARCENT provide comments on the final report for this recommendation. We will consider the recommendation resolved once we receive the specific actions that will be taken to develop updated procedures that ensure requirement review boards are validating entire requirements.</p> <p>The Chief, ARCENT Logistics, on behalf of the Commander, 1st TSC, agreed with our recommendations. During the audit, the 1st TSC began collecting and analyzing daily HL7 usage information. For a long-term solution, the 1st TSC is implementing an auditable transportation system of record to accurately forecast HL requirements. Furthermore, in an effort to implement corrective actions to improve HL7 utilization, 1st TSC initiated a weekly working group to monitor utilization and track factors that led to inefficiencies in the program. Members of the working group are also developing standard operating procedures to document the controls needed to more effectively manage HL mission execution. In addition, during the audit, 1st TSC personnel began providing usage information to the review boards for validation and are updating the requirement review process standard operating procedure to ensure the approval authority receives all required information to make an informed decision on the requested requirement. The recommendations are resolved and will be closed when we verify that the commands have implemented the proposed actions.</p> <p>The Executive Director, ACC-RI, did not respond to the recommendation to establish a reasonable and achievable guaranteed minimum on the HL8 contracts to ensure the Army does not pay for services that it will not use. However, during the audit, we discussed our observations with the ACC-RI contracting officer regarding the guaranteed minimum, and the ACC-RI contracting officer subsequently solicited for the HL8 contract with a more conservative guaranteed minimum of $1 million per contractor. The management actions taken will address our concerns regarding guaranteed minimums and should ensure that the Army uses the services it orders with the HL8 guaranteed payments. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and will be closed when the HL8 contract is awarded. We are not requesting additional comments from ACC-RI.</p> <hr /> <p><sup>1</sup> Appendix A contains our methodology for how we calculated the waste. &nbsp;</p></Blockquote> Mon, 26 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7469 Infomation Releases - Broward Chronic Pain Doctor and Office Staff Charged with Unlawfully Conspiring to Dispense Controlled Substances http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7468 Broward Chronic Pain Doctor and Office Staff Charged with Unlawfully Conspiring to Dispense Controlled Substances (.pdf 113KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>Dr. Willem Ouw, 84, of Broward County, is charged in a ten-count indictment with conspiracy to dispense oxycodone, attempting to dispense oxycodone, morphine and amphetamine, and dispensing a controlled substance without authorization by law. Sarah Shoopman, 36, Orange County, and Donna Licata, 62, and Belafonte Byard, a/k/a &ldquo;Quincy,&rdquo; 50, of Broward County, were each charged with one count of conspiracy to dispense a controlled substance, oxycodone, without authorization by law.</p></Blockquote> Fri, 16 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7468 Infomation Releases - Former U.S. Naval Attaché and Military Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador in the Philippines Sentenced for Taking Bribes in Massive Navy Corruption Scandal http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7465 Former U.S. Naval Attaché and Military Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador in the Philippines Sentenced for Taking Bribes in Massive Navy Corruption Scandal (.pdf 110KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>A Retired U.S. Navy Captain was sentenced in federal court today to 41 months in prison for his role in a massive bribery and fraud scheme involving foreign defense contractor Leonard Glenn Francis and his firm, Singapore-based, Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA).</p></Blockquote> Fri, 16 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7465 Infomation Releases - Virginia Resident Sentenced in West Palm Beach to Nine Years in Prison for Defrauding His Employer and the United States Government http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7467 Virginia Resident Sentenced in West Palm Beach to Nine Years in Prison for Defrauding His Employer and the United States Government (.pdf 177KB)<br><br><Blockquote>Brian Charles Tolley, 32, of Bedford, Virginia, was sentenced today to 9 years in prison, after having been previously convicted at trial in West Palm Beach, Florida of wire fraud, identity theft, aggravated identity theft, possession of counterfeit government seals with the intent to defraud, money laundering, making and subscribing false federal income tax returns, and failing to file federal income tax returns.</Blockquote> Fri, 16 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7467 Audit Report - Control Systems Supporting Tier I Task Critical Assets Lacked Basic Cybersecurity Controls http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7464 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-093)<br>Topic: Increasing Cyber Security and Cyber Capabilities<br>Control Systems Supporting Tier I Task Critical Assets Lacked Basic Cybersecurity Controls (Project No. D2016-D000RB-0149.000) Thu, 15 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7464 Audit Report - Audit of the Defense Contract Audit Agency Field Detachment http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7463 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-092)<br>Topic: Acquisition Processes and Contract Management<br>Audit of the Defense Contract Audit Agency Field Detachment (Project No. D2015-DISPA3-0248.000) Wed, 14 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7463 Announced Projects - Evaluation of DoD's Organizational Changes to the Past Conflict Personnel Accounting Community (Project No. D2017-D00SPO-0154.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7461 Evaluation of DoD's Organizational Changes to the Past Conflict Personnel Accounting Community (Project No. D2017-D00SPO-0154.000) Wed, 14 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7461 Audit Policy and Oversight Report - External Peer Review Report on the Army Audit Agency Special Access Program Audits http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7460 Audit Policy and Oversight Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-091)<br>Topic: External Peer Review<br>External Peer Review Report on the Army Audit Agency Special Access Program Audits<br><Blockquote><p>We have reviewed the system of quality control for the Army Audit Agency&rsquo;s Special Access Program audits in effect for the year ended December 31, 2016. A system of quality control encompasses the Army Audit Agency&rsquo;s organizational structure and the policies adopted and procedures established to provide it with reasonable assurance of conforming to Government Auditing Standards. The elements of quality control are described in Government Auditing Standards. The Army Audit Agency is responsible for establishing and maintaining a system of quality control that is designed to provide it with reasonable assurance that the organization and its personnel comply with professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements in all material respects. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the design of the system of quality control and Army Audit Agency&rsquo;s compliance with standards and requirements based on our review.</p></Blockquote> Fri, 09 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7460 Audit Report - The Army Needs to Improve Controls Over Chemical Surety Materials http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7459 Audit Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-090)<br>Topic: Joint Warfighting and Readiness<br>The Army Needs to Improve Controls Over Chemical Surety Materials (Project No. D2016-D000RF-0053.000)<br><Blockquote><p>Objective</p> <p>We determined whether the DoD had effective controls over chemical surety materials<sup>1</sup> in the possession or under the control of the Army and DoD contractors. Specifically, we evaluated accountability and access controls over chemical surety materials at the U.S. Army Pueblo Chemical Depot (Pueblo), U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground (Dugway), and a contractor. We also evaluated whether the personnel properly documented the destruction of assembled chemical munitions at Pueblo and U.S. Army Deseret Chemical Depot (Deseret).</p> <p>Findings</p> <p>Army officials properly implemented accountability controls such as inventory management or documenting the destruction of the chemical munition stockpile stored at Pueblo and Deseret; however, Army and contractor personnel did not fully implement accountability controls over chemical surety materials stored at Dugway and a contractor&rsquo;s facility. Specifically, Dugway and contractor officials did not conduct chemical agent inventories by primary container when one or more primary containers were stored in secondary containers.<sup>2</sup> Under the current process in place at these facilities, the primary containers remained sealed within the secondary containers during inventories; therefore, custodians cannot identify and account for leaks, evaporation, or theft that may have occurred. Furthermore, Dugway officials did not immediately notify the chemical materials accountability officer of a 1.5-milliliter shortage of the chemical surety material sarin (GB) identified during an April 19, 2016, inventory nor did they properly document the results of that inventory.</p> <p>In addition, the type of secondary containers used to store chemical surety materials varied at Dugway and the contractor&rsquo;s facility, and each location used different materials to seal secondary containers. Specifically, Dugway used stainless steel cylinders and ammunition cans sealed with tamper-evident seals; and the contractor used re-sealable plastic containers sealed with tape, which provides no assurance that only authorized personnel had access to chemical surety materials. The Commander, Dugway Proving Ground, also assigned one individual to serve as the accountable officer and primary agent custodian. Although we did not identify instances of fraud or theft during the audit, not segregating the accountable officer and primary agent custodian duties increases the risk of recordkeeping errors and theft.</p> <p>Army and contractor personnel did not fully implement Army accountability controls because Dugway and the contractor standard operating procedures contradict the Army Regulation (AR) 50-6, &ldquo;Chemical Surety,&rdquo; July 28, 2008, requirement to conduct inventory by primary container. Although the proponents of DoD Instruction 5210.65, &ldquo;Security Standards for Safeguarding Chemical Agents,&rdquo; January 19, 2016, stated that they agreed with the practice of conducting inventories by sealed, secondary containers, they had not documented that in the Instruction. Army Inspector General personnel stated that they conducted chemical surety inspections based on the proponents&rsquo; agreed upon practice and not the AR 50-6 requirement. Additionally, DoD Instruction 5210.65 and AR 50-6 do not define minimum specifications for secondary containers and do not provide guidance on the appropriate segregation of duties over the accountability for chemical surety materials. Not fully implementing accountability controls and insufficient oversight and guidance increases the risk that Dugway and the contractor will not properly store and account for chemical surety materials.</p> <p>In addition, personnel at Dugway, the contractor, and Pueblo did not consistently implement their respective chemical personnel reliability program (CPRP) requirements. Specifically, certifying officials did not always report prior drug use to reviewing officials; competent medical authorities did not always provide potentially disqualifying information to certifying officials; CPRP-certified individuals did not always self-report potentially disqualifying information in a timely manner; a certifying official at Pueblo did not properly refer an individual for medical evaluation after an alcohol-related incident; and officials did not always conduct personnel security investigations in a timely manner.</p> <p>CPRP requirements were inconsistently implemented because chemical surety officers did not always provide effective oversight of the program. As a result, there was increased risk that those locations would not meet the purpose of the Army chemical surety program as stated in AR 50-6; which is to ensure that chemical agent operations are conducted in a safe, secure, and reliable manner.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense revise DoD Instruction 5210.65 to provide clear guidance on appropriate segregation of duties and define acceptable inventory practices.</p> <p>We recommend that the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Headquarters Department of the Army coordinate with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense to provide guidance on appropriate segregation of duties and revise AR 50-6 to align with the revision to DoD Instruction 5210.65 that defines acceptable inventory practices for Army and contractor facilities in possession of chemical surety materials. We also recommend that the U.S. Army Inspector General update chemical surety inspections to align with the revised DoD and Army guidance.</p> <p>We recommend that the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command, and Commander, Dugway Proving Ground, require chemical material custodians to perform a 100-percent physical inventory of chemical agents, by primary container to establish a baseline of the chemical agent inventory before implementing any alternate inventory procedures; and update standard operating procedures to include any revised inventory requirements.</p> <p>We also recommend that the Commander, Dugway Proving Ground, provide refresher training on reporting and resolving inventory discrepancies and establish adequate segregation of duties over the accountability of chemical surety material inventory.</p> <p>We recommend that the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command; the Commander, Dugway Proving Ground; and the Commander, Pueblo Chemical Depot, implement additional internal controls to ensure the chemical surety officer provides effective oversight of compliance with Chemical Personnel Reliability Program requirements.</p> <p>Management Comments and Our Response</p> <p>The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense partially agreed with the recommendation; he agreed to revise DoD Instruction 5210.65 and did not agree to provide guidance on the appropriate segregation of duties. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense should provide comments to the final report specifying the minimum standards for a secondary container and the types of seals required, and how the duties of the primary agent custodian and the accountable officer will be segregated. We request that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense provide comments to the final report by July 7, 2017.</p> <p>The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, agreed with the recommendation to revise AR 50-6 to define acceptable inventory practices for Army and contractor facilities in possession of chemical surety materials. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and will be closed when we review and verify the revised AR 50-6 that includes acceptable inventory practices for Army and contractor facilities in possession of chemical surety materials. The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, did not agree with the recommendation to provide guidance on the appropriate segregation of duties; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, should specify how the duties of the primary agent custodian and the accountable officer will be segregated. We request that the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, provide comments to the final report by July 7, 2017.</p> <p>The Principal Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Logistics, G-3/4, responding for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command, agreed with the recommendations:</p> <ul> <li>to conduct a 100-percent inventory by primary container to establish a baseline chemical agent inventory prior to implementing any alternate inventory procedures defined by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense or the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7;</li> <li>to ensure the contractor&rsquo;s standard operating procedures are updated to include revised inventory procedures; and,</li> <li>that the U.S. Army Materiel Command Chemical Surety officer performs periodic reviews of the contractor&rsquo;s certifying official files to ensure chemical surety guidance is followed.</li> </ul> <p>Therefore, the recommendations are resolved and will be closed when we verify that the contractor&rsquo;s standard operating procedures have been updated to include the revised inventory procedures and we review the results of the contractor&rsquo;s file review and laboratory certification.</p> <p>Although the U.S. Army Inspector General did not agree with the recommendation to update chemical surety inspections to align with DoD Instruction 5210.65 and AR 50-6, his statement that he will modify the inspection methodology in response to changes in the DoD and Army standards addresses all specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and will be closed when we review the updated inspection methodology reflecting revisions to DoD Instruction 5210.65 and AR 50-6.</p> <p>The Commander, Dugway Proving Ground, agreed with the recommendations to:</p> <ul> <li>conduct a 100-percent inventory by primary container to establish a baseline chemical agent inventory prior to implementing any alternate inventory procedures defined by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense or the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7;</li> <li>update Dugway Proving Ground standard operating procedure, DP-0000-L-651 to comply with the updated inventory requirements;</li> <li>provide refresher training on reporting and resolving inventory discrepancies; and</li> <li>implement additional internal controls to ensure the chemical surety officer provides effective oversight.</li> </ul> <p>Therefore, the recommendations are resolved and will be closed when we:</p> <ul> <li>review the results of the 100-percent inventories conducted in June and December 2016;</li> <li>verify that the standard operating procedure has been updated to comply with updated inventory requirements;</li> <li>review documentation verifying that personnel with chemical agent accountability duties received refresher training; and</li> <li>verify that Dugway Regulation 50-1 includes additions and changes in internal controls.</li> </ul> <p>The Commander, Dugway Proving Ground, did not agree with the recommendation to ensure that segregation of duties over the accountability of chemical surety material inventory is maintained. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. The Commander, Dugway Proving Ground, should provide comments to the final report specifying how the segregation of duties over the accountability of chemical surety material inventory will be maintained. We request that the Commander, Dugway Proving Ground, provide comments to the final report by July 7, 2017.</p> <p>The Commander, Pueblo Chemical Depot, agreed with the recommendation to develop and implement additional internal controls to ensure the chemical surety officer provides effective oversight. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and will be closed when we verify that the internal controls have been updated.<hr /> </p> <p>&nbsp;<sup>1</sup> Chemical surety material is any neat (full-strength) or diluted chemical agent of which the quantity or concentration exceeds limits established by the Army.&nbsp;&nbsp;See Appendix C of this report.</p> <p>&nbsp;<sup>2</sup> A primary container is a vessel, ampule, cylinder, or other receptacle that holds a chemical agent.</p></Blockquote> Wed, 07 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7459 Technical Assessment Report - U.S.‑Controlled and ‑Occupied Military Facilities Inspection – Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7458 Technical Assessment Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-087)<br>Topic: Military Facilities Inspection<br>U.S.‑Controlled and ‑Occupied Military Facilities Inspection – Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (Project No. Project No. D2016-D000PT-0178.000)<br><Blockquote><p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3"><o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><o:p><font size="3">&nbsp;</font></o:p></span></p> <p class="Pa15" style="margin: 4pt 0in"><font size="3"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: ">Objective </span></p></font> <p class="Pa16" style="margin: 0in 0in 9pt"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">Our objective was to inspect U.S. military‑occupied facilities at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, to verify compliance with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical and fire protection systems. <o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Pa15" style="margin: 4pt 0in"><font size="3"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: ">Findings </span></p></font> <p class="Pa16" style="margin: 0in 0in 9pt"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">We found that new construction of U.S. military‑occupied facilities at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, were generally well‑built. However, some new construction that was accepted as complete did not fully comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical and fire protection systems. <o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Pa16" style="margin: 0in 0in 9pt"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">We found that existing facilities were not being maintained to DoD health and safety policies and standards. We identified a total of 691 deficiencies that could affect the health, safety, and well‑being of warfighters: 172 related to electrical systems and 519 related to fire protection systems. <o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Pa16" style="margin: 0in 0in 9pt"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">The deficiencies identified during the inspection resulted from: acceptance of new construction that did not comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards, inadequate contractor maintenance, insufficient Government inspection of work performed by the contractor, and lack of onsite Government specialized skills in electrical and fire protection inspections. <o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Pa16" style="margin: 0in 0in 9pt"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">We considered five of the deficiencies we identified to be critical deficiencies requiring immediate corrective action and issued a notice of concern on September 9, 2016, to the Commanders of Navy Installations Command, and Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. See Appendix C. <o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Pa15" style="margin: 4pt 0in"><font size="3"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: ">Recommendations<span style="color: #af841c"> </span></span></p></font> <p class="Pa16" style="margin: 0in 0in 9pt"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">We recommend that the Commander, Navy Region Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia: <o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><span times="" new="" style="font-size: 7pt; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; line-height: normal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span></p> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">Conduct a root cause analysis and implement a corrective action plan for all deficiencies identified in this report. Ensure that all facility operations and maintenance comply with the Unified Facilities Criteria and the National Fire Protection Association standards. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the analysis and corrective action plan within 90 days of the issuance of this report. <o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><span times="" new="" style="font-size: 7pt; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; line-height: normal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span></p> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">Prepare and implement a corrective action plan to ensure all construction projects are reviewed for compliance with applicable electrical and fire protection systems codes and standards before they are accepted by the Government as complete. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the corrective action plan within 90 days of the issuance of this report. <o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><span times="" new="" style="font-size: 7pt; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; line-height: normal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span></p> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">Review the circumstances surrounding the failure by the contracting officer, contracting officer&rsquo;s representative, and the performance assessment representative to fully document the contractor&rsquo;s work performance and, as appropriate, initiate administrative action. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the review findings within 90 days of the issuance of this report. <o:p></o:p></font></span></p> <p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-indent: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><span times="" new="" style="font-size: 7pt; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; line-height: normal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span></p> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><font size="3">Create an acquisition plan and take action for obtaining the services of certified electrical safety experts, as well as qualified fire protection engineers, sufficient to provide continual inspection of the base operating services contract. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the plan within 90 days of the issuance of this report. </font></span></p> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><o:p></o:p></span></p> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span times="" new="" style="font-family: "><o:p></o:p></span></p> </p> </p> </p></Blockquote> Wed, 07 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7458 Administrative Investigations Report - Whistleblower Reprisal Investigation Bio-Medical Personnel Services Missouri National Guard Public Affairs Office http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7456 Administrative Investigations Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-088)<br>Topic: Administrative Investigations<br>Whistleblower Reprisal Investigation Bio-Medical Personnel Services Missouri National Guard Public Affairs Office<br><Blockquote><p><span style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: &quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif">Investigation in response to an allegation that officials from Bio-Medical Personnel Services (BPSI) Incorporated placed Complainant, a BPSI Multimedia Specialist, on unpaid administrative leave and then discharged complainant for making protected disclosures to BPSI and to officials from the Missouri National Guard Joint Force Headquarters Inspector General about not having the proper equipment to do his job and about the assignment of tasks outside the focus of what the contract specified.<o:p></o:p></span></p></Blockquote> Wed, 07 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7456 Administrative Investigations Report - Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations Bio-Medical Personnel Services Missouri National Guard Public Affairs Office http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7455 Administrative Investigations Report (Report Number: DODIG-2017-083)<br>Topic: Aministrative Investigations<br>Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations Bio-Medical Personnel Services Missouri National Guard Public Affairs Office<br><Blockquote><p>Investigation in response to an allegation that officials from Bio-Medical Personnel Services (BPSI) Incorporated placed Complainant, a BPSI Multimedia Specialist, on unpaid administrative leave and then discharged complainant for making protected disclosures to BPSI and to officials from the Missouri National Guard Joint Force Headquarters Inspector General about not having the proper equipment to do his job and about the assignment of tasks outside the focus of what the contract specified.</p></Blockquote> Wed, 07 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=7455 Infomation Releases - Chinese Businessman Sentenced to Ten Years in U.S. Prison for Attempting to Provide Military Equipment to Peruvian Terrorist Organization http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7466 Chinese Businessman Sentenced to Ten Years in U.S. Prison for Attempting to Provide Military Equipment to Peruvian Terrorist Organization (.pdf 128KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>CHICAGO &mdash; A Chinese businessman was sentenced today to ten years in federal prison for attempting to provide military equipment to a Peruvian terrorist organization.</p></Blockquote> Tue, 06 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7466 Infomation Releases - Two Army National Guardsmen Convicted in Fraud Scheme http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7457 Two Army National Guardsmen Convicted in Fraud Scheme (.pdf 107KB)<br><br><Blockquote><p>Greenbelt, Maryland &ndash; On June 1, 2017, a federal jury found James Stewart, age 27, of District Heights, Maryland guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The jury also found Vincent Grant, age 28, of Laurel, Maryland guilty of conspiracy to commit access device fraud and aggravated identity theft.</p></Blockquote> Fri, 02 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/info_detail.cfm?id=7457 Announced Projects - Attestation of Department of State Funds Transferred to the DoD for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome(AIDS) Prevention (Project No. D2017-D000FT-0100.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7428 Attestation of Department of State Funds Transferred to the DoD for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome(AIDS) Prevention (Project No. D2017-D000FT-0100.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7428 Announced Projects - Audit Followup on the Department of the Navy's Triannual Review and New Triannual Review Requirements for Commitments, Unliquidated Obligations, Accounts Payable, Accounts Receivable, and Unfilled Customer Orders (Project No. D2017-D000FS-0123.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7432 Audit Followup on the Department of the Navy's Triannual Review and New Triannual Review Requirements for Commitments, Unliquidated Obligations, Accounts Payable, Accounts Receivable, and Unfilled Customer Orders (Project No. D2017-D000FS-0123.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7432 Announced Projects - Audit of Acquisition of the Navy’s Mine Countermeasures Mission Package (Project No. D2017-D000AE-0147.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7441 Audit of Acquisition of the Navy’s Mine Countermeasures Mission Package (Project No. D2017-D000AE-0147.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7441 Announced Projects - Audit of Army Accountability of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Government-Furnished Property in Afghanistan (Project No. D2017-D000JB-0129.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7433 Audit of Army Accountability of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Government-Furnished Property in Afghanistan (Project No. D2017-D000JB-0129.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7433 Announced Projects - Audit of Controls Over the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Cooperative Threat Reduction Contract in the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility (Project No. D2017-D000RA-0116.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7427 Audit of Controls Over the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Cooperative Threat Reduction Contract in the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility (Project No. D2017-D000RA-0116.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7427 Announced Projects - Audit of Defense Contract Management Agency's Information Technology Contracts (Project No. D2017-D000CI-0140.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7438 Audit of Defense Contract Management Agency's Information Technology Contracts (Project No. D2017-D000CI-0140.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7438 Announced Projects - Audit of Small Business Contracting at the Department of the Army (Project No. D2017-D000CF-0118.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7431 Audit of Small Business Contracting at the Department of the Army (Project No. D2017-D000CF-0118.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7431 Announced Projects - Audit of the Accuracy of Data in the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network Informalion Technology Registry (Project No. D2017-D000RD-0134.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7390 Audit of the Accuracy of Data in the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network Informalion Technology Registry (Project No. D2017-D000RD-0134.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7390 Announced Projects - Audit of the Department of the Air Force General Fund Basic Financial Statements for Fiscal Years Ending September 30, 2017, and September 30, 2016 (Project No. D2017-D000FT-0132.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7388 Audit of the Department of the Air Force General Fund Basic Financial Statements for Fiscal Years Ending September 30, 2017, and September 30, 2016 (Project No. D2017-D000FT-0132.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7388 Announced Projects - Audit of the Department of the Air Force Working Capital Fund Basic Financial Statements for Fiscal Years Ending September 30, 2017, and September 30, 2016 (Project No. D2017-D000FT-0133.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7387 Audit of the Department of the Air Force Working Capital Fund Basic Financial Statements for Fiscal Years Ending September 30, 2017, and September 30, 2016 (Project No. D2017-D000FT-0133.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7387 Announced Projects - Audit of the Department of the Army General Fund Basic Financial Statements for Fiscal Years Ending September 30, 2017, and September 30, 2016 (Project No. D2017-D000FI-0131.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7437 Audit of the Department of the Army General Fund Basic Financial Statements for Fiscal Years Ending September 30, 2017, and September 30, 2016 (Project No. D2017-D000FI-0131.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7437 Announced Projects - Audit of the Department of the Army Working Capital Fund Basic Financial Statements for Fiscal Years Ending September 30, 2017, and September 30, 2016 (Project No. D2017-D000FI-0130.000) http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7389 Audit of the Department of the Army Working Capital Fund Basic Financial Statements for Fiscal Years Ending September 30, 2017, and September 30, 2016 (Project No. D2017-D000FI-0130.000) Thu, 01 Jun 2017 04:00:00 GMT http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/projects_detail.cfm?id=7389