(U) Evaluation of DoD Law Enforcement Organizations’ Response to Active Shooter Incidents
(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of DoD Law Enforcement Organizations’ Response to Active Shooter Incidents

August 10, 2022

(U) Objective

(U) The objectives of this evaluation were to determine whether the DoD and its Law Enforcement Organizations (LEOs):

- (U) established effective active shooter incident response policies, plans, and training in accordance with DoD and Military Service requirements; and
- (U) have active shooter incident response policies, plans, and training that include non-first responder LEOs, who are authorized to carry weapons on DoD facilities and installations.

(U) The DoD LEOs are organizations with a law enforcement function. The DoD has multiple LEOs which include the U.S. Army Military Police, Naval Security Forces, Air Force Security Forces, U.S. Marine Corps Military Police, and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency. Each DoD LEO has different roles and responsibilities for responding to active shooter incidents on DoD installations. The DoD LEOs have military police and security force personnel, civilian police officers, security guards, criminal investigators, contract security guards, and other armed personnel to fulfill these roles and responsibilities. More specifically, the Manual for Courts-Martial describes military law enforcement personnel as security police, military police, master at arms personnel, members of the shore patrol, and persons designated by proper authorities to perform military criminal investigation, guard, or police duties, whether subject to the code or not, when the making of an apprehension is in the execution of law enforcement duties.¹

(U) Background

(U) DoD Instruction 6055.17, “DoD Emergency Management Program,” establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for conducting emergency management activities at DoD installations worldwide.² DoDI 6055.17 defines an active shooter threat as a "random or systematic killing in a confined, populated area."³ From 2009 through 2020, 11 active shooter incidents occurred on DoD installations.

(U) Findings

(U) We determined the DoD does not have an overall law enforcement policy covering the DoD LEO response to an active shooter incident, but five existing policies contain some elements that provide active shooter incident response requirements. These elements, although related to emergency management, arming of personnel, lessons learned, incident response plans, and training, only provide minimal active shooter incident response requirements. Due to the lack of an overall active shooter DoD law enforcement policy, the DoD LEOs did not consistently comply with the five existing DoD policies and did not establish consistent policies, plans, or training for responding to an active shooter incident.

(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) officials told us that current DoD policy did not specifically address the distinction between LEO and non-LEO personnel authorities for the use of force during an active shooter incident. The officials also stated that the LEO and non-LEO personnel authorities must be defined in DoD Directive 5210.56 by OUSD(I&S) before a specific DoD active shooter incident response policy can be developed. At the time of this report, OUSD(I&S) was developing policy.


³ (U) Active shooter is a subset of active threat. Active shooter deals primarily with the use of a firearm. Active threat incorporates the use of explosives, knives, and other means of random or systematic killing in a confined, populated area.
(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of DoD Law Enforcement Organizations’ Response to Active Shooter Incidents

(U) Findings (cont’d)

(U) As a result, the Military Services, installation LEOs, and Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations (DCIOs) may respond inconsistently to an active shooter incident. The lack of a DoD LE active shooter incident response policy may result in a delayed and uncoordinated response that could increase casualties during an active shooter incident on DoD facilities and installations.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy review, validate, and publish the law enforcement lessons learned from the active shooter incidents at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, and Naval Air Station Pensacola into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, as required by DoD Instruction 0-2000.16, Volume 1, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25G.

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security update DoD Directive 5210.56, or other appropriate policy, to include and standardize active shooter incident response procedures and planning, equipment, and training requirements for all Department and Service LEOs.

(U) We recommend that the Director of Security Forces, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, develop and provide active shooter specific incident response training at its basic military law enforcement academy at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas, as required by DoD Instruction 5525.15 and by the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission Guideline #1.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Secretary of the Navy did not respond to the recommendation in the report to review, validate, and publish the law enforcement lessons learned from the active shooter incidents; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request that the Secretary of the Navy provide comments on the final report.

(U) The Acting Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, agreed with some of the recommendations to update DoD Directive 5210.56, or another appropriate policy, to include and standardize active shooter incident response procedures and planning, equipment, and training requirements for all Department and Service LEOs. He described specific actions OUSD(I&S) would take to implement those recommendations. We consider these Recommendations for OUSD(I&S) resolved, but open.

(U) Additionally, the Acting Director partially agreed with other recommendations to update DoD Directive 5210.56, or another appropriate policy, to include and standardize active shooter incident response procedures and planning, equipment, and training requirements for all Department and Service LEOs. The Acting Director provided several reasons for partially agreeing with the recommendations and provided actions OUSD(I&S) would take to implement the parts of the recommendations where he agreed. However, the actions described by the Acting Director did not fully address the intent of these recommendations. As a result, these recommendations for OUSD(I&S) are unresolved. We request additional comments on the actions OUSD(I&S) will take to identify and update the appropriate DoD-level policies to address the specifics of the recommendations.
(U) Comments (cont’d)

(U) The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection responding for the Director of Security Forces, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, agreed with the recommendation to provide active shooter incident response training. The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff described specific actions the Air Force took to implement the recommendation. We consider the recommendation for the Air Force resolved and closed.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.
## (U) Recommendations Table

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Recommendations Unresolved</th>
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<td>2.d, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g, 2.h</td>
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<td>Director of Security Forces, Headquarters U.S. Air Force</td>
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</tbody>
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(U) Please provide Management Comments by September 9, 2022.

(U) **Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

- **(U) Closed** – DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
August 10, 2022

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

(U) SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of DoD Law Enforcement Organizations’ Response to Active Shooter Incidents (Report No. DODIG-2022-115)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management’s comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because Agency Responding Officials did not fully address the recommendations presented in the report.

(U) Therefore, as discussed in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until an agreement is reached on the actions that you will take to address the recommendations, and you have submitted adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions are completed.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, within 30 days, please provide us your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response in a PDF file to [redacted].

(U) If you have any questions, please contact [redacted].

Randolph R. Stone
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Space, Intelligence, Engineering, and Oversight
cc:

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION & SUSTAINMENT
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) DEPUTY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS
DEPUTY COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS
COMMANDER, NAVY INSTALLATIONS COMMAND
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
DIRECTOR, NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR, ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION
DIRECTOR OF SECURITY FORCES, HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE
COMMANDER, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
DIRECTOR, PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objectives of this evaluation were to determine whether the Department of Defense (DoD) and its Law Enforcement Organizations (LEOs):

- (U) established effective active shooter incident response policies, plans, and training in accordance with DoD and Military Service requirements; and
- (U) have active shooter incident response policies, plans, and training that include non-first responder LEOs, who are authorized to carry weapons on DoD facilities and installations.

(U) Background

(U) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6055.17, establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for conducting emergency management activities at DoD installations worldwide. DoDI 6055.17 defines an active shooter as the “random or systematic killing in a confined, populated area.” This definition is similar to definitions used by other national law enforcement (LE) departments and organizations. For example, in a July 2021 report, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines an active shooter as “one or more individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area.” According to the FBI report, this definition implies the shooter’s use of a firearm; furthermore, “the active aspect of the definition inherently implies the ongoing nature of an incident, and thus the potential for the response to affect the outcome.” Additionally, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Active Shooter Model Policy,” defines an active shooter as “an incident in which one or more armed persons have used, or are reasonably likely to use, deadly force in an ongoing manner, and where persons have been injured, killed, or are under imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm by such persons.”

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5 (U) Active shooter is a subset of active threat. Active shooter deals primarily with the use of a firearm. Active threat incorporates the use of explosives, knives, and other means of random or systematic killing in a defined, populated area.
(U) **Active Shooter Incidents at DoD Installations and Facilities**

(U) From 2009 through 2020, 11 active shooter incidents occurred on DoD installations. The installations and year of the incident include:

- (U) The U.S. Army Recruiting Station, North Little Rock, Arkansas, 2009;
- (U) Fort Hood, Texas, 2009;
- (U) The Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia, 2010;
- (U) Fort Bliss, Texas, 2010;
- (U) Fort Hood, Texas, 2014;
- (U) The Armed Forces Career Center, and the Navy and Marine Reserve Center, Chattanooga, Tennessee, 2015;
- (U) Joint Base (JB) Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, 2019;
- (U) Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, Florida, 2019;
- (U) NAS Corpus Christi, Texas, 2020; and

(U) **DoD Law Enforcement Organizations’ Roles and Responsibilities for Responding to an Active Shooter Incident**

(U) The DoD LEOs are organizations with a law enforcement function. The DoD has multiple LEOs which include the U.S. Army Military Police, Naval Security Forces, Air Force Security Forces, U.S. Marine Corps Military Police, and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency. Each DoD LEO has different roles and responsibilities for responding to active shooter incidents on DoD installations. The DoD LEOs have military police and security force personnel, civilian police officers, security guards, criminal investigators, contract security guards, and other armed personnel to fulfill these roles and responsibilities. More specifically, the Manual for Courts-Martial describes military law enforcement personnel as security police, military police, master at arms personnel, members of the shore patrol, and persons designated by proper authorities to perform military criminal investigation, guard, or police duties, whether subject to the code or not, when the making of an apprehension is in the execution of law enforcement duties.

Additionally, while conducting law enforcement and security operations, these personnel serve in military uniform, civilian LE uniforms, security guard uniforms, or civilian plain clothes.

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8 (U) These active shooter incidents are further detailed in Appendix B.
(U) DoD Directive 5210.56

(U) DoD Directive (DoDD) 5210.56 establishes policy, defines standards and assigns responsibilities for arming DoD personnel, carrying firearms for personal protection when related to the performance of official duties, and the use of force by DoD personnel performing security and protection, law and order, investigative, or counterintelligence duties. The directive also provides requirements, authorizations, and restrictions for carrying firearms and the use of force allowed to enforce laws and protect DoD installations, property, and personnel.

(U) DoD Instruction 5525.15

(U) DoDI 5525.15 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for DoD military and civilian LE standards and training. Additionally, the instruction establishes the DoD Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission, which provides DoD-wide LE requirements and identifies LE training standards for certifying LEO personnel in the DoD. DoDI 5525.15 states the minimum required LE training standards are contained in the POST Commission Guideline #1, “Law Enforcement Officer Training Standards,” which requires DoD military police and DoD civilian police to receive active shooter incident response training. The instruction defines active shooter training as “(t)raining to respond to and neutralize an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined or other populated area.”

(U) DoD Instruction 6055.17

(U) DoDI 6055.17 provides requirements for installation support agreements with local organizations, when necessary. The instruction applies to DoD organizations and is not specific to DoD LEOs or to the response to an active shooter incident. DoDI 6055.17 identifies an active shooter incident as a threat category of terrorism. Any DoD installation support agreements established with non-DoD organizations responding to an active shooter incident are required to follow the requirements in DoDI 6055.17.

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12 (U) There are four POST Commission Guidelines identified in DoDI 5525.15. POST Commission Guideline #1, “Law Enforcement Officer Training Standards,” Undated, is the only guideline that pertains to active shooter incident response training standards.
13 (U) Support agreements include Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA) or other support agreements written as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), inter-Service support agreement, or support contracts as necessary to support the installation.
(U) **DoD Instruction O-2000.16, Volume 1**

The policy includes under the program content of The instruction addresses the use of the DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, also addresses

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(\textit{U}) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25G**

(\textit{U}) CJCSI 3150.25G establishes policy, requirements, and responsibilities for "gathering, developing, and disseminating joint lessons learned for the armed forces."\textsuperscript{15} The instruction defines lessons as "validated observation(s) that summarize a capability, process, or procedure, to be sustained, disseminated, and replicated (best practice); or that identifies a capability shortfall requiring corrective action (issue)." CJCSI 3150.25G further defines lesson learned as a "resolved issue or best practice that improves operations or activities and results in an internalized change to capability, process, or procedure." The instruction requires the Military Services to implement a lessons learned program and provides requirements for other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DoD organizations that elect to participate in the JLLP.


\textsuperscript{15} (\textit{U}) CJCSI 3150.25G, "Joint Lessons Learned Program," January 31, 2018. CJCSI 3150.25G defines armed forces as "a term used to denote collectively all components of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard (when mobilized under title 10, U.S. Code, to augment the Navy)."
(U) Finding

(U) The DoD Does Not Have Overall Law Enforcement Policy for Responding to an Active Shooter Incident

(U) The DoD does not have an overall law enforcement policy covering the DoD LE response to an active shooter incident, but five existing policies contain some elements that provide active shooter incident response requirements. These elements, although related to emergency management, arming of personnel, lessons learned, incident response plans, and training, only provide minimal active shooter incident response requirements. Due to the lack of an overall active shooter DoD law enforcement policy, the DoD LEOs did not consistently comply with the five existing DoD policies and did not establish consistent policies, plans, or training for responding to an active shooter incident.

(U) OUSD(I&S) officials told us that current DoD policy did not specifically address the distinction between LEO nor non-LEO personnel authorities for the use of force during an active shooter incident. The officials also stated that the LEO and non-LEO personnel authorities must be distinguished in DoDD 5210.56 by OUSD(I&S) before a specific DoD active shooter incident response policy can be developed. At the time of this report, the development of policy by OUSD(I&S) to establish LEO authorities was ongoing.

(U) As a result of the lack of an overall DoD law enforcement active shooter incident response policy, the DoD, Military Services, installation LEOs, and Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations (DCIOs) may respond inconsistently to an active shooter incident. Consequently, this may lead to a delayed and uncoordinated DoD LEO response to an active shooter incident that could increase casualties on DoD facilities and installations.

(U) The DoD Does Not Have Overall Law Enforcement Policy for Responding to an Active Shooter Incident

(U) The DoD does not have an overall law enforcement policy covering the DoD LE response to an active shooter incident, but five existing policies contain some elements that provide active shooter incident response requirements. These elements, although related to emergency management, arming of personnel, lessons learned, incident response plans, and training, only provide minimal active shooter incident response requirements.
Finding

(U) Due to the lack of an overall active shooter DoD law enforcement policy, the DoD LEOs did not consistently comply with the five existing DoD policies and did not establish consistent policies, plans, or training for responding to an active shooter incident. We found that the DoD LEOs did not comply with DoDI 6055.17 for reviewing or exercising installation support agreements with local LEOs assisting in the response to an active shooter incident. Additionally, we found that the law enforcement lessons learned from active shooter incidents were not submitted into JLLIS as required by DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, and CJCSI 3150.25G.

(CU) Furthermore, the DoD LEOs and DCIOs did not establish consistent policies related to breaching equipment to access secure installation facilities, mutual aid agreements, the use of JLLIS, and the response to an active shooter incident by armed non-first responder LEO personnel. We found that the DoD does not address breaching equipment in DoD policies, resulting in inconsistent policies on breaching equipment by the DoD LEOs. The DoD provides general requirements for breaching equipment within DoDI 6055.17 and DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, but the policies are not consistent among installations.

(CU) Additionally, DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, and CJCSI 3150.25G requires that installation LEO policies be consistent in either the direction or use of the JLLIS. However, we found that the DoD LEO policies were not consistent in either the direction or use of the JLLIS. Furthermore, DoD LEO and DCIO policies did not consistently address the roles, responsibilities, and actions to be taken by DCIO personnel. Instead, we found that DCIO personnel follow requirements in DoDD 5210.56, which provides general use of force requirements applicable to other emergency response incidents, and is not specific to active shooter incidents.

(CU) Furthermore, we found inconsistent installation-level incident response plans related to the role of DCIO personnel, and requirements specific to the response to an active shooter incident. DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, provides policy applicable to installation LEO active shooter incident response plans at five installations and found that the plans did not identify the responsibilities and actions to be taken by DCIO personnel, who may be present or arrive, during an active shooter incident.

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We also found that the LE training academies active shooter incident response training curricula were inconsistent in several areas of content, including breaching equipment, historical active shooter incidents, casualty collection points, and incident command and control. For example, the Navy civilian LEO personnel and FFPA LE personnel receive active shooter incident response training on the at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), while the other LE academies do not provide similar training. We reviewed the training provided to DCIO personnel and found that three of the four DCIOs had active shooter incident response training provided to personnel attending the DCIO academies. Specifically, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), and Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) personnel receive active shooter incident response training during the organization’s basic Criminal Investigator Training Program (CITP) provided by the Department of Homeland Security at FLETC. However, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) personnel do not receive active shooter incident response training during Army CID Basic Criminal Investigator Training.

**Active Shooter Requirements for Law Enforcement Are Minimal and Generic Within Multiple DoD Policies**

We reviewed DoD policies to identify the requirements provided by the DoD for the LE response to an active shooter incident. We found requirements applicable to the LE response to an active shooter incident within DoDD 5210.56, DoDI 6055.17, DoDI 5525.15, DoDI 0-2000.16, Volume 1, and CJCSI 3150.25G. However, the requirements were generally not specific to active shooter incidents. When the policies did address active shooter incidents, they provided minimal and generic requirements that were applicable to general emergency response incidents.

For example, DoDD 5210.56, is applicable to all DoD organizations and is not specific to DoD LEOs, or to the response to active shooter incidents. The directive provides requirements for the arming of any authorized DoD personnel that perform security and protection, law and order, and investigative or counterintelligence duties, but also for personal protection when related to the performance of official duties. The directive provides requirements, authorizations, and the restrictions of DoD personnel carrying firearms and the use of force allowed to enforce the law and protect DoD installations, property, and personnel. For an active shooter incident response, DoDD 5210.56 requires the DoD Component Heads to identify the actions for armed first responder personnel

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16 **(U)** A casualty collection point is a designated location within the incident site where injured victims are consolidated in one place in order to provide more efficient care and rapid extraction to higher levels of care. The movement of wounded victims may be done by LE.

17 **(U)** NCIS, OSI, and DCIS attend the basic Criminal Investigator Training Program (CITP) provided by Department of Homeland Security at the FLETC. Army CID attends its own basic CITP at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
(U) when arriving at an active shooter incident, but does not specify what the actions are to entail. However, DoDD 5210.56 does not require the DoD Component Heads to identify the actions of DCIO personnel responding to an active shooter incident.

(U) DoDI 6055.17 applies to DoD organizations, but is not specific to DoD LEOs or to the response to an active shooter incident, and does not provide additional requirements specific to active shooter incidents. It does identify an active shooter as a threat category under terrorism. The instruction addresses DoD installation support agreements with non-DoD organizations, but does not specifically pertain to an active shooter incident. However, any DoD installation support agreements with non-DoD LEOs developed for responding to an active shooter incident are required to follow the requirements in DoDI 6055.17. The instruction also does not provide a requirement for DoD Component Heads to identify the actions of armed non-first responders such as DCIO personnel in response to an active shooter incident.

(U) DoDI 5525.15 is applicable to the DoD LEOs, but states that it is not applicable to DCIO civilian and military special agents. DoDI 5525.15 establishes the DoD POST Commission, which provides DoD-wide LE requirements and identifies LE training standards for certifying LEO personnel in the DoD. According to DoDI 5525.15, these LE training standards ensure DoD military police and DoD civilian police meet the minimum level of LE proficiency. DoDI 5525.15 states the minimum required LE training standards are contained in the POST Commission Guideline #1, which requires DoD military police and DoD civilian police to receive active shooter incident response training. The version of the POST Commission Guideline #1 applicable during the scope of the project did not detail requirements for active shooter incident response training. However, in April 2022, the POST Commission revised POST Commission Guideline #1, which now details standard active shooter incident response training requirements for DoD LEO personnel.\(^\text{18}\)

Furthermore, DoDI 0-2000.16, Volume 1, states:

(U) CJCSI 3150.25G requires the Military Services to conduct a JLLP and share AT, and therefore active shooter, lessons learned in the JLLIS. However, CJCSI 3150.25G does not require OSD and DoD Component organizations, such as OUSD(I&S) Law Enforcement Directorate and PFPA, to participate in the JLLP.

(U) **DoD Installation Leaders Did Not Comply with Existing Policies**

We determined that DoD installation leaders did not consistently comply with the DoDI 6055.17 requirement for an annual review and the exercise of local installation emergency response support agreements. Further, we determined that DoD installation leaders did not comply with DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, or CJCSI 3150.25G for Therefore, the across the DoD LEOs.

(U) **DoD Installation Leaders Did Not Review or Exercise Installation Support Agreements with Local LEOs Assisting in the Response to an Active Shooter Incident**

DoD installation personnel at the five installations we assessed did not review or exercise local installation emergency response support agreements with local LEOs, as required by DoDI 6055.17. This occurred because the DoD and Military Service policies lack a requirement to track and document when installation support agreements are reviewed and exercised. DoDI 6055.17 directs that support agreements are validated and reviewed annually and that annual reviews of the support agreements will determine if the support agreements are continued, canceled, or revised. The DoD installations we evaluated had support agreements with local LEOs, but did not consistently review and exercise the support agreements.

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20 (U) Support agreements include Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), Memorandums of Agreement (MOA), and Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA).
agreements annually as required by DoDI 6055.17. Between 2017 and 2020, JB Charleston, South Carolina; JB Lewis-McChord, Washington; and NAS Pensacola did not document the annual reviews of these agreements, as required by DoDI 6055.17. Furthermore, we found that JB Charleston, JB Lewis-McChord, JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, NAS Pensacola, and PFPA did not consistently exercise the installation support agreements with LEOs as required by DoDI 6055.17. This is important because DoD installations that do not exercise installation support agreements with local LEOs for an active shooter incident response would not know the roles of all responding LEOs.

Specifically, DoD installation personnel would not know the procedures and methods of all responding LEO personnel as an active shooter incident unfolds, nor if the procedures and methods conflict with the DoD installation LEO’s response. This diversified and joint response may include LEOs responding with patrol officers, Special Weapons and Tactics officers, or other trained personnel with specialized response equipment.

**Finding**

(U) The DoD LEOs Do Not Use the Joint Lessons Learned Information System to Share Law Enforcement Lessons Learned from Active Shooter Incidents

We determined that the Military Services did not share Law Enforcement Lessons Learned from Active Shooter Incidents, as directed by DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, and CJCSI 3150.25G. DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, requires the Military Services to submit lessons learned from Active Shooter Incidents to the Joint Lessons Learned System (JLLIS). We reviewed the JLLIS entries for the active shooter incidents at JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam in 2019, NAS Pensacola in 2019, and NAS Corpus Christi in 2020. The Joint Staff Deputy Chief told us he reviewed the unclassified and classified JLLIS databases and found that the AARs from the active shooter incidents at JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, NAS Corpus Christi, and NAS Pensacola were not documented in JLLIS, as required by CJCSI 3150.25G. He also told us that the only active shooter incident AAR he found in the JLLIS was from the Washington Navy Yard in 2013.

(U) At our request, the Joint Staff Deputy Chief of the JLLP conducted a review of the JLLIS entries for the active shooter incidents at JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam in 2019, NAS Pensacola in 2019, and NAS Corpus Christi in 2020. The Joint Staff Deputy Chief told us he reviewed the unclassified and classified JLLIS databases and found that the AARs from the active shooter incidents at JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, NAS Corpus Christi, and NAS Pensacola were not documented in JLLIS, as required by CJCSI 3150.25G. He also told us that the only active shooter incident AAR he found in the JLLIS was from the Washington Navy Yard in 2013.

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22 (U) See Appendix B for a list of active shooter incidents at DoD installations since 2009; the AAR for the Washington Naval Yard active shooter incident originated from the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
(U) Our interviews of Headquarters Program Managers, Training Academy Managers, Installation LEO leadership, and the Lessons Managers, also revealed that the LE lessons learned from the three active shooter incidents on JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, NAS Pensacola, and NAS Corpus Christi were not shared with other DoD LEOs. For example, the Army and Air Force LEO Headquarters Program Managers told us that they did not receive the AARs from the active shooter incidents from JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, NAS Corpus Christi, and NAS Pensacola. Additionally, we found that the Military Service LEOs were not using JLLIS to document or view LE active shooter incident lessons learned because Military Service LEO personnel were unaware of the requirements in CJCSI 3150.25G. For example, the Army Chief of the Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division and the Navy Security Forces Training Program Manager told us that they were unaware of any policy requirements for JLLIS.

(U) Additionally, we found that active shooter lessons learned are not shared because CJCSI 3150.25G does not require OSD and DoD Component organizations, such as the PFPA, to participate in the JLLP. We found that OUSD(I&S) Law Enforcement Division was not reviewing, and the PFPA were not reviewing or sharing, law enforcement lessons learned in the JLLP. OUSD(I&S) Law Enforcement Division and PFPA law enforcement leadership told us they were not aware of the JLLP, JLLIS, or CJCSI 3150.25G requirements. However, PFPA did not experience an active shooter incident during the period of review for this project; and therefore, did not need to upload an AAR into the JLLIS.

(U) The DoD LEOs and DCIOs Did Not Establish Consistent Active Shooter Incident Response Policies

(U) We found that the DoD LEOs and DCIOs developed inconsistent policies related to active shooter incident response, specifically, about breaching equipment, installation support agreements, the use of JLLIS, and the response to an active shooter incident by DCIO personnel.

(U) The DoD LEOs Did Not Establish Consistent Active Shooter Incident Response Policies for Breaching Equipment

(CUI) We found that DoD-level policies do not address breaching equipment for DoD LEOs, resulting in the DoD LEOs developing their own inconsistent policies on breaching equipment. For example, Air Force Manual 31-201, Volume 4, states breaching equipment availability must be considered and requires training on the equipment. In comparison, the Navy does not have policy relating to first responders breaching equipment. We determined that the inconsistent policies across the DoD LEOs could

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(U) As an example of the importance of having available breaching equipment, in an active shooter incident in 2007 at Virginia Tech, the shooter chained exit doors closed before killing students and faculty. LE first responders initially attempted to breach the doors by shooting them, but were unsuccessful and requested bolt cutters to gain access to the building, which caused a delay in entering the building. Once the building doors were breached, the incident ended within 28 seconds of LE entering the building.

**(U) The DoD LEOs Did Not Establish Consistent Active Shooter Incident Response Policies for Installation Support Agreements**

The DoD provides general requirements for within DoDI 6055.17 and DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, but the policies The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps also have broad, generic policies directing the establishment of installation support agreements with local LEOs, but do not direct that active shooter incident response be included in the installation support agreements. For example, Army Regulation 525-27, states that installations are to establish and maintain support agreements with local, State, and Federal organizations, but does not require the agreements to address active shooter incidents. We determined that across the DoD and the Military Services, these broad, generic policies led to inconsistently developed installation support agreements and the lack of local LEOs support during an active shooter incident.

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(U) **The DoD LEOs Did Not Establish Consistent Active Shooter Incident Response Policies for the Use of JLLIS**

DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, and CJCSI 3150.25G direct that To comply with CJCSI 3150.25G, DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, requires CJCSI 3150.25G also states that the Military Services will provide and maintain JLLP support for inter-Service operability. However, we found that the DoD and Military Service LEO policies were not consistent in either the direction or use of the JLLIS. For instance, Air Force Instruction 31-118, requires Air Force Security Forces to use the JLLIS to enter information related to AARs. However, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps do not have policies requiring the use of JLLIS by their LEOs. The lack of consistent policies requiring the use of JLLIS by the DoD and Military Service LEOs led to LE lessons learned from active shooter incidents not being shared with other DoD LEOs.

(U) **DoD LEO and DCIO Policies Did Not Consistently Address the Roles, Responsibilities, and Actions for DCIO Personnel During an Active Shooter Incident**

While DoD policies did not identify the specific roles and actions for DCIO personnel during an active shooter incident, the DCIO personnel we interviewed told us that they use DoDD 5210.56 as guidance in responding to an active shooter incident. We reviewed DoDD 5210.56 and found that the policy does not provide requirements specific to responding to an active shooter incident for DCIO personnel. We found that DoDD 5210.56 only provides use of force policy that may generally be used during any incident response. Additionally, DoDD 5210.56 did not provide policy on training requirements for... We also found that DoD policies did not identify...

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(U) As a result, the DoD LEOs developed policies that did not consistently address the roles, responsibilities, and actions to be taken by DCIO personnel. This is important because these DCIO personnel may be present at the onset, or arrive during an active shooter incident. We also found that the DCIOs did not consistently develop active shooter incident response policies that address the roles, responsibilities, and actions to be taken by DCIO personnel during an active shooter incident. In instances when the DCIOs did develop policy, it did not consistently align with the DoD LEOs’ policy on the roles, responsibilities, and actions to be taken by DCIO personnel. We found that the inconsistent policies between the DoD LEOs and the DCIOs could lead to confusion of the roles and responsibilities of DCIO personnel responding to an active shooter incident.

(U) For example, while NCIS developed active shooter incident response policy for its armed personnel, NCIS policy was not consistent with Military Service LEO active shooter incident response policies and installation incident response plans. We found that NCIS-3, Chapter 39, indicates NCIS personnel are categorized as first responders and provides details on the actions NCIS personnel are to take during an active shooter incident within the Navy and Marine Corps.\(^{26}\) NCIS-3, Chapter 39, paragraph 39-2.h provides requirements that indicates NCIS personnel may respond to an active shooter incident to reduce casualties and that:

> (U) responding individuals must attempt to notify the dispatcher, the Incident Command Post (ICP), the incident commander (IC), NCIS supervisor, Multiple Threat Alert Center (MTAC) Watch, and other law enforcement officers before entering an active event to mitigate [reduce] casualties, as the response typically involves multiple armed personnel.

(U) The NCIS policy indicates that NCIS personnel may respond from outside an active shooter incident and attempt to help other armed LEO personnel to reduce casualties. However, additional requirements within NCIS 3, Chapter 39, Appendix C, “Active Shooter Event,” provides requirements that NCIS personnel would act to protect and defend themselves and others under the inherent right of self-defense, which we determined would be a response for a non-first responder. Appendix C does not provide guidance for NCIS personnel to respond as a first responder.

(U) A review of Navy and Marine Corps LEO policies for the role of NCIS personnel during an active shooter incident revealed that LEO policies do not identify NCIS personnel as first responders to an active shooter incident, which conflicts with NCIS-3, Chapter 39, paragraph 39-2.h. Specifically, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-07.2.3, Commander, Navy Installations Command, Instruction 5530.1,

Finding

(U) “Commander, Navy Installations Command Ashore Protection Program,” and Marine Corps Order 5580.2B, “Law Enforcement Manual,” state that NCIS is not a first responder and identify military police officers, patrol officers, and command investigators as the first responders.27

(U) Furthermore, we found disagreement between Military Service LEO and NCIS personnel on the roles and responsibilities of NCIS personnel during an active shooter incident. NCIS personnel at various levels told us that they would respond as first responders or provide a tactical response, similar to first responders. However, Navy and Marine Corps LEO personnel told us that NCIS personnel were not first responders and would only respond as investigators.

(U) Installation Active Shooter Incident Response Plans Did Not Address the Roles and Responsibilities of DCIO Personnel

We reviewed installation active shooter incident response plans at the five installations and determined the plans were not consistent. For example, we found that JB Charleston “Integrated Defense Plan 31-1,”28 The Air Force is the lead Military Service at JB Charleston. Both NCIS personnel and OSI personnel are assigned to JB Charleston. During interviews, JB Charleston Air Force Security Forces personnel told us that NCIS and OSI personnel would not be first responders. However, a JB Charleston NCIS special agent told us that NCIS personnel would be first responders. In regard to OSI personnel active shooter responsibilities, the JB Charleston OSI Special Agent-in-Charge told us OSI personnel are not first responders and that OSI personnel would respond after all threats have been mitigated, with the scene secure, before conducting the crime scene investigation.

In another example of the DCIOs’ roles in installation active shooter incident response plans, the JB Lewis-McChord “Joint Base Garrison Operations Plan 20-003,” threat response plan we reviewed


(U) The DoD LEOs and DCIOs Did Not Establish Consistent Active Shooter Incident Response Training at the DoD LE Training Academies

(U) We found the basic LE academies that provide training to the DoD LEO and DCIO personnel do not provide consistent LE active shooter incident response training tactics.\(^{30}\) DoDI 5525.15 requires DoD Component Heads with LEOs to establish guidelines ensuring civilian and military LE officers on military installations receive active shooter incident response training. DoDI 5525.15 also states that the POST Commission Guideline #1 will identify the LE training standards for certifying LEO personnel in the DoD. However, during the period of our review, DoDI 5525.15 and POST Commission Guideline #1 did not set standard requirements in active shooter incident response training curricula across the DoD. Additionally, DoDD 5210.56 does not establish requirements for active shooter incident response training for the DCIO personnel. We found that this lack of requirements led to inconsistent training provided to the DoD LEO and DCIO personnel at the LE academies.

(U) However, in April 2022, the POST Commission revised POST Commission Guideline #1 to include national training standards for active shooter incident response training.\(^{31}\) We determined that the national training standards in POST Commission Guideline #1 provides some consistency for DoD LEO active shooter incident response training curricula across the DoD. However, since DoDI 5525.15 and POST Commission Guideline #1 are not applicable to the DCIOs, an active shooter incident response training standard for the DCIOs should still be included in DoDD 5210.56, or other appropriate DoD policy.

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30 (U) Basic LE academies provide instruction to law enforcement personnel with specific knowledge and skills necessary to perform at the entry level in a law enforcement position.
31 (U) The active shooter national training standards identified in POST Commission Guideline #1 are the Department of Homeland Security – Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency Active Shooter Preparedness | CISA, the International Association of Chief of Police (IACP) Active Shooter (theiacp.org), and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Active Shooter Report (policeforum.org).
(U) **DoD LEOs Did Not Establish Consistent Active Shooter Incident Response Training at the LE Training Academies**

(U) We determined that the DoD did not incorporate a national training standard in its active shooter incident response training policy, which led the DoD LE training academies to provide inconsistent active shooter incident response training to DoD LEO personnel. OUSD(I&S) Law Enforcement Division personnel told us that the DoD POST Commission identified an FBI recommended active shooter incident response national training standard for the DoD LEOs to follow. However, we found that the standard was not referenced in DoDI 5525.15 or POST Commission Guideline #1.

(U) We asked the Military Services and PFPA LE representatives if they were aware of the DoD POST Commission recommended active shooter incident response national training standard for the DoD LEOs. They said they were not aware that the DoD POST Commission recommended a national training standard for active shooter incident response training.

(CU) We reviewed the LE training curricula at eight DoD and Military Services LE training academies for active shooter incident response training and determined that each LE training academy used inconsistent curricula for its LE active shooter incident response courses and did not use the POST Commission previously recommended national training standard. Additionally, we found that the Air Force Military Security Forces Academy does not teach an active shooter specific incident response curriculum, while all of the other DoD LE training academies provide a curriculum for an incident response to an active shooter that teaches varying levels of content. For example, was inconsistent across the LE academies. The Army LE academies for civilian and military LEO personnel teach , but does not teach . The Marine Corps civilian LE academy teaches , but does not teach . Furthermore, at FLETC, the Navy civilian LEO personnel and PFPA LEO personnel receive active shooter incident response training on , while none of the other LE academies provide similar training to DoD LEO personnel.

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32 (U) A national training standard is a set of key concepts, skills, and tactics accepted by certain law enforcement authorities or general consent as a basis of comparison or as an approved model. The DoD LEOs send their military and civilian LEO personnel to separate LE training academies for entry level LE training. For example, the Army civilian and military LEO personnel attend training at separate academies at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The Navy civilian LE personnel attend training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), Glynnco, Georgia, while the Navy military LE personnel attend training at the LE academy at JB San Antonio-Lackland, Texas. The Air Force civilian LE personnel attend training at the Veteran Affairs Law Enforcement Training Center, Little Rock, Arkansas, while the Air Force military LE personnel attend training at the LE academy at JB San Antonio-Lackland. The Marine Corps civilian and military LE personnel attend training at the LE academy at Fort Leonard Wood. Finally, the Pentagon Force Protection Agency LE personnel attend training at the academy at FLETC.
Finding

(U) The DCIOs Did Not Establish Consistent Active Shooter Incident Response Training at the LE Training Academies

(U) We reviewed the LE training curricula at the four DCIO training academies for active shooter incident response training and determined that three of the four DCIOs had active shooter incident response related training provided to its personnel at the DCIO training academies. We reviewed the active shooter incident response training curricula provided to DCIO personnel and determined the training was not consistent in identifying the roles and actions of DCIO personnel.

(U) For example, we reviewed the CITP curriculum provided to NCIS, OSI, and DCIS personnel during their initial LE training at FLETC and found that active shooter incident response training is included in the curriculum. However, CID personnel, who do not attend initial LE training at FLETC, are not provided standardized active shooter incident response training. During an interview, the CID Deputy G2/3 (Intelligence/Operations) told us that CID personnel do not attend an active shooter incident response training course because CID personnel are not first responders and are not called on to respond to the scene until the active shooter incident is concluded. However, the CID Deputy G2/3 told us that CID personnel are authorized to use deadly force to defend themselves and other personnel during an active shooter incident if the personnel are present at the incident and need to end the threat.

(U) OUSD(I&S) officials told us that current DoD policy did not specifically address the distinction between LEO nor non-LEO personnel authorities for the use of force during an active shooter incident. The officials also stated the LEO and non-LEO personnel authorities must be distinguished in DoDD 5210.56 by OUSD(I&S) before a specific DoD active shooter incident response policy can be developed. At the time of this report, the process of distinguishing LEO and non-LEO personnel authorities by OUSD(I&S) was ongoing.

33 (U) NCIS, OSI, and DCIS attend the basic CITP provided by Department of Homeland Security at the FLETC. Army CID attends its own basic CITP at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

34 (U) According to US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, “Commander and Staff Organization and Operations,” May 2014, G2 represents “Intelligence” and G3 represents “Operations.”
(U) The DoD LEOs’ Response to Active Shooter Incidents Could Result in Increased Casualties

(U) As a result of the DoD’s lack of an overall and comprehensive LE active shooter incident response policy and training, the DoD LEOs and DCIOs may respond inconsistently to an active shooter incident. The lack of an overall LE active shooter incident response policy may result in a delayed and uncoordinated response that could increase casualties during an active shooter incident on DoD facilities and installations. Furthermore, the inconsistent DoD LEO policies, plans, and training, could result in increased casualties during an active shooter incident on DoD facilities and installations.

(U) The DoD LEO Personnel’s Inconsistent Response to an Active Shooter Incident Could Increase Casualties

(U) While current, minimal DoD active shooter incident response policies enable the DoD LEOs to develop tailored active shooter incident response policies, plans, and training, we found this to be ineffective. The DoD policies did not provide the minimal TTPs for DoD first responder LEO personnel responding to an active shooter incident. Without consistent policies, plans, and training requirements across the DoD, a LEO personnel’s response to an active shooter incident could hinder their ability to reduce the threat as they respond inconsistently to the incident.

(U) Due to the minimal and generic active shooter incident response training in DoDI 5525.15, inconsistent active shooter incident response curricula are being taught at the DoD LE academies, which could result in inconsistent responses to an active shooter incident. The JB Charleston Security Forces Manager told us that he was more confident in installation civilian Security Forces personnel than he was with the installation military Security Forces personnel because, in his opinion, the training the military Security Forces personnel were provided was insufficient and not taught to a standard. Additionally, the JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam Security Forces Deputy Security Officer and Security Forces Manager of Operations told us that, in their opinion, the active shooter incident response training for the Navy military Security Forces personnel was not effective and that the training received by the Navy civilian Security Forces personnel was sufficient.

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35 (U) The first responder LEOs we evaluated were the Army Provost Marshal Office, Naval Security Forces, Air Force Security Forces, Marine Corps Provost Marshal Office, and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency.
(U) DCIO Personnel Responding to an Active Shooter Incident May Result in Friendly-Fire LEO Casualties

(U) The DoD LEOs developed independent policies, plans, and training that were not consistent and may result in friendly-fire LEO personnel casualties. The DoD LEOs did not develop active shooter incident response policies, procedures, or training with the DCIOs for the roles and actions to be taken in response to an active shooter incident. DoD policies, such as DoDD 5210.56, [redacted] additionally, DoD and Military Services’ policies do not require installation LEO active shooter incident response plans to incorporate DCIO personnel in a unified response to an active shooter threat. However, we found that three of four DCIOs have policies requiring DCIOs to participate in DoD installation active shooter incident response training exercises.

(U) For example, Army CID Regulation 195-1 requires the [redacted] NCIS-3, Chapter 39, requires NCIS offices to coordinate, train, and exercise with installation law enforcement elements when responding to an active shooter incident. Air Force OSI Manual 71-113-0 states that [redacted] Finally, DCIS Instruction 38 does not address active shooter incident response training exercises.

(U) However, during interviews with installation DCIO personnel and installation LEO leadership, they stated that DCIO personnel did not consistently participate in installation exercises. For example, the JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam Navy Security Forces Manager of Operations told us that NCIS personnel had not participated in an installation exercise in 3 years. Additionally, the JB Charleston Security Forces Training Section Chief stated Security Forces had not conducted any training with the NCIS or OSI installation offices.

(U) Further, installation LEO leaders we spoke with consistently told us that DCIO personnel are not incorporated into active shooter incident response plans for a unified response, because of the complexity and uncertainty of an active shooter incident and to prevent friendly-fire incidents. For example, the PFPA Chief of Police told us that PFPA does not use DCIO personnel during an active shooter incident response to avoid friendly-fire incidents. Additionally, the JB Lewis-McChord Provost Marshal told us that having DCIOs arrive at an active shooter incident could increase friendly-fire incidents.

As a result of the DoD and Military Services having inconsistent active shooter incident response policies, plans, and training requirements for DCIO personnel, confusion exists in the active shooter incident response roles between the DoD LEOs and DCIO personnel. Additionally, we determined that if DCIO personnel do not consistently participate in active shooter incident response training exercises, confusion could occur between first responder and DCIO personnel during an active shooter incident. According to the DoD LEO personnel we interviewed, \[\text{(U) The DoD Installation LEOs May Not Respond Effectively to an Active Shooter Incident When They Do Not Comply with Existing Policies}\]

The DoD LEO response to a DoD installation during an active shooter incident may not be effective if the DoD installation LEOs do not review and exercise installation support agreements, and do not DoDI 6055.17; DoDI 0-2000.16, Volume 1; and CJCSI 3150.25G. This may result in either a delayed response or no response by local civilian LEOs during the critical first few moments of an active shooter incident on a DoD installation. Additionally, lessons learned from active shooter incidents may not be incorporated into DoD and Military Service LEO policies, plans, and training to improve the LEO response to active shooter incidents.

\[\text{(U) The DoD Installation LEOs May Not Receive the Expected Support from Local LEOs During an Active Shooter Incident}\]

DoD installations cannot ensure support agreements with non-DoD LEOs for assistance during an active shooter incident are operationally effective, because DoD installation personnel do not conduct or document reviews of installation support agreements with local LEOs, as required by DoDI 6055.17. Conducting and documenting the reviews of installation support agreements can determine whether the support outlined in the agreements can be met, are effective, or need to be continued, cancelled, or revised. If DoD installation leaders do not exercise the installation support agreements with local non-DoD LEOs for a unified active shooter incident response, confusion can exist between first responder DoD LEO personnel and local non-DoD LEO personnel from off the installation. The confusion during a unified LEO response could include the expected tactical support or the roles and responsibilities of all responding LEO personnel during an active shooter incident and result in delays in stopping the active shooter threat.
Specifically, DoD installation LEOs might not receive expected assistance from local civilian LEOs off the installation during an active shooter incident if all organizations do not identify the emergency assistance needed and train command and control with all organizations expected to respond during an active shooter incident. For example, according to the AAR of the active shooter incident at JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam in 2019, JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam previously established

However,

(U) The DoD LEOs May Not Improve TTPs from Previous DoD Active Shooter Incident Response LE Lessons Learned

(U) Finally, we determined that participation in the JLLP by the Military Service LEOs, and other OSD and DoD LE components, such as OUSD(I&S) Law Enforcement Division and PFPA, even if not required by policy, would ensure that active shooter incident response lessons learned are incorporated into DoD LEO policy, plans, and training. Without this information being entered into the JLLIS, lessons learned from active shooters incidents are not incorporated into the DoD and Military Service LE policies, plans, and training to improve the LE response to active shooter incidents. If the DoD LEO’s response does not continue to evolve and improve its’ TTPs based on DoD LE active shooter incident lessons learned, the DoD LEOs could fail to quickly reduce an active shooter threat and increase casualties.

39 (U) See Appendix B for a summary of the 2009 Fort Hood active shooter incidents.
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1
(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy review, validate, and publish the law enforcement lessons learned from the active shooter incidents at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, and Naval Air Station Pensacola into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, as required by DoD Instruction O-2000.16, Volume 1, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25G.

(U) Management Comments Required
(U) The Secretary of the Navy did not respond to the recommendation in the report; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request that the Secretary of the Navy provide comments on the final report.

(U) Revised Recommendations
(U) As a result of management comments, we revised recommendations 2.a through 2.h to include the option of updating another DoD policy instead of DoD Directive 5210.56.

(U) Recommendation 2
(U) We recommend the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security update DoD Directive 5210.56, or other appropriate DoD policy, to:

   a. (U) Standardize active shooter incident response procedures and planning, equipment, and training requirements for all Department and Service law enforcement organizations.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments
(U) The Acting Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, partially agreed with the recommendation. He stated that strategic, conceptual-level active shooter incident response best practices will be added to an appropriate DoD policy, but that policy might not be DoDD 5210.56. The Acting Director stated DoDD 5210.56 is a public document, and therefore, would not be the appropriate policy to include LE active shooter incident response requirements. Furthermore, he did not agree with including a mandate for DoD-wide policy
(U) standardization at the tactical-level, such as having a standardized requirement for breaching equipment. The Acting Director stated that commanders and directors should have the latitude to tailor their respective active shooter response planning, training, and resourcing requirements based on a variety of factors.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Acting Director partially addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and remains open. We agree with the Acting Director’s response that OUSD(I&S) should include strategic, conceptual-level active shooter incident response policy into an appropriate DoD-level policy, and that the policy does not need to remove a commander’s and director’s latitude to tailor their incident response planning, training, and resourcing requirements. However, we disagree with the Acting Director that establishing and including certain standards for items such as breaching equipment in a DoD-level policy would restrict a commander’s or director’s ability to tailor their respective active shooter response planning, training, and resourcing requirements.

(CUI) The intent of the recommendation for policy on an item such as breaching equipment is not to provide tactical-level requirements, but to provide strategic, conceptual-level requirements for the breaching equipment. Establishing a DoD strategic, conceptual-level policy requirement for immediate access to breaching equipment by DoD installation LEO first responders would ensure that all DoD installation LEO first responders have immediate access to breaching equipment on the installation. Our evaluation found that

Additionally, we determined that

(U) We request that the Acting Director provide additional comments in response to the final report on the actions OUSD(I&S) will take to identify and update the appropriate DoD-level policy to fully address the recommendation.
b. (U) Require all DoD and OSD law enforcement organizations to participate in the Joint Lessons Learned Program, following the requirements established in the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25G.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments

(U) The Acting Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security partially agreed with the recommendation. He stated that the law enforcement and security organizations within the Military Services are currently required to participate in the JLLP, in accordance with CJCSI 3150.25G. The Acting Director further stated that additional policy would not solve non-compliance with the existing policy. Instead of creating additional policy, the Acting Director recommended the DoD OIG hold Components accountable for compliance with the existing policy. Additionally, the Acting Director stated that OUSD(I&S) would investigate the feasibility of directing all DoD LEOs and security organizations to participate in the JLLP.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Acting Director partially addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and remains open. We agree with the Acting Director’s comments that current DoD-level policy exists requiring the Services’ LEOs to participate in the JLLP. However, we disagree with the Acting Director on the need to develop additional DoD-level policy for DoD LEO participation in the JLLP. As noted in this report, while current DoD-level policy addresses the JLLP in CJCSI 3150.25G, we found that most DoD LEO personnel were not aware of the instruction, the JLLP, or the JLLP participation requirements. Additionally, the CJCSI 3150.25G does not require DoD non-Military Service LEOs to participate in the JLLP. This results in limited access for all DoD LEOs to information on how to improve active shooter incident response policies, plans, training, and responses to active shooter incidents on all DoD facilities.

(U) We agree with the Acting Director’s comment that the DoD should hold DoD organizations accountable for following current policies. This report states that the applicable DoD LEOs did not following current policies. We found that the DoD LEOs did not follow the CJCSI 3150.25G requirement to participate in the JLLP because an overall law enforcement policy for the DoD LE response to an active shooter incident does not exist. The intent of this recommendation is to address and correct the cause of this finding, as the DoD LEOs would more likely participate in the JLLP if it is included in an overall law enforcement active
Finding (U) shooter incident response policy. Therefore, we maintain our recommendation that a DoD active shooter policy direct all DoD LEOs to participate in the JLLP and to follow the requirements in CJCSI 3150.25G.

(U) We request that the Acting Director provide additional comments in response to the final report on the actions OUSD(I&S) will take to identify and update the appropriate DoD-level policy to address the specifics of the recommendation.

c. (U) Identify the roles, responsibilities, and actions to be taken by armed non-first responder law enforcement organization personnel during active shooter incidents.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments

(U) The Acting Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security partially agreed with the recommendation. He stated that installation and facility commanders should have the latitude to tailor their respective active shooter response plans according to a variety of factors. The Acting Director also stated that the DoD does not have a centralized management structure over the DoD LE enterprise and that the DoD OIG and OUSD(I&S) split policy responsibilities for aspects of oversight of the DCIOs. Additionally, the Acting Director stated that OUSD(I&S) would direct in an appropriate policy that installation or facility commanders and directors account for non-first responder law enforcement agency personnel assigned to the installation or facility in their active shooter response plans. He further stated that armed non-first responder personnel not assigned to the installation or facility would be handled in accordance with the location’s standard procedures for armed visitors. The Acting Director stated that this action would accomplish the intent of the recommendation, while providing commanders and directors the discretion to account for situational variations between locations.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Acting Director partially addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and remains open. We agree with the Acting Director’s comment that the DoD does not have a centralized management structure over the DoD LE enterprise and that the DoD OIG and OUSD(I&S) split responsibilities for oversight of the DCIOs. We did not mention the DCIO’s in the recommendation because DCIO personnel told us they follow requirements in DoDD 5210.56, which applies to all DoD LEOs, the DCIOs, and other armed non-first responder personnel. If the Acting Director’s proposed actions are
(U) included in a separate law enforcement active shooter incident response policy outside of DoDD 5210.56, then the DoD OIG could assess whether DCIO-specific active shooter incident response policies need to be developed and we would agree that the proposed actions would meet the intent of the recommendation. However, we would not agree with the Acting Director’s proposed actions to account for non-first responder LEO personnel in their active shooter incident response plans if the policy is included in DoDD 5210.56, because it would not fully meet the intent of the recommendation.

(U) We request additional comments from the Acting Director to resolve this recommendation. We request the Acting Director identify whether a separate DoD-level policy, other than DoDD 5210.56, will be updated to direct installation or facility commanders and directors to specifically account for non-first responder law enforcement agency personnel assigned to the installation or facility in their active shooter response plans.

d. (U) Require installation active shooter incident response plans to include the roles and responsibilities of armed non-first responder law enforcement organization personnel, such as the Defense Criminal Investigative Organization personnel.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments

(U) The Acting Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, agreed with the recommendation. He stated that OUSD(I&S) would create or update the appropriate policy, requiring installation active shooter response plans to address the roles and responsibilities of armed non-first responder law enforcement organizations.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Acting Director fully addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close the recommendation after we verify OUSD(I&S) has updated DoDD 5210.56, or other appropriate policy, to address the specifics of the recommendation.
e. (U) Require installation commanders at all military installations initiate, update, validate, and exercise installation support agreements with local law enforcement organizations for the joint response to active shooter incidents on military installations.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments

(U) The Acting Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security partially agreed with the recommendation. He stated that the DoD cannot direct local non-DoD law enforcement agencies to enter into, or take any other action related to, a support agreement with the DoD and that installation commanders cannot take these actions unilaterally. The Acting Director stated that OUSD(I&S) would create an appropriate policy, which would require installation commanders to seek to initiate support agreements, and to update, validate, and exercise the support agreements, where established.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Acting Director fully addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close the recommendation after we verify that OUSD(I&S) has updated DoDD 5210.56, or other appropriate policy, to address the specifics of the recommendation.

f. (U) Require Defense Criminal Investigative Organization personnel participation in active shooter incident response exercises using scenarios where the armed non-first responder law enforcement organization personnel are already at the scene of an active shooter incident.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments

(U) The Acting Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security agreed with the recommendation. He stated that an appropriate policy would require the participation of the DCIO personnel in active shooter incident response exercises where the armed non-first responder law enforcement organization personnel are already at the scene of an active shooter incident.
(U) **Our Response**

(U) Comments from the Acting Director fully addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close the recommendation after we verify that OUSD(I&S) has updated DoDD 5210.56, or other appropriate policy, to address the specifics of the recommendation.

g. **(U) Require installation armed non-first responder law enforcement organization personnel, such as the Defense Criminal Investigative Organization field offices, to develop memorandums of understanding with installation law enforcement organizations, which describe the role and responsibilities of Defense Criminal Investigative Organization personnel during an active shooter incident response.**

(U) **Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments**

(U) The Acting Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security partially agreed with the recommendation. He stated in the majority of active shooter incidents occurring on a DoD installation, the personnel who initially respond to and mitigate the threat are armed security personnel, not law enforcement officers. He further stated that non-first responder law enforcement organizations should enter into memorandums of understanding with installation security organizations. Additionally, he stated OUSD(I&S) will include, in an appropriate policy, the requirement to develop memorandums of understanding between the DoD armed non-first responder law enforcement organization personnel and installation first responder law enforcement organization personnel.

(U) **Our Response**

(U) Comments from the Acting Director fully addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close the recommendation after we verify that OUSD(I&S) has updated DoDD 5210.56, or other appropriate policy, to address the specifics of the recommendation.
h. (U) Require law enforcement active shooter incident response training be provided to Defense Criminal Investigative Organization personnel.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments
(U) The Acting Director for Defense Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security agreed with the recommendation. He stated that OUSD(I&S) will, in an appropriate policy, require active shooter incident response training be provided to DCIO personnel.

(U) Our Response
(U) Comments from the Acting Director fully addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close the recommendation after we verify that OUSD(I&S) has updated DoDD 5210.56, or other appropriate policy, to address the specifics of the recommendation.

(U) Redirected Recommendation
(U) As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 3 to the Director of Security Forces, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, which has the authority to implement the recommendation.

(U) Recommendation 3
(U) We recommend the Director of Security Forces, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, develop and provide active shooter specific incident response training at the basic military law enforcement academy at JB San Antonio-Lackland, as required by DoD Instruction 5525.15 and by the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission Guideline #1.

(U) Director of Security Forces Comments
(U) The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Director of Security Forces, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, agreed with the recommendation. He stated that beginning October 1, 2022, Air Force Security Forces law enforcement training will no longer be conducted at the Security Forces basic military law enforcement academy at JB San Antonio-Lackland. He stated that Air Force Security Forces law enforcement personnel now receive training at the DoD POST Accredited Basic Peace Officer Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the Veterans Affairs Law Enforcement Training Center, Little Rock, Arkansas.
(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff fully address the recommendation. Furthermore, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff took action to implement the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is closed.
(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from October 2020 through June 2022 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) This report was reviewed by the DoD Component(s) associated with this oversight project to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the DoD Component(s) about the CUI treatment of their information. If the DoD Component(s) failed to provide any or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

(U) Scope

(U) We initiated this evaluation to determine the ability of the DoD Law Enforcement Organizations (LEO) to effectively respond to active shooter incidents on DoD installations to minimize casualties, including injuries and loss of life.

(U) We evaluated whether the DoD and its LEOs’ policies, plans, and training for active shooter incidents are in accordance with DoD and Military Service requirements to effectively respond to active shooter incidents on DoD facilities and installations (hereafter referred to as installations). Specifically, we evaluated two military installations that had active shooter incidents, two military installations that did not have active shooter incidents, and the Pentagon Reservation.40

40 (U) The installations evaluated were Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida; Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina; and the Pentagon Reservation, Arlington, Virginia.
(U) We reviewed after action reports (for the two installations that had active shooter incidents) that occurred between 2019 and 2020 to determine the effectiveness of the DoD LEOs’ response. We define the term effectiveness as the ability to stop the threat or reduce casualties.

(U) **Methodology**

(U) We searched the internet for publicly available active shooter incident response information. We downloaded applicable information for active shooter incident response background information.

(U) We identified and non-statistically selected installations for site visits based on a combination of criteria, as explained below.

(U) For evaluating installation LEO active shooter incident response policies, plans, and training, we selected five installation site locations. We selected two installations that had previous active shooter incidents that occurred between 2019 and 2020 and three installations that did not have an active shooter incident.

(U) For the two installations that had active shooter incidents, we selected the two installations with the first two active shooter incidents in the period under review to increase the chances that the After Action Reports (AARs) for the incidents would be completed during this evaluation. The two installations selected were Department of Navy installations at Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola and Joint Base (JB) Pearl Harbor-Hickam. Since one of the two installations chosen with incidents was a joint installation with the Navy as the lead Military Service, we decided to select two joint bases for this evaluation, one that had the Air Force as lead Military Service, and the other with the Army as the lead Military Service. We selected a Continental United States joint base from the east coast (JB Charleston, SC - Air Force) and the west coast (JB Lewis-McChord, WA - Army). For the fifth installation, we selected a DoD non-Military Service location, the Pentagon Reservation, to evaluate the Pentagon Force Protection Agency.

(U) For evaluating initial and advanced LEO active shooter incident response training, we selected all training locations where DoD civilian and military law enforcement personnel attend formal basic law enforcement training. These locations were Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; JB San Antonio-Lackland, Texas; Federal Law Enforcement Training Facility, Glynco, Georgia; and the Veterans Affairs Law Enforcement Training Center Little Rock, Arkansas.

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41 (U) We found that there were only three total active shooter incidents that occurred on DoD installations during this period. All three were on Department of Navy installations at NAS Corpus Christi, Texas; NAS Pensacola, Florida; and JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.
(U) We obtained and reviewed applicable DoD and Military Service policies, and DoD LEO policies on the response to active shooter incidents. We reviewed the active shooter incident response training standards established by the DoD LEOS to determine whether the active shooter incident response training was consistently implemented at the five installations being evaluated.

(U) We obtained and reviewed installation level active shooter incident response plans at the five DoD installations to determine whether the plans were in accordance with DoD and Military Service policies and include civilian LEO responsibilities during an active shooter incident, where necessary. We also determined whether the installation active shooter incident response plans included requirements for LEO non-first responder DoD personnel, such as Defense Criminal Investigative Organization personnel, authorized to carry firearms on installations.

(U) We obtained and reviewed AARs of three active shooter incidents to determine the effectiveness of the DoD installations LEOS’ active shooter incident response policies, plans and training. We determined if these AARs were uploaded into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) as required by CJCSI 3150.25G.

(U) To ensure compliance with DoD and Military Service policies, we obtained and reviewed active shooter incident response exercise inspection reports and training records for the five DoD installations to determine whether installation LEOS conducted active shooter incident response exercises from January 2017 to July 2020. Additionally, we determined whether the DoD and its LEOS have established processes to incorporate the lessons learned and best practices identified during active shooter incident response exercises into its policies, plans, and training.

(U) On completion of the reviews of applicable DoD and Military Service active shooter incident response policies, we conducted virtual site visits to interview the Military Service and LEO headquarters program managers to discuss the results of our active shooter incident response policy reviews. Also, on completion of the reviews of applicable LEO training academy active shooter incident response training curricula, we also conducted virtual site visits to interview training academy staff personnel at locations where DoD and Military Service LEO active shooter incident response training is provided. During these visits, we discussed the methods of developing and providing active shooter incident response training to DoD LEOS. Finally, on completion of the reviews of applicable installation-level active shooter incident response policies, plans, training, and active shooter incident response exercise inspection reports, we conducted virtual site visits to the five installations selected for evaluation to interview installation LEO leaders, supervisors, and first responder personnel. We discussed policies,
(U) plans, training, and other aspects of active shooter incident response during the interviews. Due to coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) travel restrictions, we conducted all site visits virtually, except for the Pentagon Reservation site visit with PFPA personnel since the visit did not require air travel, which was restricted at the time. We followed all DoD COVID-19 protocols.

(U) Finally, we summarized and analyzed the results of our document reviews, document analysis, and interviews in detailed work papers. The work papers identified any gaps or inconsistencies in the DoD LEO response to active shooter incidents and provided a root cause analysis for any findings.

(U) **Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data for this evaluation.

(U) **Prior Coverage**

(U) We searched the websites www.dodig.mil, www.oversight.gov, and www.gao.gov for related coverage from the past five years for the DoD Law Enforcement Organizations’ response to active shooter incidents. We did not find any applicable reports issued during that period from any of the websites.
(U) Appendix B

(U) Prior Active Shooter Incidents on DoD Installations

(U) The following active shooter incidents occurred between June 2009 and December 2020:

1. (U) On June 1, 2009, an active shooter, armed with two rifles and a handgun, opened fire on soldiers outside the U.S. Army Recruiting Center in North Little Rock, Arkansas. The active shooter killed one person and wounded one person.

2. (U) On November 5, 2009, an active shooter, armed with two handguns, opened fire in the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas. The active shooter killed 13 people and wounded 32 people. LE officers apprehended the active shooter.

3. (U) On March 4, 2010, an active shooter, armed with a handgun, shot at Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) police officers as he approached the entrance to the security screening area at the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia. The active shooter wounded two Federal LE officers and Federal LE officers killed the active shooter.

4. (U) On September 20, 2010, an active shooter, armed with a handgun, began shooting in a Fort Bliss, Texas, convenience store. The active shooter killed one person and wounded one person. LE officers killed the active shooter.

5. (U) On September 16, 2013, an active shooter, armed with a shotgun, began shooting inside a building at the Washington Navy Yard in Washington, D.C. He shot a security officer, took the officer’s handgun, and continued shooting with the handgun and shotgun. The active shooter killed 12 people and wounded 7 people, including 2 LE officers. LE officers killed the active shooter.

6. (U) On April 2, 2014, Fort Hood had its second active shooter incident in less than five years. An active shooter, armed with a handgun, began shooting inside an administrative office, moving from one office to another, and then continued firing outside the building. The active shooter killed 3 people and wounded 12 people. The active shooter committed suicide after being confronted by a military LE officer.

7. (U) On July 16, 2015, an active shooter, armed with a rifle, began shooting at the Armed Forces Career Center in Chattanooga, Tennessee. After wounding a U.S. Marine, the shooter drove to the Navy and Marine Reserve Center, Chattanooga, where he killed four Marines, wounded a Navy sailor, and wounded a LE officer. The Navy sailor died a few days later. The active shooter killed five people and wounded two people, including one LE officer. LE officers killed the active shooter.
8. (U) On December 4, 2019, an active shooter, armed with a rifle and a handgun, began shooting co-workers at JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. The active shooter killed two people and wounded one person. The active shooter committed suicide before LE officers arrived.

9. (U) On December 6, 2019, an active shooter, armed with a handgun, began shooting in a training classroom at NAS Pensacola, Florida. The active shooter killed three people and wounded eight people, including two LE officers. LE officers killed the active shooter.

10. (U) On May 21, 2020, an active shooter approached an entrance to NAS Corpus Christi, Texas, in a vehicle. The active shooter shot a Naval Security Forces member and then drove forward in an attempt to enter the installation with their vehicle. The wounded Navy Security Forces officer activated the emergency barriers and disabled the active shooter's vehicle. The active shooter wounded one person. Military LE officers killed the active shooter.

11. (U) On December 14, 2020, an active shooter, armed with a handgun, began shooting at the U.S. Army Recruiting Station in Greensboro, North Carolina. The active shooter incident did not result in casualties. LE officers apprehended the active shooter.
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR SPACE, INTELLIGENCE, ENGINEERING, & OVERSIGHT

SUBJECT: Management Comments on Inspector General Project D2021-DEV0SV-0022.000

On behalf of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, I appreciate your team evaluating the ability of the Department of Defense (DoD) to respond to active shooter incidents on DoD installations. As you note, 11 of these incidents have occurred on DoD installations between June 2009 and December 2020, and we take these events – and the protection of all personnel on DoD installations – very seriously.

The draft report, on which we were asked to provide comments, includes two critical issues to which we object. Throughout the report, the qualifier “law enforcement” (or LE) was used in relation to DoD’s response to these events, and the policies that govern or should govern that response. This qualifier is inaccurate because, in the overwhelming majority of active shooter events occurring on DoD installations, the personnel who initially respond to and mitigate the threat are armed security personnel rather than law enforcement officers.

There are presently six DoD agencies or organizations with statutory law enforcement authority: the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Office of Special Investigations, Army Criminal Investigative Command, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and the National Security Agency Police. Military police have law enforcement authority only over individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) such as uniformed service members. The majority of the active shooter incidents your report identifies were committed by personnel who were not subject to the UCMJ, so military police personnel would be responding in a security, rather than law enforcement, capacity. The report attempts to reconcile this by defining “law enforcement organization (LEO)” to include security personnel (who do not have statutory law enforcement authority), but contradicts itself by stating “DoD LEOs are organizations with a law enforcement function.”

Additionally, although the report makes frequent mention of DoD Directive 5210.56, Arming and the Use of Force, the Director within I&S with cognizance over that issuance did not have the opportunity to contribute to the report and ensure factual accuracy. Other personnel within I&S with whom your office did consult provided inaccurate information regarding I&S’s plans for this issuance and the need for separating this policy into pieces. A Secretary of Defense-directed DoD-wide review of use of force policies identified no need for such a separation, and in fact identified a significant legal basis for continuing to hold all DoD personnel using force in an official capacity to the same court-established high standard.
(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (cont’d)

The attachment contains specific responses for each of the report’s recommendations directed to the USD(I&S). DoD takes the security of our installations, and the protection of the personnel on those installations very seriously.

Attachment: as stated
(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (cont’d)

Attachment

(U) Recommendation 2: We recommend the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security update DoD Directive 5210.56, or other appropriate DoD policy, to:

a. (U) Standardize active shooter incident response procedures and planning, equipment, and training requirements for all Department and Service law enforcement organizations.

Partially agree. Active shooter response procedures should apply to all first responders armed in an official capacity, regardless of their status as law enforcement officers or security personnel. Installation and facility commanders and directors should have the latitude to tailor their respective active shooter response planning, training, and resourcing according to a number of factors including, but not limited to, geography, population density and makeup, installation and local crime statistics (current and historical), classified intelligence or sensitive law enforcement reporting and analysis of credible or imminent threats, building construction, response time, available law enforcement and security resources, mutual aid partner procedures, and jurisdictional issues. Mandates for DoD-wide standardization at the tactical-detail level, such as standardized breaching equipment, are not appropriate. Additionally, as DoD Directive 5210.56 is public (as are most DoD issuances), identifying specific response procedures and plans would provide an adversary with a roadmap to defeat or significantly degrade the response. There are, however, strategic, conceptual-level policy best practices (rather than specific procedures and plans) for active shooter response that USD(I&S) will incorporate into appropriate issuances.

b. (U) Require all DoD and OSD law enforcement organizations to participate in the Joint Lessons Learned Program, following the requirements established in the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25G.

Partially agree. As covered in this report, there is already policy requiring the military services, including the law enforcement and security organizations within those services, to participate in the Joint Lessons Learned Program, as described in CJCSI 3150.25G. Non-compliance with that existing policy will not be solved with more policy. We would welcome efforts by the DoDIG to hold Components accountable for compliance with existing policies to meet the objective of this recommendation. USD(I&S) will also investigate the feasibility of directing, in an appropriate issuance, all DoD law enforcement and security organizations – not only those within a military service and not only those with statutory law enforcement authority – to participate in the Joint Lessons Learned Program, subject to applicable restrictions on such participation by the Program.

c. (U) Identify the roles, responsibilities, and actions to be taken by armed non-first responder law enforcement personnel during active shooter incidents.

Partially agree. Installation and facility commanders and directors should have the latitude to tailor their respective active shooter response planning, training, and resourcing according to a number of factors including, but not limited to, geography, population density and makeup, installation and local crime statistics (current and historical), classified intelligence or sensitive law enforcement reporting and analysis of credible or imminent threats, building construction.
(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (cont’d)

response time, available law enforcement and security resources, mutual aid partner procedures, and jurisdictional issues. A significant contributing factor to this issue, which the report did not mention, is the absence of a centralized DoD management structure over the whole DoD law enforcement enterprise. DoDIG and OUSD(I&S) split policy responsibilities for aspects of oversight of the Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations (DCIOs). However, I&S will direct, in an appropriate issuance, installation and facility commanders and directors to specifically account for non-first responder law enforcement agency personnel assigned to the installation or facility in their active shooter response plans. Such personnel who are not assigned to the installation or facility and are merely visitors will be handled in accordance with the location’s standard procedures for such armed visitors. This accomplishes the intent of the recommendation while leaving commanders and directors the necessary discretion to account for situational variations between locations.

d. (U) Require installation active shooter incident response plans to include the roles and responsibilities of armed non-first responder law enforcement organization personnel, such as the Defense Criminal Investigative Organization personnel.

Agree. I&S will, in the appropriate issuance, require installation active shooter response plans to address this aspect.

e. (U) Require installation commanders at all military installations initiate, update, validate, and exercise installation support agreements with local non-DoD law enforcement agencies for the joint response to active shooter incidents on military installations.

Partially agree. DoD cannot direct local non-DoD law enforcement agencies to enter into, or take any other action related to, a support agreement with DoD, and installation commanders cannot take these actions unilaterally. However, I&S will, in an appropriate issuance, require installation commanders to seek to initiate these agreements, and to update, validate, and exercise them where they have been established.

f. (U) Require Defense Criminal Investigative Organization personnel participation in active shooter incident response exercises using scenarios where the armed non-first responder law enforcement officers are already at the scene of an active shooter incident.

Agree. I&S will require this participation in the appropriate issuance.

g. (U) Require installation armed non-first responder law enforcement agencies, such as the Defense Criminal Investigative Organization field offices, to develop memorandums of understanding with installation law enforcement organizations, which describe the role and responsibilities of Defense Criminal Investigative Organization personnel during an active shooter incident response.

Partially agree. As noted in the cover memo, in the majority of active shooter incidents occurring on a DoD installation, the personnel who initially respond to and mitigate the threat are armed security personnel, not law enforcement officers. Non-first responder law enforcement organizations should enter into memorandums of understanding with installation security.
(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (cont’d)

organizations, not installation law enforcement organizations (which generally do not exist). I&S will require the development of such security organization-related memorandums of understanding in the appropriate issuance.

ii. (U) Require active shooter incident response training be provided to Defense Criminal Investigative Organization personnel.

Agree. I&S will, in an appropriate issuance, require active shooter incident response training be provided to DCIO personnel.
MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: HQ USAF/A4

1000 Air Force Pentagon, RM 4E154
Washington, DC 20330


1. This is the Department of the Air Force Security Forces’ response to the DoD IG Draft Report, “(U) Evaluation of DoD Law Enforcement Organizations’ Response to Active Shooter Incidents (Project No. D2021-DEV0SV-0022.000).” The AF/AFS concurs with recommended edits to the report and welcomes the opportunity to respond and discuss further.

2. The AF/AFS is in coordination with SAF/AFG will provide any required supporting documentation in support of the response below.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The DoD IG recommends that the Commander of the Air Force Security Forces Center develop and provide active shooter specific incident response training at the basic military law enforcement academy, at JB San Antonio - Lackland, as required by DoD Instruction 5525.15 and by the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission Guideline #1.

AIR FORCE RESPONSE: The DAF recommends changing the DoD IG Recommendation #3, to read: “AF/AFS develop and provide active shooter specific incident response training as required by DoD Instruction 5525.15 and by the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission Guideline #1.”

AF/AFS is responsible for establishing training standards for all civilian, enlisted, and officer Security Forces enterprise-wide. This includes ensuring that Active Shooter training is conducted in the manner required per DoD Instruction 5525.15 and by the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission Guideline #1. Beginning 1 October 2022, law enforcement training will no longer be conducted at the Security Forces basic military law enforcement academy at JB San Antonio – Lackland. Department of the Air Force law enforcement personnel are already receiving training at the DoD POST Accredited Basic Peace Officer Course at Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri and the Veterans Affairs Law Enforcement Training Center, Little Rock, Arkansas.

3. The AF/AFS point of contact is [Redacted].
## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Report</td>
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<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Pentagon Force Protection Agency</td>
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