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DoD Needs to Improve Oversight of the Afghan National Police Training/Mentoring and Logistics Support Contract

DODIG-2013-093

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What We Did

We determined whether the Army, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) had adequate oversight processes and procedures for the Afghan National Police (ANP) contract and whether DoD conducted adequate surveillance of the contract, valued at approximately $1.2 billion. This is the second in a series of audits on the ANP contract.

What We Found

DCMA, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and Army officials did not implement adequate oversight of the ANP contract. This occurred because DCMA did not coordinate oversight procedures with program or contracting personnel and did not implement quality assurance requirements that DCMA management considered critical to mission success.

Contracting officer’s representatives (CORs) for the ANP contract did not conduct effective contractor oversight. This occurred because DCMA personnel did not review COR audit checklists, provide CORs feedback on completed audit checklists, or train CORs on oversight responsibilities.

DCMA and International Security Assistance Force Joint Command officials did not perform adequate oversight of fielded mentors for the ANP contract. This occurred because quality assurance representatives (QARs) did not always provide training and followup on audit checklists received from the CORs.

NTM-A/CSTC-A and Red River Army Depot (RRAD) personnel nominated six CORs we interviewed who were not effectively providing oversight of the ANP contract. This occurred because NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel developed a memorandum of agreement with RRAD that did not identify appropriate COR qualifications.As a result, contractor performance at ANP training sites where the six RRAD CORs were appointed was not adequately measured and assessed.

In addition, the Army could not determine whether the contractor fully delivered $439 million in services or provided effective training of the ANP.

What We Recommend

The Commander, DCMA-Afghanistan, should:

  • review the prior lead QAR’s and the prior QAR’s performance and hold them accountable for deficient performance as appropriate;
  • establish a quality control process to verify oversight was performed; and
  • establish a clear reporting strategy for fielded mentor COR oversight.

The contracting officer at Army Contracting Command-Rock Island should coordinate with DCMA to determine whether the oversight strategy was appropriate and implement a strategy to consistently review contractor internal corrective action requests.

The Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan should establish and implement an effective fielded mentor oversight strategy. 

The NTM-A/CSTC-A, Director of Contract Management and Oversight, should rescind the memorandum of agreement with RRAD and nominate CORs who have prior quality assurance experience.

Management Comments and Our Response

Comments from the Inspector General, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, responding for the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan; the Deputy Commanding General, CSTC-A, responding for the NTM-A/CSTC-A, Director of Contract Management and Oversight and the Director of the Training Program Support Office; and the Commander, Army Contracting Command, responding for the Contracting Officer at Army Contracting Command-Rock Island were responsive, and no further comments are required.

The Acting Commander, DCMA-International, responded for the Commander, DCMA-Afghanistan, and agreed with the recommendations to review the performances of the prior lead QAR and the prior QAR, to establish a quality control process to verify required oversight was performed, and to establish a clear reporting strategy for fielded mentor COR oversight. We request additional comments from the Commander, DCMA-Afghanistan on Recommendation B.1 to update the Theater Quality Plan to specify that supporting documentation should be included when an audit cannot performed, and on Recommendation B.2.d regarding how Phase II training will be conducted.

This report is a result of Project No. D2012-D000AS-0137.000.