Report | Feb. 17, 2017

U.S. European Command Needs to Improve Oversight of the Golden Sentry Program (Redacted) DODIG-2017-056

Objective

We determined whether U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) was effectively conducting enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) to ensure that defense articles transferred by the U.S. Government to foreign countries are used in accordance with the transfer agreement terms and conditions.

The DoD’s end-use monitoring (EUM) program is referred to as the Golden Sentry program.  We nonstatistically selected 4 of the 32 countries in the USEUCOM area of responsibility with EEUM-designated defense articles for our audit.  See Appendix A for a discussion of the sample selection.

Finding

USEUCOM was not effectively conducting the Golden Sentry program.  Specifically, the Security Cooperation Organization Golden Sentry Program Managers (SCO PMs) for two out of four countries did not correctly perform oversight duties when conducting EEUM for defense articles, including Javelin Missiles and night vision devices.

The SCO PMs did not correctly perform their oversight duties because:

  • USEUCOM’s Golden Sentry Program Manager (USEUCOM PM) and the Office of Defense Cooperation Support Division focused their oversight only on countries scheduled for Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) or the USEUCOM Office of Inspector General (OIG) inspections and did not ensure SCO PMs for other countries, not facing DSCA or USEUCOM OIG inspections, were complying with Golden Sentry program requirements;
  • the DSCA security checklists and USEUCOM standard operating procedures (SOPs) did not provide the SCO PMs with adequate instructions on how they should verify that the recipient countries were complying with the security checklist requirements; and
  • DSCA officials did not provide the SCO PMs with adequate initial training on the correct use of the security checklists.

Not complying with Golden Sentry program requirements increases the risk that recipient countries could misuse EEUM-designated defense articles in violation of the transfer agreement terms and conditions.  Misuse could compromise the technological advantages and security of the United States and its allies.  Although we did not identify any misuse of these defense articles, their compromise, theft, or misuse could jeopardize the safety and security of DoD personnel, missions, and installations worldwide.

Recommendations We recommend that the Director, USEUCOM, J5/8 – Policy, Strategy, Partnering and Capabilities, develop and implement a plan of action to ensure that USEUCOM is providing adequate oversight for all SCO PMs in the USEUCOM area of responsibility and not just those with upcoming DSCA and USEUCOM OIG inspections.

We also recommend that the Principal Director, Security Assistance and Equipping Directorate, DSCA:

  • update the security checklists to include instructions on when, where, and how the checklists should be used; who should use the checklists; and how that person should verify that the recipient country complied with the security checklist requirements; and
  • update the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies’ Security Cooperation Management Overseas training course to include training that addresses the use of security checklists and demonstrates how to verify the recipient country complied with the security checklist requirements.

We further recommend that the USEUCOM PM update USEUCOM’s SOPs to include standards and expectations on how the SCO PMs should verify that the recipient country complied with the security checklist requirements.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Deputy Commander, USEUCOM, responding for the Director, J5/8 – Policy, Strategy, Partnering and Capabilities, addressed all specifics of the recommendation to develop and implement a plan of action to ensure that USEUCOM is providing adequate oversight for all SCO PMs in the USEUCOM area of responsibility.  Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and will be closed once we verify completion of the proposed plan of action.  The Principal Director, Security Assistance and Equipping Directorate, DSCA, addressed all specifics of the recommendations to update the security checklists and the Security Cooperation Management Overseas training course; therefore, the recommendations are resolved.  We will close the recommendations once we review and analyze the updated EUM policy guidance, Security Cooperation Information Portal instruction, and training course and determine that the updates fully address the use of the security checklists and the verification process.

The Deputy Commander, USEUCOM, responding for the USEUCOM PM, partially addressed the recommendation to update USEUCOM SOPs so that the SOPs provide standards and expectations on how the SCO PMs should verify that the recipient country complied with the security checklist requirements; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved.  The USEUCOM PM should provide comments to the final report describing how he will update USEUCOM’s SOPs so that the SCO PMs have standards and expectations on how to verify that the recipient country complied with the security checklist requirements.  We request that the USEUCOM PM provide comments to the final report by March 17, 2017.