Objective
We determined whether the Army
effectively managed the Paladin Integrated
Management (PIM) program during
the production and deployment phase.
Specifically, we evaluated whether program
officials justified the low-rate initial
production plan and whether test plans and
results adequately prepared the program
for full-rate production. This report is the
first in a series of reports on the Army
PIM program, which includes ammunition
carriers and projectile-firing armored
vehicles, called howitzers, for use in ground
combat. During full-rate production, the
Army will complete PIM vehicle production.
Finding
PIM program officials justified their plan
to produce 133 initial production vehicles.
The plan included 33 test vehicles and
100 production vehicles—the minimum
necessary to maintain the production line
and gradually increase production before
full-rate production. Further, PIM program
officials initiated system fixes to address
seven of the nine performance deficiencies
identified by the test community during
the system development phase. PIM
program officials also updated test plans
to evaluate vehicle performance before
full-rate production. However, Army Fires
Center of Excellence, which developed PIM
program operational requirements, and
PIM program officials continued to address
test community recommendations for
deficiencies in the rate-of-fire requirement and the automatic
fire extinguisher system (AFES). Army officials did not fully
address two test community recommendations because:
- Army Fires Center of Excellence officials were revising the maximum rate‑of‑fire requirement for different firing conditions in the capability production document; and
- PIM program officials were exploring methods to fix the deficiency in the AFES in howitzer crew compartments after initially disagreeing with the test community recommendation.
As a result, Army Fires Center of Excellence and PIM program
officials risk deploying vehicles that do not meet performance
requirements and that could endanger crews. Additionally,
PIM program officials may incur costly vehicle retrofits to
address the deficiency in the AFES if not adequately addressed
before full-rate production.
Recommendations
We recommend the Commander, U.S. Army Fires Center of
Excellence, include a clear maximum rate‑of‑fire requirement
for different firing conditions in the capability production
document before operational testing. We also recommend
the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems,
evaluate and fix the deficiency in the AFES in howitzer crew
compartments before deploying the first vehicles to minimize
fire risk to soldiers and reduce retrofit costs.
Management Comments and
Our Response
The Commander, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, agreed
with the recommendation. The Deputy Program Executive
Officer, Ground Combat Systems, responding for the Program
Executive Officer, disagreed with the recommendation. The
Deputy stated that adding more AFES coverage to the crew compartment will delay fielding—risking soldier safety and decreasing Army capabilities. However, the Deputy
did not support that incorporating additional AFES
coverage would delay fielding the PIM program or how
the delay would impact the mission, readiness, or cost.
Further, the Deputy did not take into account the results
and recommendations of the AFES engineering project
or include a specific timeline for planned corrective
actions. Without addressing the AFES deficiency,
the Army could deploy vehicles that endanger crews.
Therefore, we ask that the Program Executive Officer
fix the AFES deficiency before deploying the first
vehicles. We also request that the Program Executive
Officer provide an action plan and completion dates to
address the results and recommendations of the AFES
engineering project.
This report is a result of Project No. D2016-D000AU-0003.000.