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Evaluation of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency’s Critical Law Enforcement Programs



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The PFPA is a Defense agency that evolved from the General Services Administration’s United States Special Policemen. In 1987, the General Services Administration delegated the protection of the Pentagon to the DoD, and the Defense Protective Service (DPS) was established. The PFPA assumed the functions of the United States Special Policemen. In 2002, the PFPA was established in response to the September 11‚ 2001 terrorist attack against the Pentagon.

The PFPA’s mission is to provide law enforcement services, force protection, counterintelligence‚ antiterrorism‚ protection of high-ranking DoD officials‚ and the defense of the Pentagon’s personnel, facilities, and infrastructure. It employs approximately 1,250 Federal civilian employees, including 794 law enforcement officers and criminal investigators authorized to conduct criminal and administrative investigations. In addition, the PFPA employs approximately 202 contracted security officers authorized to carry firearms at their assigned duty site.

The PFPA Threat Management Directorate (TMD) detects, responds to and assesses threats to the Pentagon, and ensures the PFPA is prepared to provide law enforcement and security services. Within the TMD, the Investigations and Intelligence Division (IID) is primarily responsible for conducting all other PFPA investigations, including criminal investigations. The PFPA Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is under the operational control of the Director, PFPA, and is not a part of the TMD. The OPR is primarily responsible for conducting employee misconduct investigations and special inspections for the Director. The OPR is required to comply with both the PFPA policies and the internal OPR policies.



We found that 100 percent of the 45 closed criminal investigations we evaluated had deficiencies.

For example, we found that the PFPA: (1) did not enter 33 (100 percent) of the 33 subjects identified in 45 criminal investigations into the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) database, (2) did not submit required criminal incident information into the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS) database for 45 (100 percent) of 45 criminal investigations, (3) did not collect and submit fingerprints for 1 (3 percent) of 33 subjects identified in 45 criminal investigations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), (4) did not collect and submit Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) for 3 (7 percent) of 33 subjects identified in 45 criminal investigations, and (5) did not notify the appropriate Defense Criminal Investigative Organization (DCIO) at the onset of investigations, as required, in 5 (11 percent) of the 45 criminal investigations.

We found that PFPA policy did not include a requirement to comply with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5505.18, “Investigation of Adult Sexual Assault in the Department of Defense,” January 25, 2013.

We also found that the PFPA did not fully investigate 2 sexual assault allegations when the PFPA investigators did not conduct critical interviews during 2 (4 percent) out of the 45 criminal investigations. We returned the two closed sexual assault investigations to the PFPA for corrective action.

We also found that the PFPA did not manage its evidence as required by PFPA Pentagon Police Department (PPD) General Order (G.O.) 5016.01, “Evidence Management and Storage Procedures,” April 20, 2005. We found that 55 (13 percent) of the 414 items of evidence we examined had deficiencies. For example, tags were illegible, item descriptions were inaccurate, and the PFPA did not count or weigh controlled substance evidence. We also found that the PFPA did not conduct semiannual evidence inventories as required by PFPA PPD G .O. 5016.01. Additionally, we found that the PFPA used four different evidence-tracking systems, which led to evidence accounting and tracking errors.

Finally, we found that the PFPA complied with applicable DoD and PFPA weapons policy and properly accounted for the weapons in its inventory.




We recommend that the Office of the Chief Management Officer (OCMO) revise DoD Directive (DoDD) 5105.68, “Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA),” December 5, 2013 (Incorporating Change 1, December 6, 2017), to direct the PFPA to comply with the provisions of DoDI 5505.18.1


We recommend that the Director, PFPA:

  • Revise PFPA policies to align with DoDI 5505.18, which requires criminal investigators to receive specialized training before responding to, or acting in a supporting investigative role during investigations of, sexual assault allegations.

  • Direct compliance with DoDI 5505.07, “Titling and Indexing Subjects of Criminal Investigations in the Department of Defense,” January 27, 2012; DoDI 5505.11, “Fingerprint Card and Final Disposition Report Submission Requirements,” July 21, 2014; DoDI 5505.14, “Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Collection Requirements for Criminal Investigations, Law Enforcement, Corrections, and Commanders,” December 22, 2015; and DoDI 7730.47, “Defense Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS),” January 23, 2014, which require collecting and submitting fingerprints and DNA samples, indexing subjects into the DCII, and submitting criminal incident information to DIBRS.

  • Direct the entry of subject and victim data of all prior criminal investigations is entered into the DCII database, criminal incident information is reported into the DIBRS, and fingerprints from subjects of all criminal investigations are collected and submitted.

  • Refer the two sexual assault investigations, case number 15-00628 and case number 2016-0089, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for it to complete the investigative steps not previously conducted.

  • Direct compliance with PFPA PPD G.O. 5016.01 concerning collecting, processing, inventorying, and disposing of evidence.

  • Identify and direct the use of one evidence management system to manage the PFPA Evidence Program.

  • Install a serviceable refrigerator in the evidence room