Feb. 8, 2019

Report of Investigation: Mr. Justin C. Poole Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

On September 21, 2018, the DoD Office of Inspector General received a complaint referred from the National Geospatial‐Intelligence Agency OIG against Mr. Justin C. Poole, NGA Deputy Director. On November 6, 2018, we initiated an investigation into the allegation that Mr. Poole engaged in an inappropriate and unprofessional relationship with a subordinate. We concluded that Mr. Poole engaged in an inappropriate and unprofessional relationship with a subordinate from July 2018 through November 2018.

Sept. 28, 2018

Evaluation of the Space-Based Segment of the U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System

We determined whether the space-based segment of the U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) met DoD requirements to detect, identify, locate, characterize, and report nuclear detonations in the earth's atmosphere and in space.

Aug. 9, 2018

U.S. Africa Command and U.S. European Command Integration of Operational Contract Support (Report No. DODIG-2018-142)

We determined whether U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) adequately integrated operational contract support (OCS) into ongoing operations and operational planning.

Dec. 19, 2017

The National Security Agency Enterprise (DODIG-2018-43)

We determined whether the National Security Agency (NSA) implemented effective security configuration controls and processes to protect its devices, systems, enclaves, and networks from insider and external threats. This report is the second in a series on the implementation of NSA’s initiatives to improve security over its systems, networks, and data. We conducted this audit in response to a congressional requirement.

Nov. 2, 2017

Report of Investigation: Mr. Anthony A. Aldwell Former Senior Executive Service and Mr. Steven L. Schleien Senior Executive Service

We initiated this investigation to address allegations that Mr. Anthony A. Aldwell, then a Senior Executive Service (SES) member serving as the Chief Operating Officer (COO), Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD-Policy), and Mr. Steven L. Schleien, SES, Deputy COO (DCOO), OUSD-Policy: failed to use the required acquisition process to procure tailored training; endorsed the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) application of an individual who was not eligible for the program; and improperly secured salary increases for two IPAs.

June 15, 2017

Control Systems Supporting Tier I Task Critical Assets Lacked Basic Cybersecurity Controls (Report No. DODIG-2017-093)

We determined whether the DoD has implemented cybersecurity controls to protect, detect, counter, and mitigate potential cyber attacks on control systems1 that support DoD critical missions or assets.

April 13, 2016

Report of Investigation: Mr. David M. Bowen Senior Executive Service

We recently completed an investigation to address allegations that Mr. David M. Bowen, Senior Executive Service, while serving as Chief Information Officer, Military Health Systems, TRICARE Management Activity (TMA), provided a contractor preferential treatment in the award of a Federal contract, and improperly accepted gifts in the form of meals from a prohibited source. Such conduct, if substantiated, would violate the Federal Acquisition Regulations ( FAR) and Department of Defense (DOD) 5500.07-R " Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)."

Feb. 17, 2016

Summary of Nuclear Enterprise Weaknesses Identified in DoD OIG Reports Issued from September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015

We reviewed DoD OIG reports issued from September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015, in order to summarize the key observations and recommendations.

Sept. 25, 2015

DoD Cybersecurity Weaknesses as Reported in Audit Reports Issued From August 1, 2014, Through July 31, 2015 (Redacted)

DoD Cybersecurity Weaknesses as Reported in Audit Reports Issued From August 1, 2014, Through July 31, 2015 (Redacted)

Sept. 8, 2015

Audit of the Acquisition of the Long Range Strike-Bomber

The overall objective was to evaluate how management was preparing the Long Range Strike-Bomber program for its next acquisition milestone (Milestone B). Specifically, we determined whether early planning for the system was adequate and if users' requirements were being met.