April 13, 2020

JEDI Cloud Procurement Review and Investigative Report - Fact Book

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General JEDI Cloud Procurement Review and Investigative Report - Fact Book I

April 15, 2019

Evaluation of Intelligence Interrogations Requiring Special Approval (Report No. DODIG-2019-077)

We determined whether the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's, the U.S. Southern Command's, the U.S. Central Command's, and the U.S. Special Operations Command's oversight of intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques adhered to applicable DoD policies and regulations. We did not focus on the Defense Intelligence Agency's role because the Defense Intelligence Agency's responsibility for intelligence interrogations was providing oversight of counterintelligence and human intelligence (Cl/HUM INT) training, not overseeing the performance of combatant command Intelligence interrogations.

March 15, 2019

Report of Investigation: General John E. Hyten U.S. Air Force

The DoD Office of Inspector General initiated an investigation on September 12, 2018 into the allegations that General Hyten: misused military aircraft (MilAir) for personal reasons, allowed his spouse to travel on MilAir for inappropriate reasons, misused his protective service detail (PSD) for personal reasons, and misused his Government cell phone for personal matters.

We did not substantiate allegations that Gen Hyten used MilAir for personal reasons, allowed his spouse to travel on MilAir for inappropriate reasons, used his PSD for personal reasons, or used his Government cell phone for personal matters. Additionally, we did not substantiate allegations that Gen Hyten improperly released classified information.  We also found no evidence to support the complainant’s assertions about Gen Hyten’s emotional state.

Feb. 8, 2019

Report of Investigation: Mr. Justin C. Poole Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

On September 21, 2018, the DoD Office of Inspector General received a complaint referred from the National Geospatial‐Intelligence Agency OIG against Mr. Justin C. Poole, NGA Deputy Director. On November 6, 2018, we initiated an investigation into the allegation that Mr. Poole engaged in an inappropriate and unprofessional relationship with a subordinate. We concluded that Mr. Poole engaged in an inappropriate and unprofessional relationship with a subordinate from July 2018 through November 2018.

Sept. 28, 2018

Evaluation of the Space-Based Segment of the U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System

We determined whether the space-based segment of the U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) met DoD requirements to detect, identify, locate, characterize, and report nuclear detonations in the earth's atmosphere and in space.

Aug. 9, 2018

U.S. Africa Command and U.S. European Command Integration of Operational Contract Support (Report No. DODIG-2018-142)

We determined whether U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) adequately integrated operational contract support (OCS) into ongoing operations and operational planning.

Dec. 19, 2017

The National Security Agency Enterprise (DODIG-2018-43)

We determined whether the National Security Agency (NSA) implemented effective security configuration controls and processes to protect its devices, systems, enclaves, and networks from insider and external threats. This report is the second in a series on the implementation of NSA’s initiatives to improve security over its systems, networks, and data. We conducted this audit in response to a congressional requirement.

Nov. 2, 2017

Report of Investigation: Mr. Anthony A. Aldwell Former Senior Executive Service and Mr. Steven L. Schleien Senior Executive Service

We initiated this investigation to address allegations that Mr. Anthony A. Aldwell, then a Senior Executive Service (SES) member serving as the Chief Operating Officer (COO), Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD-Policy), and Mr. Steven L. Schleien, SES, Deputy COO (DCOO), OUSD-Policy: failed to use the required acquisition process to procure tailored training; endorsed the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) application of an individual who was not eligible for the program; and improperly secured salary increases for two IPAs.

June 15, 2017

Control Systems Supporting Tier I Task Critical Assets Lacked Basic Cybersecurity Controls (Report No. DODIG-2017-093)

We determined whether the DoD has implemented cybersecurity controls to protect, detect, counter, and mitigate potential cyber attacks on control systems1 that support DoD critical missions or assets.

April 13, 2016

Report of Investigation: Mr. David M. Bowen Senior Executive Service

We recently completed an investigation to address allegations that Mr. David M. Bowen, Senior Executive Service, while serving as Chief Information Officer, Military Health Systems, TRICARE Management Activity (TMA), provided a contractor preferential treatment in the award of a Federal contract, and improperly accepted gifts in the form of meals from a prohibited source. Such conduct, if substantiated, would violate the Federal Acquisition Regulations ( FAR) and Department of Defense (DOD) 5500.07-R " Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)."