Aug. 22, 2014

Assessment of DoD Wounded Warrior Matters: Selection and Training of Warrior Transition Unit and Wounded Warrior Battalion Leaders and Cadre

The objective of this assessment was to determine whether the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps had policies and procedures in place to ensure the selection and training of appropriately qualified personnel to fill leadership and cadre positions for Army Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) and Marine Corps Wounded Warrior Battalions (WWBns).

Aug. 18, 2014

Project Announcement: Summary of DoD Office of Inspector General Spare-Parts Pricing and InventoryAudits (Project No. D2014-D000AT-0215.000)

Our audit objective is to provide DoD information on contracting problems with spare-parts pricing and inventory that the DoD Office of Inspector General identified and reported. We will issue a summary report for your information and use. This is report Summary of DoD Office of Inspector General Spare-Parts Inventory Audits: Additional Guidance is Needed DODIG-2015-104. This is also report Summary of DoD Office of Inspector General Spare-Parts Pricing Audits: Additional Guidance is Needed DODIG-2015-103.

Aug. 15, 2014

Project Announcement: Audit of the Army Information Technology Contracts Issued Without Competition (Project No. D2014-D000CG-0214.000)

This audit is the second in a series of audits on Information Technology contracts issued without competition. The first audit, "Audit of DoD Information Technology Contracts Awarded Without Competition" (Project No. D2014-DOOOCG-0171.000), was announced. This is report The Army's Information Technology Contracts Awarded Without Competition Were Generally Justified DODIG-2015-096.

Aug. 14, 2014

Project Announcement: Audit of the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Controls OverContracting (Project No. D2014-D000JB-0213.000)

The audit is being conducted in response to a statutory requirement. Our objective is to detetmine whether the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIRoA) Ministries of Defense. This is report The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Controls Over the ContractManagement Process for U.S. Direct Assistance Need Improvement DODIG-2015-082.

Aug. 13, 2014

Delinquent Medical Service Accounts at Brooke ArmyMedical Center Need Additional Management Oversight

Our objective was to determine whether the Military Services and selected military medical treatment facilities were effectively managing medical service accounts that were more than 180 days delinquent by transferring the debt to the appropriate debt collection agency or actively pursuing collection. This is the first in a series of reports concerning medical service accounts (MSAs). This report provides the results of our review performed at U.S. Army Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC). We reviewed the 25 highest dollar delinquent MSAs valued at $11.0 million.

Aug. 13, 2014

Solicitation, Award, and Management of Two Washington Headquarters Services Multiple-Award Contracts and Task Orders

Our objective was to determine whether Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) contracting officials complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other rules and regulations for the solicitation, award, and management of two multiple-award contracts. We reviewed two WHS multiple-award contracts, each with three contractors, and a total not-to-exceed value of $555 million, and 11 task orders, valued at $164.8 million.

Aug. 13, 2014

Project Announcement: F-35 Engine Quality Assurance Evaluation(Project No. D2014-DTOTAD-0003.000)

The Depatiment of Defense Office oflnspector General (DoDIG) is performing a quality assurance evaluation of the F-35 engine procured by the Depmiment of Defense from Pratt & Whitney.

Aug. 8, 2014

Project Announcement: Audit of Defense Logistics Agency Product Quality Deficiency Report Processing (Project No. D2014-D000AG-0205.000)

Our objective is to determine whether Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) personnel are adequately processing product quality deficiency reports and identifying the root cause of deficiencies in spare-part quality. This will·be the first of a series of audits. This is report Defense Logistics Agency Can Improve Its Product Quality Deficiency Report Processing DODIG-2015-140.

Aug. 5, 2014

Project Announcement: Audit of Chemical and Biological Defense Training for U.S. Forces in Korea (Project No. D2014-D000RF-0204.000)

Our objective is to determine whether forward-deployed forces assigned to U.S. Forces Korea are trained to defend against chemical and biological agents. This is the second in a series of audits on chemical and biological defense preparedness. This is report Chemical and Biological Training for Army and Marine Corps Units in the Republic of Korea Needs Improvement DODIG-2016-050.

July 31, 2014

Audit of the Transfer of DoD Service Treatment Records to the Department of Veterans Affairs

DoD did not consistently transfer timely and complete STRs to the VA. Our results, by Military Department, were as follows: Army – of 96,224 STRs transferred to the VA from January to December 2013, 74,470 (77 percent) were not timely (transferred within 45 business days) and 26,901 (28 percent) were not complete. Air Force – of 45,912 STRs transferred to the VA from January to December 2013, 16,187 (35 percent) were not timely and 5,144 (11 percent) were not complete. Navy – the Navy and Marine Corps did not maintain sufficient data to determine results from January to December 2013. However, data provided for July and August 2013 indicated that of the 3,217 STRs transferred to the VA, 1,479 (46 percent) were not timely. In addition, the Navy did not maintain the data necessary to determine whether the STRs were complete. This occurred because DoD did not provide the Military Departments with clear or comprehensive guidance concerning the STR transfer process, to include the DoD-VA agreed upon procedure for certifying STR completeness. In addition, the Army Reserve and National Guard and the Navy had inefficient procedures in place for transferring STRs. DoD’s failure to consistently make timely and complete STRs available to the VA likely contributed to delays in processing veterans’ benefit claims.