Report | July 31, 2014

The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan



We determined whether DoD properly accounted for Force Provider (FP) equipment in Afghanistan. An FP module is a compilation of components that support 600 personnel.


The Army did not properly account for the 62 FP modules deployed to Afghanistan from 2001 through 2013, valued at approximately $424.57 million. This occurred because the Army did not verify that FP equipment was recorded on the receiving unit’s accountability records and because the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-4 (DA G-4) did not require nonexpendable components to be tracked separately by serial number. As a result, the Army could not hold units responsible for proper use, care, and disposition of equipment deployed to Afghanistan, which included estimated losses of $200 million worth of FP equipment prior to 2010. In addition, the Army did not require item managers to assign accurate and cost-effective accounting requirements codes (ARCs) to FP components. This occurred because DA G-4 published conflicting guidance and did not have a process in place to validate that item managers assigned accurate ARCs to FP equipment. As a result, item managers assigned incorrect ARCs to 17 FP components, valued at $41.96 million, which increased the risk that the equipment would be lost, destroyed, or abandoned in theater.


Among other recommendations, we recommend that DA G-4 identify and account for all nonexpendable FP components by serial number and revise AR 735-5 to ensure items are correctly assigned accounting requirements codes. We also recommend that the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command, establish guidance that lists the responsibilities regarding the accountability of FP equipment and require 401st AFSB to conduct quarterly reconciliations of property books to the equipment that has been deployed into theater.

Management Actions

The Chief of Staff, Regional Command South secured secret- and controlled-inventory items that we identified at Kandahar Air Field and opened an investigation on the abandoned equipment. Additionally, the Chief, DA G-4 Property Accountability Division and Defense Logistics Agency personnel confirmed that they changed 10 of the 17 miscoded ARCs. This effort ensured that the items would be handled in accordance with AR 735-5.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-4 and Commanding General, Army Materiel Command, did not respond to the draft report. Therefore, we request that they provide comments in response to this report.