Objective
The overall objective of this project was to assess U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop the effectiveness of Afghan National Security Forces’ (ANSF’s) policies and procedures for the management and accountability of fuel (Class III [Bulk]) and conventional military ammunition and explosives (Class V). Specifically, this assessment evaluated:
- The train, advise, and assist relationship of U.S. and Coalition forces with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) regarding the development and sufficiency of regulations and procedures for the procurement, receipt, accountability, distribution, and consumption of ammunition and fuel;
- ANSF compliance with published accountability procedures and internal controls for ammunition, explosives, and fuel at national and regional commands;
- ANSF ammunition, explosives, and fuel distribution and accountability systems for significant gaps and vulnerabilities; and
- ANSF storage facilities for ammunition, explosives, and fuel for security gaps and vulnerabilities.
Observations
Coalition force and ANSF leaders recognized that development of policies and procedures for the management and accountability of fuel (Class III [Bulk]) and conventional military ammunition and explosives (Class V) was crucial to long-term ANSF operational success. Coalition force leaders and advisors and ANSF leaders and senior logisticians identified a need for updated policy, procedures, and management controls; improved policy enforcement/implementation; and increased contract oversight.
This report contains 7 observations, resulting in 17 recommendations. We identified key issues regarding the management and accountability of fuel and ammunition by the ANSF in the following four areas:
- Consumption reporting: ANSF units ordered and received fuel and ammunition based on unit allocations instead of operational requirements, and ANSF logisticians generated no demand history to accurately forecast future operational requirements within anticipated budgets.
- Management controls: ANSF Ministries and units had inadequate and underdeveloped control measures for the management and accountability of fuel and ammunition, leading to gaps and vulnerabilities that increased the probability of theft and the diversion of fuel and ammunition.
- Training: Both Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) leadership were not taking full advantage of training opportunities at the ANA Combat Service Support School. They lacked awareness and understanding of the need for formal fuel and ammunition management training.
- Contract oversight: ANSF Ministries were not prepared for effective oversight of the bulk fuel contract to ensure that direct financial contributions from the United States were used for the purchase of fuel in support of legitimate activities and operations.
Recommendations
We recommended that the Deputy Chief of Resources, Resolute Support/Essential Function (EF) 5 Lead advise and assist:
- The MoD Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and ANA logisticians, and the MoI Deputy Minister for Support and ANP logisticians to enforce fuel and ammunition consumption reporting policy to ensure that future commodity orders are based on valid consumption data and operational requirements; and to develop unit logistics operating procedures describing individual responsibilities and tasks for ANSF personnel responsible for the management and accountability of fuel and ammunition.
- The MoD Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the General Staff G4 to require ANA unit logisticians to assume responsibility for the management and accountability of consumption reporting.
We recommended that the Deputy Chief of Resources, Resolute Support/EF 5 Lead, in coordination with Deputy Chief of Staff Security Assistance, Resolute Support/EF 2 Lead, advise and assist:
- The MoD and ANA logisticians to develop controls to ensure ordering, distribution, delivery, receipt, and storage of fuel and ammunition in accordance with established ANA policy; develop a ministerial Internal Control Program to include an Organizational Inspection Program overseeing fuel and ammunition management and accountability; and improve the independence of Ministry and ANA fuel and ammunition oversight teams through representation by personnel outside the ANA Corps’ logistics chain of command.
- The MoI and ANP to approve the updated fuel policy and implement internal controls regarding ordering, distribution, delivery, receipt, and storage of fuel and ammunition; increase the frequency of ANP unit inspection visits by Ministry and ANP fuel and ammunition oversight teams; establish and implement procedures that monitor contractor fuel deliveries; and establish and implement procedures that ensure vendors do not deliver quantities of fuel in excess of unit storage capacity.
We recommended that the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Resolute Support/EF 4 Lead, advise and assist the MoD and ANA Training and Education Command to increase officer, noncommissioned officer, and soldier training through attendance at the ANA Combat Support School, from ANA Training and Education Command-sponsored mobile training teams, or via other decentralized training.
We recommended that the Deputy Chief of Staff Security Assistance, Resolute Support/EF 1 Lead, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, advise and assist with the development of mature MoD and MoI contract oversight capabilities.
Finally, we recommended that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Deputy Chief of Staff Support, Resolute Support/EF 5 Lead, advise and assist the MoD/ANA and MoI/ANP to ensure that internal controls contained in the MoD and MoI Bilateral Commitment Letters are implemented and enforced.