Report | July 6, 2015

Patriot Express Program Could Be More Cost-Effective for Overseas Permanent Change of Stationand Temporary Duty Travel DODIG-2015-143


Objective

The objective of the audit was to determine whether using Patriot Express channels for overseas permanent change of station and temporary duty travel was cost-effective to DoD.

Finding

Although the Patriot Express flights were not always the most economical mode of transportation for DoD personnel traveling overseas, the program is an integral component to support DoD readiness and force protection. In addition, for the five nonstatistically sampled routes we reviewed, DoD did not maximize the use of available seats on Patriot Express flights that U.S. Transportation Command purchased through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program contracts. This occurred because:

  • U.S. Transportation Command personnel did not consider all transportation costs when it evaluated the economic feasibility of Patriot Express channels;
  • passengers did not always take booked Patriot Express flights;
  • U.S. Transportation Command did not have a documented process before June 2014 to forecast future years’  Patriot Express passenger requirements; and
  • some Military Services did not have controls in place to ensure that the transportation office personnel checked Patriot Express availability for passengers traveling overseas.

As a result, DoD did not maximize its return on investment in the Patriot Express Program and overpaid for overseas travel.

Recommendations

Among other recommendations, we recommended that the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command perform transportation feasibility studies on all Patriot Express channels to evaluate the economics of using Patriot Express for permanent change of station and temporary duty travel. We also made recommendations to the Chief of Staff, Army G-4; the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command; the Director, Headquarters Air Force Logistics; and the Director, Marine Corps Logistics Plans, Policy, and Strategic Mobility.

Management Comments and Our Response

Comments from the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, did not address all specifics of Recommendations 1.a, and 1.b. Comments from the Chief of Staff, Army G-4, addressed all specifics of Recommendation 2.a and partially addressed Recommendation 2.b. Comments from the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, and Director, Headquarters Air Force Logistics, addressed all specifics of Recommendations 3.a and 4.a. However, comments from the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, partially addressed Recommendation 3.b.

As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendations 2.c, 3.c, 4.b, and 5 to the Chief of Staff, Army G-4; Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command; Director, Headquarters Air Force Logistics; and Director, Marine Corps Logistics Plans, Policy, and Strategic Mobility. Therefore, we request they provide additional comments on the recommendations by August 5, 2015.

This report is a result of Project No. D2014-D000CJ-0192.000.