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(Redacted) Evaluation of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability DODIG-2017-105

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Background

(U) The Resolute Support Command developed the Ministerial Internal Control Program (MICP) and Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) with the intent to ensure Ministry of Defense TAO capability. The MICP consists of identifying and mapping critical financial and non-financial processes from top to bottom, evaluating key risks to the achievement of critical processes, and developing internal controls to mitigate those risks. The OIP complements the MICP through inspection oversight that includes reviewing and assessing internal controls designed to assure to the Moo leadership that critical processes are in place and working efficiently and effectively. The Resolute Support Command developed a Ministerial Development Plan, which addresses actions and milestones for MICP and OIP to mature the MoD's Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight capability.

(U) Overall Evaluation

(U) We determined that MoD Directors' and Resolute Support advisors' Jack of program emphasis, along with an insufficient level of training for those advising the MoD Directors, delayed progress toward building the internal controls capability of the MoD and its subordinate commands. Resolute Support advisors need to place more emphasis on the MICP advisory efforts at the MoD and its subordinate commands to meet the TAO essential function milestones.

(U) We also determined that the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist efforts to help the MoD develop its OIPs have Jed to a capable oversight capacity, but further development is needed in inspection planning, executing, and reporting. Resolute Support advisors need to focus development in these specific areas.

 

Findings

(U) This report contains five findings:

(U) A. Senior U.S. and Coalition advisors and program managers working with the MoD in Afghanistan have recognized and endorsed the need for more efficient methods to manage information and processes. MoD leaders, working with U.S. and Coalition Advisors and program managers, have started to implement several information-management systems designed to provide system-wide checks and balances to improve MoD transparency, accountability, and oversight of funding, personnel, and equipment.

(U) B. More than a year after the MoD issued a policy requiring the development of a Ministerial Internal Control Program, none of the Ministerial Directorates had submitted complete MICP plans that the General Staff Inspector General (IG) could endorse and send to the Minister of Defense for final approval. This occurred because MoD Directors did not uniformly emphasize the development of MICP plans, and subordinate commanders did not know of their responsibilities to develop plans to implement the MICP. The Resolute Support Essential Function 2 office has primary staff responsibility for development of the MoD Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight capability.

(U) However, Coalition advisors outside of the Essential Function 2 office did not receive MICP training or stated that the training they did receive was insufficient to enable them to train, advise, and assist their counterparts in MICP development. As a result, implementation of the MICP has advise the Minister of Defense and Afghan National Army been delayed and hinders the MoD Directorates and GS organizations in preventing fraud and misuse in the consumption of key resources, money, equipment, and personnel.

 (U) C. The MoD has an IG with oversight authority, but the office of the IG has weaknesses in inspection preparation and in the quality of inspection reports. This occurred because the MoD IG did not adhere to their established inspection standards for report writing, development of recommendations, and follow-up on those recommendations. Furthermore, we found a significant shortage of U.S. and Coalition advisors to train, advise, and assist IGs at the Army Corps and major logistics Commands. Because of the weaknesses in report writing development of recommendations, and follow-up, MoD senior leaders and commanders lacked actionable information for directing the corrective actions necessary to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations.

(U) D. Some Afghan National Army (ANA) Commanders imposed limitations on their IGs' conduct of inspections. These commander-imposed limitations, along with confusion on the part of ANA Staff Judge Advocates and IGs about their roles and responsibilities, limited the ability of the IGs to combat corruption.

 (U) E. The number of U.S. and Coalition personnel assigned to the Resolute Support Directorate of National Logistics was insufficient to train, advise, and assist Afghan National Defense and Security Forces national-logistics institutions to develop the transparency, accountability, and oversight capability at the assigned Directorate of National Logistics locations.

 

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Resolute Support, in coordination with the Commanding General Combined Security Transition Command -Afghanistan, development. As a result, implementation of the MICP has advise the Minister of Defense and Afghan National Army Chief of the General Staff to emphasize the importance of the implementation plan for the Ministerial Internal Control Program and to ensure timely development of these plans (Recommendation B.1).

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Resolute Support in coordination with the Deputy Advisor to the Ministry of Defense, advise the Minister of Defense and the Afghan National Army Chief of the General Staff to update their policies and procedures to ensure that the reports by Afghan National Army Corps Inspectors General about alleged corruption are processed in accordance with Afghan law (Recommendat10n D.3).

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Resolute Support, in coordination with the Chief of Staff, Resolute Support, and Deputy Advisor to the Ministry of Defense:

• Advise the Minister of Defense and Afghan National Army Chief of the General Staff to require Inspectors General to adhere to established Ministry of Defense investigation and inspection standards (Recommendation C.1.a).

• Assist the Minister of Defense to clarify and update policy to eliminate commander-imposed confusion limitations on Inspectors General and clarify roles and responsibilities between Inspectors General, G2 Intelligence, and Staff Judge Advocate personnel (Recommendation D.1.a).

(U) We recommend that the Chief of Staff, Resolute Support, in coordination with the Deputy Advisor to the Ministry of Defense, review and update Essential Function coordination processes to ensure that all Essential Function organizations train, advise, and assist the development of implementation plans for the Ministerial Internal Control Program as a synchronized and integrated effort at the Ministry of Defense, Afghan National Army Corps, and subordinate commands (Recommendation B.2).

(U) We recommend that the Chief of Staff, Resolute Support, in coordination with the Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command -Afghanistan, review the capacity of the Resolute Support Defense National Logistics Directorate to train, advise, and assist the transparency, accountability, and oversight effort at Ministry of Defense national-level logistic institutions to ensure that current Resolute Support advisory staffing the National Logistics Directorate is sufficient to sup development of internal controls (Recommendation E).

(U) We recommend that the Resolute Support Deputy Advisor to the Ministry of Defense, in coordination with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Security Assistance, Resolute Support, and Commanders of the train, Advisee, and Assist Commands, ensure the assignment  of enough U.S. and Coalition IG advisors with the experience and training to train, advise, and assist Ministry of Defense Inspectors General to perform to the required inspection standards for Ministry of Defense Inspectors General (Recommendation C.2).

(U) We recommend that the Resolute Support Deputy Advisor to the Ministry of Defense advise the Minister of Defense, in coordination with the Army Chief of the General Staff, to define clear roles and responsibilities of Corps-level Inspectors General, legal staff, and G2 personnel related to combating corruption (Recommendation D.2).

(U) We recommend that the Director, Essential Function 2, in coordination with the Chief of Staff, Resolute Support, and Deputy Advisor to the Ministry of Defense update the Ministerial Internal Control Program advisory training to ensure that U.S. and Coalition advisors for the Ministry of Defense, Afghan National Army Corps, and subordinate commands can train, advise and assist in the development and implementation of the Ministerial Internal Control Program (Recommendation B.3).

(U) We recommend that Commanders of the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands:

• Advise Afghan National Army and Afghan Air Force Commanders to support and require their Inspectors General to adhere to established Ministry of Defense Inspector General investigation and inspections standards (Recommendation C.1.b).

• Advise Corps Commanders to take action to eliminate obstacles to the ability of Corps Inspectors General to combat corruption (Recommendation D.1.b).

This report is a result of Project No. D2016-D00SPO-0153.000.