Report | Dec. 20, 2019

Audit of Jordan Border Security Program Oversight DODIG-2020-043


Publicly Released: December 23, 2019



The objective of this audit was to determine whether the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) ensured that contractor-provided equipment and training met the requirements for the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP).



DTRA, through the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Program, oversees the implementation of the JBSP. The JBSP is intended to enhance the capability of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to deter, detect, and interdict weapons of mass destruction and related materials crossing its b order. As a critical part of this effort, DTRA is responsible for ensuring that the contractor provides preventive and corrective maintenance, supply acquisition and management support, technical documentation for system architecture design, warranties, and training to the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to achieve self-sustainment of the JBSP, which includes the Jordan Border Security System (JBSS). The J BSS consists of forward-looking infrared cameras, surveillance radars, fencing sensors, and intrusion detection devices.

To achieve the objectives of the JBSP, DTRA issued task orders 0006 and 0012 under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Integrating Contract II. The task orders provide JBSS capabilities along the Jordan-Syria and Jordan-Iraq borders.



DTRA personnel ensured the contractor provided training in the operation, administration, and maintenance of the JBSS, as well as performed maintenance of JBSS equipment to seek to meet the JBSP requirements. Additionally, DTRA personnel ensured the contractor provided equipment that complied with JBSS system requirements before formal acceptance and delivery to JAF.

However, DTRA personnel did not comply with DTRA internal guidance when providing oversight over the contractor performing inspection and inventory of the equipment transferred to JAF under task orders 0006 and 0012. Specifically, DTRA officials did not:

  • oversee the inspection of transferred equipment or properly document JAF’s acceptance of transferred equipment; or
  • request JAF to conduct annual inventories of the transferred equipment.

This occurred because DTRA’s quality assurance surveillance plan lacked specific methods for contracting officer’s representatives to provide effective surveillance over the transfer of equipment. Further, DTRA did not request that JAF conduct annual inventories because DTRA officials stated that it was unreasonable to ask JAF to undertake this effort due to the difficulty of accessing equipment integrated into the system and limited JAF manpower. In addition, DTRA stated that the conditions outlined on the Transfer of Property form are unenforceable because DTRA has no authority to direct a sovereign foreign government to perform the tasks outlined, such as conducting annual inventories.

As a result, DTRA officials did not have an accurate record of the exact type, quantity, or condition of $37 million of the $39.5 million in JBSS equipment that the DoD provided through the contractor to JAF between 2014 and 2019.

Without knowing the exact type, quantity, and condition of the equipment transferred to JAF, DTRA risks not being able to accurately determine whether JAF has sufficient equipment, including spare parts, to maintain full functionality of the JBSS moving forward.


We recommend that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction Contracting Officer update the existing quality assurance surveillance plan with oversight plans for specific methods for the inspection, acceptance, and accountability of the property transferred to the Jordanian Armed Forces, including any remaining transfers in task order 0012.

We also recommend that the Cooperative Threat Reduction Director request the Jordanian Armed Forces to perform a full annual inventory of equipment received to support the Jordan Border Security System during task order 0012. If this request is refused, pursue consultation or negotiation through appropriate channels between the U.S. Government and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan under the terms of the Transfer of Property form. If this condition is ultimately determined to be either unreasonable or unenforceable, remove it from the form for future equipment transfers. In addition, DTRA should conduct a statistically significant sample of task order 0012 equipment to perform a physical inventory.


Management Comments and Our Response

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Director partially agreed with the recommendation to update the QASP. The Director stated that although the QASP for task order 0012 was updated to reflect the oversight the COR exercised for property transfers, DTRA disagreed with the finding that a lack of U.S. Government presence at the time of property transfer precludes DTRA officials from having an accurate knowledge of the equipment transferred. The Director further stated that the JBSP system underwent independent Government testing and evaluation after installation, confirming receipt and installation of the equipment.

Comments from the Director did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. DTRA updated its QASP to include steps the COR should take when performing oversight of equipment transfers to the JAF; however, the updates did not include methods for the inspection, acceptance, and accountability of property transferred to JAF. The QASP references an updated Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate SOP, which includes a revised Transfer of Property form. However, the updated QASP does not include methods for examinations or audits cited in a provision found in the revised ToP form. We will resolve this recommendation once we verify that the QASP includes methods for conducting examinations or audits established by the aforementioned provision.

The Director agreed with the recommendation to conduct a physical inventory of property previously transferred to JAF, stating that the DTRA COR plans to conduct a statistically significant physical inventory of property previously transferred under task order 0012 to the JAF by the summer of 2020. The Director also stated that the physical inventory is subject to JAF approval.

Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but remains open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that DTRA has conducted a statistically significant inventory of property.



This report is the result of Proj. No. D2019-D000RJ-0073.000