Publicly Released: October 4, 2021
The objective of this audit was to determine whether the Military Departments managed selected depot‑level reparables (DLRs), specifically engines, to meet DoD requirements to maintain authorized stock levels and meet program readiness levels. A DLR is an item of supply that is designated for repair at a depot, or an item that is designated for repair below the depot level but cannot be repaired at that level.
The DoD assigns different levels of maintenance to repair parts depending on the skill level, tooling, and facilities needed to execute the repairs. Depot‑level repair is the most sophisticated level of maintenance. Depot‑level repair consists of repairing a major end item, such as an aircraft or a ground vehicle, by performing repairs (when economical) and replacement of parts on the system.
This audit focuses primarily on the depot, and its ability to repair sufficient numbers of engines or engine modules to maintain adequate quantities of these items to ensure that they are available for the weapon systems to meet operational readiness goals.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force did not consistently meet their stocking requirements for the nine engines in our sample.
- The Army maintained sufficient quantities of the T‑55, T700‑GE‑701D, Diesel (M88), and Diesel (M109) engines to meet the stocking requirements. The Army fell short of meeting its stocking requirement for the Diesel–Glow Plug (M113) engine in April 2021, but previously met the stocking requirement in January 2021 and was taking corrective actions related to a defect with a part that caused the shortage.
- The Navy did not maintain sufficient quantities of the T700‑GE‑401C engine to meet the stocking requirements; however, the Navy was in the process of obtaining additional engines from General Electric and had engines installed on aircraft in long‑term storage that were available to supplement stock, if needed.
- The Air Force maintained sufficient quantities of the F108‑100 engine but did not maintain enough supply of the F100‑220 and F100‑229 engines. However, the Air Force accepted the risk in engine stock to focus its limited resources on critical non‑engine‑related problems with the F‑15 and F‑16 aircraft.
In addition, the three organic depots and one contractor depot that repaired the nine selected engines and engine modules did not consistently meet the Military Department’s repair metrics for depot performance; however, the delay in repairing the nine selected engines and engine modules did not negatively impact readiness. Although the Military Departments did not consistently meet their stocking requirements and the depots did not consistently meet the repair metrics for depot performance, the engine impact to weapon system readiness was either insignificant or the Military Departments were taking action to correct the problems.
We are not making any recommendations because although supply levels for selected engines did not always meet required stock levels, and the depots did not always meet their production goals for the period reviewed, the Military Departments had processes in place to identify and correct potential problems. Despite the number of challenges identified in this report, the availability of engines and engine modules did not negatively impact readiness. In addition, the Government Accountability Office made recommendations to the Military Departments addressing both the degraded state of DoD facilities and depot workforce challenges.
This report is a result of Project No. D2020-D000RK-0157.000.