Sept. 15, 2014

Ontic Engineering and Manufacturing Overcharged the Defense Logistics Agency for Sole-Source Spare Parts (Redacted)

Sept. 9, 2014

Military Sealift Command Oversight of Excess Spare-Parts Inventory and Purchases for Sealift Program Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships Needs Improvement

We determined whether the Military Sealift Command (MSC) effectively managed the quantities of spare parts in inventory and procured the spare parts at fair and reasonable prices for the large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships in the Sealift Program. To determine whether MSC procured spare parts at fair and reasonable prices, we focused on price competition, a key control to ensure price reasonableness. We performed this audit in response to a congressional request.

Sept. 8, 2014

Fort Knox and the Army Need To Improve Internal Controls for Utility Energy Services Contracts

Our audit objective was to determine whether the contract and task orders related to the energy program at Fort Knox, Kentucky, were properly awarded and administered. We reviewed 108 task orders, totaling about $270 million, awarded by Fort Knox officials, related to the energy program at Fort Knox.

Sept. 3, 2014

Global Combat Support System-Army Did Not Comply With Treasury and DoD Financial Reporting Requirements

We determined whether the Army fielded the Global Combat Support System–Army (GCSS–Army) with the proper functionality to provide reliable financial information and support audit readiness requirements.

Aug. 29, 2014

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions

Our objective was to determine whether the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI) have controls in place to ensure a transparent and accountable fiscal process for the direct funding provided for the sustainment of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).

Aug. 13, 2014

Solicitation, Award, and Management of Two Washington Headquarters Services Multiple-Award Contracts and Task Orders

Our objective was to determine whether Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) contracting officials complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other rules and regulations for the solicitation, award, and management of two multiple-award contracts. We reviewed two WHS multiple-award contracts, each with three contractors, and a total not-to-exceed value of $555 million, and 11 task orders, valued at $164.8 million.

Aug. 13, 2014

Delinquent Medical Service Accounts at Brooke ArmyMedical Center Need Additional Management Oversight

Our objective was to determine whether the Military Services and selected military medical treatment facilities were effectively managing medical service accounts that were more than 180 days delinquent by transferring the debt to the appropriate debt collection agency or actively pursuing collection. This is the first in a series of reports concerning medical service accounts (MSAs). This report provides the results of our review performed at U.S. Army Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC). We reviewed the 25 highest dollar delinquent MSAs valued at $11.0 million.

July 31, 2014

Audit of the Transfer of DoD Service Treatment Records to the Department of Veterans Affairs

DoD did not consistently transfer timely and complete STRs to the VA. Our results, by Military Department, were as follows: Army – of 96,224 STRs transferred to the VA from January to December 2013, 74,470 (77 percent) were not timely (transferred within 45 business days) and 26,901 (28 percent) were not complete. Air Force – of 45,912 STRs transferred to the VA from January to December 2013, 16,187 (35 percent) were not timely and 5,144 (11 percent) were not complete. Navy – the Navy and Marine Corps did not maintain sufficient data to determine results from January to December 2013. However, data provided for July and August 2013 indicated that of the 3,217 STRs transferred to the VA, 1,479 (46 percent) were not timely. In addition, the Navy did not maintain the data necessary to determine whether the STRs were complete. This occurred because DoD did not provide the Military Departments with clear or comprehensive guidance concerning the STR transfer process, to include the DoD-VA agreed upon procedure for certifying STR completeness. In addition, the Army Reserve and National Guard and the Navy had inefficient procedures in place for transferring STRs. DoD’s failure to consistently make timely and complete STRs available to the VA likely contributed to delays in processing veterans’ benefit claims.

July 31, 2014

The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan

We determined whether DoD properly accounted for Force Provider (FP) equipment in Afghanistan. An FP module is a compilation of components that support 600 personnel.

July 28, 2014

Improvements Needed in Contract Administration of Mi-17 Cockpit Modification Task Order (Redacted)

Our objective was to determine whether DoD officials properly awarded and administered indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract W58RGZ-09-D-0130, Task Order 0102, for the modification of DoD-owned Mi-17 variant aircraft in accordance with Federal and DoD regulations and policies.